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What’s Really Going On:  Process Realism in Science
William Anthony Penn, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2021
I argue for a novel form of scientific realism, called “pure process realism,” that rejects
orthodox ontologies of static objects and structures. The continuity between an experimenter and
experimental systems requires that the processes of intervention and observation are the same
ontic type as the observed and inferred features of experimental systems, on pain of ontological
incoherence.  Therefore, only processes can be inferred to exist within experiments from the
epistemology of experiments alone.  Additionally, every argument for the existence of a static
object or structure within an experiment either fails or fails to rule out that the argument actually
supports inferences to a more fundamental process. Firstly, this is because such arguments are
either fallacious or inconclusive.  Secondly, the history of scientific research, in chemistry and
physics in particular, reveals that for each static object or structure posited in the history of
science, research eventually redescribes it as a system of processes.  For example, the history of
the candle flame, the molecule, and the nucleus are explicit evidence of this conclusion, and
these examples generalize.  By induction, all static objects and structures we could posit are no
more than systems of processes.   Taken together, these arguments show that pure process
realism is superior in scope, strength, and epistemic modesty to orthodox forms of realism in the
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Introduction 
This  work  is  dedicated  to  defending  a  novel  form  of  scientific  realism  that  I  call  pure  
process  realism.   This  realism  commits  us  to  those  aspects  of  our  models  and  theories  that  
represent  subjectless,  non-particular,  dynamically  contextual  activities  like  motions,  excitations,  
decays,  fluctuations,  and  more.   While  the  ontology  of  subjectless,  non-particular,  dynamically  
contextual  activities  is  the  work  of  many  others,  the  justification  I  offer  for  this  ontology  in  the  
context  of  scientific  models,  experiments,  and  theories  is  novel.   In  total,  there  are  five  positive  
arguments  for  process  realism,  intermingled  with  around  three  arguments  against  non-process  or 
mixed  process  forms  of  realism  involving  determinate,  atemporal,  independent,  particular  things 
like  structures,  substances,  particles,  and  (purely  spatial)  states.   
Chapter  1  is  designed  to  show  that,  so  long  as  one  commits  to  the  reality  of  an  observable 
world,  one  must  commit  to  the  reality  of  processes.   This  is  because  our  mere  ability  to  observe  
is  predicated  on  the  existence  of  processes  to  enable  and  ground  these  observations.   Moreover,  
because  of  the  details  of  how  we  observe  and  experiment,  we  can  commit  not  merely  to  vague  
and  undefined  processes,  but  also  to  specific  and  highly  specified  processes  contained  in  our 
scientific  models.   In  brief,  parts  of  our  experiments  will  inherit  processual  features  from  the 
intervention,  preparation,  and  observation  activities  (processes  themselves)  that  we  perform. 
Chapter  2  represents  the  negative  of  chapter  1.   While  we  are  allowed  to  infer  the  
existence  of  processes  on  the  basis  of  experiment  alone,  we  are  not  allowed  to  commit  to  things. 
Supplementing  standard  antirealist  arguments  against  the  theoretical  thing-posits  of  historical  
physics,  like  phlogiston,  the  four  elements,  mysterium,  and  Rutherford  atoms,  I  also  argue  that  
any  inference  to  things  on  the  basis  of  observation  is  dubious.   In  fact,  arguments  for  things  rest  
on  first  inferring  that  there  are  processes,  and  then  further  inferring  that  these  processes  must  
have  subjects,  vehicles,  or  continuants  (depending  on  the  terminology  of  the  relevant  literature). 
These  arguments  that  I  call  “underlier  arguments”  have  existed  since  Aristotle,  taken  many  
forms,  and  all  fail  for  the  same  reason:   they  presuppose  that  stability  entails  staticity,  which  is  
simply  a  false  premise.   In  fact,  recognizing  that  stability  is  a  relative  term  that  depends  on  
1 
  
comparisons  of  processual  entities  allows  us  to  subvert  and  co-opt  underlier  arguments  in  favor  
of  process  realism.   
Chapter  3  is  the  first  of  the  science-in-practice  chapters.   In  it,  I  present  an  extended  
example  of  the  candle  flame  as  described  in  both  historical  and  contemporary  chemistry  and  
physics.   I  show  that  nowhere  in  these  treatments  are  we  meant  to  explain  aspects  of  the  system  
in  terms  of  things,  instead  presenting  a  full  deconstruction  of  thing-terms  into  processes  alone.  
This  chapter,  then,  is  meant  to  display  the  explanatory  defeat  of  things:   all  we  need  for  our  
explanations  in  physics  and  chemistry  are  processes.   
Chapter  4  takes  this  one  step  further.   I  consider  the  famous  argument  from  Perrin  that  
atoms  are  real,  oft  taken  in  the  literature  as  a  triumph  of  thing  realism  in  the  history  of  physics.   I  
show  that  this  is  not  accurate:   a  closer  reading  of  Perrin  shows  that  we  are  meant  to  reject  realist  
claims  about  things  (qua  determinate,  atemporal,  independent,  particular  entities),  even  in  this  
supposed  argument  for  atoms.   Instead,  I  reinterpret  Perrin  as  offering  a  robustness  argument  for  
processes,  or  rather,  for  a  specific  quantifiable  aspect  of  thermal  and  statistical  processes  like  
Brownian  motion.   Namely,  I  argue  that  Perrin  is  presenting  evidence  that  thermal  and  statistical  
processes,  especially  processes  of  dispersion,  can  be  quantified  such  that  they  achieve  
equilibrium  when  these  dispersion  processes  all  achieve  the  same  characteristic  energy.   
Chapter  5  is  the  final  science-in-practice  chapter.   In  it,  I  present  the  example  of  nuclear  
models,  incompatible  on  thing-interpretations,  and  show  that  they  are  compatible  in  pure  process  
interpretations.   This  argument  acts  as  evidence  that  thing  realism  is  not  only  historically  
inadequate,  it  is  also  insufficient.   Process  realism,  in  contrast,  provides  good  accounts  of  both  
the  history  and  practice  of  science  that  solves  some  of  the  problems  produced  by  the  uncritical  
commitment  to  thing  ontologies.  
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[1.1]:   Introduction  
  
  
Many  attempts  to  justify  realism  look  to  the  features  and  relations  of  our  models  and  
theories  in  order  to  find  realist  posits  and  claims. 1    I  propose  something  else:   since  we  know  that  
our  models  must  be  empirically  adequate,  i.e.,  pragmatically  describe  and/or  enable  some  class  
of  physical  experiments,  we  should  instead  look  to  the  features  of  experiments  to  see  how  realist  
claims  can  be  justified.   If  there  is  some  form  of  realism  that  can  produce  realist  claims  as  a  
result  of  taking  seriously  that  models  essentially  describe  experiments,  then  we  will  have  
produced  a  realism  that  is  more  robust  against  the  standard  arguments  of  the  antirealist.   
This  chapter  centers  on  a  single  argument  at  three  levels  of  complexity  for  what  I  call  
pure  process  realism.   I  argue  that  processes—general,  non-particular,  subjectless  activities  like  
motions,  interactions,  fluctuations  and  the  like 2 —are  necessary  parts  of  any  and  all  scientific  
ontologies.   This  is  because  observations,  and  therefore  experiments,  are  physically  impossible  
without  the  existence  of  real  processes,  as  I  will  show.   In  every  experiment,  something  happens  
or  occurs, 3   and  we  respond  to  it  dynamically.   In  this  manner,  I  argue  that  the  plethora  of  new  
work  in  philosophy  of  science  to  justify  processual  or  process-adjacent  interpretations  of  various  
models 4   can  be  grounded  in  a  general  argument  for  the  strength  of  process  ontology  within  
scientific  theory  and  modeling.   I  call  this  argument  the  continuity  argument.   
1  General  arguments  to  this  effect  are  found  in,  e.g.,  Chakravartty  (2007),  Psillos  (1999),  Smart  (1963)  (these  argue  
that  models  and  theories  give  knowledge  of  features  of  the  world),  or  in  van  Fraassen  (1980)  (who  argues  that  
models  aim  to  give  true  descriptions  of  the  world).   Specific  arguments  for  various  types  of  realism  will  be  discussed  
later,  where  relevant.   
2  The  specifics  are  discussed  in  section  2.   I  draw  my  applied  ontology  from  primarily  Rescher  (1996,  2000)  and  
Seibt  (1996a,  b,  c,  2004,  2007,  2008,  2010).   
3  Borrowing  the  language  of  occurrents  (processes  and  events)  vs  continuants  (things  and  structures  and  states)  from  
Johnson  (1921).   
4  For  a  sample  from  across  the  sciences,  see  Barwich  (2018);  Chen  (2018);  Dupré  (2014,  2018);  Earley  (2008a,  b,  c,  
2012,  2016);  Ferner  and  Pradeu  (2017);  Finkelstein  (1996,  2008);  Guay  and  Pradeu  (2015);  Hartman  (2005);  
Jungerman(  2008);  Kaiser  (2018);  Malin  (2008);  Meincke  (2018a,  b);  Pemberton  (2018);  Pradeu  (2018);  Riffert  
(2008);  Stapp  (2008);  Tanaka  (2008).   Of  these  authors,  Joseph  Earley,  John  Dupré,  David  Finkelstein,  Marie  Kaiser,  
and  Ann  Sophie  Meincke  are  perhaps  most  representative  of  explicit  moves  toward  strictly  process  ontologies  
within  science,  while  the  others  tend  to  offer  arguments  that  are  process-ontology-adjacent  or  suggestive.   
3  
  
The  continuity  argument  is  most  basically  the  following:  
  
(P1)  All  experiments/observations  are  event-wholes  
(P2)  All  experiments/observations  contain  at  least  one  processual  part:   the  act  of  observing.   
(P3)  The  act  of  observing  cannot  count  as  an  observation  of  an  external  world  unless  this  act  is  
the  dynamic  response  to  something  in  the  world  (condition  of  continuity).  
(C1)  Therefore,  the  portion  of  an  experiment/observation  that  is  not  the  act  of  observation  itself  
must  at  least  be  actively  dynamically  potent,  i.e.,  have  a  processual  element.   
(C2)  Therefore  we  know  that  there  are  processes  in  the  world:   the  act  of  observing  the  world  and  
the  dynamics  in  the  world  that  enable  this  act.   
  
In  what  follows,  I  will  take  this  basic  formulation  and  show  how  it  can  be  fully  justified  and  
made  more  precise.   Of  particular  import  will  be  the  precisification  of  premise  (P3),  the  
condition  of  continuity.   The  successive  precisification  of  this  argument  will  produce  three  
different  arguments  that  represent  three  corresponding  levels  of  commitment  to  real  processes:  
(1)  commitment  to  some  process,  (2)  commitment  to  some  process  in  the  world,  and  (3)  
commitment  to  some  process  that  can  be  described  and  codified  in  models  and  theories  of  
worldly  systems.   
I  begin  the  chapter  with  a  brief  introduction  to  process  ontology,  its  history,  and  the  
relevant  features  of  the  ontological  category  “process”  that  I  will  be  making  use  of  (§2).   My  aim  
is  not  to  add  to  the  ontology  itself,  but  to  provide  reason  to  suppose  that  scientific  modeling  and  
experimenting  practices  necessitate  this  ontology.   I  then  turn  to  a  thought  experiment:   the  
unchanging  room  (§3).   This  thought  experiment  will  provide  us  with  the  first  and  most  basic  
version  of  the  continuity  argument,  and  will  prime  our  intuitions  for  why  we  must  suppose  
experiments  and  observations  in  actual  science  are  processual.   I  then  present  the  continuity  
argument  in  detail  (§4),  first  as  a  simple  justification  for  the  belief  that  there  are  real  processes  
independent  of  our  acts  of  observation  and  intervention  (§4.1),  then  as  a  complex  argument  for  
why  we  must  suppose  that  our  models  must  describe  real  processes  if  they  hope  to  be  empirically  
adequate  (§4.2).   I  then  conclude  by  noting  that  the  result  of  this  chapter  does  not  preclude  that  
things—those  entities  described  in  “substance  ontology,”  like  essences,  objects,  souls,  stuffs,  and  
so  on—are  real.   The  refutation  of  necessary  commitment  to  things  will  come  in  chapter  2.   
4  
  
[1.2]:   Defining  “Process”  for  Use  in  Science  
  
  
Our  first  order  of  business  is  to  articulate  an  operating  notion  of  “process.”   This  notion  is  
born  out  of  examples,  primarily.   Processes  are  entities  like:  
(1) Motions:   the  motion  of  the  earth  around  the  sun,  the  vibration  of  air  in  a  sound  wave,  etc.   
(2) Interactions:   the  electromagnetic  repulsion  of  a  one  electron  from  another,  atomic  
spectral  absorption  and  emission,  etc.   
(3) Growth/Excitation:   the  development  of  a  tree  during  its  natal  life  cycle,  the  expansion  of  
a  gas,  etc.  
(4) Decay:   the  decomposition  of  a  dead  tree,  the  energetic  fluctuation  of  a  neutron  in  beta  
decay,  etc.   
However,  these  examples  are  merely  intuitive,  meant  to  establish  that  processes  can  be  
recognized  in  the  world  independent  of  a  detailed  ontological  analysis.   Importantly,  I  will  not  be  
adding  to  existing  analysis  of  the  ontology  of  processes   Instead,  I  will  be  committing  to  one  
ontological  analysis—Johanna  Seibt’s  General  Process  Theory  (GPT)—and  adding  the  necessary  
additional  considerations  in  §4  to  the  GPT  to  enable  its  application  to  scientific  models.   In  




[1.2.1]:   Processes  vs.  Things  
  
  
Briefly,  the  history  of  ontology  contains  two  paradigmatic  projects:   the  processist  project  
and  the  substance  (or  thing)  project.   These  two  projects  are  characterized  by  different  emphasis  
on  the  core  epistemology  of  philosophical  analysis;  different  prioritization  of  dynamics  vs.  
statics  as  explainers,  identifiers,  and  definers;  and  various  secondary  differences  such  as  the  
primacy  of  theoretical  definition  over  empirical  practice  and  the  like.   The  projects  can  be  




( Process ):   Our  knowledge  stems  from  induction  over  dynamic  sensations  and  experiences  and  
the  recognition  of  similarities  between  changes  and  evolutions  of  the  world.   This  means  
that  the  primary/fundamental  ontological  entity  is  dynamic,  and  we  recover  stabilities,  
structures,  spatial  relations,  and  static  qualities/quantities  as  emergent  features  of  systems  
of  dynamics.   To  do  this,  we  emphasize  epistemological  practices  over  theories.   
  
( Thing/Substance ):   Our  knowledge  stems  from  deduction  from  first  principles  and  the  
recognition  of  static  (or  sufficiently  stable),  generalizable  patterns  that  abstract  away  the  
inconstant  aspects  of  the  world  we  observe.    This  means  that  the  primary/fundamental  
ontological  entity  is  static,  and  we  recover  change,  cyclic  systems,  temporal  relations,  and  
dynamic  qualities/quantities  as  emergent  features  of  collections  of  statics.   To  do  this,  we  
emphasize  definition  and  theories  over  practice.   
  
Those  familiar  with  the  history  of  philosophy  will  likely  recognize  that  these  two  projects  as  I  
have  glossed  them  are  immediately  recognizable  in  the  work  of  various  historical  figures.   Of  
particular  import  are  Heraclitus  and  Parmenides,  in  whose  work  the  dichotomy  between  the  
projects  is  most  apparent.   Heraclitus  emphasizes  that  knowledge  of  the  world  comes  from  
experiences,  and  so  the  primary  entities  of  the  world  are  dynamics.   His  Logos  is  the  pattern  of  
equivalent  exchange  found  in  the  system  of  dynamic  flows  and  motions,  the  “coming  into  being  
and  going  out  of  existence”  of  the  world’s  “ever-living  fire.” 5    Parmenides,  in  contrast,  denies  
that  change  is  real,  emphasizing  instead  that  knowledge  is  of  absolute  and  eternal  truths,  from  
which  we  deduce  true  claims  about  the  world. 6    The  resulting  ontology  is  found  as  one  
interpretation  of  Platonic  ontology:   a  primitive  ontology  of  absolute  forms  from  which  are  built  
the  various  combinations  of  qualities  and  their  changes  we  observe  in  the  world.   
One  can  find  thorough  accounts  of  the  histories  of  these  two  projects  in  existing  works.  
For  the  history  of  the  process  project,  see  Clayton  (2008),  Eastman  and  Keeton  (2008)  (preface)  
Rescher  (1996,  2000),  Seibt  (2017).   For  the  substance  project,  see  Moore  (2012) 7 ,  Robinson  
5  Heraclitus,  fragment  30.   See  also  Plato  Cratylus  402a  for  the  apparent  first  instance  of  the  attribution  to  Heraclitus  
of  the  claim  that  “one  cannot  step  into  the  same  river  twice.”   
6  Parmenides’  poem  “On  Nature.”   
7  Note  that  Moore  presents  his  (very  thorough)  history  of  substance  metaphysics  as  merely  a  history  of  metaphysics.  
Aspects  of  the  contrast  to  process  metaphysics  can  be  found  if  one  knows  where  to  look—for  example,  in  chapter  18  
on  Heideggar—but  otherwise  the  discussion  clearly  treats  “things”  (variations  on  substance)  as  the  primary  
explanans  of  metaphysics.   
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(2018),  Seibt  (1990),  (and  in  general  most  historical  analyses  of  metaphysics).   I  will  not  attempt  
to  recreate  such  narratives,  only  to  add  a  few  additional  historical  points  for  those  wishing  to  
observe  this  dichotomy  in  the  history  of  science.   
We  also  see  the  opposition  between  process  and  substance/thing  thought  at  various  points  
in  the  history  of  science,  and  between  various  culturally  divergent  scientific  practices.   Four,  in  
particular,  are  worth  mentioning  for  the  stark  manner  in  which  they  paint  the  differences  between  
these  ontologies:   
(1) Galenic  vs.  Han-era  Chinese  medical  theory.  
(2) Roman,  Islamic,  and  Scholastic  vs.  Mohist/Taoist  physics.  
(3) Revelation  vs.  Naturalism  in  Galilean  era  physics  and  theology.  
(4) Classical  vs  Quantum  ontology  in  20th  century  science.   
In  each  of  these,  we  see  different  aspects  of  the  applied  dichotomy  between  process  and  
substance  thought.   In  (1),  we  see  the  difference  between  the  anatomical  definition  of  parts  in  
Galenic  medicine  and  the  emphasis  on  whole-functions  (literal  “flows”  or  Qi)  of  the  body  in  
Chinese  medicine. 8    In  (2),  the  primacy  of  motions  in  the  Mohist/Taoist  physics  contrasts  with  
the  primacy  of  bodies  in  (much  of)  Roman,  Islamic,  and  Scholastic  physics. 9    In  (3),  the  differing  
emphases  on  epistemological  practices  caused  a  schism  between  those  who  believed  knowledge  
of  the  world  (qua  Truth  and  the  divine)  could  come  from  empirical  study  and  practice  vs.  those  
who  believed  it  could  come  only  from  divine  revelation  (something  akin  to  the  Parmenidean  
poetic  ascent  to  the  goddess  who  reveals  the  absolute  truths  of  the  world).   This  moment  in  
particular  is  worth  a  more  thorough  investigation,  given  that  this  schism  propagated  into  
something  like  a  clear  epistemological  difference  between  the  physics  of  the  celestial  vs.  matter  
physics  in  the  centuries  to  follow. 10    (4)  represents  the  most  stark  historical  difference,  and  the  
quantum  revolution  is  often  taken  as  a  motivation  toward  the  process  enterprise. 11    In  the  words  
of  David  Finkelstein,  “Classically,  knowledge  is  a  mental  representation  of  things  as  they  are.  
An  ideal  observation  informs  us  about  its  object  completely  and  without  changing  it.   …  [but]  in  
8  See  Kuriyama  (1999).   Note  that  Yuasa  (1987)  develops  an  account  of  body  (both  medical  and  philosophical)  that  
trades  on  the  same  dichotomy  noted  in  Kuriyama,  and  with  different  historical  analysis.   To  some  extent,  the  
dichotomy  between  European  and  Chinese-Japanese  approaches  to  personhood  (including  medical  features)  is  also  
presented  in  Watsuji’s  (1935)  work  “Fūdo”  (“wind  and  earth”  sometimes  translated  as  “Climate  and  Culture”).   
9  See,  for  instance,  Needham  (1969  ch  4,  7).   
10  The  argument  for  this,  and  the  beginnings  of  a  thorough  analysis,  are  contained  in  Penn  “Lecture  Notes  on  Space,  
Time,  and  Matter.”   
11  See  Eastman  and  Keeton  (2008),  Seibt  (2017).   
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a  quantum  epistemology,  knowledge  is  a  record  or  reenactment  of  actions  upon  the  system,”  
(1996,  18).   
  
  
[1.2.2]:   What  is  a  Process?  
  
  
We  turn  now  to  our  operating  definition  of  “process.”   Following  the  Mohist/Taoist  
tradition,  I  treat  “process”  as  a  primitive  ontological  term.   However,  the  specifics  of  the  
categorical  features  of  processes  can  be  listed  as  five  considerations  on  how  they  enter  into 
linguistic,  spatial,  causal,  and  temporal  relations.   These  are  discussed  in  great  detail  in  Seibt’s  
work  (1990,  1995,  1997,  2006,  2008,  especially  2010,  2015,  2018).   I  summarize  them  here. 12    
(1) Processes  are  general,  not  particular,  entities :   they  are  individual  in  that  they  can  be  
named  and  have  features  attributed  to  them,  but  they  are  not  particular.   I.e.,  processes  are  
not  inherently  localized  either  in  a  single  spatiotemporal  location  or  in  a  single  entity  by  
necessity. 13    
(2) Processes  are  subjectless :   
(a) They  are  not  alterations  or  modifications  of  things,  or  alternatively,   
(b) Their  existence  or  occurrence  is  not  dependent  on  something  in  which  they  occur  
(3) Processes  are  occurrent,  not  continuant : 14    They  are  temporally  extended,  and  cannot  be  
identified  at  a  moment  in  time  (they  are  not  instantaneous).   
(4) Processes  are  not  countable,  but  are  measurable : 15    One  quantifies  processes  into  
amounts,  which  may  be  counted  (10  Joules  of  kinetic  energy,  for  example,  is  a  measure  
of  the  function  of  a  thermal  process  equivalent  to  10  processes  of  1-gram-of-water  
heating  by  1  K).   Quantities  attributed  to  processes  cannot  enable  a  mapping  from  a  set  
formed  of  processes  to  the  natural  numbers.   However,  it  is  possible  to  model  systems  of  
processes  in  such  a  way  as  to  produce  countable  numbers  of  comparisons  of  processes.  
12  I  omit  the  features  described  in  the  GPT  that  I  will  not  make  use  of.   These  include  (i)  that  processes  can  be  both  
determinately  and  indeterminately  localized  in  space  and  time.   
13  This  is  similar  to  the  non-particular  ontologies  of  Sellars’  (1952)  and  Leibniz.   See,  for  instance,  Rescher  (1967).   
14  C.f.,  Johnson  (1921),  Johnston  (1984,  1987),  Simons  and  Melia  (2000),  Seibt  (2008).   
15  Note  that  we  can  count  kinds  of  processes  (e.g.,  excitations),  but  there  are  no  “countable  process  individuals,”  
(e.g.,  “the  excitation  of  the  neutron  in  this  hydrogen  isotope”).   
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(5) Processes  are  not  necessarily  determinate,  but  are  determinable :   This  is  a  generalization  
of  (4)  above  on  a  scientifically  grounded  understanding  of  the  determinate  determinable  
distinction.   
(6) Processes  are  individuated  contextually :   The  role  of  a  process  in  a  system,  the  dynamic  
responses  to  and  perturbations  of  the  process,  and  other  functional  considerations  serve  to  
characterize  the  process  in  terms  of  its  context.   
(7) Corollary  to  (1)  and  (2),  processes  are  not  changes,  nor  do  they  have  temporal  phases  or  
stages :   rather,  we  say  that  processes  can  have  their  function  measured  by,  or  be  
partitioned  into  changes,  phases,  or  stages. 16    
Of  these,  (1)  and  (2)  will  only  become  important  when  we  move  to  the  later  chapters,  especially  
chapter  2.   (3)  is  essential  for  the  continuity  argument  to  come.   This  is  because  the  inability  to  
find  instantaneous  properties  of  interventions  or  observations  will  indicate  to  us  both  that  
interventions  and  observations  are  themselves  processual,  and  that  the  systems  we  intervene  on  
similarly  lack  instantaneous  properties.   (4)  will  prove  particularly  important  when  we  reach  
chapter  4.   (5)  will  largely  play  only  a  background  role,  but  is  worth  mentioning.   (6)  is  essential 
to  this  chapter,  and  will  be  discussed  in  great  detail  within  the  context  of  scientific  experiment  in  
section  4.2.3.   (7)  represents  a  linguistic  point.   Together,  these  seven  features  (plus  the  one  I  
have  omitted)  define  the  categorical  character  of  process  slightly  modified  from  the  general  
process  theory  (GPT)  ontology,  defined  and  defended  by  Seibt. 17    
Importantly,  the  features  of  processes  are  the  means  by  which  we  identify  them  in  the  
world.   We  also  need  to  construct  a  means  of  classifying  processes  into  types  to  meet  different  
linguistic,  descriptive  needs.   We  can  construct  these  classifications  by  noting  not  how  we  
identify  processes,  but  how  we  differentiate  them  from  each  other. 18    These  classifications  will  
16  This  is  a  slight  departure  from  Seibt’s  GPT,  but  is  important  for  the  purposes  of  this  work.   Namely,  we  must  
eschew  describing  processes  as  if  they  can  be  made  particular  with  sequences  of  states.   States,  as  terms  within  our  
physical  models,  can  act  as  designators  of  processes  (in  that  we  can  collect  contextual  information  about  processes  
into  mathematically  defined  states),  but  they  cannot  act  as  descriptors  of  those  processes  (the  process  is  not  built  up  
from  those  states).   
17  In  what  follows,  I  simply  commit  to  this  ontological  framework.   There  are  a  few  additions  to  it  I  advocate  in  later  
sections  and  chapters,  but  for  the  most  part,  the  GPT  is  an  ontology  of  pure  (subjectless)  processes  that  meets  the  
linguistic  needs  of  the  ontologist  and  the  realist.   I  will  show  that  this  ontology  of  subjectless  processes  can  be  
reconstructed  and  evidenced  within  scientific  practice  and  theory.   
18  This,  too,  is  drawn  directly  from  Seibt’s  work.   However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Pemberton  (2018)  offers  a  
somewhat  similar  analysis  of  how  we  individuate  and  classify  processes  in  science.   Many  of  Pemberton’s  
categories  end  up  overlapping  with  those  described  by  Seibt,  while  a  few  do  not  (e.g.,  Pemberton  admits  a  
classification  of  processes  in  terms  of  “originating  things”).   I  have  purposefully  committed  to  Seibt’s  account  over  
Pemberton’s  because  Pemberton’s  is  not  yet  developed  enough  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  serious  pure  process  realism  in  
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allow  us  to  reconstruct  every  sentence  involving  things,  substances,  events,  properties,  actions,  
relations,  structures,  vehicles,  and  so  on.   They  are: 19    
(1) Participation :   The  system(s)  involved  in  the  process.   For  example,  two  motions  may  
differ  in  the  types  of  system  in  which  they  occur,  despite  sharing  all  other  features  and  
classifications.   
(2) Process  Structure :   The  relations  between  processes  or  processual  parts  that  obtain  
(cycles,  sequences,  etc).   For  example,  two  quantum  field  theoretic  interactions  may  
differ  solely  in  that  they  have  a  different  number  of  closed  loops  in  k-space  (as  
represented  in  their  respective  Feynman  diagrams).   
(3) Dynamic  Context :   The  connections  between  processes  and  the  event-wholes  within  
which  they  obtain.   For  example,  two  radiative  emissions  may  differ  in  the  scope  of  their 
influence  on  their  environment  (the  sun  vs.  my  sunlamp).   Two  processes  may  also  differ  
according  to  the  pragmatically  chosen  effects  we  consider.   E.g.,  the  radiation  of  the  sun  
has  physical,  biological,  ecological,  and  sociological  effects.   We  would  want  to  
differentiate  between  these  in  labeling  our  processes.   
(4) Mereological  Signature :   The  relations  that  processual  wholes  bear  to  their  own  parts.  For  
example,  the  performance  of  Rachmaninoff’s  2nd  Piano  Concerto,  the  motion  of  a  
pendulum,  and  the  activity  of  the  sun  shining  differ  in  how  alike  the  parts  of  these  
processes  are  to  their  respective  wholes.   The  concerto  has  no  parts  that  are  alike  to  the  
whole,  the  motion  of  the  pendulum  has  some  parts  that  are  alike  to  the  whole,  and  any  
part  of  the  sun  shining  is  like  the  whole.   
The  mereological  signature  is  the  primary  means  of  classifying  processes  qua  reproducing  all  
linguistic  forms.   Type-1  processes  are  activities  like  “it  is  raining”  that  are  everywhere  and  
everywhen  like-parted.   I.e.,  any  part  of  the  process  is  a  part  in  which  the  entirety  of  the  process  
occurs.   Type-2  processes  are  the  processes  of  “stuff”  like  water  or  mud,  marked  by  non-maximal  
and  non-minimal  spatial  like-partedness  and  maximal  temporal  like-partedness.   And  so  on. 20    
science.   Indeed,  I  believe  Pemberton’s  work  ultimately  fails  to  argue  that  processes  are  effective  posits  for  
explaining  either  linguistic  or  scientific  data.   
19  I  omit  the  classification  of  “dynamic  shape”  (Seibt  2010,  49)  because  this  seems  to  track  linguistic  differences  
between  process  descriptions,  not  physical  differences  necessarily.   As  such,  this  classification  is  important  for  
normative  projects  that  take  linguistic  data  as  their  primary  data,  but  will  prove  less  interesting  for  the  project  here.   
20  For  full  details,  see  Seibt  (2010).   I  do  not  reproduce  these  details  here  because  they  will  serve  little  purpose  for  
the  coming  discussion.   
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For  the  purposes  of  what  is  to  come,  the  most  important  classificatory  differences  
between  processes  come  from  (1),  (2),  and  (3).   This  is  because  our  goal  will  be  to  show  that  the  
entities  or  terms  we  find  in  our  physical  models  differ  according  to  differences  in  their  dynamic  
context,  structure,  and  participants.   (4)  will  play  some  role  as  well,  although  mostly  in  the  final  
analysis,  when  we  eschew  thing-claims  in  our  models  entirely  in  favor  of  process  claims.   At  that  
point,  it  will  be  important  to  show  that  any  apparent  thing  claim  can  not  only  be  physically  
understood  as  a  placeholder  claim  about  purely  processual  entities,  but  also  that  any  statement  
involving  things  in  our  models  can  be  reproduced  entirely  in  terms  of  the  subjectless  general  




[1.3]:   A  Thought  Experiment:   First-level  Process  Realist  Commitment  
  
  
With  an  operating  notion  of  process  in  place,  we  can  now  turn  to  the  arguments  for  why  
we  are  justified  in  committing  to  processes  as  part  of  the  ontology  of  scientific  models  and  
theories.   As  stated  in  the  introduction,  this  argument  begins  with  a  simple  version  and  proceeds  
through  more  complex  iterations  further  on.   Our  first  argument  for  the  reality  of  process  is  that  
processes  must  exist  in  order  for  observation,  experiment,  and  scientific  knowledge  to  be  
possible.   This  establishes  only  that  processes  should  feature  somewhere  in  our  ontic  
understanding  of  science,  not  that  we  must  accept  any  specific  processes  or  find  real  processes  in  
any  specific  place.   To  see  this,  we  turn  to  a  simple  thought  experiment.    
  
  
[1.3.1]:   The  Unchanging  Room  
  
  
Imagine  a  room  in  which  nothing  changes.   Imagine  we  sit  in  this  room  and  we  imagine  
attempting  to  understand  this  room  scientifically.   Surely,  to  do  so,  we  will  first  need  to  observe  
the  room,  and  then  perhaps  to  experiment  on  it.   Perhaps  we  might  even  wonder  if  there  is  
anything  we  can  infer  about  this  room  or  anything  in  it.   To  that  end,  we  must  ask  ourselves:  
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what  can  we  observe  in,  experiment  on,  or  infer  about  this  room?   The  simple  answer  is:  
absolutely  nothing.   
Let  us  consider  examples.   I  have  stated  that  we  are  in  a  room.   Can  we  observe  that  there  
are  walls  around  us?   We  certainly  cannot  see  them.   Seeing  walls  would  require  propagating  
light  reflecting  off  of  the  walls.   Seeing  would  require  a  dynamic  response  in  our  eye  in  response  
to  the  light.   The  recognition  of  this  as  an  observation  of  the  wall  would  require  an  activity  
within  our  nervous  system  in  response  to  the  dynamic  response  of  our  eye. 21    All  of  these  are  
dynamics,  which  will  be  characterized  by  measurable  changes,  phases,  and  stages  (c.f.  Feature  
(7)  of  processes  above),  but  the  room  contains  no  change.   
We  might  think  that  we  could  somehow  be  in  constant  contact  with  the  wall.   Perhaps  
there  is  some  static  relationship  or  link  between  us  and  the  wall,  born  physically  by  some  
stationary  light  wave  or  electromagnetic  structure.   Even  supposing  this  (outrageously  incorrect  
physical  assumption),  we  would  still  be  incapable  of  observing  the  wall.   We  would  be  greeted  
with  at  most  one  undifferentiated  and  unchanging  image.   How  could  we  notice  that  there  is  a  
wall  in  front  of  us  without  comparison,  without  shifts  of  focus  and  active  differences  in  our  
response  to  one  part  of  the  image  or  the  other?   Past  experience  cannot  be  used  for  comparison.  
The  thoughts  through  which  we  could  compare  the  image  to  past  experience  are,  after  all,  
activities  (type-1  processes).   Activities  are  processes,  and  so  should  have  associated  measurable  
changes.   But  the  room  contains  no  change.   
What  about  something  other  than  sight?   Touch  and  hearing  might  work  where  sight  fails.  
You  certainly  cannot  touch  the  walls.   Touching  them  would  require  that  you  move  your  arms,  
which  cannot  occur  without  change  in  your  position.   Even  granting  that  you  could  already  be  in  
contact  with  the  wall,  the  feeling  of  touch  requires  that  there  is  an  electromagnetic  interaction  
between  you  and  the  wall,  i.e.,  a  process  of  equal  and  opposite  energetic  exchange  through  
repulsion.   But  the  room  contains  no  change.   Even  further,  you  would  not  know  that  you  were  in  
21  For  those  curious,  the  literature  on  observation  nowhere  disputes  that  observation  involves  perceptual  processes  as  
I  have  stated.   E.g.,  though  Hempel  and  Feyerabend  both  dispute  the  naive  account  of  observation  in  which  
observation  is  just  a  perceptual  process,  it  is  because  they  believe  respectively  that  perceptual  processes  must  
originate  in  determinate  facts  about  objects  and  things  (Hempel  1952,  674),  and  that  perceptual  processes  must  
include  processes  in  measurement  tools  and  apparatuses  (Feyerabend  1969,  132-137).   Helmholtz  similarly  disputed  
the  naive  account  on  the  basis  that  perceptual  processes  could  not  register  changes  in  a  system  smaller  than  some  
human  limit,  and  so  had  to  include  as  observations  artificial  processes,  or  “artificial  methods  of  observation”  (see  
the  analysis  of  Olesko  and  Holmes  (1994,  84)).   Thus,  while  the  theory-ladenness  of  observation,  the  distinction  
between  observation  and  experiment,  or  even  whether  observations  are  of  data  or  phenomena  (Bogen  and  
Woodward  1989),  the  processual  character  of  the  perceptual  processes  involved  in  observing  is  never  in  doubt.   
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contact  with  a  wall  as  opposed  to  anything  else  unless  there  was  an  appreciable  difference  in  the  
pressure  you  feel  in  your  fingers  as  your  hand  presses  against  the  wall  and  against  something  
else.   Measuring  such  a  difference  in  pressure  would  require  multiple  sensations,  or  a  comparison  
to  past  experiences  of  sensations,  which  we  have  already  ruled  out.   Hearing  is  similarly  
impossible,  since  we  hear  because  of  vibrational  changes  in  air  pressure  causing  oscillations  of  
the  cilia  in  our  inner  ear.   But  the  room  contains  no  change.   
Perhaps  observing  the  walls  is  impossible.   Can  we  experiment?   Surely  that  too  is  
impossible  in  the  absence  of  the  ability  to  observe.   Moreover,  experiments  are  typically  
differentiated  from  bare  observations  by  the  observer’s  ability  to  manipulate  and  intervene  on  the  
system  being  observed. 22    Interventions  are  activities.   Manipulating  a  system  requires  us  to  
dynamically  alter  it  in  some  way.   They  require  change  in  the  room.   But  the  room  contains  no  
change.   
What  about  inferring  that  the  walls  exist?   We  might  imagine  that,  even  barring  an  ability  
to  access  the  walls  scientifically,  some  manner  of  abstract,  first-principles  analysis  might  allow  
us  to  deduce  that  there  are  walls.   Perhaps  we  might  infer  that  a  benevolent,  non-deceiving  deity  
would  not  place  us  in  a  room  we  could  know  nothing  about.   Indeed  we  might  so  infer,  were  we  
capable  of  inferring  at  all.   Inference  would  require  us  to  engage  in  an  activity  of  mind,  perhaps  
manifest  as  neurochemical  activities  in  our  physical  body.   These  would  entail  the  existence  of  
measurable  changes,  but  the  room  contains  no  change.   
At  best,  we  might  hope  that  we  simply  know  that  there  are  walls  without  justification  or  
inference,  and  that  this  knowledge  is  somehow  manifest  as  a  static  property  of  our  minds.   Such  
knowledge  would  look  rather  different  from  our  everyday  knowledge,  however,  since  it  would  be  
inutterable,  inaccessible,  and  unresponsive  to  processes  of  thought  or  consideration  or  the  like.  
You  could  not  deduce  from  it,  nor  induce  over  it,  nor  reevaluate  it,  nor  build  a  theory  or  model  or  
concept  from  it,  or  anything  else.   Perhaps  such  knowledge  could  exist,  but  it  certainly  wouldn’t  
count  as  scientific  knowledge.   
22  See,  for  instance,  Cartwright(  2001,  2002,  2006);  Hausman  and  Woodward  (1999,  2004);  Hitchcock  (2006,  2007a,  
b);  Suárez  (2013);  and  Woodward  (2003,  2014a,  b,  2015,  2019).   Interventionists  of  the  causal-Beyes’-net  variety  
often  remark  that  interventions  are  represented  as  “an  exogenous  variable…  with  two  states  (on/off)  and  a  single  
arrow  into  the  variable  [the  on-off  switch]  manipulates,”   (Eberhardt  and  Scheines  2006).   This  means  that  the  
intervention  is  understood  implicitly  as  the  causal  action  of  the  external  manipulator  on  the  internal  system  variable.  
Although  I  think  the  talk  of  manipulating  variables  (predominantly  influenced  by  Woodward  (1999,  2003,  2004))  
does  not  track  the  ontology  of  experiment  (variables  should  not  be  treated  as  real  entities),  this  representation  is  still  
useful  for  revealing  that,  indeed,  interventions  depend  on  an  activity  or  process.   
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So  the  walls  are  beyond  our  ken.   Similarly,  every  other  so-called  concrete  or  stable  entity  
in  the  room  would  be  inaccessible.   Might  there  be  something  in  the  room  that  is  observable  or  
inferrable  independent  of  the  physics  of  the  room?   As  an  example,  we  might  appeal  to  Kantian  
forms  of  intuition:   space  and  time.   Perhaps,  in  this  room,  we  may  be  incapable  of  observing  
anything  and  yet  capable  of  having  observations  were  we  only  permitted  to  engage  in  that  
process.   Perhaps,  you  could  know  that  there  is  time  or  space  simply  in  virtue  of  their  necessary  
existence  for  your  metaphysical  and  physical  state  of  being.   
Once  more,  however,  we  are  defeated.   The  Kantian  forms  of  intuition  are  justified  on  the  
basis  of  experience.   Critically,  they  are  justified  because  we  have  multiple  and  dynamic  
experiences  of  the  world.   The  recognition  of  passing  time  comes  from  recognizing  that  there  are  
indeed  different  moments  to  be  ordered  in  a  sequence.   If  we  have,  at  best,  a  single  static  image  
of  the  world  with  which  to  judge,  we  cannot  possibly  recognize  ordered  moments  from  this  
single  state.   Similarly,  the  recognition  of  space  is  born  from  our  ability  to  order  sensations  in  
terms  of  nearness  and  farness.   Again,  if  we  have  but  one  static  image  with  which  to  judge  (and  
probably  not  even  that),  we  will  be  incapable  of  even  recognizing  any  difference  in  the  nearness  
and  farness  of  the  impressions  in  that  image.   
We  have  one  final  recourse:   appeal  to  the  most  unassailable  of  ideas.   For  instance,  can  
we  infer  that  we  exist  in  this  room?   If  we  take  Descartes  seriously,  we  only  know  this  because  
we  think.   However,  thinking  is  an  activity.   We  cannot  think  statically.   Thinking  and  thereby  
knowing  that  we  exist  require  change.   But  the  room  contains  no  change.   
  
  
[1.3.2]:   Without  Process,  No  Observation  
  
  
The  problem  we  face  in  this  room  is  general.   Observation,  experiment,  and  inference  are  
all  processual:   type-1  or  type-3  processes  on  Seibt’s  account  above, 23   occurrents  in  Johnson’s  
(1921)  and  the  literature  on  endurance  and  perdurance,  activities  in  Vendler’s  (1957)  linguistic  
account,  causal  arrows  in  interventionism,  etc.   Observations,  experiments,  and  inferences  are  all  
identified  by  involving  measurable  changes,  and  by  being  occurrents  (c.f.  §2.2  above).   Our  
23  That  is,  either  activities  or  accomplishments/developments  respectively.   
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mistake  was  to  suppose  that  these  processes  could  exist  in  a  room  where  dynamics  are  
prohibited.   
However,  this  is  essentially  an  admission  that  without  processes,  we  cannot  have  
observations,  experiments,  or  inferences.   Given  that  each  of  these  are  essential  to  the  practice,  
development,  and  improvement  of  science,  this  means  that  science  is  impossible  without  
processes.   Without  processes,  we  cannot  have  observations,  and  without  observations,  science  is  
empty.   Theories  and  models  cannot  be  built  independent  of  experience,  and  experience  is  
processual.   
This  matches  how  philosophers  of  science  understand  observation.   Carnap  and  
Feyerabend,  and  more  recently  Kuby  (2018),  all  put  it  rather  well:   
  
“Rain-observing…  can  perhaps  be  characterized  as  being  found  in  certain  
conditions  (namely  when  it  is  raining)  or  if  rainlike  audible  or  visible  processes  
are  present,  and  the  eyes  or  ears  of  B  are  in  the  appropriate  relative  position  to  
these  processes)  and  as  stimulating  such  and  such  observable  bodily  reactions…”  
(Carnap  1987,  460)  
  
“Now  it  is  most  important  to  realize  that  the  characterization  of  observation  
statements  implicit  in  the  above  quotations  is  a  causal  characterization,  or  if  one  
wants  to  use  more  recent  terminology,  a  pragmatic  characterization,”  (Feyerabend  
1962,  36).   
  
Kuby  argues  that  both  of  these  interpretations  of  observation  statements  are  to  be  understood  as  
statements  about  causal  processes  (see,  e.g.,  2018,  12).   Indeed,  we  are  meant  to  understand  
observations  as  “protocols”  for  interacting  with  and  learning  about  changes  in  the  environment  
and  physical  state  of  the  observer,  according  to  Kuby.   
Indeed,  the  processual  character  of  observation  is  never  under  dispute  in  the  literature.  
There  are  disputes  about  (a)  whether  there  is  an  object  of  observation  (the  system  observed),  (b) 
whether  the  thing  observed  is  evidence  or  data  or  phenomenon,  (c)  what  can  be  inferred  from  
observations  (but  not  observation ),  (d)  whether  observations  can  be  treated  as  independent  from  
existing  concepts  or  theories  (theory  ladenness),  etc.   
Drawing  on  Carnap’s  and  Feyerabend’s  theories,  we  can  put  the  points  above  more  
pointedly.   Scientific  knowledge  is,  most  basically,  built  out  of  collections  of  experiments  and  
observations  that  together  enable  the  construction  of  some  model  or  theory  codifying  and  
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generalizing  the  set-up  and  outcome  of  each  of  those  experiments  and  observations.   So,  if  
scientific  knowledge  depends  on  and  is  about  observation,  and  observation  cannot  exist  without  
processes,  then  our  scientific  knowledge  is  dependent  on  and  about  processes.   
This  is  the  most  simple  argument  in  favor  of  process  realism.   By  showing  that  processes  
are  essential  parts  of  observation,  we  can  infer  that  our  models  and  theories  in  science  must  at  
least  contain  reference  to  processes  as  real  entities  in  some  capacity.   The  most  obvious  way  in  
which  they  do  refer  to  process  is  whenever  they  refer  to  or  tacitly  assume  the  truth  of  one  or  
more  observation  sentences.   In  other  words,  I  always  know  that  processes  are  real  in  science  
because  scientific  models  and  theories  expect  me  to  be  able  to  observe.   The  act  of  observing  is  
the  first  and  most  basic  process  to  which  I  must  commit  in  science.   
In  addition  to  this,  we  learn  three  more  refined  points  with  which  we  will  construct  the  
second  and  third  iterations  of  the  argument  for  process  realism:   
(1) Our  ability  to  observe  is  dependent  on  two  processes:   
(a) an  external  or  initiating  process,  a  change  in  environment  and  an  interaction  
between  that  environment  and  the  observer.   
(b) an  internal  or  responsive  process,  an  activity  in  the  observer.   
(2) There  are  three  meanings  of  observation,  only  one  of  which  is  essential  to  the  process  of  
science.   These  are:  
(a) The  facts,  features,  or  entities  that  ground  the  truth  of  an  observation  claim;  the  
direct  object  of  the  act  of  observation  (as  in  “I  observed  Beta  decay”  whenever  a  
real  beta  decay  process  occurs).   
(b) The  statement  of  an  observation  itself  (as  in  the  dialectic  exchange  “There  are  real  
processes,”  and  “that  is  a  good  observation”)  
(c) The  act  of  observing  (as  in  “I  observed  alpha  decay  by  using  a  geiger  counter”).   
(3) Observation  (2c)  is  identical  to  the  responsive  internal  dynamics.   I.e.,  observation  is  not  
just  dependent  on  the  existence  of  these  dynamics,  it  is  these  dynamics.  
(4) Observation  (2a)  is  at  least  dependent  on  the  existence  of  the  external  initiating  processes,  
although  it  may  not  be  completely  processual  (there  may  be  real  things  being  observed,  
so  long  as  they  are  admitted  to  be  dynamically  potent).   
(5) Any  successful  observation  will  necessarily  posit  the  inseparability  of  the  first  and  the  
second  processes,  1a  and  1b.   
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In  other  words,  for  every  observation  you  claim  to  have  made,  it  is  possible  to  provide  the  
necessary  processes  that  initiate  the  observation,  the  process   
Notice,  finally,  that  it  is  not  the  lack  of  a  subject  that  makes  the  unchanging  room  
unobservable.   In  fact,  the  recognition  that  there  is  a  subject  observing  is  itself  an  observation  we  
cannot  make  in  the  unchanging  room  room.   This  should  indicate  to  us  that  the  only  essential  
feature  of  our  observations  is  that  they  are  processes  qua  general,  non-particular,  subjectless  
dynamic  activities,  not  that  they  are  activities  of  anything  at  all.   Whether  or  not  these  activities  
have  a  subject  is  superfluous.   However,  one  is  welcome  to  assume,  for  now,  that  the  activity  of  
observation  must  have  a  subject.   I  will  refute  this  and  all  other  underlier  arguments  in  science  in  




[1.4]:   The  Continuity  Argument  
  
  
It  is  often  assumed  that  the  antirealist  has  better  claim  to  the  idea  of  empirical  adequacy  
than  does  the  realist.   The  realist  “goes  beyond”  empirical  adequacy  in  making  their  realist  
claims.   Indeed,  against  most  realist  positions,  the  antirealist  has  a  point:   the  realism  being  
posited  is  not  merely  a  means  of  enabling  the  successful  description  of  pragmatic  aspects  and  
outcomes  of  experiments.   Instead,  the  realist  seems  to  posit  their  realist  claims  to  ground  
empirical  adequacy  of  a  model  in  some  metaphysical  feature  of  the  world.   The  antirealist,  then,  
seems  to  commit  to  far  less  than  the  realist,  and  so  they  do  not  fall  victim  to  metaphysical  
extravagance.   
However,  the  thought  experiment  above  shows  something  different.   Crucially,  we  must  
ask  if  there  are  any  features  of  the  world  without  which  empirical  adequacy  would  be  impossible.  
I.e.,  what  happens  when  we  seek  not  to  explain  empirical  adequacy  in  terms  of  the  metaphysics  
that  enables  it,  but  instead  seek  to  understand  the  metaphysical  claim  contained  within  the  claim  
of  empirical  adequacy?   The  answer  is,  we  get  an  argument  for  process  realism,  and  the  subject  
of  this  section.   Namely,  we  get  the  continuity  argument.   
The  program  for  this  section  is  as  follows.   We  begin  with  a  simple  version  of  the  
continuity  argument  (§4.1).   This  will  establish  that  we  are  justified  in  inferring  that  there  are  real  
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processes  external  to  the  observer,  i.e.,  the  second  level  of  realist  commitment.   Having  presented  
the  simplified  version  of  the  argument,  we  turn  to  a  defense  of  the  full-fledged  continuity  
argument  (§4.2).   This  argument  shows  that  we  are  also  justified  in  inferring  the  existence  of  real  
processes  as  described  by  our  models  and  theories,  i.e.,  the  final  and  most  important  level  of  
realist  commitment  for  scientific  realism.   Along  the  way,  we  will  show  how  and  in  what  way  we  
partition  and  identify  processes  within  our  experiments,  and  use  this  to  show  that  the  entities  we  
infer  from  our  theories,  models,  and  experiments  fit  the  description  of  subjectless  activities  in  the  
GPT  (see  §2).   
  
  
[1.4.1]:   The  Simple  Continuity  Argument  
  
  
In  the  thought  experiment  above,  I  showed  that  for  every  observation  or  experiment,  
there  must  exist  some  process  in  order  for  that  observation  or  experiment  to  occur.   I  could  not,  
with  this  argument  alone  and  with  this  most  basic  understanding  of  observation,  learn  anything  
about  the  type  or  features  of  those  processes,  nor  indeed  whether  those  processes  were  processes 
in  the  experimental  system.   The  next  step  in  our  argument  for  process  realism  is  therefore  to  
further  specify  the  general  features  of  experiments  and  observations,  so  that  we  may  see  what  
processes  must  exist  in  our  experimental  systems,  and  what  features  they  must  have.   
The  simple  continuity  argument  is  as  follows:   
  
(P1)  Observations  of  an  external  world  are  occurrences.  
(P2)  Such  observations  consist  of  two  temporally  extended  parts:   (1)  the  activity  of  the  observer  
alone  which  is  a  dynamic  response  to  (2)  whatever  exists  or  goes  on  outside  the  observer  
in  the  system  being  observed.   
(P3)  (1)  and  (2)  are  dynamically  continuous:   any  distinction  between  them  will  need  to  track  
only  pragmatic  or  partial  physical  distinctions  between  them,  not  ontological  distinctions.   
(C1)  Therefore,  at  least  one  part  of  (2)  must  be  a  process  (since  if  it  were  not,  there  would  need  
to  be  a  determinate  and  absolute  ontological  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  (1)  and  (2)).   
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(C2)  Therefore,  there  exists  at  least  one  process  of  indeterminate  type  external  to  the  observer  
that  is  responsible  for  the  activity  (type-1  process)  of  the  observer  in  their  act  of  
observation.   
  
This  simple  improvement  on  the  argument  for  process  realism  in  section  3  rests  on  two  
features  of  observation.   The  first  is  that  the  act  of  observing  a  system  is  indeed  an  observation  of  
an  external  system.   The  second  is  that  any  criterion  by  which  we  identify  the  internal  process  
will  also  be  a  definition  of  the  external  process.   Our  means  of  identifying  the  internal  and  
external  processes  are  identical  where  they  are  in  spatiotemporal  contact  with  each  other.  
Moreover,  this  means  of  identifying  the  two  processes,  and  partitioning  them  from  each  other,  is  
itself  dependent  on  some  process  to  be  specified  contextually  as  per  the  classification  of  
processes  (3)  in  §2.   This  suggests  that  the  internal  and  external  processes  are  identified  by  
features  unique  to  subjectless  processes,  namely  features  (3)  and  (6),  occurrent-ness  and  
contextuality  (§2).   Thus,  the  processual  nature  of  the  act  of  observing  a  system  necessitates  that  
the  external  environment  that  enables  this  act  is  at  least  as  processual  as  the  act  itself.   Thus,  
processes  exist  external  to  observers,  and  therefore  exist  in  experimental  systems.   
  
  
[1.4.1.1]:   The  Act  of  Observation  Partitioned  Into  Two  Processual  Parts  
  
  
When  we  make  observation  statements,  we  typically  specify  both  a  system  and  an  agent  
that  engages  with  the  system.   Examples  include,  “I  observed  a  tree,”  “Curie  observed  the  
radioactivity  of  Uranium,”  “Kandinsky  observed  blue.”   However,  we  implicitly  assign  or  
assume  two  key  features  of  such  statements  that  determine  the  details  of  their  specific  real-world  
commitments.   First,  in  each,  we  assume  that  for  every  such  statement,  we  can  answer  the  
question  of  “how”  the  observation  took  place.   I  observed  the  tree  by  seeing  it.   Curie  observed  
radioactivity  with  an  electrometer  that  produced  deflections  of  a  needle  in  response  to  Uranium 
rays.   Kandinsky  observed  blue  by  mixing  paint  and  looking  at  it.   Second,  we  assume  that  the  
subject  and  the  object  of  the  sentence  are  not  identical.   I  am  not  the  tree.   Curie  is  not  
radioactivity,  and  Kandinsky  is  not  blue.   
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We  can  express  these  two  assumptions  as  follows:   
(1) Essential  to  each  observation  is  some  dynamic  act  involving  a  physical  perturbation  of  
the  observer,  and   
(2) Essential  to  each  observation  is  the  assumption  that  this  dynamic  act  is  the  response  to  
some  external  source.   
(2)  provides  for  the  assumed  difference  between  subject  and  object;  notice  that  (2)  is  true  even  in  
cases  of  reflexive  observation  such  as  introspection.   (1)  provides  for  the  answer  to  our  “how”  
questions.   We  will  always  refer  to  some  change  in  the  observer’s  activities  or  their  environment  
(usually  both)  to  answer  these  “how”  questions.   
  
  
[1.4.1.2]:   Two  Parts,  One  Whole  Activity  
  
  
While  we  admit  that  observation  acts  have  two  parts,  these  parts  are  co-dependent.   The  
identifying  features  of  one  are  identifying  features  of  the  other  as  well.   Put  simply,  an  observer  
cannot  have  a  response  to  some  external  system  if  the  external  system  doesn’t  initiate  this  
response.   The  external  system  is  therefore  partially  defined  by  the  features  that  identify  the  act  
of  observing  as  an  activity.   
To  see  this,  let  us  consider  the  act  of  seeing.   We  have  already  said  that  we  assume  that  “I  
see  X”  entails  both  that  I  engaged  in  some  internal  perceptual  process  and  that  there  is  some  
entity  that  initiates  this  process.   My  act  of  seeing  is  identified  by  core  processual  features:   it  is  
non-instantaneous,  context  dependent,  and  cannot  be  counted  but  can  be  measured.    Importantly,  
the  context  dependence  necessitates  that  my  act  of  seeing  is  identified  by  the  dynamics  involved  
in  the  context  in  which  I  see.   I.e.,  my  act  of  seeing  is  partly  identified  as  a  process  by  the  fact  
that  it  is  an  active  dynamic  response  to  my  environment.   
In  acts  of  seeing,  this  dynamic  context  takes  the  form  of  an  electromagnetic  flux  in  the  
eye.   I  physically  see  because  my  eye  responds  to  changes  in  the  electromagnetic  environment  of  
my  eye.   I.e.,  me  seeing  involves  a  necessary  presumption  of  an  electrodynamic  interaction  
between  my  eye  and  the  environment.   It  is  this  electrodynamic  interaction  that  defines  the  
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dynamic  context  of  my  act  of  seeing,  and  to  thereby  identify  this  act  of  seeing  as  this  particular  
act  of  seeing  and  not  that  one.   
The  reverse  is  true  of  the  environment,  experimental  system,  or  external  entity  that  we  
observe.   The  external  entity  qua  observed  entity  only  counts  as  observed  when  there  is  a  
dynamic  response  in  some  observer.   The  necessity  of  this  dynamic  response  means  that  the  
observed  entity  will  be  partially  identified  as  observed  only  when  we  can  attribute  to  it  some  real  
dynamic  effect.   I.e.,  to  be  observed,  the  entity  must  cause  an  act  of  observation.   This  can  only  
obtain  if  the  observed  entity  has  as  processual  features.   It  must  be  non-instantaneous,  since  there  
can  be  no  instantaneous  response  in  the  observer.   It  must  be  uncountable  but  measurable,  since  
the  response  in  the  observer  is  uncountable  but  measurable.   It  must  depend  on  the  dynamic  
context  of  the  observer(s),  since  how  the  observer  responds  will  define  the  observed  object  (qua  
observed).   
But  this  means  that  the  external  part  of  our  observation,  the  system  observed,  is  
identifiable  as  a  process.   The  same  features  that  identify  my  act  of  seeing  as  an  activity  (or  
development),  a  type-1  or  type-3  process,  are  the  features  that  we  use  to  (partially)  identify  the  
object  of  our  observations.   In  particular,  both  are  identified  in  observation  sentences  by  a  
non-instantaneous,  non-countable,  actual  dynamic  interaction.   This  means  that  both  the  act  of  
observing  and  the  object  of  observation  must  be  at  least  equally  processual.   There  may  be  
additional  features  that  define  the  object  of  observation,  and  so  allow  it  to  contain  other  sorts  of  
entities  (e.g.,  things  that  undergo  processes).   Nevertheless,  any  observation—both  the  act  of  
observing  and  the  observed  system—must  be  processual  in  character.   Indeed,  given  the  
connection  between  the  former  and  the  latter,  we  should  say  that  the  two  form  a  single  dynamic  
event  “the  observation”  that  contains  two  processual  parts.   
  
  
[1.4.1.3]:   Experiments  Assume  the  Existence  of  External  Processes  
  
  
The  upshot  is  this:   the  processual  character  of  our  observations  requires  that  whatever  we  
observe  is  at  least  as  processual.   In  short,  our  reasoning  pattern  here  is  an  inference  from  a  
known  process  (the  act  of  observing)  to  an  entity  of  unknown  type  (the  external  
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environment/experimental  system).   Since  the  two  are  necessarily  co-identified  by  a  set  of  
processual  features  (non-instantaneity  and  dynamic  contextuality),  the  unknown  entity  acquires  
these  processual  features  in  virtue  of  being  connected  to  the  known  process.   In  other  words,  the  
fact  that  we  observe  a  system  entails  that  the  system  is  dynamic,  such  that  it  can  be  observed.  
Were  it  not,  our  “observations”  would  be  impossible—we  would  not  be  dynamically  responding  
to  anything.   Unlike  in  §3,  however,  we  now  know  that  the  something  we  are  responding  to,  the  
external  experimental  system  plus  the  surrounding  environment,  contain  real  processes  because  
they  have  the  identifying  features  of  processes  listed  in  §2.   We  are  therefore  justified  in  inferring  
that  real  processes  exist  in  our  experimental  systems.   
  
  
[1.4.2]:   The  Complex  Continuity  Argument  
  
  
We  now  have  a  basic  argument  pattern  for  process  realism,  and  for  specific  processes  
within  our  experiments.   We  begin  with  some  whole  event.   We  show  that  this  event  can  be  
partitioned  into  parts  that  meet  a  special  condition  at  the  partition  between  them  
(non-instantaneous  identification,  measurability  but  not  countability,  co-identification).   We  
show  that  one  of  the  partitioned  parts  is  a  process  (usually  by  feature  analysis).   We  then  show 
that  the  special  condition  entails  that  the  other  part  is  a  process  in  virtue  of  being  identified  by  
the  same  processual  features  as  the  known  process.   
Those  familiar  with  mathematics  may  notice  that  the  special  condition  at  the  partition  
looks  a  lot  like  a  continuity  condition.   E.g.,  in  the  Dedekind  cut  construction  of  the  real  
numbers,  the  method  involves  first  producing  a  partition  in  a  set,  then  showing  that  both  
partitioned  parts  are  co-defined  at  the  partition  and  that  the  partition  can  be  moved  
infinitesimally  (this  is  the  equivalent  of  the  “non-instantaneity”  of  the  partition  between  parts  of  
an  experiment).   Our  argument  can  therefore  be  written  as:   
  
(P1)  Experiments  are  event  wholes  (i.e.,  single  events,  possibly  with  legitimate  compositional  
parts).   
(P2)  We  know  that  these  wholes  have  at  least  two  processual  parts:   our  act  of  observing  (the  
perceptual  process)  and  our  act  of  intervention  (the  manipulation  process).   
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(P3)  Experimental  wholes  can  be  completely  partitioned  into  parts  defined  by  our  acts  of  
observing  and  of  intervening.   
(P4)  All  parts  of  the  experimental  whole  not  identical  to  the  acts  of  observing  and  intervening  
have  features  defined  by  these  acts  in  virtue  of  them  being  continuous  (the  condition  of  
continuity).   I.e.,  the  physical  definition  of  the  partition  between  these  parts  is  
non-instantaneous  and  co-identifying.   
(C1)  Therefore,  all  parts  of  the  experiment  must  be  processual,  since  they  have  processual  
features.   
(C2)  Therefore,  there  are  real  processes  within  the  experimental  system  that  are  describable  
using  models  that  imply  or  refer  to  the  observation  and  intervention  acts  of  the  relevant  
experiments.   
(P5)  In  order  for  our  models  to  be  empirically  adequate,  they  must  contain  reference  to  or  
implication  of  a  class  of  observation  and  intervention  acts.  
(C)  Therefore,  our  empirically  adequate  models  must  describe  real  processes.   
  
Our  development  of  this  argument  pattern  into  one  capable  of  producing  true  realism  
(commitment  level  3—(C)  above)  will  involve  making  precise  the  continuity  condition  (P4)  that  
was  implicit  in  the  basic  argument,  and  making  precise  the  means  by  which  we  generally  identify  
parts  of  our  experiments  (P3).   We  begin  with  the  former.   
  
  
[1.4.2.1]:   Defining  Continuity  
  
  
Continuity  appears  in  philosophical  literature  as  both  premise  and  conclusion  to  many  
arguments.   Roughly,  there  are  four  types  of  continuity  that  are  used:  functional,  causal,  
spatiotemporal  (topological),  and  conceptual.   Common  to  all  of  these  is  the  idea  that  for  any  
continuous  entity  of  the  appropriate  type  (a  function,  a  causal  agent  or  client,  a  spatiotemporally  
extended  entity,  or  a  concept),  (a)  we  can  partition  the  entity  into  parts,  (b)  we  know  that  for  any  
such  partition  there  is  a  some  sense  in  which  the  partition  is  co-identifying  of  the  two  parts.   We  
might  reverse  this  and  say  that  for  any  two  entities  said  to  be  continuous  with  each  other,  we  
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know  that  there  is  some  co-identifying  boundary  between  the  two  without  which  the  two  cannot  
be  identified.   
For  example,  in  the  case  of  a  spatially  continuous  entity,  we  would  say  that  two  
partitioned  parts  of  the  entity  are  defined  as  parts  by  a  shared  boundary,  and  that  this  boundary  is  
the  sole  means  of  defining  them  as  parts.   In  other  words,  the  two  spatially  continuous  parts  
cannot  be  identified  as  separate  entities,  given  that  they  share  at  least  one  necessary  feature  in  
their  shared  boundary.   
We  could  make  this  more  precise  by  speaking  of  spatial  cuts  of  the  continuous  whole  
defining  sequences  along  spatial  dimensions,  and  noting  that  any  sequence  of  such  cuts  will  
necessarily  converge  to  another  cut  of  the  entity. 24    In  this  way,  we  would  say  that  the  entity  lacks  
“gaps”  or  “breaks.”   If  such  a  gap  were  present,  a  sequence  of  cuts  could  be  constructed  that  
would  converge  to  the  gap.   
This  simple  definition  of  continuity  is  enough  to  define  it  for  our  use.   Essentially,  we  
will  be  generalizing  the  mathematical  notion  of  continuity  to  enable  talk  of  continuous  parts  of  a  
single  general  entity  and  continuous  pairs  of  general  entities.   Namely:   
  
( Entity-Entity  Continuity ):   Two  entities  are  continuous  with  each  other  if  for  any  total  
identification  of  one,  that  identification  also  acts  as  a  simultaneous  partial  identification  
of  the  other  in  the  same  context  of  identification.   
  
And  equivalently:   
  
( Part-Whole  Continuity ):   Two  entities  are  continuous  whenever  there  is  some  third  entity  of  
which  both  are  parts,  for  which  both  completely  compose  the  whole,  and  such  that  all  
three  are  the  same  metaphysical  type. 25    
24  This  is  the  “complete  convergence”  condition  of  the  real  number  line  that  acts  as  a  differentiator  from  the  
rationals.   
25  This  is  the  less-obvious  version  of  the  continuity  condition.   One  might  say  that  atoms  in  molecules  or  the  various  
parts  of  an  organism  are  continuous  under  this  criterion,  which  would  be  dubious  claims.   However,  in  both  
instances,  the  criterion  fails  to  apply  (at  least  on  orthodox  interpretations  of  all  the  relevant  entities).   Importantly,  
the  atoms  in  a  molecule,  under  orthodox  thing-ontological  or  substance-ontological  interpretations  do  not  
completely  compose  a  molecule  on  their  own.   Instead,  they  require  some  third  non-substantial  entity—the  relation  
between  atoms  or  structure  of  the  molecule—to  form  a  mereological  whole.   Since  this  third  entity  is  not  the  same  
ontic  type  as  the  atoms  (on  thing-interpretations  of  atoms),  this  interpretation  does  not  meet  the  continuity  condition.  




In  short,  we  define  continuous  entities  by  their  lack  of  gaps.   If  one  entity  ends  (along  some  
considered  dimension),  that  end  must  define  the  beginning  of  the  other.   
This  definition  has  a  few  key  features  that  will  play  an  important  role  in  the  discussion  to  
come:   
(1) The  definition  is  entity-type  independent .   Importantly,  we  need  not  specify  what  sort  of  
entity  is  being  evaluated,  so  long  as  we  specify  how  we  identify  the  entity  and  are  
consistent  in  this  identification.   So,  for  instance,  metaphysical  substances  can  be  
continuous, 26   so  long  as  we  know  how  to  identify  them.   Therefore,  the  recognition  of  
continuity  does  not  presuppose  any  particular  ontological  posit,  which  is  essential.   
(2) The  definition  entails  the  corollary  that  no  two  entities  may  be  continuous  if  they  are  not  
of  the  same  metaphysical  type .   This  follows  from  the  requirement  that  both  entities  can  
be  either  identified  by  the  same  means  (e.g.,  with  the  same  properties  or  by  the  same  
methods)  or  that  together  they  completely  compose  a  context-sensitive  whole.   This  is  
essential  to  any  definition  of  continuity,  since  implicit  in  the  idea  of  continuity  is  that  the  
continuous  entities  flow  into  each  other  in  some  definable  manner.   E.g.,  if  I  move  my  
hand  in  a  circular  pattern,  part  of  the  motion  of  my  hand  flows  into  another  part  of  the  
motion  continuously,  and  we  recognize  this  because,  e.g.,  the  flux  of  kinetic  energy  in  the  
region  can  be  defined  with  a  continuous  function.   
(3) The  definition  does  not  entail  that  two  continuous  entities  need  to  be  the  same  physical  
type .   For  instance,  we  may  say  that  a  freshwater  river  and  the  ocean  are  continuous  with  
each  other,  despite  being  different  physical  mixtures  of  water  and  saline.   We  might  also  
say  that  the  motion  of  my  hand  is  continuous  with  (or  is  a  continuous  part  of)  the  motion  
of  the  door  I  open  with  it,  even  though  they  are  physically  distinguishable  by,  e.g.,  their  
electromagnetic  or  thermodynamic  signatures.   
(4) The  definition  can  be  used  to  claim  that  two  entities  are  continuous  if  we  can  do  one  of  
the  following :  
(a) Find  an  identification  method  for  one  entity  that  also  partially  identifies  the  other.  
This  is  because  any  total  identification  of  the  first  entity  must  include  the  
26  It  is  worth  noting  that  metaphysical  substances  are  not  primarily  understood  to  be  “stuffs”  like  mud,  but  are  
usually  understood  as  primarily  a  thing-like  entity  (and  these  are  discontinuous).   
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identification  that  acts  as  the  partial  identification  of  the  other.   The  definition  is  
weak  enough  to  allow  that  two  systems  can  be  continuous  in  one  sense  or  
experimental  context  while  discontinuous  in  another.   
(b) Find  a  system  that  is  a  whole  composed  out  of  the  two  entities.   For  this,  we  will  
need  to  show  that  the  whole  is  of  the  same  metaphysical  type  as  the  two  entities.  
This  is  to  preclude  the  so-called  unrestricted  composition  mereology  from  making  
continuity  an  empty  concept.   
(5) The  definition  allows  us  to  say  that  two  systems  are  metaphysically  continuous  while  also  
saying  that  the  systems  can  be  physically  isolated  with  the  right  methods .   This  is  
critically  important  for  the  practice  of  physics,  at  the  least.   One  of  the  tasks  of  the  later  
sections  is  to  show  that  the  metaphysical  continuity  we  locate  in  two  continuous  systems  
tracks  exactly  the  physical  continuity  of  their  respective  processes  as  described  in  our  
models.   We  do  not  need  to  show,  however,  that  two  systems  are  totally  continuous  in  
order  to  show  that  some  physical  continuity  between  systems  appears  as  an  essential  
feature  of  models  of  the  system,  and  therefore  is  a  necessary  process-metaphysical  posit  
of  the  model.   
With  this  definition  in  hand,  we  can  now  turn  to  the  most  complex  and  specific  version  of  the  
continuity  argument.   The  definition  will  become  relevant  in  §4.2.4.   
  
  
[1.4.2.2]:   Experiments  are  Wholes   
  
  
In  this  section,  I  merely  wish  to  defend  that  experiments  are  wholes  in  the  first  place,  
independent  of  what  type  of  entity  these  wholes  are.   The  argument  is  exceedingly  simple:  
experiments  are  wholes  because  we  can  name  them  as  singlet  events.   Here  is  Thomson’s  
experiment,  here  is  Pauli’s,  here  is  Hypatia’s,  here  is  Curie’s,  here  is  Franklin’s.   We  can  also  sort  
them  into  types,  if  we  so  wish:   a  Thomson  Scattering  experiment  and  a  Franklin  Spectroscopic  
experiment  are  identifiable  and  reidentifiable.   E.g.,  Thomson’s  Scattering  experiments  involve  
scattering  and  bombardment  and  electromagnetic  interaction  making  use  of  particular  tools  and 
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set  ups.   When  I  see  these  features  in  place—the  tools  being  used  properly,  the  interactions  and  
observable  changes  occurring  normally—I  recognize  a  Thomson  experiment.   
While  I  take  it  as  uncontroversial  that  experiments  are  wholes,  it  is  worth  noting  that  they  
are  not  wholes  of  necessarily  physical  substances.   Experiments  are  not  identified  in  the  same  
way  as  a  statue:   as  composed  of  a  particular  substance.   Even  experiments  in  chemistry,  
plausibly  experiments  on  particular  substances,  are  not  defined  by  those  substances  but  rather  by  
the  observations  and  interventions  performed  on  them.   We  may  say  that  the  experiment  
essentially  involves  the  particular  chemical  substance  being  studied,  but  we  would  not  say  the  
experiment  itself  is  that  substance,  even  in  part.   
The  upshot  is  this:   we  must  keep  in  mind  that,  if  we  wish  to  support  realist  claims  on  the  
basis  of  the  existence  and  features  of  experimentation,  we  must  ensure  that  our  inference  patterns  
are  appropriately  independent  of  the  particulars  of  any  single  experiment.   For  this  reason,  we  
rule  out  that  experiments  can  be  anything  other  than  events,  and  we  seek  to  ground  our  
inferences  to  realist  claims  in  only  the  mereological,  metaphysical,  and  conceptual  features  of  
this  special  type  of  event.   
  
  
[1.4.2.3]:   Partitioning  the  Experimental  Whole  
  
  
I  now  argue  that  experiments  can  indeed  be  partitioned  into  parts.   This  partitioning  is  the  
result  of  differentiating  the  act  of  observation,  the  system  dynamics  and  the  initial  dynamics  by  
means  of  perturbative  dynamics,  i.e.,  intervention  acts.   In  partitioning  the  experimental  whole  
into  these  parts,  we  define  the  scope  and  purpose  of  our  models,  the  description  of  the  
experimental  system.   This  means  that  our  partitions  of  experiments  into  parts  (intervention,  
system,  outcome  observation)  are  non-instantaneous  and  co-defining.   
Let  us  consider  a  simple  example  to  develop  this.    Consider  the  experiments  performed  
by  Rutherford  and  his  doctoral  students  on  the  scattering  of  alpha  particles  fired  through  sheets  
of  gold  foil.   In  this  experiment,  an  alpha-decaying  substance  is  prepared  in  a  lead  block  with  a  
small  aperture  so  that  the  emitted  alpha  particles  will  be  fired  in  a  single,  controlled  direction  at  
long  intervals  between  emissions.   These  alpha  particles  are  then  fired  toward  a  thin  sheet  of  gold  
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foil,  behind  which  sits  a  fluorescent  screen.   We  observe  that,  corresponding  to  each  emission  
event,  the  fluorescent  screen  flashes  with  light  in  a  small  region  on  the  screen.   By  treating  the  
alpha  particles  as  being  emitted  unidirectionally,  we  can  then  use  the  flashing  point  on  the  screen  
to  measure  the  deflection  of  the  alpha  particle  from  its  original  emission  trajectory.   We  then  
infer  that,  since  the  alpha  particle  will  not  interact  electromagnetically  with  anything  other  than  
the  gold  sheet,  that  the  deflection  is  the  result  of  the  alpha  particle  passing  through  the  screen.  
By  repeating  this  many  times,  we  can  use  statistical  analysis  to  calculate  the  approximate  size  of  
the  deflection  region  within  the  gold  sheet,  since  greater  deflection  will  correspond  to  a  greater  
electromagnetic  interaction  between  the  alpha  particle  and  the  gold  sheet.   Rutherford  then  used  
this  result  to  posit  (incorrectly)  that  this  strength  of  deflection  corresponds  to  the  size  of  the  
atom’s  positive  charged  substance,  and  to  construct  a  model  of  the  atom  now  known  colloquially  
as  the  “plum  pudding”  model.   
This  experiment  illustrates  the  means  by  which  we  isolate  and  differentiate  the  parts  of  an  
experiment.   The  experiment  as  a  whole  is  a  collection  and  statistical  analysis  of  the  temporally  
distinct  events  of  an  alpha  particle  following  a  particular  trajectory.   We  might  call  each  of  these  
events  “singlet  experiments.”   Each  singlet  experiment  consists  of  a  single  continuous  
electromagnetic  flux:   
(1) the  alpha  particle  (carrying  a  2e +   charge)  is  fired  out  of  the  lead  box,   
(2) follows  its  trajectory  up  until  the  gold  sheet,   
(3) has  this  trajectory  deflected  through  electromagnetic  interaction  with  the  gold  sheet,   
(4) flows  through  the  new  trajectory,   
(5) then  electromagnetically  interacts  with  the  fluorescent  screen  to  produce  a  flash  of  light  
(electromagnetic  radiation),   
(6) that  causes  our  eyes  to  respond  to  and  register  the  dynamic  end  of  the  process.   
We  immediately  recognize  that  the  experiment  consists  of  this  single  process  of  electromagnetic  
flux,  and  linguistically  codify  this  recognition  by  referring  to  the  process  as  “the  trajectory  of  the  
alpha  particle.”   However,  we  also  recognize  that  we  must  impose  divisions  on  the  singlet  
experiment  as  a  whole  in  order  to  appropriately  model  the  process,  and  potentially  to  infer  
something  interesting  about  the  phenomena  to  which  we  do  not  have  direct  access.   In  this  case,  
we  wish  to  use  this  process  as  a  means  to  measure  the  average  strength  and  size  of  the  deflection  
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of  the  alpha  particles,  so  that  we  can  learn  something  about  the  electromagnetic  properties  of  the  
gold  sheet.   We  therefore  divide  the  system  into  three  parts  when  we  go  to  model  the  experiment:   
(1) The  initial  trajectory  of  the  alpha  particle  
(2) The  final  trajectory  of  the  alpha  particle,  including  the  flash  of  light  on  the  screen  and  
that  light’s  propagation  into  our  eye  that  we  take  as  evidence  of  the  final  direction  of  the  
trajectory.  
(3) The  interaction  between  the  gold  sheet  and  the  alpha  particle,  which  is  assumed  to  take  
place  over  a  negligibly  small  (but  non-zero!)  period  of  time  for  the  sake  of  simplicity  in  
modeling.   
Now,  we  bring  in  counterfactuals.   If  it  were  not  for  the  gold  sheet,  (1)  and  (2)  would  be  
identical. 27    Therefore,  (3)  is  the  salient  dynamic  link  between  initial  and  final  trajectories.   Since  
we  believe  that  this  interaction  must  be  electromagnetic,  we  then  model  (3)  as  a  deflection  of  the  
trajectory  caused  by  proximity  to  an  electromagnetic  source  and  the  particle.   From  there,  the  
model  is  relatively  simple  to  construct.   
What  we  have  done  here  is  divide  what  was  once  a  single  continuous  event—the  singlet  
electromagnetic  flux  from  preparation  to  perception—into  three  parts.   One  of  the  parts—(1)—is  
uninteresting,  since  it  represents  the  dynamic  origins  of  the  dynamics  of  interest.   Another  
part—(2)—is  interesting  only  insofar  as  it  enables  our  analysis:   it  is  the  dynamics  of  the  system  
that  we  actually  observe  directly.   The  last  part  is  partitioned  from  the  other  two  by  the  assumed 
relevant  dynamics  of  the  system  we  are  studying.   Namely,  we  are  studying  the  nature  of  the  
electromagnetic  interactions  of  the  gold  sheet  with  other  known  electrodynamically  potent  
systems.   We  assume  that  these  interactions  are  responsible  for  the  difference  between  process  
(1)  and  process  (2).   We  are  allowed  to  assume  this  because  we  treat  the  presence  of  the  gold  
sheet  as  a  dynamic  perturbation  of  some  original  system.   The  electromagnetic  interactions  
between  the  gold  sheet  and  the  alpha  particle  are  the  source  of  the  dynamic  change  from  (1)  to  
(2)  because  counterfactually,  we  know  that  without  it  there  would  be  no  such  change. 28    This  
allows  us  to  say  that  the  process  that  occurs  between  (1)  and  (2)  is  both  real  (deflection  occurs)  
and  has  definite  calculable  properties  (the  deflection  has  a  characteristic  strength  and  local  
27  Note  that  this  turns  on  there  being  no  angular  difference  between  a  partitioned  trajectory,  and  thus  no  physical  
reason  to  partition  the  trajectory;  the  initial  trajectory  just  is  the  final  trajectory  if  both  are  the  whole  trajectory  
unpartitioned.   
28  In  fact  we  could  test  for  this  to  produce  further  counterfactuals.   
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region).   In  other  words,  the  divisions  between  initial  dynamics,  system  dynamics,  and  our  act  of  
observing  the  system  are  provided  for  by  the  assumed  or  known  dynamics  we  use  to  intervene  on  
the  system.    
This  generalizes.   Our  partition  of  the  experimental  system  pre-  and  post-intervention  is  
defined  by  that  intervention  (i.e.,  the  dynamic  context  (feature  (6)  of  §2).   Since  interventions  are  
processes  of  manipulation  or  perturbation,  and  are  therefore  non-instantaneous,  our  partition  is  
similarly  non-instantaneous.   This  means  that  the  boundaries  between  the  pre-  and  
post-intervention  system  are  defined  by  a  temporally  extended  interaction  or  transition.   To  put  it  
more  simply,  because  we  assume  that  our  interventions  actually  perturb  the  system,  we  implicitly  
posit  that  there  is  something  going  on  before  and  after  our  intervention,  with  the  intervention  as  
(part  of)  the  transition  between  the  two.   This  is  the  key  that  allows  us  to  apply  the  continuity  
argument.   
  
  
[1.4.2.4]:   Without  Process,  No  Models  
  
  
Our  experiments  have  parts,  including  the  processes  of  observation  and  intervention,  and  
any  other  parts  of  our  experiments  will  be  defined  by  those  processes.   It  remains  to  show  that  
these  other  parts  are  indeed  processes  themselves,  or  at  least  contain  processes  as  essential  
components. 29    The  argument  is  simple:   our  condition  of  continuity  applies  in  this  case,  and  so  
those  parts  of  experiments  described  by  our  models  must  be  of  the  same  ontic  type  as  the  
processes  of  observation  and  intervention.   Thus,  they  must  be  processes.   Further,  the  processes  
described  in  our  models  will  have  some,  but  not  all,  of  their  features  defined  by  the  processes  of  
observation  and  intervention  used  to  identify  and  differentiate  them  within  the  experimental  
whole.   This  includes  both  physical  and  metaphysical  features  of  those  processes.   E.g.,  
electromagnetic  interventions  will  necessitate  that  the  model-processes  are  electromagnetic  
processes  (or  at  least  electromagnetically  responsive  and  potent).   
29  Recall  that  we  will  later  rule  out  that  there  are  any  other  components  when  we  move  into  the  arguments  of  chapter  
2.   
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Although  it  is  intuitive  that  all  four  partitioned  parts  of  the  experiment—the  pre-  and  
post-intervention  system,  the  intervention  process,  and  the  perceptual  process  of  
observing—mereologically  combine  to  form  a  single  whole,  we  will  not  be  making  use  of  
Part-Whole  Continuity.   The  use  of  this  version  of  the  continuity  condition  is  legitimate,  but  feels  
too  easy.   Instead,  we  will  consider  only  Entity-Entity  Continuity  at  each  boundary  between  the  
post-intervention  experimental  system  and  the  other  parts.   This  post-intervention  system  is  the  
part  that  we  invariably  will  want  to  model  in  our  theories,  so  it  is  the  part  of  interest  to  the  realist.  
Importantly,  we  have  already  suggested  in  §4.1  that  the  act  of  observing  (the  perceptual  process)  
and  the  experimental  system  are  continuous,  so  we  will  not  consider  this  in  detail.   
Let  us  consider  the  boundary  between  the  pre-  and  post-intervention  system.   Since  both  
are  defined  at  their  partition  by  the  intervention,  both  have  as  identifying  features  the  features  of  
the  intervention.   Namely,  there  is  a  non-instantaneous  transition  between  the  two,  and  both  must  
be  temporally  extended  and  contextually  defined  by  the  type  of  process(es)  involved  in  the  
intervention.   As  discussed  before,  we  identify  the  evolution  of  the  system  before  and  after  
perturbing  it  with  our  intervention  by  noting  how  and  in  what  way  our  perturbation  changes  the  
evolution  of  the  system.  
This  means  that  Entity-Entity  Continuity  applies.   The  pre-intervention  and  
post-intervention  systems  are  only  what  they  are  in  virtue  of  there  being  a  particular  intervention  
that  transitions  the  former  into  the  latter.   Similarly,  partitions  between  the  pre-intervention  
system  and  the  intervention,  and  the  post-intervention  system  and  the  intervention,  will  meet  the  
requirements  of  Entity-Entity  Continuity.   
However,  there  is  a  more  striking  feature  of  the  partitions  of  the  experimental  whole  that  
we  can  discuss  in  order  to  make  the  continuity  condition  utterly  clear.   That  is,  since  the  
definition  of  the  boundaries  between  experimental  dynamics  rests  on  interventions  and  
interactions  between  subsystems,  and  since  we  know  that  no  interaction  or  intervention  is  
instantaneous,  we  can  construct  a  mathematical  representation  of  the  system  dynamics  for  which  
the  boundaries  are  defined  only  within  a  non-zero-magnitude  (though  possibly  arbitrarily  small)  
region  or  duration.   I.e.,  since  interventions  must  occur  and  affect  the  system  over  some  finite,  
non-zero  duration  epsilon,  and  since  this  defines  the  temporal,  dynamic  boundary  between  the  
pre-intervention  system  and  the  post-intervention  system,  this  boundary  is  necessarily  
determined  only  up  to  some  finite,  non-zero  duration  or  extent  delta .   Thus,  (as  we  should  
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suspect)  not  only  does  our  condition  of  continuity  apply,  we  can  equally  well  model  the  
partitions  of  the  experiment  mathematically  such  that  standard  mathematical  proofs  of  continuity  
(delta-epsilon  proofs)  can  be  constructed.   (Note  this  is  how  we  discuss  pre-  and  
post-intervention  systems  and  the  partition  between  them.   We  can  similarly  define  the  partition  
between  the  system  and  the  observer’s  sensory  response  to  the  system  in  terms  of  a  dynamic  
interaction  between  them.   Since  no  interaction  can  be  instantaneous,  we  get  a  similar  result:   we  
can  always  model,  for  every  experiment,  the  relevant  pragmatic  partitions  in  the  experiment  in  
terms  of  mathematically  continuous  functions  defined  with  the  temporal  variable.   Thus,  we  get  
mathematical  continuity  precisely  because  (and  which  entails)  there  is  dynamic  continuity).   
If  continuity  applies,  then  the  pre-  and  post-intervention  systems  must  be  processually  
defined,  just  like  the  intervention  itself.   We  can  show  this  by  simply  noting  that  the  applicability  
of  the  continuity  condition  entails  that  every  process-feature  from  §2  (save  for  features  (1)  and  
(2),  subjectlessness  and  generality)  can  be  found  in  the  parts  of  the  experimental  whole  in  virtue  
of  two  parts  of  this  whole  being  processual  (i.e.,  the  intervention  and  the  act  of  observation).   To  
avoid  repetition,  we  will  only  discuss  the  post-intervention  system  and  the  intervention.   
( Feature  3,  Occurrent-not-Continuant ):   The  intervention  is  non-instantaneous,  and  is  defining  of  
the  resultant  post-intervention  system.   The  post-intervention  system  therefore  is  defined  
by  its  having  undergone  some  dynamics,  or  by  its  continuing  to  undergo  some  dynamics.   
( Feature  4,  Uncountability  but  Measurability ):   The  intervention  comes  in  degrees  and  amounts,  
not  discrete  units.   The  post-intervention  system  will  therefore  respond  to  the  intervention  
in  proportion  to  these  degrees  and  amounts,  and  so  is  defined  by  the  degree  or  amount  of  
its  response  to  the  intervention.   
( Feature  5,  Determinability  but  indeterminate ):   The  intervention  is  not  statically  defined  by  its  
spatiotemporal  location  or  its  causal  effects,  but  rather  has  a  determinable  spatiotemporal  
extension  and  causal  function  relative  to  the  degree  of  influence  we  think  is  
non-negligible.   The  post-intervention  system  will  therefore  be  determinable  as  “the  
system  at  the  point  in  time  at  which  the  response  to  the  intervention  becomes  
non-negligible.”   
( Feature  6,  Dynamic  Contextuality ):   Related  to  feature  5,  the  intervention  only  counts  as  an  
intervention  in  virtue  of  it  having  a  determinable  non-negligible  effect  on  another  system  
that  responds  to  it.   I.e.,  it  has  a  necessary  dynamic  context.   Therefore,  the  
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post-intervention  system  has  as  its  dynamic  context  the  intervention  itself,  plus  any  and  
all  dynamics  that  persist  through  the  intervention  or  are  altered  by  it.   
( Feature  7,  Functionality  measurable  in  stages,  phases,  or  changes ):   the  function  of  the  
intervention  is  its  act  of  changing  the  experimental  system,  measurable  in  either  a  degree  
of  change  or  a  number  of  changes  in  a  variable  quantity  or  quality.   Therefore,  the  
post-intervention  system  will  be  functionally  dependent  on  this  degree  or  amount  of  
change.   It  will  acquire  (part  of)  its  function  from  how  these  changes  are  propagated  
forward.   Notably,  if  the  system  is  complex,  the  propagation  of  this  functional  origin  in  
the  intervention  will  involve  many  sequential  functional  transitions,  as  in  the  case  of  a  
nucleus  bombarded  with  a  neutron:   one  motion  is  propagated  into  the  motions  of  many  
by  sequential  collisions  and  recollisions.   
To  put  it  simply,  since  our  act  of  intervening  is  a  process,  and  it  is  continuous  with  the  
post-intervention  system,  the  post-intervention  system  must  be  processual  in  character.   I.e.,  it  is  
a  process,  with  some  as-yet-unknown  possibility  of  being  a  process  of  some  thing  or  collection  
of  things  (structures,  substances,  static  properties,  souls,  and  so  on).   We  are  therefore  justified  in  
calling  these  parts  of  an  experiment  “experimental  dynamics,”  and  we  are  justified  in  saying  that  
any  model  of  the  experimental  system  must  describe  or  identify  these  dynamics   I.e.,  there  is  a  
real  and  inferrable  process  external  to  the  observer  that  is  described  using  our  models.   
The  upshot  is  this:   if  our  models  hope  to  describe  experimental  systems,  and  so  be  
empirically  adequate,  they  must  describe  processes.   This  is  simply  because  the  portion  of  every  
experimental  system  that  we  have  reason  to  believe  must  exist  is  that  portion  that  is  continuous  
with  dynamics  like  our  interventions  and  acts  of  observing  (our  sensory  responses  to  the  system  
or  our  measurement  apparatuses).   To  quote  the  late  physicist  David  Finkelstein:   “In  a  quantum  









[1.5]:   Conclusion   
  
  
The  continuity  argument  allows  us  to  commit  to  processes  as  real  entities  on  the  basis  of  
experiment.   The  argument,  which  comes  in  three  levels  of  complexity,  enables  a  corresponding  
three  levels  of  specificity  about  which  processes  are  real  and  legitimately  inferrable  on  the  basis  
of  experiment  and  observation.   These  are:   
- Level  1:   We  are  allowed  to  commit  to  the  existence  of  processes  in  general,  because  no  
observations  are  possible  without  some  processes.   
- Level  2:   We  are  allowed  to  commit  to  the  existence  of  processes  in  our  experiments,  so  
long  as  they  are  parts  of  those  experiments,  because  the  experiments  are  wholes  with  
known  dynamic  parts.  
- Level  3:   We  are  allowed  to  commit  specifically  to  the  processual  parts  of  our  
experiments  that  are  (a)  unobservable,  and  (b)  described  in  our  models.   We  may  commit  
in  this  way  provided  the  processes  in  our  models  are  defined  as  the  processual  parts  of  the  
experiment  that  complete  the  mereological  composition  of  the  experimental  whole.   We  
may  commit  in  this  way  because  the  completion  of  this  whole  means  that  the  unobserved  
processes  described  in  our  models  are  not  metaphysically  or  physically  distinguishable  
from  the  processes  with  which  we  are  in  direct  contact.  
Consider,  for  instance,  the  Bohr  model  of  the  atom,  used  to  describe  the  spectral  emission  and  
absorption  of  light  of  particular  frequencies  by  hydrogen  atoms. 30    We  should  have  no  trouble  
admitting  that  the  emitted  light  (each  spectral  line)  is  real.   This  is  level  1  commitment:   there  are  
processes  in  this  experiment.   Level  2  commitment  comes  when  we  seek  to  say  that  there  are  real 
processual  parts  of  our  spectroscopic  experiment:   there  is  the  emission  process,  but  also  the  
processes  in  the  system  that  flow  into  the  emission  process.   Level  3  commitment  is  most  
specific,  and  is  the  commitment  level  of  interest  to  the  realist  about  scientific  models  and  
theories.   Namely,  level  3  commitment  comes  when  we  say  that  there  are  real  processes  
described  in  the  Bohr  model  and  wholly  contained  in  the  model  system  to  which  we  can  commit.  
Namely,  we  are  allowed  to  say  that,  because  the  transitions  between  energy  levels  are  described  
in  the  Bohr  model  as  being  the  continuation  of  the  dynamics  of  absorption  and  continue  into  the  
30  Note  that  the  type  of  atom  is  a  historical  accident,  and  a  simplifying  assumption,  not  a  necessary  defining  feature  
of  spectral  experiments.   
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dynamics  of  emission,  we  can  legitimately  claim  these  transitions  to  be  real  processes.   The  Bohr  
orbits  are  not  necessarily  real  (actually,  they  are  impossible),  but  the  dynamic  transitions  are  
definitely  real.   
Note  that  what  I  have  called  the  continuity  condition  is  not  actually  a  novel  contribution,  
except  insofar  as  I  have  named  it  and  described  it  using  standard  Western  analytic  philosophy.  
The  source  of  the  condition  is  actually  found  in  the  philosophies  of  Taoism,  Buddhism,  and  the  
Kyoto  School,  and  is  first  stated  explicitly  in  the  Dharmakirti  in  the  9th  century  CE.   In  these  
philosophies,  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  so-called  “external”  relations  and  “internal”  
relations.   External  relations  are  just  those  relations  we  are  used  to  in  analytic  philosophy:   they  
are  comparative  facts  or  independent  entities  that  obtain  or  exist  independent  of  the  nature  of  the  
relata.   Internal  relations,  however,  are  those  relations  that  mark  entities  that  are  inseparably  
interdefined,  such  that  the  two  cannot  be  said  to  be  metaphysically  independent  of  each  other.   In  
other  words,  internally  related  entities  are  just  those  for  which  a  defining  feature  of  one  is  also  
partially  defining  of  the  other,  i.e.,  entities  that  are  continuous.   
It  is  the  work  of  later  chapters  to  show  how  the  particulars  of  our  models  follow  the  
details  laid  out  here.   In  chapters  3,  4,  and  5,  I  develop  three  such  examples,  making  use  of  the  
arguments  here  and  in  chapter  2  to  show  how  historical  physics  conforms  to  the  continuity  
argument,  and  is  supplemented  by  it.   However,  before  this,  I  must  first  argue  that  things—the  
orthodox  static,  substantial  opposite  of  processes—cannot  be  reasonably  inferred  on  the  basis  of  
experiment  alone.   
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[2.1]:   Introduction  
  
  
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  argued  that  we  are  justified  in  inferring  the  existence  of  
processes.   Importantly,  this  was  because  our  experiments,  and  thereby  the  experimental  systems  
of  interest,  are  necessarily  defined  by  known  dynamics.   We  therefore  infer  that  there  must  be  
real,  describable  processes  in  experimental  systems,  and  that  these  will  form  at  least  some  of  the  
content  of  our  models  and  theories.   This  was  our  positive  argument  for  process  realism.  
However,  I  did  not  rule  out  that  there  is  additional  content  in  our  models,  or  that  there  are  
non-processual  parts  of  our  experiments.   While  it  is  necessary  for  all  parts  of  our  experiments  to  
at  least  be  dynamically  potent—to  have  the  potential  to  undergo  dynamics—it  is  not  necessarily  
true  that  they  must  be  actual  dynamic  processes.   
Indeed,  there  is  a  class  of  arguments  that  there  must  be  things—substances,  structures, 
souls,  static  properties,  etc.—to  underlie  processes.   These  arguments  originate  in  Aristotle’s 
argument  that  every  change  requires  a  substantial  underlier,  or  material  cause:   
  
“Now,  in  all  cases  other  than  substance  it  is  plain  that  there  must  be  something  
underlying,  namely,  that  which  becomes.   For  when  a  thing  comes  to  be  of  such  a  
quantity  or  quality  or  in  such  a  relation,  time,  or  place,  a  subject  is  always  
presupposed,  since  substance  alone  is  not  predicated  of  another  subject,  but  
everything  else  of  substance.  [...]  For  we  find  in  every  case  something  that  
underlies  from  which  proceeds  that  which  comes  to  be,”  ( Physics ,  190a31-b9). 31    
  
That  is,  no  change  or  dynamics  can  occur  independent  of  some  persistent  object  with  which  to  
identify  the  change  or  dynamics.   I.e.,  no  processes  can  exist  without  an  underlier.   I  call  
arguments  of  this  type  “underlier  arguments.”  
31  See  Cohen  (1984)  for  a  good  overview  of  the  debate  surrounding  Aristotle’s  underlier  argument,  and  Robinson  
(1974)  for  a  good  benchmark  discussion  of  Aristotle  on  Prime  Matter.   Note  that  Aristotle’s  argument  that  every  
change  requires  an  underlier  is  one  reason  why  many  take  Aristotle  to  be  necessarily  committed  to  the  idea  of  Prime  
matter,  to  underlie  substantial  change,  while  others  argue  that  the  underlier  of  substantial  change  need  not  be  some  
further  substance  beyond  the  five  elements.   This  very  debate  mirrors  the  analysis  that  I  offer  in  this  chapter.   
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This  argument  should  be  immediately  dubious  to  the  reader,  given  that  some  have  argued  
that  Aristotle  himself  considered  the  four  elements  as  basic  subjectless  activities, 32   and  more  
recently  in  view  of  work  done  by  Seibt  and  others  to  show  the  exact  opposite:   we  can  identify  
and  classify  dynamics  in  the  world  without  a  subject.   However,  underlier  arguments  come  in  
many  variations,  and  some  are  especially  prevalent  in  the  philosophy  of  science.   Namely,  
so-called  robustness  arguments.   
In  what  follows,  I  argue  that  the  essential  feature  of  every  underlier  argument  is  the 
assumption,  deduction,  or  induction  of  something  stable  within  one  or  more  experiments.   This,  
at  least,  is  legitimate.   However,  each  underlier  argument  further  treats  this  inference  to  
something  stable  as  an  inference  to  something  static .   This  entails  that  there  is  a  static  thing  
underlying  the  observed  dynamics  of  an  experiment.   However,  these  arguments  must  assume  
that  the  inferred  underlier  is  static,  not  merely  stable.   I.e.,  they  must  assume  that  any  relative  
stability  in  the  dynamics  of  experience  is  absolute  stability  (staticity).   If  they  do  not  assume  this,  
there  can  be  no  reason  to  suppose  that  these  stable  underliers  are  things  and  not  processes.   
Therefore,  the  process  realist  can  not  only  refute  these  arguments,  but  can  co-opt  them.  
The  key  is  to  note  that  the  stability-entails-staticity   assumption  is  false.   In  short,  I  argue  that  all  
we  can  reasonably  infer  is  that  there  is  something  more  stable  than  the  experimental  dynamics,  
rather  than  something  static.   This  allows  us  to  show  that,  when  an  inference  to  an  underlier  is  
warranted  in  the  first  place,  it  is  an  inference  to  a  more-stable  process,  not  to  a  static  thing.   
Crucially,  the  relativity  of  stability  is  something  only  permissible  as  a  feature  of  
processes.   Things  are  not  the  sort  of  entity  that  can  accept  degrees  of  stability:   a  thing  either  is  
or  is  not.   It  is  determinate .   A  process,  however,  is  only  ever  determinable,  and  admits  as  
identifying  a  dynamic  context  (c.f.  Ch  1,  §2,  features  5  and  6).   Therefore,  only  a  process  
ontology  can  account  for  the  relativity  of  stability.   This  means  that  our  negative  argument  
against  thing-underliers  is  also  a  positive  argument  for  process  realism.   
The  chapter  proceeds  thusly.   First,  I  will  offer  a  discussion  of  the  types  of  underlier  
arguments,  a  general  prescription  of  their  form,  and  the  key  differentiating  factors  in  how  they  
are  constructed  (§2).   I  also  proceed  through  each  of  the  underlier  arguments  I  have  collected, 
offering  a  reconstruction  following  my  prescription  of  form  and  a  refutation  (§2.1,  §2.2,  §2.3).  
This  will  present  us  with  an  inductive  base  for  constructing  a  general  refutation  of  underlier  
32  See  Gill  (1989).   
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arguments,  namely,  the  rejection  of  the  stability-entails-staticity  premise  (§3).   I  then  conclude  




[2.2]:   Underlier  Arguments  and  Their  Types  
  
  
Underlier  arguments  are  simple  in  form,  but  are  multifarious  in  their  precise  
manifestation.   The  form  is  as  follows:   
  
( Premise  1:   Stability  Exists )   There  is  some  stability  in  or  related  to  our  experience  
(experiments  are  a  subset  of  experience).   
( Premise  2:   Stability  Entails  Staticity )   Stability  entails  staticity,  i.e.,  the  unchanged  part  of  an  
experience  entails  an  unchanging  part  of  that  experience.   
( Conclusion:   There  is  Staticity )   Therefore,  there  is  some  static  thing  in  or  related  to  our  
experience.   
  
Underlier  arguments  differ  from  each  other  in  how  they  make  this  argumentative  form  precise  
and  particular.   To  do  this,  they  must  specify:   
(i)  What  stability  in  particular  exists,  and  in  what  way  it  is  stable  
(ii)  How  this  stability  is  not  relative,  i.e.,  how  this  stability  the  existence  of  something  
static,  and  what  that  static  thing  is.   
By  specifying  (i),  underlier  arguments  are  particularized  as  arguments  for  specific  things  to  
underlie  experimental  dynamics.   Restricting  ourselves  to  the  domain  of  scientific  experiments,  
models,  and  theory,  this  is  done  by  appealing  to  three  basic  features  of  science,  and  physics  in  
particular,  that  are  suggestive  of  real  stabilities.   Namely,  underlier  arguments  trade  on  (a)  the  
stability  of  experimental  outcomes  and  practices,  (b)  the  language  and  models  we  use  to  describe  
these  outcomes,  and  (c)  that  all  experiments  occur  in  a  material  world.   Each  of  these  features  is  
uncontroversial  when  it  is  present,  and  essential  to  any  reasonable  account  of  scientific  
experiment  and  modeling.   Thus,  nearly  all  underlier  arguments  have  an  uncontroversial  first  
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premise,  and  the  specifics  of  this  first  premise  define  what  type  of  underlier  argument  is  being  
applied.   Namely,  corresponding  to  (a),  (b),  and  (c),  we  get  three  types:   
(A)   Underliers  of  Experimental  Practice :   Underlier  arguments  that  trade  on  stability  
within  and  between  experimental  events  and  methods.  
(B)   Underliers  of  Descriptions  and  Model  Features :   Underlier  arguments  that  trade  on  
stability  of  our  language  and  the  models  we  use  to  describe  experiments.  
(C)   Underliers  of  Existence  and  Physical  Nature :   Underlier  arguments  that  trade  on  the  
stability  of  the  material/physical  world.   
However,  underlier  arguments  that  rely  on  these  three  features  of  science  must  also  justify  
premise  2,  how  stability  entails  staticity  (ii).   Namely,  each  underlier  argument  must  assume  or  
argue  that  the  uncontroversial  stability  in  scientific  experiments  and  practices  entails  the  
existence  of  staticity  in  the  form  of  a  static  thing.   If  the  argument  for  premise  (2)  is  deductive,  
this  involves  the  injection  of  additional  (and  often  subtle)  metaphysics  into  the  argument.  
However,  some  underlier  arguments  appeal  to  inductive  support  for  premise  (2)  instead.   These  
arguments  tend  to  fare  better,  and  are  usually  the  arguments  that  can  be  co-opted  by  the  process  
realist.   As  I  argue  in  this  section,  all  specifications  and  justifications  of  premise  (2)  fail.   This  
means  that  all  underlier  arguments  fail  to  justify  that  stability  is  anything  more  than  a  relative  
feature,  a  comparison  between  different  dynamics.   Since  processes  can  be  relatively  stable,  i.e.,  
stable  with  respect  to  other  processes,  this  in  turn  means  that  all  underlier  arguments  fail  to  rule  
out  that  the  underliers  of  stability  in  our  experiments  are  processes,  not  things.   
  
  
[2.2.1]:   Underliers  of  Experimental  Practice:   Stability  Within  and  Between  Experiments  
  
  
The  first  stable  feature  of  science  we  consider—the  stability  of  experimental  outcomes  
and  practices—is  threefold.   First,  in  every  experiment,  there  is  persistence.   In  other  words,  
every  experiment  exhibits  some  stability  that  persists  unchanged  through  the  dynamics  of  the  
experiment  (persistence  stability).   Second,  when  similar  experiments  are  performed  many  times,  
the  outcomes  of  those  experiments  are  stable.   That  is  to  say,  despite  the  minor  differences  in,  
e.g.,  who  by  and  where  the  experiment  is  performed,  similar  experiments  produce  similar  results  
(Similar  Experiment  Robustness).   Third,  when  many  different  experiments  are  performed  on  the  
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“same  system,”  certain  features  appear  within  that  system  as  constants  across  all  the  multifarious  
experiments  performed.   These  constants  are  said  to  be  robust  across  these  multifarious  
experiments,  i.e.,  tolerant  of  the  perturbations  inherent  in  the  interventions  performed  
(Systematic  Robustness). 33    
These  three  types  of  stability  all  appear  within  the  experiments  themselves,  rather  than  in  
our  descriptions  of  them  or  our  assumptions  about  how  they  are  manifest  in  the  world.   As  such,  
these  three  types  of  stability  support  three  types  of  underlier  argument  that  can  be  categorized  
under  a  single,  more-broad  type:   robustness  arguments.   Briefly,  all  robustness  arguments  trade  
on  the  fact  that  certain  aspects  of  our  experiments  persist  through  the  changes  and  dynamics  that  
define  those  experiments.   I.e.,  our  interventions,  and  the  dynamic  context  of  our  experimental  
setting,  do  not  affect  certain  parts  of  our  experimental  system  as  much  as  they  affect  others.  
Neutrons  won’t  respond  to  electromagnetic  perturbations  (up  to  a  certain  energy).   Molecules  of  
water  do  not  respond  to  the  thermodynamic  perturbations  involved  in  boiling  the  water.   Etc. 
These  underlier  arguments  then  go:   if  there  is  an  aspect  of  our  experiments  that  is  stable  
with  respect  to  experimental  interventions  and  dynamics,  then  it  must  be  an  unchanging  thing. 34   
I.e.,  if  there  is  such  stability/robustness  within  and  between  our  experiments,  there  must  be  some  
static  entity  that  underlies  the  experimental  dynamics  to  explain  this  stability/robustness.   As  
with  all  undelier  arguments,  it  is  this  last  inference—from  stability  to  staticity—that  is  
unwarranted.   
33  Those  who  employ  and  defend  such  robustness  arguments  are  consistently  opposed  to  the  arguments  I  present  in  
this  chapter.   For  more  on  robustness  in  general,  see  Eronen  (2015),  Llyod  (2010,  2015),   Schupback  (2010,  2015,  
2016),  Stragenga  (2009,  2012),  and  Stragenga  and  Menon  (2017).   The  robustness  literature  is  also  rich  with  
examples  from  biology,  climate  science  (of  which  Llyod  is  one),  and  physics,  which  I  will  not  cite  here.   Needless  to  
say,  the  common  refrain  of  this  chapter—that  stability  is  relative,  not  absolute—will  provide  us  with  an  interesting  
way  of  co-opting  robustness  arguments  in  favor  of  the  process  realist.   Namely,  since  robustness  is  relative  (it  
depends  on  a  certain  context  and  comparison),  physically  robust  features  of  experiments  are  robust  in  virtue  of  being  
processes  with  a  characteristic  energy  greater  than  the  class  of  perturbations  being  considered.   I  return  to  this  point  
in  §3.   
34  There  is  a  nuance  here  that  is  worth  mentioning:   robustness  arguments  in  the  literature  can  be  both  epistemic  and  
ontic.   Many  arguments  in  the  robustness  literature  are  focused  on  the  epistemic  side:   that  multifarious  means  of  
measurement  and  description  entail  stronger  certainty  about  the  experimental  outcomes.   At  first  pass,  these  
epistemic  robustness  arguments  would  seem  not  to  make  the  inferences  I  have  attributed  to  them.   However,  implicit  
in  most  of  these  is  the  ontic  argument:   that  whatever  is  robust  across  experiments  is  real .   This  is  because  the  
epistemic  argument  is  only  interesting  because  we  wish  to  know  what  entities  science  commits  us  to  explicitly.   I.e.,  
our  knowledge  about  experiments  is  directly  linked  to  our  ontological  commitments  to  entities  within  our  
experiments.   Thus,  while  many  robustness  arguments  do  not  seem  ontological  in  their  first  reading,  nearly  all  of  
them  are  indeed.   Those  papers  I  have  cited  above  make  this  abundantly  clear,  either  through  their  allusion  to  ontic  
relevance  or  through  their  explicit  claims.   In  what  follows,  I  attempt  to  cite  only  those  instances  of  robustness  
arguments  that  are  seeking  an  ontic  interpretation  of  experiments.   
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[2.2.1.1]:   Persistence  Stability   
  
  
[2.2.1.1.1]:   The  Characteristic  Underlier  Argument  
  
  
Persistence  stability  is  the  sort  that  appears  when  some  aspect  of  a  system  persists  
through  experimental  dynamics.   Consider,  for  example,  taking  a  small  sample  of  copper  sulfate  
and  placing  it  within  a  candle  flame  (the  intervention).   The  copper  sulfate  reacts  with  the  other  
combustion  components  and  the  candle  flame  turns  green.   These  changes,  leading  from  the  
intervention  to  the  change  in  color  of  the  candle  flame,  are  the  experimental  dynamics.  
However,  throughout  these  dynamics,  the  candle  flame’s  shape  remains  unchanged,  as  do  the  
convection  currents  around  the  candle  flame,  (some  of)  the  chemical  products  of  combustion  
such  as  water  vapor,  the  chemical  makeup  of  the  combustion  fuel  (the  Paraffin),  and  the  
production  of  light  through  incandescence.   It  is  because  of  these  persistent  features  of  the  
system  that  we  say  that  the  candle  flame  changes  color.   
In  other  words,  there  is  some  entity  in  our  experiment  that  persists  despite  the  changes  
and  dynamics  within  the  experimental  system.   This  entity  is  stable,  unaffected  by  the  
interventions  we  perform  or  the  goings  on  in  the  system.   Moreover,  there  must  be  such  a  
persistent  entity  in  every  experiment.   While  all  experiments  involve  some  change  in  the  
system-plus-observer  continuum,  this  change  is  necessarily  contrasted  with  some  aspect  of  this  
continuum  that  remains  unaffected  by  the  interventions  performed. 35    It  is  a  natural  enough  
assumption  to  make  that  this  persistent  entity  is  a  static  entity,  i.e.,  a  thing.   Therefore,  the  
thing-realist  argues  that  things  underlie  experimental  dynamics  because  every  experiment  must  
include  a  persistent  thing.   In  more  precise  form,  this  argument  goes:   
  
( Persistence  Underlier  Argument ):  
35  Oddly  enough,  this  is  a  key  part  of  Wesley  Salmon’s  so-called  causal  process  account  of  causation:   the  
recognition  of  a  “mark”  that  is  transmitted  in  every  causal  process  (Salmon  1984,  1994,  c.f.  Reichenbach  1935,  
1956).   Phil  Dowe  (1992,  1995,  2000,  2003)  also  adopts  this  in  his  slightly  different  account  of  causation,  where  
“marks”  are  given  physical  definition  as  “conserved  quantities.”   Arguably,  neither  account  can  be  considered  a  pure  
process  realist  account,  since  neither  account  takes  seriously  that  processes  are  basic.   However,  both  have  value  for  




(P1 PS ):   There  must  be  a  persistent  entity  within  (an/every)  experiment.   
(P2 PS ):   A  persistent  entity  is  necessarily,  or  necessarily  contains,  a  static  entity  (stability  entails  
staticity).  
(P3 PS ):   A  static  entity  is  a  thing  (there  are  no  static  dynamics—I  omit  this  premise  in  most 
cases).  
(C PS ):   Therefore,  there  is  at  least  one  thing  in  (an/every)  experiment.   
  
(P1 PS )  is  uncontroversial,  as  is  (P3 PS ).   For  this  argument  to  work,  we  need  only  to  justify  (P2 PS ),  
that  stability  entails  staticity.   
To  do  this,  thing  realists  have  offered  many  justifications  in  the  past.   For  example,  one  
argument  common  to  early  modern  philosophers  like  Descartes  and  Locke  goes  that  a  persistent  
entity  consists  of  properties  that  can  change  and  properties  that  cannot  (secondary  and  primary  
properties  respectively). 36    It  is  because  there  are  such  unchanging  properties  that  an  entity  is  
capable  of  persisting.   The  unchanging  properties  of  the  entity—its  static  essence—explains  its  
persistence. 37    Put  another  way,  staticity  grounds  the  stability  of  persistence,  and  so  persistence  
entails  the  existence  of  (some)  staticity.   In  the  case  of  Descartes  at  least,  this  argument  was  
meant  to  provide  a  foundation  for  scientific  theory  and  practice  (Moore  2012,  Ch  1). 38   
36  See  Descartes  (Meditations  I)  and  Locke   (“On  Identity  and  Diversity,”)  for  their  relevant  views.   For  a  more  
detailed  gloss  on  Descartes’  view  in  the  context  of  debates  on  perdurance  and  endurance,  see  Gorham  (2010).   For  a  
more  detailed  gloss  on  Locke,  see  Strawson’s  (2011)  commentary  in  the  cited  work  by  Locke  above.   Locke’s  view  
is  couched  in  terms  of  personal  identity,  not  strict  haeccity  or  the  nature  of  physical  entities  in  general,  but  it  is  no  
less  relevant  for  this.   
37  This  argument  is  actually  quite  difficult  to  locate  in  the  work  of  any  one  particular  philosopher.   Nevertheless,  it  
has  existed  at  least  since  Aristotle’s  time,  through  the  Scholastic  interpretation  of  Aristotle,  and  up  to  more  recent  
debates  about  the  nature  of  temporal  parts  and  persistence.   As  already  mentioned,  Aristotle  (190a31-b9)  is  the  first  
instance  of  an  argument  that  every  change  is  grounded  in  a  material  substrate.   More  recent  debates  about  
persistence  are  found  within  the  literature  on  perdurance  and  endurance,  largely  as  a  result  of  first  the  seminal  work  
by  McTaggart  (1908,  1927)  and  by  later  work  by  Lewis  (1976,  1986,  especially  pg  202).   Most  interestingly  for  our  
current  discussion,  Wasserman  (2016)  offers  an  argument  that  the  debate  about  temporal  parts  is  the  result  of  a  
conflation  of  the  ontological  question  (whether  objects  have  temporal  parts)  and  the  epistemological  question  of  
whether  objects  persist  in  virtue  of  those  temporal  parts.   In  other  words,  Wasserman  explicitly  shows  that  the  debate  
about  temporal  parts  is  motivated  by  the  desire  to  explain  persistence  in  terms  of  static  states  and  parts  of  being.   See  
also  Wasserman  (2003,  2004,  2005,  2006).   The  most  explicit  recognition  of  the  persistence  argument  comes  in  
Wiggins  (1980,  2001).   
38  Moore  also  remarks  that  Descartes’s  very  epistemological  project  is  to  discover  that  which  is  “stable  and  likely  to  
last”  ( ibid ,  29).   This  suggests  the  further  point  that,  for  early  modern  philosophers  following  in  the  Cartesian  
tradition,  one  of  the  core  projects  for  grounding  scientific  theory  was  to  provide  a  vindicating  epistemology  to  show  
how  science  produces  stable  claims,  in  addition  to  being  about  stable  entities  and  facts.   
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More  recently,  the  literatures  on  temporal  parts  and  personal  identity  contain  implicit  
justifications  of  premise  2  of  the  persistence  underlier  argument.   That  is  to  say,  because  these  
literatures  often  rely  on  persistence  arguments  to  justify  their  core  points,  these  literatures  
contain  implicit  appeals  to  various  methods  of  justifying  premise  2. 39    For  example,  one  account  
of  personal  identity  goes  that  a  person  is  identified  by  those  psychological  parts  of  them  that  
remain  unchanged  through  mental  and  physical  changes  (the  psychological  continuity  view).  
Similarly  to  Aristotle’s  argument,  as  long  as  there  is  some  part  of  the  person’s  psychology  that  
remains  unaffected  by  changes  in  their  mental  or  physical  state,  they  can  remain  the  same  person  
through  these  changes. 40    Another  view  holds  that  personal  identity  is  maintained  by  there  being  
a  single  biological  organism  that  remains  unchanged  across  time. 41    Yet  another  view  holds  that  a  
single  person  is  identified  as  the  recurrent  referent  for  the  protagonist  in  a  story  or  narrative. 42    In  
all  of  these,  diachronic  persistence  is  explained  by  there  being  something—psychological  core,  
brute  biological  fact,  or  narrative  referent—that  remains  unchanged  through  the  inevitable  
dynamic  of  progression  through  time.   
Similarly,  the  literature  on  temporal  parts,  especially  those  papers  focusing  on  the  
so-called  problem  of  change—alternatively  and  tellingly  renamed  the  “problem  of  temporary  
intrinsics”  (Lewis  1986a,  203-4)—contains  reference  to  static  underliers  of  persistence.  
Endurantists  hold  that  change  is  defined  as  a  difference  of  state  between  two  times.   The  change  
in  a  system,  then,  is  grounded  in  there  being  some  constant  between  those  two  states:   the  
endurant  object.   E.g.,  a  bud  changes  into  a  flower  over  time,  and  we  can  say  this  because  
throughout  the  change  from  bud-state  to  flower-state,  other  aspects  of  the  plant  organism  remain  
identical  (only  the  shape  changes). 43    Of  particular  interest  amongst  endurantists  is  Melia  (2000),  
who  argues  explicitly  in  favor  of  enduring  things  over  processes.   In  contrast  (if  we  can  call  it  a  
contrast  at  all),  the  perdurantist  and  stage  theorist  argue  that  it  is  only  because  objects  have  
39  C.f.  Wasserman  (2016),  who  argues  that  in  the  literature  on  persistence,  there  is  an  implicit  conflation  of  the  
explanation  of  persistence  and  whether  or  not  entities  have  temporal  parts.   
40  For  more  on  this  see  Garrett  (1998),  Hudson  (2001,  2007),  Johnston  (1987,  2016),  Lewis  (1976),  Nagel  (1986:  
40),  Noonan  (2003,  2011),  Parfit  (1971,  1995,  2012),  Perry  (1972),  Shoemaker  (2008,  2011),  and  Unger  (1979,  
1990:  ch.  5;  2000).   
41  For  more  on  this  “brute  physical  identity”  view,  see  Ayers  (1990:  278–292),  Carter  (1989),  Mackie  (1999),  Olson  
(1997),  van  Inwagen  (1990,  1997),  and  Williams  (1956-7,  1970).  
42  For  more  on  the  Narrativist  view,  see  Schechtman  (1996,  2001)  and  Schroer  and  Schroer  (2014).    Strawson  
(2008)  and  Olson  and  Witt  (2019)  criticize  the  narrativist  view.  See  also  DeGrazia  (2005).  
43  For  more  on  Endurantism,  see  Fiocco  (2010),  Merricks  (1994),  Hinchliff  (1996),  Zimmerman  (1998);   See  also  
Johnston  (1987),  Haslanger  (1989a,  b),  and  Lowe  (1987),  for  adverbialist  positions  (derived  in  part  from  Sellars’  
1952  work).  
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temporal  parts  that  they  can  be  said  to  change.   E.g.,  the  plant  is  said  to  blossom  because  there  is  
a  temporal  part  of  the  plant  that  is  a  bud,  and  a  temporal  part  that  is  a  flower,  and  these  temporal  
parts  appear  within  the  same  four-dimensional  object. 44    Interestingly  enough,  endurantists  
criticize  this  position  because  they  see  it  as  not  describing  real  change. 45    Regardless  of  these  
differences,  in  each  explanation,  the  persistence  of  a  manifestly  changing  object  is  explained  by  
there  being  something  unchanging—the  core  3D  object,  or  the  4D  object—that  either  gains/loses  
new  properties  or  else  has  static  parts  at  different  times  that  manifest  different  properties. 46   
The  key  to  these  defenses  of  premise  2  is  that  they  are  all  deductive.   Persistence  entails  
staticity  because  of  a  priori  principles  about  what  sort  of  entity  can  (in  the  minds  of  the  thing  
realist)  persist.   That  is,  (a)  only  objects  with  property-sharing  temporal  parts  can  persist,  (b)  only  
objects  without  intrinsic  temporally-indexed  properties  can  persist,  (c)  only  objects  with  some  
unifying  and  unchanging  biological  referent  can  persist,  and  so  on.   Refuting  these  arguments,  




44  For  more  on  Perdurantism,  see  Hudson  (2001),  Lewis  (1971,  1976,  1986),  Quine  (1950,  1960),  and  Robinson  
(1982).   Stage  theory  offers  a  slightly  different  explanation  of  change,  although  one  with  a  similar  spirit.   F or  stage  
theory  see  Sider  (1996,  2000;  2001)  and  Hawley  (2001,  chapter  1).   For  alternatives  to  endurantism  and  
perdurantism,  see  Brower  (2010),  Ehring  (1997;  2001),  MacBride  (2001),  and  Simons  (2000).   Most  interesting  for  
our  discussion  here,  Klein  (1999)  argues  that  genuine  change  cannot  be  captured  by  either  endurantism  or  
perdurantism.   Klein  is  therefore  most  in  line  with  the  process  realist  position,  although  not  an  explicit  advocate  of  
it.   See  also  Meincke  (2018a,  b).  
45  For  more  on  this  criticism,  see  McCall  and  Lowe  (2009),  McTaggart  (1927),  Mellor  (1998,  section  8.4),  Oderberg  
(2004),  and  Simons  (1987).   The  argument  offered  in  various  forms  by  these  authors  is  quite  similar  to  arguments  
offered  by,  e.g.,  Henri  Bergson  (1896)  and  William  James  (1890,  1909)  that  continuous  experience  cannot  be  
reconstructed  from  static  stages  or  states  put  in  order.   A  similar  argument  is  offered  by  Aristotle  (anachronistically)  
and  his  interpreters  regarding  the  real  numbers,  namely  that  no  number  of  points  can  be  used  to  reconstruct  the  
continuum.   Similarly,  the  authors  cited  here  argue  that  temporal  parts  cannot  simply  be  arranged  in  order  to  
reconstruct  the  continuous  flow  of  change.   Of  these,  Orderberg  (2004)  is  most  in  line  with  the  process  realist,  in  that  
he  argues  that  there  is  no  puzzle  to  be  solved.   Heller  (1992)  argues  that  there  is  such  a  puzzle  (the  problem  of  
change),  and  that  there  is  genuine  change  to  be  found  in  endurantism.   See  Lombard  (1994)  for  a  response  to  Heller.  
See  also  Botterell  (2004).   
46  I  confess,  I  long  found  this  debate  troubling,  as  have  many  process  theorists.   Change  is  not  to  be  defined  by  
reference  to  static  things.   Change  is  change.   The  flower  doesn’t  grow  from  the  bud  because  bud  and  flower  are  
different  stages  of  one  entity,  the  flower  grows  from  the  bud  because  the  bud  blossoms.   The  change  is  primitive,  
observable,  and  inalienable.   The  reason  why  there  is  a  “problem  of  change”  in  the  first  place  is  precisely  because  
thing  realists  have  long  dominated  philosophical  and  scientific  discourse.   For  good  arguments  to  this  effect,  see  
Seibt  (1990),  who  argues  that  the  problem  of  change  is  the  result  of  a  complex  of  22  assumptions  made  in  substance  
(or  thing)  metaphysics.   For  more  recent  arguments  against  the  problem  of  change,  see  Hansson  (2007),  Hofweber  
(2009),  Rychter  (2009),  and  Seibt  (2008).   Raven  (2011)  offers  a  response,  arguing  that  there  is  indeed  a  problem  of  
change.   See  Einheuser  (2012)  for  a  summary  of  the  debate.   
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[2.2.1.1.2]:   The  Refutation  
  
  
The  persistence  underlier  arguments  rests  on  establishing  deductively  that  persistence  
entails  something  static.   However,  this  is  false.   Persistence  does  not  entail  the  existence  of  a  
static  unchanging  entity.   Whatever  persists  in  our  experiments  is,  admittedly,  unchanged  by  our  
interventions  or  the  dynamics  within  the  system.   However,  this  does  not  entail  that  these  
persistent  entities  are  unchanging .   In  other  words,  persistence  within  an  experimental  system  
alone  is  insufficient  to  conclude  that  there  is  something  static,  not  when  we  could  equally  
conclude  that  there  is  a  persistent  set  of  dynamics  that  are  unaffected  by  the  interventions  we  
perform.   
Therefore,  to  justify  P2 PS ,  the  thing  realist  must  adopt  additional  deductively  stronger  
premises  about  the  nature  of  persistence.   We  saw  a  few  examples  of  this  above.   If  such  
premises  were  adopted  solely  for  the  sake  of  establishing  that  persistence  entails  staticity,  the  
premises  would  beg  the  question.   For  example,  consider  the  position  of  the  radical  endurantist  
who  holds  that  persistence  can  only  be  interpreted  as  the  duration  of  an  unchanging  structure  or  
collection  of  unchanging  properties.   This  assumption  in  this  context  presumes  the  conclusion:  
that  persistence  entails  the  existence  of  something  static.   Similarly,  if  one  argues  as  the  early  
modern  philosophers  did  that  persistence  results  from  the  existence  of  a  core  or  primary  set  of  
properties  that  are  unchanging,  one  similarly  begs  the  question.   
The  situation  is  slightly  complicated,  however.   Most  of  the  authors  I  surveyed  above  are  
interested  in  resolving  an  existing  problem  within  thing/substance  ontology.   In  short,  the  
assumptions  about  persistence  are  not  merely  meant  to  establish  the  existence  of  static  things,  but  
also  are  used  to  meet  various  other  explanatory  needs.   
For  example,  it  seems  natural  to  suppose  that  my  ability  to  reidentify  some  persisting  
portion  of  an  experimental  system  is  grounded  in  something  like  mathematical  identity.   In  other  
words,  I  can  identify  this  spectroscope  now  with  that  spectroscope  then  because  the  respective  
systems  each  have  some  set  of  properties  X  and  Y  for  which  equation  X  =  Y  holds  true.   This  
would  be  one  more  nuanced  reason  to  suppose  that  the  persistent  system  is  defined  by  some  
collection  of  properties  that  are  unchanged.   
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There  are  two  problems  with  this  particular  account  of  persistence.   First,  even  if  we  must  
understand  various  instances  of  persistence  in  this  way,  this  does  not  entail  staticity  of  the  
cross-temporally  identical  properties.   It  could  very  well  be  the  case  that  X  =  Y  is  true  across  the  
relevant  duration,  but  ceases  to  be  true  across  greater  durations.   I.e.,  the  property  X  could  be  
time-scale  sensitive,  in  that  for  durations  less  than  some  value  T,  X  is  unchanging,  but  for  
durations  greater  than  T,  X  changes.   For  example,  we  might  say  that  a  radioactive  atom  is  like  
this:   persistent  (with  moment-to-moment  identity  of  atomic  number)  for  time  scales  less  than  the  
average  half  life  of  the  element,  not  persistent  for  greater  time  scales.   
Second,  and  more  interestingly,  it  seems  unlikely  that  such  a  static  definition  of  
persistence  will  ever  successfully  track  the  physics  of  any  experimental  system,  even  the  
persistent  aspects  of  it.   This  is  to  say,  the  history  of  physics  seems  to  rule  out  that  any  system  is  
absolutely  persistent.   In  virtue  of  being  characterized  by  energy,  physical  systems  are  
susceptible  to  energy  fluctuations.   We  may  discuss,  e.g.,  the  motions  of  molecules  in  a  gas  when  
we  heat  or  cool  the  gas.   We  may  even  say  that  the  molecule  is  a  persistent  entity  in  this  gas.  
However,  we  know  that  the  molecule’s  structure  and  composition  are  only  persistent  and  stable  
in  the  gas  because  we  are  not  perturbing  the  system  with  enough  energy  to  break  this  structure.  
Our  claim  that  the  molecule  persists  is  true  only  because  we  are  observing  and  experimenting  
with  its  structure  in  a  way  that  does  not  destroy  it.   
All  systems  in  physics  are  perturbable  in  this  way.   Even  properties  like  charge  in  an  
electron  system  can  be  gained  or  lost  under  the  appropriate  perturbations  (e.g.,  the  introduction  
of  appropriate  fluctuations  in  the  quantum  electrodynamic  field).   While  there  are  some  systems  
that  we  cannot  manipulate  directly,  we  nevertheless  know  that  their  persistent  aspects  are  
manipulable  and  perturbable.   
We  are  therefore  put  in  the  position  of  asking  what  benefit  could  be  gained  from  
presuming  that  the  persistent  parts  of  our  experiments  are  static.   If  we  know  that  they  are  only  
unchanged  by  the  experimental  dynamics,  why  should  we  suppose  that  they  are  unchanging ?  
There  are,  perhaps,  good  reasons  to  suppose  this  in  metaphysics.   An  unchanging  persistent  
provides  a  clear  and  effective  means  of  characterizing  cross-temporal  reidentification.   An  
unchanging  persistent  allows  for  the  definition  of  persistence  in  terms  of  definite  determinants  
like  static  properties  of  states  at  a  moment  in  time.   However,  when  we  move  to  the  domain  of  
physically  realized  experiments,  we  need  to  admit  that  all  of  the  persistent  entities  we  recognize  
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in  those  experiments  are  not  necessarily  unchanging  persistent  entities.   There  may  be  some  
such,  but  the  burden  of  proof  lies  on  the  thing  realist  to  produce  examples.   
Moreover,  process  ontology  can  admit  of  cross-temporal  reidentification  such  that  
processes  can  successfully  ground  statements  of  persistence.   The  fact  that  one  possible  dynamic  
shape  (C.f.  Ch1,  §2)  is  the  cyclic  process  proves  this.   Cyclic  processes  like  pendular  or  
harmonic  motions  can  allow  us  to  mark  the  coincidences  between  the  cyclic  process  and  another  
process.   Once  we  have  marked  these  coincidences,  we  can  further  mark  out  various  features  of  
the  non-cyclic  process.   If  that  process  has  the  same  processual  features  between  coincidences,  
then  we  can  say  it  is  the  same  process.   Finally,  once  we  have  cross-temporal  reidentification  of  a  
process,  we  can  use  this  process  as  a  comparison  between  processes.   This  allows  us  to  say  that  
one  process  is  “faster”  than  the  other,  or  is  otherwise  less  stable.   The  more  stable  process  can  
then  be  said  to  persist  through  the  less  stable  process.   
Indeed,  since  most  apparatuses  built  to  measure  or  record  time,  and  so  to  record  
persistence  at  a  basic  level,  involve  cyclic  processes  should  suggest  to  us  that  persistence  is  not  
necessarily  a  thing-specific  concept.   Everything  from  light-clocks  to  grandfather  clocks  make  
use  of  cyclic  or  at  least  recurrent  dynamics  in  order  to  measure  the  duration  of  events.   It  would  
therefore  be  unwise  to  suppose  that  the  persistence  underlier  argument  can  successfully  rule  out  
that  the  persistent  parts  of  our  experiments  are  processes  rather  than  things.   
Finally,  as  I  argue  later,  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  claims  about  stable  persistence  
should  be  understood  in  terms  of  processes  and  not  things,  not  merely  that  we  could  do  so.   This  
is  because  all  stability  statements  involve  a  relativity  assumption:   something  is  stable  with  
respect  to  something  else.   In  the  case  of  persistence,  we  can  reconstruct  this  relatively  simply:  
All  persistence  claims  are  true  in  virtue  of  the  persisting  entity  being  compared  to  some  smaller,  
cyclic  process.   E.g.,  I  would  say  that  a  table  persists  in  virtue  of  having  comparably  unstable  
systems  that  undergo  noticeable  change  much  faster,  systems  like  light  clocks,  decaying  atoms,  
candle  flames,  and  air  currents.   This  means  that  for  every  persistence  claim,  we  can  interpret  it  
in  terms  of  relative  energy  or  time  scales  of  comparable  systems.   A  table  typically  lasts  for  years  
in  roughly  the  same  structure.   A  candle  flame  changes  in  seconds,  and  candles  change  in  hours.  
Persistence,  then,  is  relative  to  time  scales.   Process  ontology  can  account  for  this;  processes  are  
assumed  to  be  temporally  extended  with  characteristic  time  scales.   Thing/substance  ontology  
will  find  it  difficult.   Thus,  the  persistence  underlier  argument  either  fails  (because  it  can’t  rule  
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out  that  processes  are  persistent  underliers)  or  can  be  co-opted  (because  we  can  alter  it  to  infer  
the  existence  and  features  of  further  processes  or  processual  features).   
  
  
[2.2.1.2]:   Replication  Robustness  
  
  
[2.2.1.2.1]:   The  Characteristic  Underlier  Argument  
  
  
The  second  type  of  stability  we  see  in  our  experiments—single-experiment  
robustness—is  a  feature  of  the  repetition  of  an  experiment.   Namely,  when  we  perform  one  
intervention  on  similar  systems,  we  notice  that  the  observed  outcomes  are  similar.   For  example,  
suppose  that  you,  I,  and  another  scientist  all  take  a  candle,  light  it,  and  introduce  a  sample  of  
copper  sulfate  into  the  combustion  region  using  a  pair  of  tweezers.   All  three  of  us  will  observe  
that  the  candle  flame,  once  yellow,  now  burns  green.   Moreover,  all  three  of  us  will  observe  that  
our  particular  flame’s  shape,  its  incandescence,  the  water  vapor  rising  from  it,  etc.  remain  
unchanged.   In  short,  all  three  of  us  observe  similar  experimental  outcomes,  both  in  terms  of  
what  changes  in  the  system  and  what  remains  unaffected  as  a  result  of  our  similar  interventions.  
I.e.,  our  experimental  outcomes  are  stable  in  replication.   
According  to  the  thing  realist  this  similarity  between  experimental  outcomes  must  be  
explained  in  terms  of  some  feature  of  the  replicated  experiment  that  is  statically  similar  in  all  
three  instances.    For  example,  in  our  candle  flame  experiment,  we  must  look  for  some  aspect  of  
our  three  experiments  that  identifies  the  systems  as  “the  same”  system.   Similarly,  we  must  look  
for  some  aspect  of  the  experimental  outcomes  with  which  to  identify  each  of  our  outcomes  as  
“the  same”  experimental  result.   The  thing  realist  argues  that  these  identifying  features  must  be  
static  things  present  in  the  system  because  we  may  only  consistently  refer  to  such  static  things.  
Thus,  the  stability  of  replicated  experiments  (their  outcomes  and  features)  entails  the  existence  of  





( Replicability/Similarity  Underlier  Argument ):  
  
(P1 R ):   Identifiably  Similar  or  Replicable  experiments  produce  similar  results.  
(P2 R ):   Experiments  are  identifiably  similar  because  they  share  static  things  within  their  systems  
to  which  experimental  descriptions  refer  and  on  which  experimental  results  depend  
(stability  entails  staticity).  
(C R ):   Therefore,  There  are  static  things  that  underlie  similar  or  replicable  experiments.   
  
Once  again,  (P1 R )  is  uncontroversial  (when  it  obtains)  and  it  is  only  (P2 R )  that  requires  support.   
Notice  that  there  is  far  more  work  going  on  in  (P2 R )  than  it  might  initially  seem.   Support  
for  this  premise  must  include  a  defense  of  the  claim  that  experiments  are  verifiably  similar  as  the  
result  of  some  feature  of  the  system  and  the  set-up  of  the  experiment.   Such  a  defense  can  be  
found  in  the  literature  on  replicability. 47    However,  we  must  note  that  this  literature  often  relies  
on  arguments  from  other  domains  to  support  claims  about  what  makes  two  experiments  similar,  
or  one  experiment  replicable. 48    An  important  example  comes  from  Schmidt  (2009),  who  in  turn  
draws  from  Hendrick  (1991)  and  Radder  (1996,  2003,  2006,  c.f.,  2009,  c.f.,  2012).   Both  define  
one  of  the  key  functions  of  exact  replication  (i.e.,  the  replication  I  have  described  here)  as  the  
verification  that  previous  experiments  were  not  the  result  of  chance  or  specific  laboratory  
conditions.   Exact  (direct,  concrete,  literal)  replication  is  contrasted  with  inexact  or  conceptual  or  
constructive  replication  in  which  variables  in  the  experiment  are  purposefully  altered  in  order  to  
further  build  upon  previous  experiments. 49    What  is  described  as  inexact  replication  will  be  
subject  of   §2.1.3.  
  
  
47  See  especially  Nosek,  Spies,  and  Motyl  (2012)  for  summary  and  paradigmatic  accounts.   Steinle  (2016)  criticizes  
their  argument  that  science  must  be  replicable  from  an  historical  perspective.  
48  For  example,  Gómez,  Juristo,  and  Vega’s  (2010)  account  of  replication  defines  five  manners  in  which  two  
experiments  may  be  identical  (and  thus  five  ways  for  replications  to  diverge  from  their  parent  experiment):  
spatiotemporal  location,  experimenter,  apparatus  or  interaction  between  experimenter  and  system,  measurement  
conventions  and  “operationalizations,”  and  so-called  population  properties.   They  draw  these  types  from  a  survey  of  
literatures,  including  existing  examples  of  replicated  studies,  and  so  their  account  is  reasonably  comprehensive  of  
the  literature.   
49  For  more  on  the  distinction  between  exact  and  inexact  replication  (and  the  benefits  of  each),  see  Keppel  (1982),  
Lykken  (1968),  Sargent  (1981),  Schmidt  (2009),  drawing  from  Gómez,  Juristo,  and  Vegas  (2010)  and  Radder  (1996,  
2003,  2006,  2009,  2012).   
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[2.2.1.2.2]:   The  Refutation  
  
  
Much  like  the  persistence  argument  before  it,  the  success  of  the  replicability/similarity  
argument  rests  squarely  on  the  success  of  (P2 R ),  the  stability  entails  staticity  premise.   In  much  
the  same  way  as  the  persistence  argument,  the  process  realist  can  refute  or  co-opt  this  argument  
by  rejecting  or  modifying  this  premise.   The  modification  is  this:   experiments  are  plausibly  
similar  not  because  of  their  shared  static  things,  but  rather  because  of  their  shared  dynamics.  
When  we  compare  two  experimental  systems,  we  appeal  primarily  to  the  specifics  of  the  way  we  
intervene  on  the  system,  what  sorts  of  dynamic  controls  we  have  in  place  to  prevent  outside  
interference  (perturbations  from  an  uncontrolled  source),  etc.   Our  appeal  to  the  similarity  of  two  
experiments  is  also  the  result  of  noticing  that  we  actually  observe  the  system  in  the  same  way:  
when  we  observe  similar  outcomes,  we  are  interacting  with  our  individual  experimental  systems  
in  a  similar  way  to  each  other. 50    In  our  candle  flame  example,  we  all  interact  with  our  particular  
flame  electromagnetically,  and  this  interaction  has  a  characteristic  energy,  rendering  our  vision  of  
the  flame  “green.”   In  short,  we  appeal  to  the  dynamic  features  of  the  experiments  primarily.   
Moreover,  supposed  non-dynamic  similarities  between  experiments  can  also  be  defined  
in  terms  of  the  processes  within  the  system.   For  this,  we  need  only  recall  that  persistent  features  
of  the  system  can  be  understood  in  processual  terms.   If  persistent  features  of  the  
experiment—the  types  of  tools  used,  the  variables  modeled,  etc—can  be  processually  defined,  
and  the  experimental  dynamics  are  processes,  there  is  no  need  to  suppose  the  existence  of  things  
in  order  to  explain  similarity  or  replication.   Thus,  piggybacking  on  the  response  to  the  
persistence  underlier  argument,  the  replicability/similarity  underlier  argument  is  easily  refuted.   
We  might  have  expected  this,  taking  the  continuity  argument  of  chapter  1  seriously.  
Experiments  are  basically  and  most  modestly  dynamic  continua:   temporally  extended  dynamic  
activities  in  the  world  beginning  with  us  intervening  and  ending  with  us  observing  the  evolution  
of  a  system.   We  might  further  posit  that  there  are  stable  features  of  the  experiment  that  allow  us  
50  This  account  is  similar  to  that  found  in  Norton  (2015),  who  argues  that  there  is  no  universal  principle  of  
replicability,  but  rather  that  replicability  is  established  by  similarity  in  background  facts  of  experiments,  things  like  
the  interventions  performed  and  our  preexisting  knowledge  of  how  these  interventions  affect  various  features  of  
experimental  systems.   While  not  explicitly  process  realist,  I  believe  this  account  and  argument  can  be  easily  
modified  to  be  so  by  simply  noting  that  the  background  facts  to  which  Norton  appeals  will  inevitably  be  processual  
in  character.   Processes  have  the  uniqueness  and  contextuality  of  identification  necessary  to  provide  for  Norton’s  
local-inference  account  of  replicability  because  they  are  general  entities  defined  in  part  by  a  dynamic  context.   
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to  replicate  the  experiment.   However,  fundamentally,  we  cannot  replicate  an  experiment  by  
reproducing  these  stable  features  alone.   We  only  replicate  an  experiment  successfully  when  we  
perform  similar  interventions  and  engage  in  similar  acts  of  observing  a  system.   
Indeed,  the  similarity  between  experiments  is  relative  to  these  dynamics.   Suppose  I  (1)  
observe  one  candle  flame  with  my  eye,  and  (2)  observe  another  with  an  infrared  sensor,  leaving  
the  interventions  the  same  in  both  instances.   The  similarities  between  (1)  and  (2)  are  apparently  
contextually  dependent  on  exactly  this  difference  in  dynamics:   the  act  of  observing  the  system  
in  both  (1)  and  (2)  is  similar  in  that  both  involve  electromagnetic  interactions,  but  different  in  
what  subclass  of  electromagnetic  interactions  are  being  considered.   If  we  wished  to  say  that  we 
had  replicated  an  experiment  revealing  that  candles  emit  light  across  a  specific  spectrum,  both  
(1)  and  (2)  count  as  relevant  experiments  for  this.   However,  if  we  wished  to  say  that  candles  can  
produce  thermodynamic  fluctuations  in  the  air,  (1)  is  less  relevant  than  (2)  because  of  the  
difference  in  the  nature  of  our  dynamic  observations .   
Therefore,  as  before,  the  replicability/similarity  argument  for  thing  underliers  fails  to  rule  
out  that  the  similarity  between  two  experiments  is  a  similarity  of  dynamics,  not  statics. 
Moreover,  once  more,  we  have  reason  to  suppose  that  a  process  account  of  this  similarity  will  
prove  similarity  because  of  relativity  considerations.   Namely,  because  similarity  between  
experiments  is  relative  to  the  context  in  which  we  interpret  them  (and  use  them  to  draw  
inferences), 51   we  have  reason  to  suspect  that  there  can  be  no  absolute  similarity  or  difference  
between  experiments.   Process  ontology  admits  of  such  context  dependence  as  a  defining  feature  
(Ch1,  §2). 52    Thing/substance  ontology  will  need  a  good  deal  of  additional  metaphysical  
structure.   Once  more,  an  underlier  argument  can  be  easily  co-opted  into  an  argument  for  
processes.   
  
  
51  This  is  a  greatly  discussed,  and  sufficiently  proven  point  in  philosophy  of  science.   Namely,  many  authors  have  
remarked  on  the  context-sensitivity  of  the  interpretation  and  usefulness  of  experiments.   See  especially  Rehg  (2009a,  
b,  c),  who  both  surveys  the  literature  and  presents  an  argument  to  the  effect  that  the  context  of  practice  and  
purpose—i.e.,  the  dynamics  of  intervention  and  observation  techniques—are  key  components  to  defining  similarities  
between  experiments  (to  allow  for  the  communication  between  experimentalist  groups  and/or  theorists).   See  also  
Davidson  (2001).  
52  While  clearly  not  committed  to  process  realism,  Ross  (forthcoming)  offers  compelling  arguments  (c.f.,  especially  
8-9)  to  the  effect  that  we  are  actually  better  off  in  causally  complex  systems  describing  the  key  features  of  the  
experiment  in  terms  of  a  single  causal  process  (a  pathway  or  mechanism)  for  the  sake  of  replicating  and  
understanding  the  experiment  as  replicable  or  its  results  as  communicable.   
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[2.2.1.3]:   Systematic  Robustness  
  
  
[2.2.1.3.1]:   The  Characteristic  Underlier  Argument  
  
  
The  third  form  of  stability  we  observe  within  our  experiments  is  the  stability  of  features  
of  a  single  system  under  many  different  interventions. 53    When  we  perform  many  different  
interventions  on  a  single  system,  we  inevitably  observe  many  different  dynamics  within  the  
system  leading  to  many  different  observed  outcomes.   However,  regardless  of  these  differences,  
the  systems  upon  which  we  perform  these  interventions  remain  comparable.   I.e.,  each  of  the  
systems  retain  certain  features  that  are  unchanged  by  each  of  our  many  interventions,  and  the  
corresponding  dynamics  within  the  system.   In  short,  the  system  has  features  that  are  robust  in  
our  experiments. 54    
For  example,  suppose  I  introduce  copper  sulfate  in  my  candle  flame,  while  another  
experimenter  introduces  strontium  chloride,  and  another  introduces  calcium  chloride,  and  
another  introduces  potassium  sulphate  and  potassium  nitrate  (in  a  3:1  ratio).   In  each  of  our  
experiments,  we  will  observe  a  different  colored  flame:   green,  red,  blue,  and  violet  respectively.  
However,  in  each  of  our  experiments  certain  features  of  our  experiments  remain  unchanged.  
Namely,  the  shape  of  the  candle  flame,  the  fact  that  combustion  is  occurring,  the  fact  of  
incandescence,  the  existence  of  certain  combustion  features,  etc.   
This  is  the  simplest  form  of  systematic  robustness.   In  each  of  our  different  experiments,  
we  arrive  at  different  experimental  outcomes  while  certain  aspects  of  the  system  remain  
unchanged.   These  unchanged  aspects  are  called  the  robust  features  of  the  system.   The  
corresponding  underlier  argument  that  trades  on  this  robustness  can  therefore  be  thought  of  as  an  
induction  over  the  first  underlier  argument  we  considered.   Namely,  we  have  four  different  
experiments,  and  therefore  four  different  potential  persistence  arguments.   We  then  see  that  in  
each  of  these  experiments,  the  same  entities  are  persistent,  and  so  the  persistence  arguments  all  
share  the  same  particular  claims  about  what  persists.   By  induction,  we  therefore  suggest  that  
these  entities  must  be  the  persistent  entities.   Crucially,  we  do  not  claim  that  they  are  persistent  
53  As  already  mentioned,  this  has  been  called  inexact,  constructive,  and  conceptual  robustness  or  replicability  of  an  
experiment.  
54  This  is  perhaps  the  strongest  argument  in  favor  of  thing-underliers,  apart  from  the  unification  argument  to  come.   
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on  the  basis  of  purely  metaphysical  reasoning,  e.g.,  that  these  entities  must  be  present  in  any  
persistent  system.   Rather,  we  support  that  these  entities  must  be  the  persistent  entities  in  the  
system  by  induction  over  many  experiments.   We  therefore  arrive  at  a  modified  version  of  our  
earlier  persistence  argument: 55    
  
( Systemic  Robustness  v1 ):  
  
(P1 SR1 ):   There  must  be  a  persistent  entity  within  (an/every)  experiment.  
(P2 SR1 ):   In  many  interventions  on  the  same  system,  the  same  persistent  entity  (entities)  appears  
(contingent  experimental  fact).  
(C1 SR1 ):   Therefore,  this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanged  by  all  experimental  dynamics  
involved  in  each  of  the  experiments,  e.g.,  it  is  unperturbed  by  any  of  the  many  
interventions  (inductive  base).   
(C2 SR1 ):   Therefore,  this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanging,  because  it  is  unchanged  by  many  
dynamics  and  interactions  (inductive  generalization).   
(C SR1 ):   Therefore,  there  is  a  static  thing  in  (an/every)  experiment.   
  
In  short,  we  have  replaced  (P2 PS1 )  (persistence  stability  entails  staticity)  in  the  persistence  
underlier  argument  with  an  induction  over  many  experimental  interventions.   Namely,  we  induce  
that  since  the  same  entity  remains  unchanged  under  several  interventions  and  experimental  
dynamics,  that  entity  will  be  unchanged  under  all  dynamics  in  the  system.   I.e.,  the  stability  
55  A  good  historical  example  of  this  sort  of  argument  is  the  investigation  of  the  rate  of  downward  acceleration  of  
material  bodies.   The  candle  flame  example  I  provide  is  simpler,  and  is  historical  as  well,  but  is  perhaps  a  little  
simplistic.   
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under  many  dynamic  changes  exhibited  by  this  entity  entails  its  staticity. 56    This  induction  is  
therefore  no  more  than  an  inductive  means  of  supporting  premise  2  in  the  persistence  argument.   
The  success  of  this  argument  will  rest  on  the  strength  of  the  inductive  step.   (C2 SR1 )  can  
only  work  if  (C1 SR1 )  is  assured.   Unfortunately,  our  simple  example  of  robustness—that  of  many  
different  alterations  of  the  color  of  the  candle  flame—does  not  produce  a  sound  induction.   This  
is  because  our  many  interventions  on  the  system  all  have  roughly  the  same  character:   we  
introduce  a  new  element  into  the  combustion  reaction  and  observe  the  change  in  color  of  the  
candle  flame.   As  a  result,  the  similarities  between  our  experiments  are  manifold;  we  could  
conclude  that  anything  from  the  shape  of  the  candle  flame  to  the  chemical  nature  of  the  
combustion  products  is  a  persistent  and  unchanging  entity  within  the  system.   In  many  ways,  
while  we  are  performing  manifestly  different  interventions  on  the  candle  flame  system,  this  
experiment  (and  the  resultant  robustness  v1  argument)  is  too  similar  to  the  replication-robustness  
argument  of  the  previous  section.   
Therefore,  we  might  improve  the  robustness  argument  by  making  the  differences  between  
our  experiments  more  striking.   For  example,  rather  than  4  different  experiments  that  all  
manipulate  the  same  dynamics  within  the  system—e.g.,  the  production  of  light  of  a  specific  color  
in  the  candle  flame—we  might  instead  manipulate  many  different  aspects  of  the  system.  
Suppose  that  I  manipulate  the  color  of  the  candle  flame,  but  another  uses  a  different  sort  of  wax  
for  their  candle,  and  another  uses  a  differently  shaped  candle  stick.   In  each  of  these  cases,  we  
disturb  different  features  of  the  candle  flame  system:   I  disturb  the  color,  while  the  other  
experimenters  disturb  the  ratios  of  the  chemical  products  of  combustion  and  the  shape  of  the  
flame  respectively.   
56  The  key  difference  between  the  persistence  argument  and  this  robustness  argument  lies  in  the  induction  performed  
in  the  latter.   The  persistence  argument  and  its  critical  premise—premise  2  that  stability  entails  staticity—were  
supported  deductively  from  first  principles.   This  meant  that  the  proponent  of  the  persistence  argument  needed  to  
support  their  second  premise  with  quite  powerful  (and  dubious)  assumptions.   However,  the  robustness  argument 
seeks  instead  to  support  its  critical  premise  through  induction.   This  means  it  does  run  the  risk  of  begging  the  
question,  but  does  fall  prey  to  the  problems  of  induction.   Notable  amongst  these  problems  is  the  problem  of  
underdetermination,  which  is  a  problem  unique  to  robustness  arguments  in  particular.   See  Duhem  (1914),  Goodman  
(1955),  Mill  (1867),  and  Quine  (1975,  1990)  for  the  typical  locus  of  underdetermination.   See  Laudan  (1990)  for  a  
criticism  of  the  radical  scope  of  underdetermination  arguments.   See  also  Belot  (2015),  Norton  (2008),  Stanford  
(2001,  2006)  for  less  radical  approaches  to  underdetermination  (though  each  accepts  the  underdetermination  
problem,  none  see  it  as  requiring  radical  skepticism  about  the  scope  and  rationality  of  science).   See  Chakravartty  
(2008)  for  a  defense  of  realism  against  underdetermination.   Note  that  the  problem  of  underdetermination  is  not  one  
I  am  seeking  to  resolve  in  this  discussion,  but  I  do  believe  process  realism  presents  a  novel  solution  in  virtue  of  
being  independent  from  the  thing-realist’s  robustness  arguments.   In  other  words,  processes  are  not  underdetermined  
because  we  do  not  need  to  inductively  infer  their  features  in  the  same  manner  that  we  infer  the  features  of  things.   
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Our  robustness  argument  now  looks  like:   
  
( Systemic  Robustness  v2 ):  
  
(P1 SR2 ):   There  must  be  a  persistent  entity  within  (an/every)  experiment.   
(P2 SR2 ):   In  many  interventions  on  different  features/aspects  of  the  same  system,  the  same  
persistent  entity  appears  (contingent  experimental  fact).   
(C1 SR2 ):   Therefore,  this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanged  under  all  experimental  dynamics  
involved  in  each  of  the  experiments,  e.g.,  it  is  unperturbed  by  any  of  the  many  
interventions  (inductive  base).   
(C2 SR2 ):   Therefore,  this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanging  under  all  experimental  dynamics  
because  it  is  unchanged  under  many  dissimilar  dynamics  of  a  single  system  (inductive  
generalization).   
(C SR2 ):   Therefore,  there  is  a  static  thing  in  (an/every)  experiment.   
  
The  strength  of  this  argument  (compared  to  version  1)  comes  from  the  strengthening  of  the  
inductive  step.   In  short,  the  fact  that  the  stability  we  observe  is  unchanged  in  multiple  dissimilar  
interventions  entails  that  it  is  unchanged  in  dissimilar  dynamics.   This  in  turn  suggests  
inductively  that,  no  matter  what  is  going  on  in  the  system  dynamically,  that  stable  entity  will  be  
unchanged.   Were  we  capable  of  producing  a  list  of  all  possible  dynamics  the  system  could  
undergo,  this  argument  would  provide  a  sufficiently  strong  formalism  for  determining  if  that  
system  were  truly  static.   In  essence,  version  1  of  the  robustness  argument  performed  an  
induction  over  only  a  single  case,  while  version  2  performs  an  induction  over  many  cases.   
However,  this  second  argument  is  still  not  as  strong  as  we  might  like.   The  stability  in  the  
system  may  just  be  a  quirk  of  the  system  itself.   Since  all  interventions  are  performed  on  this  
same  system,  we  have  no  way  of  knowing  if  the  observed  stability  will  persist  outside  of  the  
dynamics  of  that  system.   This  means  that  (C2 SR2 )  is  dubious;  even  if  we  could  say  that  our  
observed  stability  is  unchanged  under  all  interventions  and  dynamics  within  our  single  system,  
this  does  not  thereby  entail  that  it  is  unchanged  under  all  interventions  and  dynamics.   The  
inductive  generalization  (C2 SR2 )  requires  the  universality  of  the  inductive  base:   the  unchanged  
entity  must  be  unchanged  in  every  system  under  any  intervention.   
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We  therefore  make  one  final  improvement  to  the  systemic  robustness  argument.  Suppose  
that  we  not  only  make  the  differences  in  our  interventions  on  a  single  system  more  striking,  but  
we  also  perform  these  manifold  interventions  on  different  systems  entirely.   For  example,  I  light  
a  candle,  and  another  experimenter  ignites  wood,  and  another  ignites  gasoline.   No  longer  are  the  
components  of  our  experimental  systems  the  same,  nor  our  interventions.   If,  in  such  a  case,  we  
all  observe  the  same  stabilities,  this  would  provide  strong  evidence  that  this  stability  is  present  
universally—it  persists  both  through  different  interventions  and  across  different  physical  
systems.   In  our  example,  we  might  notice  that  in  all  cases,  Oxygen  is  always  present  in  the  
combustion  of  the  system.   Thus,  we  might  conclude  that  Oxygen  is  a  static  thing  that  underlies  
the  process  of  combustion.   
This  gives  us  the  final  form  of  the  systemic  robustness  argument:   
  
(Systemic  Robustness  Argument):   
  
(P1 SR ):   There  must  be  a  persistent  entity  within  (an/every)  every  experiment.  
(P2 SR ):   In  many  interventions  on  different  features  of  one  system,  the  same  persistent  entity  
appears  (contingent  experimental  fact  1)  
(C1 SR ):   Therefore,  this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanged  under  all  experimental  dynamics  
involved  in  each  of  the  experiments;  it  is  unperturbed  by  any  of  the  many  interventions  
on  the  single  system  (inductive  base).  
(C2 SR ):   Therefore,   this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanging  under  all  experimental  dynamics  
because  it  is  unchanged  under  many  dissimilar  dynamics  of  a  single  system  (inductive  
generalization).   
(P3 SR ):   In  interventions  and  experiments  on  different  systems,  the  same  persistent  entity  appears  
(contingent  experimental  fact  2).   
(C3 SR ):   Therefore,  this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanged  under  all  dynamics  involved  in  the  
separate  systems  (inductive  base)  
(C4 SR ):   Therefore  this  persistent  entity  must  be  unchanging  under  all  dynamics  in  all  systems.   
(C SR ):   Therefore,  by  (C2 SR )  and  (C4 SR ),  there  is  a  static  thing.   
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This  version  of  the  argument  involves  two  inductions.   The  first  induction  is  meant  to  establish  
that  there  is  an  entity  that  is  unchanging  within  a  single  system.   This  is  just  what  was  done  in  
version  2.   The  second  induction  is  meant  to  establish  that  this  unchanging  thing  is  unchanging  
outside  the  context  of  that  single  system.   This  second  induction  is  not  performed  over  specific  
interventions,  but  rather  over  systems.   The  inductive  step,  then,  is  to  infer  that  if  the  persistent  
entity  is  unchanging  within  many  systems,  and  it  is  unchanging  under  many  interventions  on  
each  of  those  systems,  it  is  unchanging  universally.   A  universally  unchanging  entity  is  nothing  
more  than  a  static  entity,  a  thing.   Thus,  by  combining  these  two  inductions,  the  thing  realist  
produces  a  strong  argument  for  the  claim  that  there  is  at  least  one  static  thing  to  underlie  
experimental  dynamics.   
  
  
[2.2.1.3.2]:   The  Refutation  
  
  
Crucially,  the  robustness  argument  is  inductive.   Refuting  it,  therefore,  is  not  as  simple  as 
noting  the  failure  of  its  deductive  principles.   While  this  does  means  that  the  Systemic  
Robustness  Argument  inherits  various  problems  of  induction,  it  is  much  stronger  as  an  argument  
for  static  things  than  the  other  arguments  we  have  so  far  considered.   However,  a  similar  line  of  
reasoning  is  still  available  to  the  process  realist.   Namely,  the  Systemic  Robustness  Argument 
still  fails  to  rule  out  that  the  persistent  underliers  are  processes  and  not  things.   This  is  because  
the  second  induction—induction  over  all  experimental  systems—is  illicit,  even  if  the  
first—induction  over  interventions  and  perturbations—is  justified.   It  will  prove  difficult  to  
provide  the  necessary  general  principles  with  which  to  reasonably  model  all  possible  
experimental  systems.   Without  such  principles,  we  cannot  know  that  we  have  successfully  ruled  
out  experimental  systems  in  which  the  persistent  entity  we  are  considering  fails  to  persist.   In  
short,  the  second  induction  will  be  underdetermined.   
The  first  induction—that  a  stable  entity  persistent  through  some  dynamics  in  a  system  
will  persist  through  all  dynamics  in  a  system—is  somewhat  justified.   If  we  define  our  “system”  
by  some  characteristic  set  of  dynamics,  it  becomes  very  easy  to  exhaustively  test  those  dynamics,  
or  at  least  those  types  of  dynamics.   For  example,  in  our  candle  flame  example,  we  might  say  
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that  a  candle  system  is  characterized  by  combustion,  convection,  capillary  action,  incandescence,  
evaporation,  melting,  and  cooling  processes.   Even  if  the  token  instances  of  these  processes  in  a  
particular  candle  system  differ  subtly  from  those  in  another  candle  system,  they  will  still  be  
instances  of  the  same  dynamics.   Thus,  if  we  test  each  of  these  dynamics  and  observe  the  same  
emergent  stabilities,  we  can  reasonably  say  that  these  stabilities  are  stable  with  respect  to  all  of  
the  dynamics  within  the  candle  system.   
The  reason  we  need  the  second  induction,  then,  should  be  apparent.   Namely,  an  entity  
that  is  stable  with  respect  to  the  dynamics  in  a  candle  system  will  not  thereby  be  stable  with  
respect  to  all  dynamics.   For  this  to  be  true,  there  would  need  to  be  no  dynamics  in  the  
world—no  interactions,  motions,  etc.—beyond  those  in  the  candle  system.   By  testing  for  these  
same  stabilities  in  systems  other  than  the  candle,  we  widen  the  scope  of  the  dynamics  with  
respect  to  which  the  considered  entity  is  stable.   Thus,  we  build  evidence  that  this  entity  is  not  
only  stable,  but  static.   
However,  unlike  the  finite  collection  of  characteristic  type-dynamics  within  a  candle  
system,  the  dynamics  within  the  world  are  infinite.   Any  change,  any  interaction,  any  motion  is  a  
type  of  dynamics  within  the  world.   As  a  result,  our  induction  from  the  stability  of  the  considered  
entity  to  its  staticity  will  necessarily  be  an  induction  from  finite  facts  to  infinite  scope.   This  
means  that,  in  order  to  perform  the  second  induction  necessary  to  complete  the  robustness  
argument,  we  would  need  some  sort  of  universal  material  fact 57   or  principle  to  justify  that  the  
dynamics  we  have  tested  are  not  meaningfully  different  from  those  we  haven’t  tested.   
No  such  material  fact  is  available.   Every  system  we  have  observed  to  date  contains  
stabilities  that  we  know  could  be  destabilized.   The  only  thing  preventing  us  from  performing  
these  destabilizations  (when  we  are,  in  fact,  prevented  from  this)  is  the  sheer  amount  of  energy  
required  to  perturb  the  relevant  systems.   However,  this  is  merely  a  practical  limitation.   In  
principle,  there  is  always  an  energy  threshold  past  which  some  stability  in  the  world  can  be  
destabilized.   The  thing  realist,  accordingly,  would  need  to  argue  here  that  there  is  an  absolute  
energy  threshold  in  the  world,  past  which  no  system’s  energy  could  ever  increase.   In  addition,  
even  if  such  an  absolute  threshold  were  to  exist,  one  would  still  need  to  describe  an  entity  that  is  
57  See  Norton  (2003,  2010,  2021).   Norton’s  material  theory  of  induction  rests  on  background  facts  to  provide  for  the  
strength  of  an  inductive  inference.   Similarly  to  Norton’s  account  of  replicability,  I  believe  the  material  theory  of  
induction  is  co-optable  by  the  process  realist  because  these  background  facts  will  be  about  processes.   However,  
Norton’s  account  is  nowhere  explicitly  process  realist,  nor  does  it  need  to  commit  to  any  realist  position.   
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stable  at  (exactly!)  that  energy.   When  such  an  argument  is  made,  I  will  accept  the  existence  of  at  
least  one  static  entity.   However,  contingent  upon  us  being  so  far  incapable  of  stating  such  
universal  facts  about  absolute  stability,  the  second  induction  fails:   we  cannot  say  that  any  
stability  in  the  world  is  absolute  (i.e.,  static). 58    If  there  is  no  such  absolute  stability,  we  can  once  
more  turn  to  our  refutation  of  the  Persistence  Underlier  Argument  to  argue  that  the  persistent  
underliers  of  our  experiments  might  very  well  be  processes  and  not  things.   
  In  short,  the  robustness  argument  fails  to  establish  that  there  are  static  things  without  
serious  and  (as  yet)  unprovable  assumptions  about  physical  contingencies.   I.e.,  once  again,  we  
cannot  justify  that  stability  entails  staticity.   Moreover,  this  failure  accords  with  an  important  
point  about  our  experimental  practice.   Namely,  that  stabilities  in  an  experiment,  i.e.,  each  
process  in  an  experiment,  has  a  characteristic  energy  threshold.   I.e.,  the  energy  of  the  probes  we  
use  in  our  experiments  determine  what  we  treat  as  dynamic  vs.  stable  parts  of  a  system.   This  
point  is  critical  for  the  epistemological  aspects  of  pure  process  realism:   how  we  determine  what  
sorts  of  interventions  we  can  perform  on  the  dynamics  in  an  experiment,  how  we  make  those  
interventions,  and  even  how  we  identify  processes  within  an  experiment.   These  points  are  
discussed  in  more  detail  in  a  later  chapter.   
It  is  worth  noting  here  that  much  of  the  robustness  literature  makes  no  claims  about  the  
ontological  features  of  robust  entities  within  scientific  experiments.   Their  arguments  are  focused  
more  on  the  epistemology  of  robustness  reasoning.   Insofar  as  such  reasoning  is  still  an  important  
part  of  science,  I  endorse  it.   Robustness  arguments  are  co-optable  by  the  process  realist,  after  all.  
For  this  reason,  I  have  refrained  in  this  section  from  criticizing  specific  authors  in  the  robustness  
literature;  their  work  is  not  being  called  into  question  except  where  robustness  is  used  for  making  
explicit  ontological  claims. 59    
However,  equally  of  note,  even  in  a  literature  focused  almost  entirely  on  the  
epistemology  of  scientific  practice,  the  participating  authors  make  implicit  ontological  claims.  
This  is  seen  not  through  their  explicit  arguments,  but  rather  through  the  examples  of  robustness  
to  which  they  refer.   Chief  among  these  are  the  examples  of  Brownian  motion  and  the  
confirmation  of  the  molecule,  an  example  referred  to  almost  universally  in  the  literature.   The  
58  It  is  important  to  note  that  this  absolute  stability  is  what  the  thing  realist  needs  to  justify  the  existence  of  things.   A  
static  thing  cannot  be  the  sort  of  entity  that  is  relatively  unchanging.   Such  an  entity  is  still  dynamic,  and  so  is  not  
static.   A  thing  must  be  unchanging  full  stop.   
59  Eronen  (2015)  is  perhaps  the  best  example  of  this.   
59  
  
example  itself  is  taken  as  an  historical  moment  in  which  atomism  was  confirmed  and  plenum  
theories  refuted.   Salmon  (1984)  makes  the  thing-realist  tint  of  this  explicit. 60    Even  when  robust  
phenomena  are  not  explicitly  thing-realist,  as  in  the  case  of  the  conjunction  fallacy  studied  by  
Crupi  et  al.  (2007) 61   or  the  Volterra  principle  discussed  by  Weisberg  and  Reisman  (2008),  the  
discussion  of  these  phenomena  seems  to  inherit  the  orthodox  assumptions  of  thing  realism  
anyway.   Firstly,  those  robust  phenomena  that  do  not  conform  to  a  thing  ontology  (as  does  the  
robustness  of  the  molecule)  are  treated  as  a  type  of  “model  robustness,”  and  not  a  type  of  robust  
entity  within  the  world.   I.e.,  the  Volterra  principle  and  conjunction  fallacy  being  as  they  are  not  
explicit  substantial  things,  they  are  robust  epistemic  tools  for  modeling  what  is  real,  not  real  
themselves.   Secondly,  when  such  modeling  tools  are  reified,  they  are  reified  in  terms  of  thing  
realism,  as  in  the  case  of  Climate  models. 62    This  is  seen  even  more  explicitly  in  the  philosophy  
of  science  literature  surrounding  robustness.   One  key  factor  in  robustness  explanations,  
according  to  some,  is  the  “ontological  independence”  of  the  lines  of  evidence.   This  ontic  
independence  is  exclusively  thing-ontic,  since  independence  is  prohibited  for  any  entity  that  
must  be  contextually  identified  (such  as  processes).   
I  will  spend  a  fair  amount  of  time  refuting  the  supposed  triumph  of  thing-realism—the  
Brownian  motion  case—in  chapters  3  and  4.   However,  this  refutation  and  all  other  refutations  of  
robustness  I  have  offered  come  from  the  lamentable  fact  that  thing-realism  is  so  firmly  ingrained  
in  orthodoxy  that  few  stop  to  consider  that  a  slight  ontological  shift  could  offer  a  solution  to  the  
problems  of  robustness  (i.e.,  underdetermination,  typological  problems,  etc.).   In  addition,  while  
some  in  the  robustness  literature  will  no  doubt  appeal  to  the  non-ontological  character  of  their  
investigations,  even  if  this  were  true,  the  epistemic/descriptive  versions  of  robustness  are  equally  
problematic,  as  I  will  discuss  in  §2.2.   
  
  
[2.2.1.4]:   Summary  of  Experimental  Stability  Underlier  Arguments  
  
  
Each  of  the  underlier  arguments  presented  in  section  2.1  were  based  on  stabilities  
observed  in  experiments.   As  such,  they  formed  the  strongest  empirical  arguments  for  the  
60  See  also  Cartwright  (1983,  1991),  Mayo  (1986),  and  Hacking  (1984)  for  further  discussion  in  this  line.   
61  See  also  Crupi  et.  al.  (2008).   
62  C.f.,  Lloyd  (2010),  Parker  (2011),  who  both  use  the  thing-realist  language  of  states  and  state-causes.   
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existence  of  things  to  underlie  processes  we  could  posit.   However,  in  each  case,  these  underlier  
arguments  relied  upon  a  dubious  premise:   that  sabilities  observed  in  the  world  entailed  the  
existence  of  statics  in  the  world.   Deductive  attempts  to  justify  this  failed  because  no  
non-question-begging  principle  strong  enough  for  the  deduction  could  be  produced.   Inductive  
attempts  fair  better,  but  ultimately  fail  because  they  would  require  assumptions  about  contingent  
features  of  the  world  that  are  unverifiable.   Both  deductive  and  inductive  versions  fail  in  part  
because  of  known  physics:   in  order  for  us  to  deduce  or  induce  that  there  is  a  lack  of  change,  we  
would  need  to  show  that  there  is  a  threshold  past  which  it  is  impossible  to  supply  additional  
energy  to  probe  and  perturb  a  system.   Further,  there  would  have  to  be  a  stable,  persistent  entity  
that  persists  through  perturbations  at  that  energy  threshold.   This,  at  least,  has  not  been  (and  is  
unlikely  to  be)  observed.   Lacking  this,  there  is  always  an  amount  of  energy  that  can  destabilize  
any  stable  entity  posited  in  any  theory  or  as  part  of  any  experiment.   
Crucially,  if  stability  does  not  entail  staticity,  this  opens  the  door  for  viable  and  
preferable  process-ontological  interpretations  of  stable  systems .   The  thing  realist  doesn’t  
technically  need  entailment.   All  she  does  need  is  that  a  static  account  of  stability  is  preferable  
for  explanatory  goals  of  science  and  metaphysics.   However,  since  there  is  no  strong  entailment  
between  stability  and  staticity,  the  process  realist  is  at  liberty  to  reinterpret  stability  claims  in  
terms  of  processes.   I  have  already  offered  suggestions  of  how  to  do  this,  leaving  the  thorough  
discussion  for  §3.   However,  the  general  strategy  is  the  following:   all  we  need  to  act  as  stable  
underliers  for  experimental  dynamics  are  processes  that  are  characteristically  more  stable  than  
the  experimental  dynamics,  or  are  unperturbed  by  the  experimental  interventions.   Stability  
claims  are  made  true  by  referencing  this  loose  hierarchy  of  relative  energy  and  time  scales  in  
addition  to  the  specific  physical  dynamics  involved  in  the  relevant  systems.   
  
  
[2.2.2]:   Stability  of  Descriptions  and  Models  
  
  
Our  second  broad  category  of  underlier  argument  is  built  on  claims  about  the  stabilities  
present  in  one  or  more  of  our  scientific  models:   stabilities  of  descriptions.   This  stability  of  
description  follows  a  similar  pattern  as  the  stability  of  experimental  systems  we  have  already  
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discussed.   I.e.,  the  stability  of  description  comes  in  three  forms. 63    First,  in  every  description  of  
an  experimental  system,  certain  terms  appear  that  supposedly  refer  to  static  entities,  i.e.,  nouns.  
This  is  similar  to  the  appearance  of  persistent  aspects  in  every  experiment.   Second,  our  
descriptions,  and  especially  the  general  terms  that  appear  in  those  descriptions,  are  consistent  in  
their  application.   This  is  similar  to  the  stability  we  observe  in  repetitions  or  reproductions  of  a  
single  experiment.   Third,  across  multiple  different  descriptions  of  various  systems,  it  is  not  
uncommon  for  certain  similar  terms  to  appear,  apparently  referring  to  the  same  entities  in  
different  systems.   This  is  similar  to  the  robustness  we  observe  between  different  experimental  
systems.   
Just  like  with  underlier  arguments  based  on  experimental  stabilities,  those  based  on  
descriptive  similarities  come  in  three  types,  following  (roughly)  the  three  types  of  descriptive  
stability.   However,  these  descriptive  underlier  arguments  are  generally  weaker  than  those  based  
on  experimental  stabilities.   In  large  part  this  is  because  arguments  based  on  stabilities  of  
description  are  implicitly  reliant  on  the  stabilities  found  in  experiments.   When  they  are  not  
reliant  in  this  way,  descriptive  stability  underlier  arguments  rely  on  assumptions  about  the  
connection  between  language  and  metaphysics.   Those  arguments  that  implicitly  rest  on  the  
arguments  we  have  already  discussed  will  prove  easy  for  the  process  realist  to  refute  or  co-opt.  
The  latter  type  of  descriptive  stability  arguments—those  that  rest  on  quirks  of  our  language—are  
also  quite  easy  to  refute  or  co-opt.   This  is  because  process  realism  does  not  require  that  we  alter  
our  language,  only  that  we  recognize  that  language  (especially  mathematical  language)  is  not  
indicative  of  a  particular  metaphysical  entity.   In  other  words,  the  arguments  discussed  in  this  








63  One  might  expect  this,  since  descriptions  of  experimental  systems  should  align  with  the  goings  on  in  those  
systems.   
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[2.2.2.1]:   On  Nouns 
[2.2.1.1]:   The  Characteristic  Underlier  Argument 
In  many  models  or  descriptions  of  experiment(s),  there  appear  terms  that  apparently  
demarcate  static  things.   These  terms  are,  typically,  nouns.   Terms  like  “electron,”  “organism,” 
“chemical,”  “molecule,”  “galaxy,”  and  so  on.   These  terms  are  not  inherently  referring  to  
changes  in  the  world—they  are  not  verbs  or  adverbs—and  so  they  must  at  least  be  stable  entities. 
The  intuition,  then,  is  that  these  terms  are  not  merely  referring  to  something  stable,  they  are  
referring  to  something  static,  i.e.,  a  thing.   
This  trades  on  the  standard,  so-called  inferential  approach  within  analytic  ontology. 64   
The  program  of  the  inferential  approach  is  to  interpret  ontology  as  a  properly  simplified  domain  
of  linguistic  reference  and  inference.   In  other  words,  whatever  our  sentences  (minimally)  refer  
to  as  truth-makers  for  the  range  of  meanings  we  can  generate  are  necessary  ontological  posits.  
Our  ontology,  then,  posits  entities  that  we  check  against  our  linguistic  data.   If  “we  would  say  P” 
about  something,  then  our  ontological  posit,  meant  to  act  as  referent  to  that  sentence,  should  
allow  for  the  predication  of  P.   If  it  fails  to  allow  this,  the  ontology  fails  to  capture  some  
linguistic  data,  and  is  thereby  made  less  preferable  than  some  ontology  that  does  capture  this  
data.   The  strength  or  success  of  an  ontology  then  is  the  sum  of  the  successes  it  has  in  capturing  
our  functional  uses  of  referring  terms  in  everyday  (or  technical  scientific)  speech.   
In  the  context  of  scientific  language,  the  intuitions  behind  this  argument  are  strengthened  
by  assumptions  made  about  mathematical  reference.   In  a  mathematical  model  or  description, 
there  is  a  much  more  clear  demarcation  made  between  terms  or  functions  that  vary  and  terms  that 
do  not  vary.   E.g.,  the  mass  factor  in  a  kinematic  equation  is  an  unchanging  factor,  as  is  the  
number  of  molecules  per  mole  in  a  thermodynamic  system  (i.e.,  Avogadro’s  number  “N”).   In  
contrast,  terms  such  as  the  position  of  that  mass,  or  the  volume  of  a  mole  of  gas  undergoing  
adiabatic  expansion  are  both  described  mathematically  as  functions  of  time.   This  suggests,  more  
strongly  than  the  distinction  between  nouns  and  verbs,  that  there  are  entities  in  the  world  that  do  
64  The  inferential  approach  is  built  on  the  ideas  of  Carnap  (1934)  and  Quine  (1960),  and  has  become  multifarious  in 
its  specifics  over  the  last  century.   For  reconstructions  of  the  history  of  this  approach,  see  Seibt  (1996,  1997,  2000). 
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not  change,  simply  because  they  are  referred  to  by  terms  that  lack  a  dependence  on  a  temporal  
variable.   
In  other  words,  we  have:  
  
( Noun  Underlier  Argument ):  
  
(P1 N ):   There  are  noun-terms  in  our  theories  and  models  (more  generally,  descriptions)  of  
experimental  systems.   
(P2 N ):   Noun  terms  admit  of  the  sort  of  inter-theoretical/inter-descriptive  inferences  typified  only  
(or  most  often)  by  entities  with  definite,  non-contextual  properties,  most  especially  
quantities  (stability  entails  staticity).   
(P3 N ):   We  should  adopt  as  part  of  our  ontology/realism  about  scientific  models  only  those  
entities  that  are  necessary  to  make  true  the  inter-descriptive  inferences  we  make  in  and  
among  those  models  (inferential  approach  to  ontological  modeling).   
(C N ):   Therefore,  there  are  entities  with  definite,  non-contextual  properties/quantities,  which  is  
just  to  say  that  there  are  things.   
   
The  mathematical  intuitions  behind  this  argument  are  apparent  in  the  best  example  of  it  in  
philosophy  of  science.   Namely,  in  accounts  of  scientific  reference.   There  are  two  predominant  
approaches:   the  semantic  account  (de  Costa  and  French  1990,  2003,  French  2016,  van  Fraassen  
1989,  2014, 65   Suppe  1989)  and  the  syntactic  account  (LeBihan  2012,  Frigg  2006,  2010,  
Goodman  1977, 66   Halvorson  2012). 67    In  both  a  metaphorical  isomorphism  is  used  to  suggest  that  
all  terms  within  a  theory  or  model  that  bear  a  one-to-one  (and  onto)  relationship  with  the  
mathematically  definite  features  we  observe  in  experiments  must  be  real  or  referential.   More  
simply,  if  a  measured  value  can  be  produced  in  an  experiment,  and  a  model  mathematical  term  
can  take  this  value,  we  have  evidence  of  real  reference.   The  difference  between  the  semantic  and  
syntactic  accounts  then  arises  as  a  result  of  whether  this  syntax  is  taken  as  enough  to  define  the  
reference  class  of  a  theory  (the  syntactic  view)  or  whether  the  reference  class  is  further  
65  See  Súarez  (2009)  for  a  description  of  how  van  Fraasseen  evolved  from  a  proponent  of  the  syntactic  approach  into  
a  proponent  of  the  semantic  account.   
66  Described  extensively  in  Polanski  (2009).   
67  See  French  (2016),  Frigg  (2006),  LeBihan  (2012),  Suppes  (1989),  and  Halvorson  (2012).   See  also  Glymour  
(2013)  and  van  Fraassen  (1989,  2014).   
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determined  by  inferential  use  within  the  context  of  the  model  (the  semantic  view).   French  
describes  the  key  difference  like  this:   
  
“Given,  then,  that  scientific  models  are,  primarily,  representations,  in  what  sense  
may  they  also  be  mathematical  structures  in  the  way  that  the  semantic  approach  
proposes?   The  answer  is  straightforward:  ‘A  model  is  a  mathematical  structure  in  
the  same  sense  that  the  Mona  Lisa  is  a  painted  piece  of  wood.’   In  other  words,,  
both  the  representational  content  of  the  painting  and  the  action  painted  piece  of  
wood  are  what  make  the  Mona  Lisa  the  artefact  that  it  is,  and  similarly,  there  is  
more  to  a  model,  as  a  scientific  artefact,  than  the  relational  structure  [syntax]  in  
terms  of  which  we  can  define  embeddability,  isomorphism  and  so  on.”   (2016,  4).  
  
I.e.,  scientific  theory  representation  is  the  result  of  both  a  direct  isomorphism  between  a  
theoretical  term  and  an  entity  in  the  world  and  a  context  of  use  on  the  semantic  account.   Thus,  
we  infer  that  a  theoretical  term  refers  in  virtue  of  both  its  direct  mathematical  relationship  to  
experimental  outcomes  and  the  inferences  we  draw  within  the  model  about  those  theoretical  
terms.   This  is  almost  identical  to  the  ontological  approach  in  the  inferential  program  in  
ontological  methodology.   
(Importantly  motivating  the  semantic  theory  of  scientific  reference  is  the  issue  of  
equivalence  between  theories.   The  problem  is  that  two  theories  with  different  terms  (e.g.,  
Heisenberg  matrix  mechanics  and  Schroedinger  wave  mechanics,  Legrangian  and  Hamiltonian  
formulations  of  classical  physics)  can  sometimes  be  shown  to  have  equivalent  empirical  support  
and  import.   In  such  cases,  the  semantic  theory  makes  use  of  the  less-metaphorical  isomorphisms  
one  can  produce  between  the  two  theories  to  show  that  they  are  indeed  equivalent.   The  intuition,  
then,  is  that  there  must  be  a  reference  relation  from  theory  to  world  that  is  preserved  under  this  
isomorphism.   The  natural  candidate  is  another  isomorphism.   See,  for  instance,  Halvorson  2012,  
who  argues  for  exactly  this  in  order  to  suggest  that  the  syntactic  identity  between  such  equivalent  
theories  suggests  that  they  are  the  same  theory  (in  terms  of  referential  domain).   See  also  French  
2016  for  a  response  to  Halvorson  on  this  point.)   
In  both  the  semantic  and  syntactic  views,  we  find  arguments  that  theories  refer  to  thing.  
The  syntactic  account  takes  the  mathematical  features  of,  e.g.,  certain  scalars  in  scientific  models  
as  indications  of  entities  with  definite,  scalar  quantity  values  in  the  world  (i.e.,  things).   The  
semantic  account,  acting  as  a  hybrid  of  the  descriptivist  and  intentionalist  models  of  general  
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reference,  that  the  descriptive  and  intentional  elements  of  a  model  or  theoretical  term  force  its  
relationship  to  specific  types  of  entities  in  the  world.   I.e.,  thing-like  terms  must  refer  to  things:  
“molecule”  must  refer  to  an  object  with  static  “molecular  properties,”  because  “molecule”  is  
used  to  refer  in  this  way.   Such  terms  are  nouns  with  descriptive  adjectives  but  no  apparent  
natural  adverbs.   Thus  our  inferences  using  theoretical  terms  force  us  to  adopt  thing-ontological  
claims.   Examples  of  both  thing-inference  can  be  found  in  Gooday  and  Michell  (2013),  Fraser  
(2011),  and  North  (2009)  for  classical,  field-theoretic,  and  general  physical  things  respectively.   
  
  
[2.2.2.1.2]:   The  Refutation  
  
  
There  is  a  problem  with  the  standard  account:   while  the  intensional  inferences  of  a  
linguistic  structure  may  provide  many  easy  cases  in  which  grammatical  forms  are  apparently  
indicative  of  ontological  types,  there  are  also  many  cases  in  which  this  does  not  hold.   For  
example,  one  possible  inference  I  may  draw  about  ontological  types  from  grammatical  forms  is  
that  nouns  (and  therefore  noun-referents)  can  be  predicated  of.   I  might  therefore  infer  that  
noun-referents  are  the  sort  of  entity  that  can  admit  of  definite  properties  like  “being  square,”  
corresponding  to  the  predication  of  squareness  of  various  nouns  in  sentences  like  “the  table  is  
square.”   However,  there  are  also  nouns  that  admit  of  both  definite  and  indefinite  predications.  
There  are  nouns  like  “run,”  for  which  both  the  predication  of  “long”  and  the  predication  of  “3  
miles  long”  are  grammatically  concordant.   Moreover,  there  are  nouns  (gerunds)  that  admit  also  
of  adverbial  predication,  such  as  “running.”   Are  we  then  to  suppose,  strictly  following  the  
inferential  approach,  that  noun-referents  are  general  enough  to  admit  of  definite,  indefinite,  and  
adverbial  properties?   Such  an  entity  is  not  clearly  a  thing  anymore,  nor  is  it  clearly  a  process.   
More  importantly,  many  of  the  examples  above  refer  intuitively  to  specific  ontic  types  
because  of  the  way  in  which  we  employ  the  terms.   “Table”  is  intuitively  referring  to  a  thing.  
“Run”  is  referring  to  a  complete  process.   “Running”  is  referring  to  an  ongoing  process.   Three  
nouns,  with  three  different  ontic  types.   The  existence  of  nouns  alone  cannot  be  indicative  of  
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things.   We  must  look  further  to  the  function  and  use  of  the  term  in  actual  reference  instances. 68   
Specifically,  how  do  we  use  noun-terms  in  experimental  descriptions?   
The  answer  is  that  we  do  not  consistently  use  nouns  in  our  experiments  to  refer  to  any  
particular  ontological  category.   Indeed,  the  reference  of  a  term  is  so  highly  contextualized  to  the  
experimental  scenario  that  exactly  the  same  term  can  admit  of  contradictory  predications.   I  go  
through  an  extended  example  of  this  in  chapter  5  on  nuclear  modeling.   Suffice  it  to  say,  for  now,  
that  terms  like  “nucleus”  can  support  predicate  sentences  like  “the  nucleus  has  internal  energy  
structure”  and  “the  nucleus  has  no  internal  energy  structure”  depending  on  the  experimental  
context  of  the  relevant  models.   
We  should  also  be  dubious  of  this  argument  from  the  outset  because  of  its  implicit  
cultural  and  historical  contextual  assumptions.   Seibt  (2015)  has  argued  that  the  inferential  
approach  needs  to  be  modified  to  be  sensitive  to  the  differences  between  Indo-European  and  
non-Indo-European  languages.   Moreover,  she  argues  with  reference  to  recent  work  on  the  
“Linguistic  Relativism  Hypothesis”  that  Indo-European  languages  predispose  speakers  towards  
an  ontological  prejudice  for  thing-like  noun-referents.   This,  coupled  with  her  modified  
inferential  approach,  leads  her  to  argue  that  general,  subjectless  processes  can  act  as  the  sole  
ontic  type  to  encompass  the  linguistic  needs  of  a  non-Eurocentric  linguistic  analysis.   I.e.,  
processes  alone  can  satisfy  the  needs  of  reference.   This  is  an  extension  of  the  work  of  many,  
including  Vendler  (1957),  Kenny  (1963),  and  Zemach  (1970).   
A  simple  example  of  this  will  suffice  to  drive  home  the  point.   English  being  verbs  (or  
rather  the  lexical  semantics  of  the  nouns  paired  with  these  verbs)  seem  to  suggest  in  their  use  that  
whatever  is  is  definite  and  thing-like.   “I  am  a  person,”  “She  is  moral,”  “Trees  are  all  plants,”  
“We  are  a  community”  “Molecules  are  structured.”   In  each,  the  being  verb  seems  to  define  the  
definite  existence  of  a  thing-like  entity.   The  nouns  are  all  (to  use  the  slogan)  values  of  a  bound  
variable  (Quine,  1953,  13f).   However,  the  being  verb  in  Chinese  Hanzi  and  Japanese  Kanji  
indicates  no  such  definitiveness.   Indeed,  the  Hanzi  是  is  a  pictograph  composed  of  the  radicals  
for  “sun”  “below”  and  “movement/flow/change.”   The  kanji,  then,  is  used  to  indicate  being  as  
“the  change  that  underlies  everything  under  the  sun.”   Something  that  is,  then,  is  something  that  
is  defined  by  change  and  by  participating  in  the  whole  of  the  world.   It  is  the  recognition  of  this  
that  allows  us  to  interpret  the  famous  (simplified)  Sutra:   ⾒ ⼭ 是 ⼭,  ⾒ ⼭ 不 是 ⼭,  ⾒ ⼭ 秪 是 ⼭  
68  This  is  the  basic  idea  behind  Frege’s   
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(roughly  “mountains  are  mountains,  mountains  are  not  (不)  mountains,  [but  then  I  came  to  see  
again  that]  mountains  are  merely  (秪)  mountains.”). 69    
The  fact  that  a  processist  account  of  the  referents  of  nouns  across  languages  has  already  
been  given  (Seibt  2010,  2015)  should  prove  as  sufficient  response  to  the  nouns  argument.   Once  
more,  it  is  enough  to  show  that  processes  can  meet  the  inferential  implications  of  nouns  equally  
well  as  things.   This  entails  that  the  nouns  argument  cannot  rule  out  that  the  underliers  of  our  
noun-terms  are  processes  rather  than  things.   Moreover,  once  again,  there  is  some  reason  
(cultural,  historical,  and  scientific)  to  suppose  that  processes  will  be  better  ontological  
commitments  in  the  domain  of  interpreting  language  usage.   This  is  both  because  processes  can  
meet  the  contextuality  needs  of  inter-cultural  analysis  of  language,  and  because  processes  can 
allow  for  consistency  of  reference  where  things  cannot  (c.f.,  chapter  5  of  this  work).   
Perhaps  more  interestingly,  noun  arguments  for  things  can  be  co-opted  as  arguments  for  
processes  using  the  same  methods  from  ontology  and  philosophy  of  science.   The  semantic  
account  of  model-reference  is  particularly  useful  to  the  process  realist,  since  it  naturally  demands  
that  scientific  models  are  partially  defined  by  the  context  of  the  inferential  use  in  the  practice  of  
science. 70    While  I  would  not  commit  wholeheartedly  to,  e.g.,  French’s  (2003,  2016)  partial  
structures  approach,  and  would  instead  follow  the  spirit  of  Seibt’s  (2015)  program  by  requiring  
alteration  of  the  methods  of  the  semantic  approach,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  French’s  partial  
structures  account  was  co-developed  by  Bueno  (Bueno  2000,  2016,  Bueno,  French,  and  
Ladyman  2002,  Bueno  and  French  2011,  2012,  forthcoming).   Bueno  has  long  been  
process-realist-adjacent  at  least  (2000,  2019),  which  might  suggest  that  a  purely  process  realist  
account  of  scientific  modeling  practice  and  reference  will  eventually  see  success,  much  like  the  






69  The  Japanese  Kanji  version  of  this  looks  similar  in  the  kanji  used,  with  the  exception  of  the  connecting  phrases  
that  I  have  omitted.   
70  See  Súarez  (2003)  for  an  argument  that  representation  in  science  is  contextual  in  this  way.   
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[2.2.2.2]:   Consistent  Reference  and  “Fine  Tuning”  
  
  
[2.2.2.2.1]:   The  Characteristic  Underlier  Argument  
  
  
Our  next  underlier  argument  comes  from  the  stability  of  our  descriptions  in  their  
application.   I.e.,  our  (best)  descriptions  are  consistent  in  their  application  between  different  
particular  systems  of  a  similar  character.   For  example,  when  I  point  at  a  tree  and  describe  its  size  
or  shape,  “tree”  refers  in  much  the  same  way  as  when  you  point  at  a  different  tree  to  describe  its  
different  size  or  shape.   In  other  words,  regardless  of  the  particulars  of  the  tree  I  am  currently  
referring  to,  the  word  refers  to  the  same  sort  of  entity  as  the  one  you  are  referring  to  when  you  
use  the  same  word.   This  suggests  that  there  is  a  stable  set  of  properties  of  the  entity  in  the  world  
(whatever  it  is)  that  allow  us  to  consistently  refer  to  it.   The  argument  then  goes  that  a  stable  set  
of  properties  can  only  exist  if  that  stable  set  is  static,  and  static  properties  can  only  be  attributed  
to  and  exist  within  things.   
We  should  note  at  the  outset  that  this  type  of  argument  follows  a  similar  pattern  as  the  
arguments  for  things  offered  by  the  semantic  account  of  scientific  reference.   Namely,  the  
patterns  of  our  inferences  entail  that  there  is  some  stable  collection  of  referent  things.  
Nevertheless,  the  argument  is  slightly  different  from  the  noun  argument  above,  as  I  show.   
This  argument  is  immediately  plausible  in  the  mathematical  context  of  scientific  
modeling  practice.   A  gas,  for  example,  is  described  thermodynamically  using  a  set  of  core  
properties:   typically  osmotic  pressure  and  molecular  (or  atomic)  weight.   These  properties  are  
given  quantitative  definitions,  units  of  measurement,  and  conventional  scales  for  comparison  
with  different  gases.   Then,  we  identify  a  particular  gas—e.g.,  Helium  gas—by  its  particular  core  
properties.   This  lets  us  apply  our  general  models  for  gas  expansion  and  contraction  to  Helium  
gas  consistently  and  precisely.   
Crucially,  the  existence  of  stable,  determinate,  identifying  features  of  the  gas  is  what  
allows  us  to  reidentify  it  in  each  experimental  or  theoretical  context.   It  is  because  Helium  has  a  
determinate  atomic  number  (=2)  and  molecular  structure  (monatomic)  in  every  thermodynamic  
context  that  it  can  be  identified  wherever  it  appears  in  models,  theories,  or  experiments  (at  least,  




( Consistent  Reference ):   
  
(P1 CR ):   We  refer  consistently  with  a  term  in  multiple  (similar)  contexts/models.  
(P2 CR ):   The  term’s  successful  reference  is  picked  out  by  identifying  stable  determinate  features  
of  a  system.   
(C1 CR ):   Therefore,  by  induction  over  multiple  similar  identifications  of  successful  reference,  
there  is  a  collection  of  stable,  determinate  features  of  systems  that  is  context  invariant.   
(C CR ):   Therefore,  there  is  a  thing  (defined  by  this  collection  of  stable,  determinate  features).   
  
This  argument  essentially  seeks  to  show  that  the  existence  of  determinate  features  to  which  we  
refer  consistently  entails  a  subject  for  those  features.   The  induction  contained  in  the  argument  is  
an  induction  over  cases  of  identifying  these  features,  e.g.,  instances  of  determining  the  atomic  
number  of  helium,  or  the  internal  energy  structure  of  an  atom’s/molecule’s  electrons.   The  more  
instances  in  which  we  successfully  determine  these  features,  the  more  likely  it  becomes  that  
those  model  features  have  real  referents.   These  real  referents  must  then  be  as  stable  and  
determinate  as  the  values/variables  we  see  in  our  models.   
This  is  exemplified  in  the  literature  on  essential  properties.   Three  lines  dominate  this  
discussion:   the  modal  account  of  essential  properties  (standard  and  non-standard),  the  
definitional  account,  and  the  intrinsic/extrinsic  account.   The  details  of  these  are  not  important  
for  our  discussion,  but  the  literature  in  which  these  accounts  exist  is  rich  with  examples  of  the  
consistent  reference  argument  as  I  have  called  it,  as  well  as  implicit  underlier  arguments  of  other  
sorts.   Fine’s  (1994)  definitional  account  is  a  prime  example.   Essential  properties,  according  to  
Fine,  are  those  that  define  the  state  of  being  of  a  thing.   They  are  therefore  properties  that  
consistently  define  the  thing  in  every  context,  and  to  which  we  implicitly  refer  when  we  mention  
the  thing.   Zalta’s  (2006)  “encoding”  account  is  similarly  suggestive.   According  to  Zalta,  an  
essential  property  is  one  that  encodes  the  object  in  which  it  is  found.   I.e.,  reference  to  the  
property  is  implicit  reference  to  the  thing  in  which  that  property  is  found.   In  both  of  these,  it  is  
the  consistency  of  reference  to  specific  properties  that  defines  a  thing.   An  important  contribution  
to  this  literature  comes  in  N.  Salmon’s  (1979,  1981(2005),  2003)  work  which  makes  the  link  
between  consistent  reference  and  the  essences  of  things  more  explicit.   In  addition,  it  should  be  
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noted  that  the  history  of  Aristotelianism  is  ever  present  in  this  literature,  especially  the  
connection  offered  by  Aristotle  between  the  definition  of  an  entity  and  its  ontological  essence.  
See  Peramatzis  (2011).   
  
  
[2.2.2.2.2]:   The  Refutation  
  
  
While  the  consistent  reference  argument  is  suggestive,  the  process  realist  has  the  
now-standard  response.   Namely,  this  argument  does  not  rule  out  that  the  consistent  referents  of  
terms  and  features  of  our  models  are  processes.   Given  that  processes  can  be  given  identifiable  
features  (Seibt  2010,  details  provided  in  chapter  1  §2),  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  
processes  cannot  be  identified  and  reidentified  consistently  in  scientific  experiments  and  models  
such  that  we  can  consistently  refer  to  them.   Instances  of  such  reference  abound.   For  example,  
we  refer  to  motions  both  in  natural  language  and  mathematical  language  consistently.   We  also  
refer  to  interactions,  e.g.,  “gravitation”  or  “electromagnetic  repulsion”  both  in  natural  language  
and  mathematical  language.   These  entities  are  dynamic  entities,  identified  by  dynamic  features  
such  as  dynamic  shape,  dynamic  context,  measurability,  determinable-ness,  and  so  on.   
What  is  more,  historical  examples  exist  in  which  a  model  of  a  system  refers  to  a  real  
interaction  or  motion  that  was  as-yet  unobserved.   For  example,  the  model  of  the  nucleus  first  
proposed  by  Heisenberg  in  1932,  and  later  made  empirically  adequate  by  Yukawa,  proposed  that  
the  nucleus  was  held  together  and  made  stable  by  an  exchange  force  interaction  between  protons  
and  neutrons.   This  interaction  was  quantitatively  incorrect  in  Heisenberg’s  model,  but  was  later  
found  and  explained  by  Yukawa.   
The  thing  realist  may  claim  in  response  that  neither  motions  nor  interactions  can  be  
referred  to  without  things.   E.g.,  motion  must  be  the  motion  of  something,  and  interactions  must  
occur  between  two  (or  more)  things.   This  is  almost  exactly  the  point  made  in  Strawson’s  (1966,  
especially  part  2,  chapters  1,  2,  and  3)  argument  that  reidentifiability  is  impossible  in  a  purely  
processual  (or  event-based)  metaphysics. 71    According  to  Strawson,  processes  (and  events)  need  
71  Strawson’s  argument  in  part  2  chapter  1  is  that  reidentifiability  is  the  result  of  existence  in  a  spatiotemporal  nexus,  
and  so  there  must  be   
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things  to  give  them  reidentifiability  in  part  because  only  things  can  enable  coordinate  
descriptions  of  space  and  time.   Thus,  when  we  go  to  reidentify  a  system  from  earlier  or  
elsewhere,  we  need  to  be  able  to  locate  that  system  in  space  and  time,  and  so  require  things. 72   
However,  this  would  be  a  clear  instance  of  overreach.   There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  
underliers  of  motions  and  interactions  must  be  static  if  processes  have  identifying  features  
independent  of  having  a  subject.   
The  consistent  reference  argument  can  and  should  be  co-opted  by  the  process  realist.   For  
example,  interactions  are  indeed  interactions  between  two  or  more  entities,  and  it  is  true  that  we  
refer  to  an  interaction  consistently  in  virtue  of  similarities  between  the  interacting  entities  in  
addition  to  similarities  in  our  description  of  the  interaction  itself.   More  generally,  it  is  true  that  
similarities  between  referenced  entities  are  demarcated  by  stable  features  of  those  entities.   
However,  stability  does  not  entail  staticity;  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  similar  
entities  are  things  simply  because  they  are  stable  and  similar.   Echoing  Fine  (1994)’s  definitional  
account  of  core  properties  of  things,  we  might  say  instead  that  there  are  core  processes  to  which  
we  refer  whenever  we  use  certain  terms.   These  core  processes  would  need  to  be  stable  enough  
to  allow  for  us  to  identify  the  less  stable  interactions,  motions,  and  (generally)  dynamics  that  we  
observe  in  an  experimental  system.   For  example,  the  terms  “the  nucleus”  or  “the  molecular  
bond”  are  not  used  to  consistently  refer  to  static  things,  or  to  a  core  set  of  static  properties  of  
unknowable  substances.   Rather,  they  refer  consistently  to  a  collection  of  dynamics  with  
characteristic  energies  and  relative  stabilities,  and  to  particular  classes  of  interactions.   These  
examples  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  later  chapters.   
I  contend  in  later  chapters  that  we  not  only  can,  but  should  and  do  refer  to  processes  as  
consistent  identifiers  of  experiments  and  of  models.   Indeed,  I  argue  that  the  substitution  of  
dynamic  referents  for  thing  posits  is  at  the  core  of  the  historical  development  of  physics.  
Namely,  we  begin  by  positing  a  stable  thing  because  of  dynamics  observed  in  a  system.   We  then  
show  how  this  thing,  and  all  of  its  stable  properties,  are  no  more  than  dynamics  themselves,  
albeit  dynamics  that  are  more  stable  than  those  observed  in  the  original  experiment(s).   If  we  are  
so  inclined,  we  then  posit  further  things  to  underlie  these  new  dynamics,  only  to  continue  the  
process  and  discover  how  these  further  things  are  collections  of  dynamics  themselves.   In  short,  
while  thing-terms  may  be  useful,  they  are  only  ever  placeholder  terms  for  further  processes.   At  
72  Seibt  (1990,  27-37)  argues  extensively  against  Strawson  in  particular.   
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best,  a  thing  is  never  referred  to.   The  term  is  only  a  linguistic  tool  for  arbitrarily  demarcating  the  
processes  of  interest  in  an  experiment.   I  will  show  this  in  the  context  of  a  simple  thermodynamic  
model,  and  again  in  the  context  of  a  more  complex  thermodynamic  argument  famous  in  the  
literature  for  supposedly  offering  support  for  real  things.   That  is,  I  will  consider  Perrin’s  (1909)  
argument  for  atoms/molecules  in  thermodynamics.   
  
  
[2.2.2.3]:   Unification  of  Models  
  
  
[2.2.2.3.1]:   The  Characteristic  Underlier  Argument  
  
  
The  last  argument  we  will  consider  that  makes  use  of  stability  of  reference  and  
description  rests  on  moves  throughout  history  to  unify  disparate  models  and  descriptions  of  
experiments.   Suppose  we  have  multiple  descriptions  of  different  experiments,  and  that  in  each  
of  these  descriptions,  the  same  term  appears.   This  suggests  that,  whatever  this  term  refers  to,  
that  referent  entity  is  the  same  in  each  of  the  descriptions.   Since  each  description  will  
(inevitably)  involve  some  reference  to  dynamics  and  change,  this  referent  entity  is  unchanged  in  
each  of  the  described  situations,  the  experimental  dynamics.   Thus,  ultimately,  the  referent  entity  
is  unchanging,  because  only  then  could  it  act  as  a  unifier  of  our  many  and  varied  descriptions  of  
many  and  varied  experiments.   
This  sort  of  unification  should  be  differentiated  from  what  we  saw  in  the  robustness  
argument  above.   Namely,  the  difference  lies  in  what  is  meant  to  act  as  the  unifier.   In  the  
robustness  argument,  we  unify  our  experiments  by  presuming  a  common  ontic  element  within  
those  experimental  systems.   This  argument,  however,  attempts  to  unify  descriptions  of  
experimental  systems  by  presuming  a  common  referential  structure  for  those  descriptions.   Given  
that  any  ontological  conclusion  drawn  from  the  existence  of  a  common  referential  structure  will  
likely  involve  positing  a  common  referent,  and  so  a  common  real  entity,  unification  arguments  
and  robustness  arguments  are  oftentimes  inextricably  linked.   In  particular,  many  of  what  I  call  
unification  arguments  will  ultimately  rely  on  what  I  call  robustness  arguments  in  order  to  justify  
their  central  claims.   
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However,  just  like  the  robustness  argument  discussed  above,  the  unification  argument  
attempts  to  justify  the  existence  of  a  static  thing  with  an  induction  over  many  descriptions.   The  
weakest  version  of  this  induction  is  an  induction  over  similar  descriptions  of  similar  
experimental  systems.   For  example,  let  us  say  we  describe  one  particular  nuclear  experiment  in 
terms  of  a  nucleus  qua  collection  of  colliding  nucleons,  and  another  in  terms  of  a  nucleus  qua  
collection  of  quantized  nucleon  energy  shells.   The  (weak)  unification  argument  would  argue  
that,  despite  differences  in  the  theoretical  description  of  these  two  “nuclei,”  the  fact  that  there  are  
unifying  features  (e.g.,  the  existence  of  nucleons,  the  exact  number  of  protons  and  neutrons  in  a  
given  nucleus)  as  reason  to  suppose  that  the  term  “nucleus”  can  unify  the  two  descriptions.   
More  powerfully,  the  thing  realist  could  attempt  to  show  that  a  unifying  concept  of  the  
nucleus  is  in  operation  in  both  descriptions.   Finding  such  a  unifying  model,  that  successfully  
encompasses  the  explanations  and  descriptions  offered  by  both  models  within  the  same  
theoretical  structure,  would  act  as  justification  for  supposing  that  this  unifying  concept  is  real.  
Describing  historical  instances  of  unification  arguments  such  as  this  appear  as  a  core  research  
program  in  Janssen’s  work  (delivered  most  evocatively  in  a  talk  entitled  “Arch  and  Scaffold”  in  
2015,  see  Janssen  2004a,  b,  2011). 73    
What  we  get  is  an  argument  that  whatever  core  term  or  structure  responsible  for  unifying  
two  previously  disparate  domains  of  reference/representation  must  be  real.   Most  often,  the  
unifying  features  of  a  theoretical  domain  are  taken  to  be  the  thing-ontic  descriptions  of  the  
relevant  system,  as  in  Linnaeus’s  unification  of  biological  classifications  resulting  from  core  
biological  properties,  or  the  unification  of  Heisenberg  and  Schroedinger  mechanics,  or  the  
unification  of  various  thermal  dynamics  supposedly  present  in  Perrin’s  (1909)  argument  for  
atoms  (to  be  discussed  in  chapter  4).   This  gives  the  following  argument  for  things:   
  
( Unification  Argument ):   
  
(P1 U ):   Every  model  and  theory  has  a  domain  of  reference.   
(P2 U ):   In  (certain  cases  of)  two  or  more  disparate  experiments,  we  see  the  emergence  of  stable  or  
robust  referential  portions  of  our  models  of  those  experiments.   
73  See  also  Kitcher  (1981)  for  one  of  the  key  accounts  of  explanatory  unification.   
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(P3 U ):   The  stable  portions  of  the  domain  of  reference  are  referred  to  by  the  terms  identifying  
things,  i.e.,  the  terms  that  identify  the  essential  and  stable  determinate  features  of  the  
experimental  system(s).   
(C U ):   Therefore,  the  referential  unifier  of  these  disparate  experiments  is  a  thing  or  thing-like  
entity  (it  has  determinate  properties,  it  manifests  determinate  structures).   
  
(P3 U1 )  is  doing  all  of  the  work  of  this  argument.   Implicitly,  this  premise  is  reliant  on  an  induction  
over  many  cases  of  referential  similarity  in  many  experiments.   E.g.,  the  stable  features  of  the  
nucleus—those  that  are  not  involved  in  or  responsive  to  the  perturbations  we  perform  in  our  
many  experiments—are  the  only  possible  stable  aspects  of  our  descriptions  of  the  nucleus  in  
each  experiment.   
This  should  be  rather  intuitive,  even  to  a  process  realist.   The  fact  that  each  different  
experiment  (and  therefore  each  description  of  it)  involves  a  different  set  of  dynamics  seems  to  
entail  that  any  two  experiments  will  differ  because  they  involve  different  dynamics.   The  fact,  
then,  that  there  are  similarities  between  the  descriptions—e.g.,  we  describe  both  nuclear  
experiments  as  experiments  on  the  nucleus —is  highly  suggestive  that  this  similarity  cannot  be  
because  of  the  processual  descriptions  of  the  system.   Those  processual  descriptions,  e.g.,  
descriptions  of  the  interventions  performed  on  each  nuclear  system,  are  not  unifying  by  default.   
A  special  class  of  unification  arguments  are  the  ones  seeking  to  unify  all  of  science  or  all  
of  physics  under  a  single  umbrella  ontology.   These  arguments  tend  to  be  explicit  in  their  
preference  for  thing  ontologies.   For  example,  an  explicit  preference  is  placed  on  the  reductionist  
ontology  of  fundamental  particles  as  the  unifying  ground  of  all  scientific  phenomena  in  works  
such  as  Bennett  (2017)  and  Sider  (2011),  both  of  whom  combine  the  notion  of  a  complete  
minimal  basis 74   of  fundamental  entities  with  this  preference  for  a  particle  ontology  to  form  their  
complete  ontological  picture. 75    
74  See  Bennett  (2017),  Jenkins  (2013),  Paul  (2012),  Raven  (2016),  Schaffer  (2010),  Sider  (2011),  Tahko  (2013,  
2014),  and  Wilson  (2012,  2014,  2016).  
75  See  also  Morganti  (2009),  Ney  (2015),  Wolff  (2012),  and  Zimmerman  (1996).   It  is  interesting  that  even  in  
diverging  from  standard  particle-ontology  views,  authors  like  Wolff  (2012)  (who  advocates  structuralism)  and  
Zimmerman  (1996)  (who  advocates  for  “pure  substance”  or  gunk)  still  commit  to  a  thing  ontology  in  order  to  
characterize  their  fundamental  layer  of  reality.   Something  similar  can  be  said  for  Schaffer’s  (2003,  2004,  2009,  
2010a,  2010b)  holistic  monism  (see  also  Ismael  and  Schaffer  (2020)  for  what  I  take  to  be  an  interesting  new  
movement  on  Schaffer’s  part  toward  a  more  process-oriented  ontology).   
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These  special  “universal”  unification  arguments  are  not  terribly  relevant  to  our  
discussion.   They  rarely  rest  their  unification  premises  on  actual  descriptions  provided  by  
experimental  models,  opting  instead  to  import  various  reductionist  principles  applied  to  theories,  
rather  than  experiments,  to  support  their  move  to  universality.   Following  the  program  of  chapter  
1,  the  goal  of  this  chapter  is  to  show  that  the  thing  realist  cannot  infer  from  specific  experiments  
and  models  of  them  to  the  existence  of  things,  unlike  the  process  realist.   Whether  or  not  things  
provide  a  universal  unifier  is  moot.   
  
  
[2.2.2.3.2]:   The  Refutation    
  
  
By  now,  the  strategy  of  refutation  should  come  as  no  surprise.   The  process  realist  needs  
only  to  show  (a)  that  the  unification  argument  cannot  rule  out  that  the  relevant  underlier  (the  
unifying  descriptor)  is  itself  a  process,  and  (b)  that  we  can  co-opt  the  unification  argument  to  
argue  that  the  proper  unifiers  of  different  model-descriptions  of  experiments  are  indeed  
processes.   This  is  as  simple  as  exhibiting  such  an  instance,  and  noting  that  it  is  likely  to  
generalize.   
Just  like  with  the  robustness  argument,  the  inductive  risk  shouldered  by  the  proponent  of  
the  unification  argument  is  too  great.   There  is  no  term  that  refers  consistently  under  all  
descriptive  and  experimental  differences.   As  such,  the  best  the  thing  realist  can  hope  for  is  to  
provide  a  term  that  refers  consistently  in  almost  all  contexts.   Such  a  term  can  easily  refer  to  a  
process;  the  stability  of  the  term  does  not  entail  the  staticity  of  the  term,  and  therefore  the  term’s  
referent  need  not  be  static  either.   Thus,  the  thing  realist  cannot  rule  out  that  the  unifiers  of  our  
descriptions  (the  stable  terms  present  in  our  descriptions)  refer  to  processes  and  not  things.   
I  note  here  that  the  unification  argument,  properly  applied  to  historical  examples,  is  
actually  an  argument  for  process  unifiers.   That  is  to  say,  the  historical  unification  of  disparate,  
incompatible  descriptions  of  experimental  systems  has  been  accomplished  primarily  by  
eliminating  the  unnecessary  thing  terms  from  the  unified  model  while  retaining  the  relevant  
processual  aspects  of  the  unified  description.   This  is  most  obvious  in  the  unification  of  models  
of  the  molecular  bond  (see  Gavroglu  and  Simões  2012,  especially  chapter  1).   I  provide  an  
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extended  and  novel  discussion  of  a  similar  unification  of  nuclear  models  in  chapter  5,  of  
particular  interest  because  these  models  have  long  eluded  unification  in  thing-interpretations.   
Moreover,  we  can  make  clear  why  unification  should  always  come  by  rejecting  things  
and  retaining  processes.   Namely,  unifying  models  must  always  retain  the  descriptions  of  
experimental  systems.   Since,  in  chapter  1,  we  have  seen  that  such  descriptions  essentially  
include  descriptions  of  processes  (interventions,  dynamic  responses  to  interventions,  interactions  
with  observers,  etc.),  this  means  that  unifying  models  must  at  least  describe  all  of  the  relevant  
experimental  dynamics  of  the  unified  models.   Thing  terms,  in  contrast,  are  unnecessary.   
A  little  investigation  reveals  that  unification  arguments  can  offer  very  few  obvious  
examples  for  the  thing  realist.   Most  instances  of  unification  present  in  the  literature  are  actually  
instances  of  unification  of  method,  of  mathematics,  or  explicitly  of  processes  and  dynamics.  
While  the  rare  instance  of  apparent  “thing  unification”  exists  (c.f.  the  atom  and  the  electron),  
some  of  the  most  prominent  instances  of  historical  unification  are  unifications  of  processes.  
Newtonian  gravitation,  which  unifies  earthbound  and  celestial  gravitational  processes,  is  one  
such  example.   The  categorization  of  oxidation  and  reduction  reactions  under  a  single  archetype  
in  the  chemical  revolution  is  another.   To  think,  therefore,  that  unification  is  something  only  
available  to  the  thing  realist  is  mistaken.   
  
  
[2.2.2.4]:   Summary  of  Descriptive  Stability  Underlier  Arguments  
  
  
We  end  our  analysis  of  descriptive  stability  underlier  arguments  noticing  that  they  fare  
similarly  to  those  based  on  experimental/observed  stabilities.   All  of  them  begin  with  a  sound  
premise:   the  positing  of  a  particular  sort  of  stability.   All  of  them  then  make  the  case  that  this  
stability  can  only  exist  if  something  static  exists,  by  either  inductive  or  deductive  means.   But  
ultimately,  all  of  them  commit  the  same  mistake  as  the  experimental  stability  underlier  
arguments:   assuming  that  stability  entails  staticity.   In  fact,  the  existence  of  stability  only  entails  
that  there  are  more  and  less  stable  entities.   
However,  descriptive  stability  underlier  arguments  differ  in  that  they  rest  on  more  
complicated  philosophical  work  on  the  relationships  between  utterances  and  their  truth-makers.  
Our  analysis  of  these  arguments,  is  therefore  much  less  easily  confirmed  and  supported  than  
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were  the  analyses  of  the  arguments  in  §2.1.   In  each  instance,  I  argued  that  such  referential  and  
inferential  networks  can  indeed  be  coordinated  around  processes  and  not  things.   However,  as  
noted  above,  the  fully  developed  account  of  scientific  representation  using  process  ontology  is  
still  some  ways  from  complete.   
That  said,  process  ontology  already  has  a  significant  history  of  work  in  reference  and  
language,  as  I  have  pointed  out.   We  can  therefore  be  somewhat  sure  that  process  ontology  can  
indeed  provide  a  successful  account  of  the  reference  of  scientific  models  and  terms.   I  will  spend  
some  time  in  chapters  3,  4,  and  5  showing  examples  of  how  to  make  use  of  this  existing  
process-ontological  architecture  to  interpret  various  historical  and  contemporary  scientific  
models.   
  
  
[2.2.3]:   Manifest  and  Assumed  Stability   
  
  
In  §2.1  and  §2.2,  I  argued  that  underlier  arguments  based  on  experimental  and  descriptive  
stabilities  failed  as  arguments  for  static  entities,  i.e.,  things.   Given  that  we  have  now  largely  
ruled  out  that  things  can  be  (safely)  inferred  from  either  observed  or  described  stabilities,  one  
might  wonder  whether  there  are  any  underlier  arguments  left  to  be  offered.   In  fact,  there  is  one  
final  class  of  underlier  arguments  left  to  discuss:   arguments  from  assumed  manifest  stability.  
Namely,  one  might  think,  generally,  that  since  the  world  is  a  material  world,  it  is  therefore  
composed  of  a  substance—matter—that  is  thing-like  (defined  by  atemporal,  determinate  
properties).   
While  the  basic  argument  is  simple,  this  category  of  underlier  arguments  is  the  most  
varied  of  the  categories  we  have  discussed.   These  underlier  arguments  trade  on  deeply  
embedded  assumptions  about  metaphysical  priority  relations.   For  example,  the  assumption  that  
everything  in  the  world  must  be  material  plus  the  assumption  that  matter  is  a  substance  entails  
that  everything  in  the  world  must  ultimately  be  composed  of  substances  (things).   Other  
examples  include  assumptions  about  what  can  act  as  a  common  cause  or  unifier,  the  proper  
definition  of  change,  what  sort  of  entity  can  bear  symmetry,  etc.   As  such,  these  arguments  tend  
to  be  quite  convoluted.   
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That  said,  I  will  be  discussing  these  arguments  mostly  for  the  sake  of  completeness;  they  
are  largely  beyond  the  scope  of  this  chapter.   The  argument  of  this  chapter  has  been  to  show  that  
facts  about  specific  experiments,  observations,  and  experimental  descriptions  cannot  support,  on  
their  own,  inferences  to  things.   As  such,  any  argument  for  things  that  takes  as  data  facts  and  
features  of  experience  or  metaphysics  or  language  that  go  beyond  what  can  be  found  in  manifest  
experiments  will  not  be  immediately  relevant  here.   Suffice  it  to  say  that  these  arguments  will  
largely  face  the  same  challenges  as  the  arguments  we  have  already  discussed.   Namely,  they  will  
fail  to  rule  out  (without  quite  strong  and  dubious  assumptions)  that  the  relevant  underliers  are  not  
processes.   
  
  
[2.2.3.1]:   The  Argument  that  Matter  is  Essentially  Substantial  
  
  
We  begin  with  a  rather  interesting  argument.   Namely,  that  matter  physics  is  
fundamentally  concerned  with  discovering  the  fundamental  definite  components  of  the  world  
that  ground  all  relations,  properties,  and  dynamics  of  higher  level  systems.   I.e.,  that  matter  
physics  is  about  discovering  that  which  is  “not  predicated  of  a  subject  but  [of  which]  everything  
else  is  predicated,”  (Aristotle,  Metaphysics  1017b1).   This  is  readily  apparent  in  the  debates  
about  field  vs.  particle  interpretations  of  quantum  field  theory,  and  the  philosophical  discussions  
drawing  on  or  referencing  this  debate.   
I  say  that  this  argument  is  interesting  in  part  because  it  contains  within  it  a  host  of  
historical  and  philosophical  assumptions.   The  philosophical  assumptions  of  the  substance  
paradigm  that  underlie  this  argument  have  been  catalogued  already  (see  Seibt  1990,  chapter  1),  
in  which  Seibt  catalogues  22  assumptions  or  components  of  an  ontological  commitment  to  
“substance.”   This  allows  her  to  argue  that  claims  involving  substance  face  various  challenges  
because  of  the  specifics  of  the  sub-collection  of  assumptions  involved.   Given  that  she  has  made  
it  part  of  her  research  program  to  dissect  and  defeat  various  thing-ontological  claims  in  this  way,  
I  will  simply  reference  this  work,  and  focus  primarily  with  the  historical  point:   that  matter  
physics  (has  been/is  currently)  interested  in  producing  thing-like  referents  to  underlie  and  define  
the  concept  of  matter  and  its  properties  and  dynamics.   I  will  present  only  a  brief  overview  of  the  
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history  here  in  order  to  set  the  stage  for  the  discussion  to  come  in  chapters  3  and  4.   A  full  
account  of  the  historical  development  of  matter  physics  must  be  left  for  another  work  entirely.   
The  history  of  matter  physics  is  at  least  as  long  as  the  history  of  philosophy.   It  begins  
with  mythological  accounts  of  creation  and  the  nature  of  the  world.   In  these,  we  find  consistent  
reference  to  some  sort  of  “stuff”  (usually  primordial  water)  out  of  which  some  agent  or  force  
created  all  entities  living  and  dead.   This  informed  the  presocratic  milesian  monists,  who  began  
to  ask  the  explicit  question  of  what  (stuff)  was  the  fundamental  component  of  all  (material)  
entities  in  the  world.   Thales  said  water,  Anaximander  said  apeiron ,  Anaximenes  said  air.   From  
this,  Parmenides  and  Heraclitus  introduced  the  question  of  how  and  in  what  way  this  stuff  could  
be  said  to  change.   This  formed  the  first  apparent  dichotomy  between  processual  and  substance  
accounts  of  being,  and  so  formed  the  first  division  between  process  and  substance  accounts  of  
matter.   It  was  at  this  time  that  matter  and  motion  became  associated  in  physics.   In  particular,  the  
ancients  posited  first  and  foremost  in  their  physics  a  strong  explanatory  connection  between  the  
matter  of  a  body  and  its  natural  and  possible  motions.   This  is  seen  in  both  Plato  ( Timaeus ),  in  
which  we  also  see  a  clear  expression  of  the  Heraclitus-Parmenides  distinction  (“What  is  that  
which  always  is  and  has  no  becoming;  and  what  is  that  which  is  always  becoming  and  never  is?”  
27d5), 76   and  in  Aristotle  ( Physics  II ).   The  key  was  this:   a  body  could  move  in  a  particular  way  
(naturally)  if  and  only  if  the  body  was  composed  of  the  appropriate  matter.   Thus  matters  and  
motions  (especially  circular  vs.  linear  motions)  were  co-explanatory.   This  same  explanatory  
connection  is  apparent  in  the  medicine  of  the  time  as  well,  which  posited  a  strong  explanatory  
connection  between  the  matters  of  the  body  and  its  functions  or  natural  motions  (see  “Waters  and  
Airs”  in  the  Hippocratic  Corpus).   
Much  of  the  history  leading  to  the  scientific  revolution  is  a  story  of  increasing  precision  
and  calculational  acumen.   However,  this  fundamental  connection  between  types  of  
matter/substantial  stuff  and  physical  motions  remained  largely  unchallenged  until  the  time  of  
Galileo  (it  was  also  apparently  challenged  in  Hypatia  of  Alexandria’s  work,  but  no  primary  
sources  remain  to  corroborate  this).   Galilean  physics  divorced  the  quantity  of  motion  from  the  
quantity  of  matter,  and  to  some  extent  the  specific  substantial  constitution  of  matter,  by  noting  
the  identical  free-fall  motions  of  different  bodies.   
76  See  Timaeus’s  speech  beginning  on  29e.   
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However,  while  an  important  development  in  matter  physics,  this  did  little  to  unseat  the  
prevailing  interpretation  of  matter  as  a  kind  of  stuff  similar  or  identical  to  the  philosophical  
concept  of  substances.   Cartesian  physics  shows  that  this  assumption  was  still  largely  
unchallenged  in  the  early  17th  century,  since  matter  in  Descartes’  physics  is  defined  as  “spatial  
extension”  or  “Body.”   
However,  it  was  at  this  point  that  alchemical  traditions,  developed  in  response  to  the  
alchemical  traditions  imported  from  China  through  the  Islamic  empire  (See  Lindberg  (2007),  
Needham  (1969)), 77   began  to  display  interesting  divergences  from  the  orthodoxy  on  the  
definition  of  matter.   Namely,  three  sorts  of  alchemical  interpretation  of  matter  were  at  play,  
defined  by  the  debate  surrounding  the  proper  methods  of  physical  manipulation  and  production  
of  alchemical  changes  in  matter.   Namely,  there  were:  
(1) Plenum/Continuum  interpretations :   Change  in  substances  must  be  solely  in  terms  of  the  
form  of  the  substance.   I.e.,  in  a  shift  from  water  to  ice,  wetness  is  replaced  with  dryness,  
with  no  corresponding  change  in  the  underlying  matter  that  accepts  these  qualities/formal  
features.   Substance/matter  is  therefore  the  bare  subject  of  form,  and  it  is  only  differences  
in  form  that  define  differences  between  subsystems  of  the  world.   
(2) Minima  interpretations :   Change  in  substances  is  the  result  of  stripping  form  from  matter,  
and  replacing  it  with  a  new  form.   This  replacement  results  in  the  creation  of  new  core  
hylomorphic  components—new  minimal  units  of  material  composition  (minima)—since  
each  form  defines  a  characteristic  minimum  component  of  that  form.   Substance/matter  is  
therefore  the  hylomorphic  indivisible  minimum  of  composition. 78    
(3) Atomist  interpretations :   Change  in  substance  is  the  result  of  rearranging  the  core  
components  of  the  substance,  i.e.,  the  discrete  atomic  constituents  of  various  macroscopic  
substances  like  lead  or  gold.   
77  Lindberg  remarks  that  alchemical  tradition  probably  came  from  ancient  Greece.   However,  while  a  natural  
assumption,  this  is  not  corroborated.   Needham’s  work,  then,  acts  as  a  proper  bridge,  showing  how  the  advanced  
matter  physics  of  China  especially  was  filtered  into  Europe  both  in  specific  engineering  marvels  like  the  printing  
press  or  the  horse  stirrup  or  gunpowder,  but  also  in  terms  of  the  theory  of  matter  that  was  built  on  mohist  and  Taoist  
traditions.   The  fact  that  alchemical  practice  was  so  prevalent  in  ancient  China,  and  that  alchemical  traditions  
became  far  more  prevalent  in  Europe  around  the  time  of  these  transfers  in  technology  from  China  to  Europe  is  taken  
as  reasonable  evidence  that  Chinese  alchemy  had  some  influence  on  the  practices  in  Europe.   Needham  admits,  
however,  that  the  precise  relationship  between  Chinese  and  European  alchemy  is  still  unclear.   A  more  thorough  
investigation  is  still  needed.   
78  The  minima  interpretations  saw  very  little  support.   They  were  primarily  defended  as  a  philosophical  attempt  to  
achieve  the  best  of  both  the  atomist  and  the  continuum  interpretations.   However,  they  failed  primarily  because  they  
could  not  describe  a  method  for  “stripping  form  from  matter,”  when  form  and  matter  were  thought  to  be  co-defining.   
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Of  these,  only  the  third  could  produce  a  consistent  account  of  the  method  for  altering  substances  
in  the  world.   I.e.,  only  (3)  had  any  scientific  impact.   That  is,  (3)  introduced  the  now-familiar  
perturbative  method  of  modern  physics  as  the  core  means  of  producing  changes  of  interest  to  the  
experimenter.   It  was  this  tradition  that  eventually  developed  into  chemistry,  through  the  work  of  
especially  Boyle.   Plenum  theory  saw  a  few  attempts  to  reclaim  explanatory  ground,  e.g.,  in  the  
explanation  of  thermal  reactions  in  terms  of  phlogiston  (Becher  and  Stahl).   However,  the  
success  of  the  method  of  (3)  and  the  resultant  chemistry  was  far  too  great.   Though  atomism  
would  not  be  “confirmed”  until  much  later,  the  methods  of  those  assuming  something  along  the  
lines  of  atomism  produced  results.   
Importantly,  this  opened  the  door  for  the  final  rejection  of  the  Aristotelian  connection  
between  matters  and  motions.   The  characterization  of  material  composition  in  terms  of  
components  and  their  organizations  meant  that  no  longer  could  we  describe  particular  motions  as  
the  result  of  particular  material  natures.   All  material  components  would  need  to  be  able  to  move  
in  similar  ways  in  order  to  account  for  the  many  composites  of  the  world  in  the  framework  of  
(3).   
Having  rejected  this  connection,  physicists  were  able  to  take  seriously  the  perturbative  
methods  that  would  prove  so  useful  in  especially  quantum  mechanics  and  quantum  chemistry.  
No  longer  was  it  necessary  to  describe  experimental  setups  in  terms  of  qualitative  changes  in  the  
form  of  the  substance.   Instead,  physicists  could  describe  solely  the  slight  alterations  of  quantities  
of  motion  independent  of  stuff  (substance)  and  its  features.   Matter  physics  then  proceeded  as  a  
steady  precisification  of  the  observable  and  isolatable  motions  associated  with  material  systems.  
In  so  cataloguing  these  motions,  matter  physics  required  sequentially  the  positing  of  smaller  and  
smaller  components  of  material  systems  to  carry  the  relevant  motions  and  dynamics.   Each  
instance  of  such  a  posit  was  eventually  rejected  in  favor  of  lower  level  dynamics  of  smaller  
things.   This  brings  us  roughly  to  the  current  day,  in  which  the  “most  fundamental”  material  
component—the  Higgs—is  not  obviously  a  thing  at  all,  but  is  better  described  as  a  fundamental  
self-interaction  through  which  systems  acquire  their  mass.   
There  is  an  intuitive  sense  in  which  matter  physics  is  about  substances.   We  need  only  
look  at  examples  throughout  history  to  see  that  the  non-rigorous  sense  of  substance—some  stuff,  
usually  optically  homogeneous—is  a  core  target  of  investigation.   Alchemy  is  about  changing  
stuff  like  lead  into  gold.   Chemistry,  born  from  alchemy,  is  similarly  about  stuff.   Fluid  dynamics  
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and  solid  state  physics  are  both  about  particular  phases  of  stuff,  fluids  and  solids.  
Thermodynamics  is  about  the  response  of  stuff  to  heating  and  cooling.   Early  quantum  
mechanics  is  about  core  components  of  stuff—the  specific  properties  and  dynamics  of  the  
constituents  of  the  periodic  table.   Later  quantum  mechanics  is  about  the  measurability  and  
character  of  stuff  in  general.   
I  do  not  think  it  unnatural  to  suppose  this.   However,  a  more  thorough  look  at  the  history,  
which  regrettably  I  could  only  sketch  here,  reveals  that  this  assumption  that  matter  physics  is  
about  stuff  is  far  too  simplistic.   Indeed,  most  matter  physics  was  developed  to  explain  stuff  in  
terms  of  more  fundamental  dynamics.   These  developments  were  defined  by  rejections  of  things  
in  favor  of  dynamics,  and  by  the  increasing  precision  of  perturbing  the  stable  features  of  the  
systems  being  studied.   From  the  substances  of  chemistry,  to  molecules,  to  atoms,  to  nuclei,  to  
nucleons,  to  quarks,  to  field  fluctuations,  the  progress  of  matter  physics  has  been  defined  by  a  
move  toward  more  and  more  fine-grained  dynamics,  both  in  experimental  practice  and  in  
explanatory  modeling.   
As  I  have  said,  I  can  only  sketch  this  here.   However,  chapters  3,  4,  and  5  describe  in  
detail  three  moments  in  this  progression  of  matter  physics,  in  roughly  the  order  in  which  they  
historically  occurred.   Together,  the  chapters  compose  an  inductive  base  for  the  claim  I  have 
sketched  here:   that  for  each  thing-posit  in  history,  eventual  work  in  matter  physics  (or  other  
science)  eliminated  (or  eliminates)  this  thing-posit  in  favor  of  more  fundamental  and  explanatory  
dynamics.   I  call  this  the  regression  argument  in  favor  of  processes.   
For  the  purposes  of  this  chapter,  suffice  it  to  say  that  once  again  we  cannot  rule  out  that  
matter  is  processual  and  not  substantial.   While  the  claim  that  matter  is  substantial  is  intuitive,  
the  process  realist  may  claim  instead  that  matter  is  an  umbrella  concept  meant  to  express  a  
particular  class  of  interactions.   For  example,  one  might  say  that  a  process  or  event  is  material,  or  
occurs  in  matter,  whenever  that  process  or  dynamic  event  includes  as  parts  gravitational,  
electromagnetic,  and  other  such  physical  interactions.   In  this  way,  we  might  say  that  a  new  type  
of  matter  has  been  discovered  whenever  we  have  discovered  an  instance  in  which  these  
interactions  are  not  similarly  co-localized.   For  example,  dark  matter  is  a  new  type  of  matter  
present  in  galactic  gravitational  dynamics  precisely  because  there  are  gravitational  interactions  
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with  no  associated  co-localized  electromagnetic  interactions.   I  have  argued  this  explicitly  
elsewhere. 79    
  
  
[2.2.3.2]:   The  Matter  as  Unifier  Argument  
  
  
Rather  than  presupposing  that  matter  is  substantial,  one  might  instead  attempt  to  argue  
that  matter  acts  as  the  unifier  of  experiments  in  the  world.   Essentially,  the  thing  realist  argues  
along  lines  similar  to  the  robustness  or  unification  arguments  above.   In  every  experiment,  there  
is  some  aspect  of  the  experimental  system  that  is  called  material.   What’s  more,  these  same  
aspects  are  found  unchanged  in  many  different  experiments  on  many  different  experimental  
systems.   Thus  (by  virtue  of  the  robustness  argument),  these  material  aspects  must  be  unchanging  
entities  to  unify  the  diverse  dynamics  of  those  different  experiments.   
Due  to  the  similarity  with  the  robustness  and  unification  arguments,  this  argument  variant  
will  face  similar  problems,  namely,  illicit  inductive  inferences.   In  fact,  this  is  little  more  than  a  
precisification  of  those  arguments.   As  such,  the  argument  deserves  no  additional  refutation  
beyond  that  offered  for  the  robustness  argument  in  particular.   The  argument  is  interesting  in  its  
own  right  only  insofar  as  it  is  the  most  historically  common  robustness  or  unification  argument  
offered  in  favor  of  thing  realism.   However,  this  historial  commonality  can  be  accounted  for  as  
merely  the  result  of  the  overwhelming  focus  on  substance  ontology  throughout  the  history  of  
philosophy,  philosophy  of  science,  and  the  science  that  developed  out  of  these  traditions.   If  one  
wishes  to  describe  the  world  as  composed  of  substances ,  then  it  is  only  natural  that  one  will  offer  
primarily  arguments  for  the  existence  of  this  matter  or  that  matter,  this  material  feature  or  that  
material  feature.   The  process  realist,  in  turn,  needs  only  to  note  that  throughout  all  of  the  back  
and  forth  about  what  material  things  to  reify  in  science,  the  dynamics  within  which  are  
supposedly  located  these  things  remain  untouched  by  metaphysical  controversy.   This  point,  too,  
will  be  taken  up  in  more  detail  in  a  later  chapter.   
  
79  Penn,  Manuscript,  “Matter  Inferences:   The  Case  of  Dark  Matter,  Dark  Energy,  and  Mysterium.”  
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[2.2.3.3]:   The  Argument  from  Metaphysical  Necessity  
  
  
This  argument  rests  on  the  intuition  that  processes  are  necessarily  twofold  entities,  
requiring  both  an  actor  and  an  act.   Essentially,  processes  cannot  be  subjectless.   Thus,  even  if  
some  processes  can  have  processual  subjects,  eventually  we  must  posit  a  subject  that  is  not  
processual,  or  face  an  infinite  regress.   In  this  case,  the  infinite  regress  is  taken  to  be  an  absurdity,  
and  so  there  must  at  least  be  some  substantial  thing  to  act  as  the  grounding  subject  for  all  
less-fundamental  processes.   
This  is  a  fair  argument  to  make.   Of  course,  the  possibility  of  subjectless  processes  is  not  
a  matter  of  intuition  but  of  definability.   If  we  can  identify  processes  in  the  world  independent  of  
the  identification  of  some  subject  for  that  process,  then  there  is  no  empirically  grounded  reason  
to  suppose  that  all  processes  must  have  subjects.   We  can  identify  processes  in  this  way,  so  we  
cut  the  problematic  regress  short.   
Indeed,  this  argument  is  made  weak  by  being  so  general.   The  regress  is  only  problematic  
if  indeed  we  can  show  it  must  occur.   If  all  processes  were  described  using  subject-laden  
language  (as  in  “I  ran,”  or  “the  atom  decayed,”),  then  we  would  indeed  be  faced  with  the  regress.  
However,  if  even  one  process  is  not  described  commonly  using  subject-laden  language,  then  the  
burden  of  proof  shifts.   E.g.,  since  we  commonly  say  “it  is  snowing  outside”  with  the  implicit  
understanding  that  the  “it”  specifies  no  real  subject,  the  proponent  of  the  metaphysical  necessity  
argument  must  provide  us  reason  to  suppose  that  most  or  some  processes  are  not  similarly  
subjectless.   
  
  
[2.2.3.4]:   The  Priority  of  Stability  Argument  
  
  
A  cousin  of  the  metaphysical  necessity  argument,  this  argument  goes  that  change  is  
defined  in  terms  of  differences  in  states  of  affairs.   In  other  words,  what  it  is  to  be  a  change,  or  a  
dynamic  event,  is  to  be  a  difference  of  property  P  of  system  X  between  time  one  and  time  two.  
If  this  definition  is  accurate,  no  change  can  be  defined  without  reference  to  the  static  things  in  
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which  the  change  manifests.   I.e.,  stabilities,  namely  static  things,  are  metaphysically  prior  to  
changes  and  dynamics.   
The  definition,  however,  is  not  accurate.   Or  rather,  it  is  not  necessarily  ontic.   While  we  
often  do  describe  the  occurrent  dynamics  in  a  system  in  terms  of  the  boundaries  of  those  
dynamics—the  initial  and  final  states  of  the  process,  as  it  were—this  does  not  mean  we  should  
reify  those  boundaries.   Rather,  we  should  treat  those  boundaries—the  states  of  affairs  and 
properties  therein—as  what  they  are:   an  epistemic  means  for  defining  dynamics  in  relation  to  
other  dynamics.   This  is  explicitly  how  I  argued  in  chapter  1,  and  I  will  continue  to  argue  this  
point  in  chapters  3,  4,  and  5.   
More  importantly,  change  is  not  something  that  can  or  should  be  defined  in  terms  of  
anything  static.   This  is  one  area  where  process  realism  can  draw  on  a  history  of  explicit  
arguments  against  this  possibility.   Namely,  dating  at  least  back  to  Zeno  and  Parmenides,  
arguments  exist  showing  the  impossibility  of  change  provided  change  is  defined  in  terms  of  static  
properties .   In  the  modern  era,  philosophers  such  as  Bergson,  James,  and  Whitehead  have  argued  
that  such  a  definition  is  impossible.   
The  crux  of  these  arguments  is  as  follows.   Zeno’s  paradoxes  present  us  with  a  tension  
between  an  entity  that  both  has  a  fixed  (determinate)  property  and  can  change  that  property.  
Explicitly,  Zeno  presents  this  as  a  contradiction  between  an  object  having  a  location  and  the  
ability  to  move.   If  an  object  has  a  location,  then  it  is  fully  described  without  reference  to  any  
other  locations.   If,  however,  an  object  is  in  motion,  it  cannot  be  fully  described  without  
reference  to  at  least  two  locations.   So  goes  the  paradox:   a  property  that  is  changing  cannot  be  
fixed,  but  a  property  must  be  fixed  to  be  held  by  an  object.   
The  key  to  resolving  this  paradox  has  been  properly  noted  by  many  philosophers  of  the  
past.   Most  recently  by  Maël  (2018). 80    Put  simply,  Zeno’s  paradoxes  smuggle  in  a  premise  that  is  
illicit:   that  there  are  static  things  with  static  properties  in  the  first  place.   Since  things  are  static,  
they  will  be  described  and  fully  understood  even  when  they  are  not  changing.   I.e.,  there  is  no  
sense  in  which  a  static  description  of  a  thing  at  rest  is  lacking  any  information  necessary  for  a  
80  Bathfield  also  provides  some  examples  of  how  Zeno’s  paradoxes  appear  in  modern  physics  and  science  as  a  result  
of  failures  to  understand  this  point.   See  also  Silagade  (2005)  and  Atkinson  (2006)  for  discussions  of  the  paradoxes  
in  modern  science.   See  also  Papa-Grimaldi  (1996)  for  discussions  of  how  the  common  mathematical  solutions  to  
the  paradox  miss  the  point.   See  also  Lynds  (2003)  for  a  brief  discussion  (based  on  a  longer  work)  of  the  paradoxes  
in  specific  that  shows  how  the  paradoxes  express  a  tradeoff  between  determinate  properties  and  determinable  
continuous  properties  (coded  language  for  a  tradeoff  between  substance  and  process  ontological  pictures).   
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complete  definition  of  that  entity.   In  this  way,  Zeno  (and  every  Parmenidean  to  follow)  sneaks  in  
a  metaphysical  premise  that  begs  the  question:   that  entities  in  the  world  are  static.   
Notice  that  it  is  not  simply  enough  to  resist  this  premise.   For  example,  one  cannot  simply  
adopt  “causal  powers”  or  “intrinsic  states  of  motion”  and  still  resolve  the  paradoxes.   In  order  to  
resolve  Zeno’s  paradoxes,  one  must  accept  that  there  are  no  such  things  as  static  entities.   In  
other  words,  the  resolution  of  the  paradoxes  amounts  to  the  negation  of  the  claim  that  dynamics  
and  change  are  defined  in  terms  of  anything  other  than  further  dynamics  and  change.   
The  Parmenidean  concept  of  being,  which  has  been  so  prevalent  in  European  philosophy,  
is  difficult  to  dislodge.   It  is  ensconced  in  Plato  and  Aristotle,  and  so  figures  prominently  in  the  
Scholastics  and  Early  Modern  philosophers  who  defined  the  landscape  of  philosophy  for  the  20th  
and  now  21st  centuries.   However,  its  status  as  a  significant  historical  influence  should  not  mean  
that  it  is  immune  to  criticism.   The  Parmenidean  conception  of  being  has  many  difficulties  in  
dealing  with  the  concept  of  change  and  dynamicity  to  this  day.   It  fails  to  account  for  
philosophical  positions  and  success  stories  from  cultures  outside  of  the  European  traditions.   Any 
argument  dependent  on  the  Parmenidean  concept  of  being,  such  as  this  and  other  underlier  
arguments,  will  therefore  inherit  its  philosophical  problems  and  contextual  quirks.   
  
  
[2.2.3.5]:   The  Common  Cause  Argument  
  
  
Another  means  of  arguing  that  things  must  underlie  processes  is  to  argue  that  only  things  
can  act  as  common  causes.   In  other  words,  one  assumes  that  processes  are  incapable  of  multiply  
causing.   Thus,  when  we  think  there  are  two  events  caused  by  the  same  preceding  event,  there  
must  be  a  thing  that  explains  the  evolution  of  the  original  event  into  the  two  later  events.   
This  argument  is  little  more  than  another  example  of  the  robustness  and/or  unification  
argument  already  discussed.   As  such,  it  will  face  similar  challenges.   In  this  case,  the  
assumption  that  processes  cannot  be  multiply  causing  is  a  false  premise.   Processes  are  identified  
in  part  by  their  dynamic  shape  (Chapter  1,  §2).   One  such  shape  is  a  fork,  in  which  one  process  
splits  into  two.   Such  a  process  is  a  clear  example  of  a  physical  common  cause.   We  have  also  
seen  that  processes  can  act  as  underliers  and  unifiers  of  multiple  different  phenomena.   The  
common  cause  argument  is  therefore  insufficient  by  itself.   
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There  is  a  further  problem,  related  to  thing  realism,  that  is  worth  noting.   Namely,  things  
cannot  cause  except  insofar  as  they  are  dynamic.   In  order  for  a  thing  to  affect  change,  it  itself  
must  achieve  its  potential  to  change.   In  order  for  a  thing  to  compose  and  enable  an  occurrent  
event ,  it  must  itself  have  an  occurrent  aspect. 81    This  means  that,  at  best,  things  can  act  as  
structural,  not  causal,  explanations  of  the  dynamics.   This  is  tantamount  to  an  admission  that  
things  do  not  play  a  physical-causal  role  in  the  dynamics  of  an  experiment,  and  so  will  not  serve  
the  thing  realist  very  well  as  they  attempt  to  justify  that  things  must  underlie  processes.   
  
  
[2.2.3.6]:   The  Symmetry  Argument  
  
  
One  of  the  primary  means  of  justifying  the  existence  of  structures  and  structural  features  
in  philosophy  of  science  is  the  appeal  to  symmetries.   The  idea  is  that  (a  subclass  of)  structures  
obtain  in  virtue  of  static,  quantified  mathematical  features  of  a  state  of  a  system. 82    These  
structures  have  definite  relational  features—the  symmetry  relation—that  obtain  independent  of  
time.   Therefore,  intuitively,  these  symmetries  cannot  be  held  by  inherently  temporal  entities  like  
processes. 83   
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  argument  is  meant  to  work  in  detail.   The  basic  argument  is 
simple  enough,  but  symmetries  are  most  often  treated  as  theoretical  relational  facts  that  constrain  
systems  and  system  properties,  but  are  not  found  in  any  property  of  those  systems  and  properties.  
Another  snarl  comes  from  the  fact  that  symmetry  arguments  are  most  common  in  quantum  field  
81  See,  for  instance,  Simons  and  Melia  (2000).   
82  There  are  cross-temporal  symmetries  discussed,  especially  in  the  context  of  quantum  field  theory  where  CPT  
symmetry  is  explicitly  temporal.   
83  Once  more,  our  friends  Bueno  (2001,  2006)  and  French  (2001,  2006)  both  offer  accounts  of  symmetries  in  the  
literature  that  are  interesting  in  their  differences  of  ontological  commitment.   French  (2001)  is  explicit  in  his  
commitment  to  structures  qua  static  features  of  objects,  and  takes  symmetry  arguments  in  physics  especially  as  a  
reason  to  support  structural  realism  (further  supported  in  2006).   Bueno  (2001)  is  (as  one  might  expect  given  our  
earlier  discussion  of  these  interlocutors)  less  committed,  treating  symmetries  not  as  indicators  of  anything  ontic,  but  
rather  as  an  effective  tool  for  drawing  inferences  about  physical  systems,  especially  physical  dynamics  in  the  
examples  from  von  Neumann  and  Weyl  he  presents.   See  Butterfield  (2005)  for  an  account  of  symmetries  that  is  
both  less-technical  and  relatively  ontologically  neutral.   See  also  Earman  (2002),  who  argues  that  symmetries  are  
important  for  establishing  invariances  (coded  language  for  thing-like  entities  and  their  properties).   See  Rosen  
(2008),  who  argues  that  symmetries  are  actually  less  interesting  in  the  study  and  interpretation  of  physics  than  
asymmetries,  and  uses  this  as  a  justification  for  a  Whiteheadian  process  interpretation  of  physics.   Finally,  see  Baker  
(2010).   
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theory,  where  it  is  less  than  obvious  that  there  are  entities  that  can  bear  the  sort  of  static  
symmetry  relation  that  the  thing  realist  needs.   
I  think  this  argument  is  meant  to  express  a  mathematical-descriptive  point:   that  
symmetries  are  often  explanatory  and  powerful  within  our  theories  when  they  are  mathematically  
defined.   For  some  strange  reason,  the  descriptive  power  of  mathematics  has  been  co-opted  by  
the  structural  realist  literature  as  their  domain  alone, 84   and  so  symmetries  are  taken  to  be  
suggestive  of  structures  and  structures  alone.   
However,  processes  can  manifest  symmetries.   Dynamic  symmetries  like  CPT-symmetry  
are  obvious  enough  examples.   Non-dynamic  symmetries,  like  transposition  or  rotational  
symmetry,  can  also  be  manifest  by  processes  so  long  as  processes  can  have  measurable  quantities  
in  small  enough  spacetime  regions.   Put  another  way,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  a  stable  
relation—a  symmetry  relation—entails  the  existence  of  anything  static.   In  fact,  we  can  
reinterpret  all  symmetry  claims  in  the  literature  by  noting  that  processes  can  not  only  bear  
symmetry,  they  are  often  the  defining  features  of  that  symmetry.   Symmetries  in  physics,  
quantum  mechanics  and  field  theory  in  particular,  are  defined  as  the  similarity  of  actions  of  a  
system  under  certain  perturbations,  where  those  actions  are  considered  the  “reverses”  of  each  
other  in  some  sense.   For  example,  temporal  symmetry  is  defined  as  the  similarity  of  the  
equations  of  motion,  field  action,  transition,  etc.  for  a  system  under  a  reflection  in  the  direction  
of  time. 85    The  symmetry  then  arises  because  the  dynamic  evolution  of  the  system  is  identical  
whether  run  forwards  or  backwards. 86    Thus,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  symmetries  entail  




84  See  Brading  and  Landry  (2006),  Bueno  (1999,  2000),  French  (2001,  2003,  2006,  2011),  Psillos  (1995,  2001),  van  
Fraassen's  (2006,  2007,  2008),  Votsis  (2003,  2005),  and  Worrall  (1989,  2007)  for  various  forms  of  ontic  and  
epistemic  structural  realism.   Worrall  in  particular  is  guilty  of  the  assertion  that  mathematics  is  indicative  of  
structuralism,  as  are  all  ontic  structural  realists.   An  interesting  counterexample  comes  from  Earley  (2008a,  b,  c,  
2012,  2016)  who  argues  consistently  for   “Process  structural  realism”  where  structures  are  understood  as  the  
emergent  order  found  in  systems  of  multiple  processes  like  chemical  reactions  or  molecular  dynamics,  similar  to  
Heraclitus’s  Logos .   
85  Here,  the  direction  of  time  is  to  be  understood  solely  mathematically:   we  just  flip  the  sign  of  the  temporal  
variable  from  positive  to  negative  (or  vice  versa).   
86  A  lot  must  be  said  about  this,  but  unfortunately,  I  lack  the  tools  to  enable  this  discussion  at  present.   The  purpose  
of  this  work  is,  in  large  part,  to  build  the  foundation  for  this  future  analysis.   
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[2.2.3.7]:   The  Contingent  Thing  Argument  (Exhibition)  
  
  
Finally,  the  thing  realist  might  simply  point  to  a  thing.   Exhibition  is  an  argument  for  
existence,  after  all.   This  is  truly  the  last  resort  of  the  thing  realist.   Yet,  it  is  perhaps  the  most  
persuasive  argument,  simply  because  it  rests  on  no  general  assumptions.   Rather,  the  argument  is  
based  entirely  on  peculiarities  of  particular  scientific  experiments  and  models.   The  “contingent  
things  argument”  goes  as  follows.   A  particular  collection  of  dynamics  include  reference  to  an  
underlying  thing,  with  all  of  the  properties  of  things:   material  features  and  the  like.   Thus,  
contingent  on  this  description  being  accurate,  this  particular  collection  of  dynamics  refer  
explicitly  to  a  real  thing  to  underlie  and  undergo  those  dynamics.   
For  example,  it  was  once  argued  that  fire  is  a  substance.   It  had  properties  that  suggested  
it  was  a  physical  thing.   Many  fires,  such  as  a  candle  flame,  had  structures  that  seemed  
(relatively)  stable.   They  always  had  the  same  color(s).   They  would  always  produce  the  same  
sensations  when  touched,  and  were  causally  dependent  upon  the  combustion  of  some  other  
substance,  the  fuel.   
Of  course,  we  later  discovered  that  fire  is  not  a  thing.   It  is  no  more  than  a  collection  of  
dynamics. 87    Its  structure,  such  as  it  is,  is  no  more  than  the  balance  of  interactions  between  those  
processes:   the  motions  of  air  and  the  combustion  products.   Its  color  is  no  more  than  the  result  of  
a  particular  process  within  the  system:   incandescence.   Its  dependence  on  fuel  is  not  actually  
dependence  on  a  substance,  but  rather  a  dependence  on  a  particular  sort  of  chemical  interaction:  
yet  more  dynamics.   In  fact,  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  claim  that  the  entirety  of  this  supposed  thing  
and  its  supposed  thing-properties  is  accurately  described  in  terms  of  underlying  dynamics .  
So,  this  example  will  not  work  for  the  thing  realist.   What  about  other  examples?   The  
issue  should  be  apparent:   the  very  thing  that  made  this  argument  strong—its  contingency—also  
places  a  heavy  burden  on  the  thing  realist.   Namely,  they  must  actually  produce  an  instance  in  the  
history  of  science  wherein  a  thing  was  posited,  was  successfully  retained  through  all  theory  
changes,  was  not  superseded  by  a  better  description  of  a  similar  thing,  and  was  not  (and  cannot  
be)  later  described  in  terms  of  underlying  dynamics  as  was  the  candle  flame.   This  is  quite  the  
87  C.f.  Psillos  1994  for  a  discussion  of  this.   It  should  be  noted  that  Psillos  approaches  the  discussion  from  a  
structural  realist  position,  and  so  misses  key  points  about  the  shift  in  thinking  to  thermal  dynamics .   
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task.   No  example  presents  itself  at  this  time.   Perhaps,  if  the  thing  realist  believes  strongly  
enough,  an  example  will  appear:   a  messiah  for  thing  realism.   
More  importantly,  and  in  all  seriousness,  as  I  argue  in  the  next  chapter,  the  thing  realist  is  
actually  subject  to  a  historically  contingent  regression  argument.   Namely,  for  each  thing  we  
posited  in  the  past,  science  eventually  showed  how  that  thing  is  no  more  than  a  collection  of  
dynamics.   Given  the  plethora  of  examples  of  this,  and  their  alignment  with  the  general  trends  of  
scientific  inquiry,  we  have  good  reason  to  suspect  that  this  trend  will  continue:   things  will  




[2.3]:   General  Refutation:   From  Negation  to  Position  
  
  
[2.3.1]:   The  Negative:   Refuting  Underlier  Arguments  Algorithmically  
  
  
Underlier  arguments  all  require  that  somewhere,  somehow,  we  recognize  stability  in  the  
world.   This  recognition  is  of  one  of  two  types  of  stability:   (1)  an  observed  stability  that  is  mind  
independent,  or  (2)  a  stability  in  our  epistemic  or  referential  access  to  that  mind-independent  
world.   This  latter  type  is  then  divided  into  linguistic  and  conceptual  subtypes.   From  this  
recognition,  the  thing  realist  then  argues  that  these  stabilities  either  are  or  entail  static  things:  
structures,  substances,  etc.   This  argument  that  stability  entails  staticity  is  either  deductive,  or  it  
is  inductive.   Deductive  versions  rest  on  assumptions  (whether  supported  or  not)  about  language,  
about  metaphysical  priorities,  and  about  the  nature  of  the  material.   Inductive  versions  instead  
attempt  to  justify  the  entailment  of  staticity  from  stability  by  appeal  to  specific  cases  or  
collections  thereof.   
We  have  already  discussed  the  general  refutation  of  the  underlier  argument.   Namely,  it  is  
simply  false  that  stability  entails  staticity.   In  order  for  this  to  be  true,  stability  would  need  to  be  
an  absolute  property  of  systems.   However,  stability  is  relational:   something  can  only  be  stable  
with  respect  to  that  which  is  not.   The  claim  that  stability  entails  staticity  therefore  amounts  to  
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the  claim  that  everything  that  is  stable  is  imperturbable.   I.e.,  the  thing  realist  must  infer  from  the  
existence  of  something  that  is  unchanged  to  the  existence  of  something  unchanging.   
Recognizing  the  failure  of  the  thing  realist’s  assumption—that  stability  entails  
staticity—is  the  key  to  refuting  every  underlier  argument  that  has  been,  or  will  be  offered.   One  
might  even  construct  an  algorithm  out  of  these  refutations.   First,  locate  the  offending  premise.  
Second,  articulate  how  the  particular  stability  of  interest  can  be  represented  by  a  comparison  of  
two  dynamics  with  different  characteristic  time  or  energy  scales.   Finally,  if  possible,  show  how  
this  dynamic  representation  is  superior  at  capturing  the  practice  of  science  in  the  context  of  the  
particular  system  in  which  was  found  the  stability  to  begin  with.   This  last  step  is  merely  icing  on  
the  cake:   all  the  process  realist  needs  to  do  in  order  to  refute  an  underlier  argument  is  to  
demonstrate  parity  between  dynamic  and  static  representations  of  stability.   The  fact  that  
dynamic  representations  are  generally  superior  only  acts  as  further,  but  unnecessary,  reason  to  
endorse  pure  process  realism.   
Crucially,  the  thing  realist  can  offer  no  inductive  support  for  the  claim  that  stability  
entails  staticity,  even  in  particular  instances.   We  discussed  this  in  the  context  of  two  of  the  
stronger  underlier  arguments:   the  robustness  and  unification  arguments.   There,  we  noted  that  in  
order  to  offer  inductive  support  for  the  stability  entails  staticity  premise,  the  thing  realist  would  
need  to  have  access  to  some  material  fact  about  the  world  and  its  constituents  that  would  justify  
the  inductive  comparison  between  every  possible  dynamic  system.   I.e.,  the  things  that  are  
inferred  inductively  in  these  arguments  assume  that  not  only  is  the  entity  in  question  stable  in  
many  systems  under  many  interventions  and  dynamics,  but  that  it  is  stable  in  every  feasible  
system,  under  every  feasible  intervention.   This  sort  of  inductive-risk-laden  universality  is,  
perhaps,  acceptable  to  the  devout  thing  realist,  but  no  one  can  call  it  epistemically  modest.   
Moreover,  even  granting  that  there  are  thing  underliers  to  act  as  robust  unifiers  of  
experiments  and  their  descriptions,  these  underliers  are  accessible  and  useful  to  us  only  insofar  
as  they  are  dynamic.   For  example,  when  we  (supposedly)  use  electrons  to  probe  the  
electromagnetic  properties  of  some  system,  the  thing  realist  would  have  us  believe  that  this  
entails  the  existence  of  electrons  qua  things.   However,  what  we  are  actually  using  to  probe  the  
system  is  the  electromagnetic  interaction  processes.   “Electron”  is  just  the  word  we  give  for  this  
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interaction.   It  is  not  the  probe  which  we  are  using,  but  rather  the  prob ing :   the  interactions  and  
propagations  we  already  know  enough  to  make  use  of. 88   
This  lack  of  inductive  support  for  the  offending  premise  of  the  general  underlier  
argument  means  that  the  thing  realist  can  only  justify  their  claims  with  deductive  principles.  
This  in  turn  means  that  their  support  for  the  existence  of  things  can  only  come  from  principles  
that  are  at  least  as  strong  as  the  claim  that  stability  entails  staticity.   Moreover,  these  deductive  
principles  cannot  come  from  experience:   it  is  impossible  to  experience  a  thing  because  
experience  requires  interaction,  i.e.,  dynamics.   The  deductive  principles  must  be  a  priori,  and  
pure  of  inductive  support.   Thus,  underlier  arguments  for  things  are  inevitably  question-begging:  
they  must  at  least  assume  that  which  they  are  attempting  to  prove.   
In  contrast,  the  process  realist  can  offer  arguments  based  solely  in  experience,  or  from  
induction.   This  was  the  point  of  the  continuity  argument  from  chapter  1,  and  of  the  various  
refutations  of  thing-underlier  arguments  above.   This  breaks  the  parity  between  process  and  thing  
realisms.   Most  underlier  arguments  are  defeated  once  we  recognize  that  they  do  not  act  as  
arguments  for  thing-underliers  over  process-underliers.   However,  the  continuity  argument,  and  
the  various  sample  arguments  offered  through  this  chapter  in  favor  of  particular  process 
underliers  suggests  that,  whenever  we  are  justified  in  inferring  to  underliers,  we  will  only  be  
justified  in  inferring  to  process  underliers.   
  
  
[2.3.2]:   The  Positive:   Explaining  Stability  
  
  
Something  stronger  can  be  said.   If  underlier  arguments  all  fail  because  they  cannot  
justify  that  stability  entails  staticity,  this  indicates  that  stability  is  not  the  sort  of  thing  that  can  
even  be  explained  by  staticity,  independent  of  any  entailment  relationship.   In  fact,  this  is  the  
case:   stability  is  an  inherently  dynamic  notion,  as  I  argue  in  this  section.   
Every  claim  about  stability  is  comparative.   Consider:   “the  table  has  a  stable  shape,”  or  
“the  molecule  is  stable.”  and  “the  microtransaction  business  practices  of  predatory  game 
publishers  stably  produces  revenue.”   One  of  the  unifying  features  of  these  claims  qua  stability  is  
88  C.f.  Hacking’s  “Use”  argument  for  entity  realism  (Hacking  1984).   Importantly,  I  have  merely  co-opted  Hacking’s  
argument  by  applying  it  unaltered  save  for  the  rejection  of  the  implicit  underlier  argument  Hacking  adopts.   
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that  they  are  meaningless  without  a  comparison  class.   I.e.,  “the  table  has  a  stable  shape”  is  
equivalent  in  logical  content  to  “the  table  has  a  shape”  if  no  comparison  is  specified  or  implicit.  
E.g.,  in  a  logically  possible  world  composed  only  of  a  single  table,  the  claims  are  identically  
made  true  or  false.   It  is  only  when  we  specify  some  time  scale  over  which  we  are  considering  
the  table—a  time  scale  over  which  other  changes  do  occur—that  we  notice  that  the  table’s  shape  
does  not  change  in  that  same  time  scale.   We  might  similarly  specify  an  energy  scale  for  
comparison:   the  table  has  a  stable  shape  within  my  house  because  my  house  contains  no  highly  
energetic  processes  or  systems.   Put  the  table  in  the  center  of  the  sun,  and  it  will  not  retain  a  
stable  shape.   Finally,  we  might  simply  compare  the  table  to  other  systems  that  are  less  stable.  
E.g.,  the  table  has  a  stable  shape  compared  to  the  shape  of  a  collection  of  gaseous  molecules.   
However,  no  matter  how  we  specify  the  comparison  class  of  the  stable  entity,  we  will  be  
appealing  to  processual  notions.   I.e.,  we  will  always  explain  the  difference  between  the  stable  
entity  and  its  comparison  in  virtue  of  the  changes  each  undergo  either  independently  or  when  
subjected  to  the  same  perturbations.   E.g.,  this  uranium-216  atom  is  stable  and  that  uranium-239  
atom  is  not  precisely  because  when  both  are  allowed  to  decay  naturally,  uranium-216  will  decay  
in  milliseconds,  while  the  uranium-239  will  decay  in  nanoseconds.   The  processes  of  decay  (of  
the  transition  to  a  lower  energy  state  within  the  nuclear-energy-shells  of  the  respective  nuclei)  
occur  over  different  time  scales.   
Every  claim  about  stability  must  therefore  be  made  in  reference  to  a  comparison  class  of 
dynamics.   In  addition  to  this,  stability  claims  come  attached  to  dynamic  contexts.   Consider:  
“the  microtransaction  business  practices  of  predatory  game  publishers  stably  produces  revenue.” 
The  claim  is  still  comparative;  what  would  count  as  unstable  production  of  revenue?   The  claim  
is  also  obviously  context  sensitive.   The  production  of  revenue  in  various  industries  occurs  over  
different  time  scales.   For  example,  the  production  and  selling  of  grand  pianos  can  take  years,  
and  involves  a  very  small  market  and  so  the  revenue  stream  from  this  industry  is  indexed  to  very  
long  time  scales  with  large  bursts  of  income  periodic  to  those  time  scales.   In  contrast,  the  
production  of  glassware  occurs  over  days  at  most,  and  has  a  relatively  constant  consumer  base.  
The  revenue  stream  in  this  case  occurs  far  more  frequently  and  in  smaller  spikes.   
What  we  mean  by  stability  in  this  instance  is  clearly  relative  to  more  than  just  a  
comparison  between  specific  processes.   Rather,  we  must  also  define  what  sort  of  stability  we  are  
interested  in  with  respect  to  other,  non-comparable  processes.   Is  the  size  of  the  influxes  of  
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revenue  or  is  the  time  between  them  more  important  for  determining  the  stability  of  the  revenue  
stream?   The  answer  is  that  it  depends  on  what  our  context  is.   For  a  company,  long  gaps  
between  revenue  influxes  may  be  acceptable  or  even  preferable  so  long  as  the  influxes  occur  
frequently  enough  and  are  large  enough  that  the  company  can  engage  in  its  spending  
processes—paying  its  workers,  investing  in  more  production  capacity,  paying  off  loans,  hoarding  
money  in  offshore  accounts,  etc.   For  an  individual  looking  to  hand-make  these  products,  other  
factors  will  be  more  important—affording  food,  paying  for  medical  coverage,  etc.   Thus,  while  a  
company  may  say  that  the  revenue  from  making  and  selling  pianos  is  stable,  a  family  will  not  
necessarily  say  the  same  in  virtue  of  the  other  economic  processes  of  interest  to  each  
respectively .  
Thus,  stability  has  (at  least)  two  conceptual  features:   
(1) Stability  is  comparative  between  processes  of  change.  
(2) Stability  is  relative  to  a  context  of  other  processes  of  change.  
These  features  of  stability  are  explicit  and  suggestive  in  physics.   When  we  experiment  on  a  
physical  system,  those  aspects  that  are  stable  are  said  to  be  so  in  virtue  of  having  a  characteristic  
binding  energy  greater  than  the  perturbing  energies  of  the  experimental  interventions.   Claims  
about  stability  are  made  true  both  by  the  comparison  between  systems  subjected  to  the  same  
perturbations  and  by  the  recognition  of  which  perturbations  we  are  actually  performing  on  the  
system.   
In  short,  stability  is  like  “faster  than”:   it  can  only  exist  as  a  comparison,  and  only  as  a  
comparison  between  temporally  extended  entities.   As  such,  stability  requires  the  existence  of  
dynamics  and  change  in  order  to  be  an  operational  concept.   In  other  words,  processes  are  
ontologically  prior  to  stabilities;  change  always  supersedes  rest.   
This  is  a  point  that  is  worth  stressing.   Much  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  and  of  
philosophy  of  science,  has  been  centered  on  explaining  change—in  terms  of  differences  of  states  
of  affairs,  differences  in  properties,  causal  connections,  causal  powers,  potentialities,  etc.—but  
this  work  assumes  a  metaphysical  priority  relation  that  is  illicit.   Namely,  it  assumes  that  change  
is  the  thing  to  be  explained,  and  that  statics  are  brute.   However,  this  simply  does  not  accord  with  
experience.   This  priority  relation  should  be  reversed:   it  is  change  that  is  brute  and  primary.  
Stability  can  only  exist  in  a  world  defined  by  brute  change.   
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Corollary  to  this,  it  may  be  worthwhile  for  the  GPT  that  I  have  subscribed  to  to  adopt  an  
additional  feature  as  process-identifying  in  order  to  account  for  stability  claims.   That  is,  
something  along  the  lines  of  “characteristic  energy  or  time  scale”  could  explicitly  ground  claims  
of  stability  in  physical  sciences  to  allow  for  clear  hierarchies  between  the  experimental  processes  
of  interest  and  the  processes  that  persist  through  experimental  intervention.   While  the  GPT  does  
not  need  any  additional  machinery  to  account  for  linguistic  and  conceptual  data,  I  would  
advocate  that  we  need  this  additional  classification/differentiation  of  processes  in  order  to  
account  for  the  practices  of  physics.   This  becomes  especially  important  if  we  wish  to  construct  
an  account  of  spatiotemporal  locality  using  the  GPT.   However,  this  new  classification  (relativity  
to  a  characteristic  energy  of  destructibility/perturbation)  may  be  possible  to  construct  as  a  




[2.4]:   Conclusion  
  
  
One  of  the  common  refrains  against  process  metaphysics  is  that  it  is  revisionist.   The  
implication  is  that  in  order  to  justify  or  motivate  a  move  to  a  process  ontology,  and  a  process  
interpretation  of  science  or  language,  we  need  sufficient  reason  to  give  up  our  existing  ontology  
of  things.   The  weight  and  accident  of  history  then  oppresses  such  a  move.   After  all,  things  were  
sufficient  throughout  history  for  interpreting  and  understanding  science  and  language  in  the  
majority  of  cases.   What  could  process  ontology  add  to  this?   
Of  course,  this  is  similar  to  the  mistake  made  by  those  who  initially  rejected  quantum  
mechanics  for  contradicting  classical  intuitions.   Just  because  thing-talk  has  succeeded  in  the  past  
does  not  mean  that  thing-talk  has  more  success  than  process-talk.   What’s  more,  in  this  case,  it  is  
only  the  history  of  Western  philosophy  and  science  (and  arguably  not  even  the  science)  that  
suggests  any  success  of  thing-talk.   Both  a  broader  scope  and  a  more  narrow  focus  reveals  that  
thing-talk  was  not  nearly  as  successful  as  the  anti-revisionist  would  have  us  believe,  and  there  
were  indeed  plenty  of  other  philosophical  approaches  that  emphasized  processes  over  things.   In  
fact,  Chinese,  Indian,  Japanese,  and  Korean  historical  philosophy  all  enjoyed  great  cultural  and  
scientific  successes  while  centering  on  ontologies  of  process.   The  idea  that  process  ontology  is  a  
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revision  is  therefore  not  an  absolute  judgment,  but  is  dependent  on  a  particular  cultural  context  
and  the  resulting  linguistic  and  scientific  data  we  choose  to  admit  as  evidence  for  an  ontology;  
process  ontology  does  not  revise  our  ontology,  it  revises  orthodox  (Christian)  European  (mostly  
English,  French,  and  Italian)  ontologies. 89   
Nevertheless,  it  is  worthwhile  to  point  out  those  linguistic,  conceptual,  or  scientific  
considerations  that  can  only  be  handled  with  a  process  ontology.   This  chapter  produces  one  
such.   Namely,  stability  cannot  be  understood  with  things  alone,  while  processes  are  clearly  
capable  of  explaining  stability.   In  particular,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  stability,  and  even  
if  there  were,  too  many  of  the  stabilities  we  describe  in  scientific  models  are  relative  stabilities.  
In  fact,  stability  is  conceptually  empty  without  dynamics:   the  whole  idea  is  that  there  is  a  system  
that  is  unchanged  in  response  to  various  perturbative  forces.   Moreover,  we  often  make  explicit  
claims  about  relative  stability  in  our  scientific  models.   
Consider,  as  a  final  example,  the  photoelectric  effect.    In  the  relevant  experimental  
system,  we  have  essentially  an  undriven  capacitor  formed  of  a  plate  of  metal  and  a  separated  
wire  lead,  with  both  connected  by  an  unclosed  circuit.   Photons  incident  on  the  plate  will  cause  a  
current  to  pass  through  the  capacitor  system  (i.e.,  to  flow  from  plate  to  wire  lead)  when  they  have  
some  minimum  frequency.   The  modeled  explanation  for  this 90   is  that  electrons  in  the  plate  are  
dislodged  from  the  plate  to  jump  to  the  wire  lead  only  when  the  photons  have  the  appropriate  
energy,  which  requires  that  they  have  some  minimum  frequency.   I.e.,  the  electrons  in  the  plate  
are  stably  contained  within  the  plate  up  to  a  certain  energy  of  perturbation.   I.e.,  the  electrons  are  
only  ever  relatively  stably  bound  in  the  plate.   
We  should  take  this  seriously.   Not  only  do  we  have  no  need  of  things  to  explain  and  
describe  experimental  systems,  we  have  reason  to  believe  that  processes  are  the  explanatory  
entities  of  all  aspects  of  our  experimental  systems,  including  the  underlying  persistent  or  stable  
aspects  of  our  experiments.   It  would  not  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  practice  of  science  
requires  this.   In  short,  processes,  and  processes  alone,  underlie  experimental  dynamics.    
89  Needham  spent  his  entire  academic  career  arguing  against  our  assumptions  that  this  Orthodoxy  is  somehow  
scientifically  superior  to  others,  in  particular  those  from  China,  India,  and  Japan.   The  key  point  to  remember  is  that  
Chinese  medicine,  physics,  and  engineering  was  in  many  ways  far  more  advanced  than  European  equivalents  for  
most  of  history,  as  measured  by  their  relative  standard  of  living  and  life  expectancy  and  the  specifics  of  their  
advances.   What’s  more,  many  of  the  great  advances  in  especially  chemistry  and  engineering  in  Europe  can  be  
traced  to  previous  work  done  in  China  that  were  later  transmitted  through  the  Islamic  empire  into  the  hands  of  
scientists  like  Boyle.   
90  See  Einstein’s  (1905a)  paper  containing  the  light-quantum  argument.   
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Interlude:   Two  Shifts  in  Method 
We  have  so  far  discussed  process  realism  in  a  relatively  abstract  context.   Arguments  of 
the  earlier  chapters  were  mostly  about  what  it  is  possible  to  infer  from  experiment  in  general,  
rather  than  from  specific  experiments  or  historical  moments.   In  the  coming  chapters,  we  shift  
our  method,  instead  seeking  to  evidence  process  realism  explicitly  in  the  actual  practice  and  
history  of  physics.   
This  will  mostly  take  the  form  of  three  arguments  about  macroscopic  thermal  systems,  
microscopic  thermal  systems,  and  nuclear  systems.   In  each  case,  there  are  specific  arguments  
being  made,  but  there  is  also  a  structural  argument  implicit  in  the  background  of  these  chapters.  
Namely,  by  presenting  the  chapters  in  this  sequence,  and  noting  the  parallel  to  actual  historical  
developments  in  physics,  I  begin  to  make  the  further  inductive  argument  that  for  every  thing  
posit  in  physics,  eventual  work  has  and  will  show  that  the  thing  is  nothing  more  than  a  collection 
of  more  fundamental  dynamics .   This  inductive  argument  is  also  an  implicit  regress:   in  the  actual 
history  of  physics,  things  have  been  posited,  shown  to  be  collections  of  dynamics  in  smaller  
things,  and  then  these  things  have  been  analyzed  in  exactly  the  same  manner.   
The  regressive  part  of  this  induction  presents  us  with  something  like  a  parity  between  
things  and  processes  (note  that  the  inductive  part  does  not  present  such  a  parity).   In  the  historical 
regress,  processes  are  posited  to  explain  things,  and  then  things  to  explain  processes.   Implicitly  
breaking  the  parity  of  this  regress  is  that  field  theory  has  no  natural  particle  interpretation  
(Malament  1996)  (nor  even  a  substantial  field  interpretation,  see  Baker  2009).   As  I  have  already  
written  above,  the  Higgs  field,  and  mass,  should  be  understood  as  a  subjectless  process  of  
self-interacting  (like  “snowing”).   Further  breaking  this  apparent  parity  is  the  epistemic  modesty  
of  process  realism.   As  chapter  1  argued,  processes  are  necessary  posits  for  understanding  
experiments  and  experimental  practice.   As  chapter  2  showed,  things  are  nowhere  near  necessary  
posits,  no  matter  how  desirable  they  may  be.   
We  will  also  explicitly  break  the  parity  in  chapter  5.   In  this  chapter,  I  will  show  that  thing 
interpretations  of  certain  systems—namely,  nuclear  systems—are  impossible  because  they  are  
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explicitly  contradictory.   Process  interpretations,  in  contrast,  remain  consistent  and  plausible.  
Thus,  parity  will  be  broken  in  a  third  manner.   
The  inductive  regress  argument,  then,  will  be  left  as  an  implication  of  the  chapters  to  
come.   However,  it  is  important  to  frame  these  chapters  in  light  of  this  inductive  regress.   In  this  
manner,  we  see  a  third,  inductive  method  for  arguing  for  process  realism,  equally  general  as  the  
arguments  of  chapters  1  and  2.   
There  is  one  additional  methodological  point  to  make  as  we  move  from  chapters  1  and  2  
to  3,  4,  and  5.   That  is,  we  will  be  placing  a  much  greater  emphasis  on  the  explanatory  power  of  
process-posits  within  scientific  theories.   This  should  be  contrasted  with  the  more  general  
ontological  sufficiency  of  processes  that  we  saw  in  chapters  1  and  2.   In  chapters  3,  4,  and  5,  it  
matters  most  that  the  processual  parts  of  various  theories,  models,  and  experiments  that  we  infer  
from  our  descriptions  of  experimental  systems  are  acting  as  explanans  for  the  explananda  within  
those  experimental  systems.   That  is,  these  later  chapters  involve  arguments  to  the  effect  that 
processes  are  the  only  necessary  posits  for  our  explanations  to  make  sense,  not  that  they  are  
necessary  for  our  descriptions  or  inter-model  inferences  (qua  inferential  method  in  analytic  
ontology).   
However,  these  two  views  of  processes—as  ontological  ground  for  descriptions/linguistic  
cohesion  or  as  explanatory  posits—overlap  in  an  important  way.    Namely,  I  will  assume  in  what  
follows  that  the  referent  of  a  theoretical  term  or  description  is  explanatory  just  when  that  referent  
is  a  necessary  precondition  for  the  explanatory  inferences  we  draw.   For  example,  if  I  explain  the  
blueness  of  the  sky  as  the  result  of  scattering  of  light  from  the  sun  through  our  atmosphere,  all  
and  only  those  entities  that  are  necessary  preconditions  for  our  inference  from  “the  sky  is  blue”  
to  “there  is  scattering  of  light  in  our  atmosphere”  count  as  explanatory  entities.   In  many  cases,  
these  explanatory  entities  will  be  identical  to  those  that  allow  for  us  to  infer  the  truth  of  various  
statements  in  general  language.   However,  we  must  always  remember  that  our  primary  goal  in  
science  is  not  necessarily  truth  (or  “capital  T  truth”),  but  rather  is  explanation.   This  goal  of  
explanation  constrains  our  inferences,  practices,  and  language  in  ways  different  from  the  
constraints  of  speaking  the  truth,  or  of  accurately  describing  the  world.   Where  necessary,  I  will  
point  out  these  differences  in  the  chapters  to  come.   
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[4.1]:   Introduction  
  
  
In  the  last  two  chapters,  I  argued  first  that  we  must  commit  to  processes—which  were  
categorized  according  to  the  GPT  as  general,  subjectless,  contextually  individuated,  
determinable,  and  measurable  dynamic  entities  akin  to  activities—within  our  experiments.  
Second,  I  argued  that  inferences  to  any  further  entities  within  our  experiments  (and  especially  
things  like  substances,  atemporal  structures,   objects,  etc.)  either  fail  or  fail  to  act  as  inferences  to 
something  other  than  processes.   These  arguments  taken  together  support  that  things  cannot  
appear  as  ontological  posits  in  our  theories,  so  long  as  we  expect  our  theories  to  be  primarily  
interested  in  describing  and  explaining  possible  or  actual  experiments.   
However,  the  thing  realist  has  one  final  bastion:   to  rely  on  the  explanatory  power  of  
things.   Namely,  the  thing  realist  argues  that  the  explanations  of  scientific  models  would  be  
impossible,  or  else  a  miracle,  if  things  were  not  real. 91    Perhaps,  therefore,  we  might  commit  to  
things  as  explanatory  entities  without  reifying  them.   I.e.,  we  hold  firmly  to  a  
fundamental-process  ontology,  but  allow  for  things  to  appear  as  real-enough  entities  in  our  
epistemology.   
I  argue  in  this  chapter  that  this  fails.   As  many  others  have  already  noted,  the  no-miracles  
argument  is  fallacious, 92   it  adopts  false  premises, 93   and  even  modest  versions  of  it  fail. 94   
Moreover,  there  are  many  instances  in  scientific  theories  where  the  explanations  offered  seem  
91  C.f.  Putnam  (1975,  73)  for  the  first  explicit  example  of  this  “no-miracles”  argument.   The  argument  has  taken  
many  forms  in  the  years  since  Putnam’s  paper,  and  appears  in  spiritual  ancestors  of  Putnam  as  well.   See,  for  
instance,  Barnes  (2002);  J.  Brown  (1982);  Boyd  (1989);  Busch  (2008);  Dellsén  (2016);  Frost-Arnold  (2010);  Lipton  
(1994);  Lyons  (2003);  and  Psillos  (1999:  ch.  4).   Note  that  of  these,  only  Psillos  and  Putnam  explicitly  argue  for  a  
thing-categorical  explanans.   The  others  may  only  be  construed  as  offering  such  arguments,  given  the  targets  of  their  
arguments  (i.e.,  the  antirealists  who  offer  pessimistic  meta-inductions).   
92  See,  for  instance  Howson  (2000:  ch.  3);  Lipton  (2004:  196–198);  Magnus  &  Callender  (2004).   See  also  Menke  
(2014);  for  a  criticism  of  the  miracle  argument  based  on  a  different  probabilistic  framing  in  terms  of  likelihoods,  see  
Sober  (2015:  912–915).  
93  See  van  Fraassen  (1980)  and  Wray  (2007,  2010)  for  arguments  that  the  success  of  science,  or  the  fact  of  its  
successful  explanations,  require  no  explanation  themselves.   
94  E.g.,  the  version  in  which  the  no-miracles  argument  is  called  an  abduction,  or  inference  to  the  best  explanation.   
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not  to  involve  things  at  all. 95    I  tend  to  agree  with  this  analysis.   However,  in  this  chapter,  I  will  
argue  from  a  different  angle.   Namely,  I  argue  that:  
(1) Things  will  inevitably  be  explained  by  processes,  and   
(2) Things  explain  only  insofar  as  they  have  associated,  explanatory  processes.   
Together,  these  points  spell  the  explanatory  defeat  of  things  within  scientific  theory.   Notice,  
however,  that  my  argument  does  not  force  us  into  an  antirealist  position.   Rather,  my  argument  
further  strengthens  the  claims  of  chapters  1  and  2  by  showing  that  processes  and  only  processes  
are  explanatory  in  our  models.   In  other  words,  the  processes  of  our  models  and  theories  are  
doing  all  of  the  explanatory  work.   Things  are  just  an  unfortunate  byproduct  in  science  of  the  
historically  influential  Parmenidean  concept  of  being,  especially  the  belief  that  processes  
metaphysically  require  things  as  subjects.   
To  argue  for  (1)  and  (2),  I  analyze  the  example  of  the  candle  flame,  as  it  was  understood  
both  pre-  and  post-chemical  revolution.   This  example  exhibits  two  interesting  features:  
(1) Scientists  and  philosophers  of  the  past  thought  the  candle  flame  (and  fire  generally)  was  
thing-like  (i.e.,  substantial).   
(2) Scientists  of  today  describe  fire  as  the  rapid  cascading  oxidation  of  the  fuel  in  an  
exothermic  process  of  combustion,  i.e.,  they  describe  it  as  a  process.   
We  are  therefore  led  to  ask  the  historical  question:   how  did  scientific  inquiry  refute  the  former  
intuition  and  lead  us  to  our  current  one?   Importantly,  scientific  inquiry  did  not  reveal  that  any  of  
the  reasons  for  which  historical  figures  adopted  position  (1)  were  wrong.   Rather,  scientific  
inquiry  resulted  in  the  rejection  of  underlying  assumptions  made  by  those  who  adopted  position  
(1).   Namely,  I  show  that  science  revealed  the  mistaken  assumption  made  by  proponents  of  (1)  of  
the  static  character  of  the  various  features  of  the  candle  flame,  replacing  them  with  explanatory  
and  descriptive  dynamics  instead.   
To  begin,  I  will  evidence  the  thing-realist’s  posit  in  history,  briefly  presenting  the  history  
of  phlogiston  and  its  refutation  (§2).   I  will  then  present  an  analysis  of  the  candle  flame  system,  
making  use  of  historical  descriptions  of  each  of  its  thing-like  elements.   In  this  analysis,  I  show  
that  the  key  explanatory  move  is  to  eliminate  the  thing-ness  of  the  candle  flame  in  favor  of  
underlying  dynamics  (§3).   After  showing  that  every  explanatory  task  in  this  system  can  (and  
was  historically)  performed  using  processual,  not  thing,  posits,  I  will  turn  to  the  question  of  what  
95  See  the  contributions  in  Bueno,  Chen,  and  Fagan  (2019),  and  in  Eastman  and  Keeton  (2008).   
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role  things  could  still  play  in  these  explanations.   Finding  that  these  roles  can  equally  be  played  
(and  will  be  played  in  future  history)  by  processes,  I  conclude  that  there  is  no  explanatory  role  
for  things  to  play  (§4).   I  conclude  by  noting  that  this  extended  example  of  the  candle  flame,  
analyzing  the  explanatory  tasks  and  successes  of  chemico-thermal  models,  mirrors  perfectly  the  
arguments  I  presented  in  chapters  1  and  2  (§5).   This  example  therefore  acts  as  a  historical  




[4.2]:   The  Flame  and  Phlogiston,  the  Thing-Realist’s  Posit  
  
  
At  face  value,  the  candle  flame  appears  to  be  a  substantial  entity  as  much  as  any  other  
mesoscopic  object  we  interact  with  daily.   When  we  poke  it,  we  feel  something.   It  has  
persistence  and  characteristic  shape.   There  are  clear  properties  (all  sorts!)  we  can  ascribe  to  it,  
such  as  “hot,”  “yellow,”  “7  cm  long,”  “persistent  throughout  dinnertime,”  and  “capable  of  
igniting  this  piece  of  paper.”   While  it  may  undergo  changes,  e.g.,  its  characteristic  flicker  when  
blown  upon,  the  candle  flame  appears  to  persist  in  much  the  same  way  as  a  table  or  chair:   some  
properties  remain  unchanged,  while  others  change.   For  most  intents  and  purposes,  the  candle  
flame  is  as  much  a  thing  as  our  solid,  work-a-day  tea  kettles  and  coffee  mugs. 96    
It  should  be  no  surprise,  then,  that  the  candle  flame  (and  fire  in  general)  was  treated  as  a  
substantial  entity  (i.e.,  things  or  quantities  of  stuff)  for  centuries.   Beginning  in  the  Aristotelian  
tradition  in  which  fire  is  one  of  five  material  causes, 97   fire  would  continue  to  be  treated  as  a  
substantial  thing  through  the  scholastic  period  and  a  significant  portion  of  early  modern  period.  
Scholastic  thinkers  explained  many  of  the  experiences  of  fire  in  terms  of  primitive  substantial  
properties  of  this  substance.  Most  famously,  Johann-Joachim  Becher  and  Georg  Ernst  Stahl  in  
96  Note  that  the  candle  flame  doesn’t  meet  the  common  sense  idea  of  solidity,  or  non-interpenetrability  of  everyday  
things,  and  the  candle  flame  doesn’t  meet  the  common  sense  idea  of  transportability.  
97  It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  Heraclitus  was  the  first  to  posit  fire  as  the  matter  of  the  world.   However,  I  believe  
this  attribution  to  be  incorrect  because  (a)  it  falsely  considers  Heraclitus  to  be  one  of  the  material  monists  when  what  
little  we  know  of  him  suggests  that  he  was  quite  adamantly  opposed  to  this  orthodoxy,  and  (b)  the  fragment  used  to  
attribute  this  view  to  Heraclitus  (the  world  is  an  ever-living  fire…)  can  be  read  as  emphasizing  the  metaphorical  
comparison  to  the  flickering  of  fire  rather  than  the  material  constitution  of  fire.   The  fragment  in  question  stresses  
that  the  world  comes  to  be  and  is  annihilated  in  equal  proportion,  suggesting  that  it  is  this  change  and  flow  in  the  
world  that  makes  it  comparable  to  fire.   
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the  17th  century  proposed  that  fire  (and  combustion)  is  the  manifestation  of  a  substance  called  
phlogiston. 98    
Today,  we  tend  to  think  of  these  views  as  the  result  of  bad  science,  or  of  an  illicit  use  of  
dreaded  metaphysics. 99    However,  one  finds  that  these  positions  are  based  on  prima  facie  
empirical  arguments.   Namely,  they  are  based  on  the  observation  of  special  sorts  of  features  in  
the  world.   We  might  summarize  these  views  as  follows:   the  candle  flame  (and  fire  in  general)  is  
a  thing  because  it  has  a  collection  of  features  indicative  of  thing-ness.   These  are  features  like:  
- Spatial  Shape :   the  candle  flame  has  a  spatial  shape  that  is  definite  at  a  moment  in  time.  
- Spatial  property/relational  Structure :   the  flame  has  various  regions  defined  by  definite  
properties  like  color,  location,  or  the  chemical  potentials  in  those  regions.   
- Countable  properties :   the  candle  flame  is  one  flame,  it  has  three  color/heat  regions,   
- Particularity :   the  candle  flame  is  here  and  not  there  (both  spatially  and  temporally),  and  
cannot  be  there  if  it  is  here. 100   
- Continuance :   the  candle  flame  is  a  continuant,  in  that  it  is  definitely  identified  at  
moments  of  time  and  continues  through  moments  (at  any  time,  I  can  point  to  the  candle  
flame  and  identify  it  definitely  and  completely).   I.e.,  it  is  not  (or  not  obviously)  
occurrent. 101   
- Material :   The  flame  has  the  properties  we  associate  with  other  states  of  matter  (causal  
potency  for  material  systems,  physical  extension,  perturbability,  etc.)  
- Materially  Perturbable :   we  can  see,  touch,  and  hear  the  flame.  
- Causal,  motive,  potent :   the  flame  affects  other  material  systems. 102    
Each  of  these  features  bears  similarity  to  the  features  of  other,  paradigmatic  things  like  rocks.  
This  is  further  confirmed  by  comparing  these  features  to  the  features  of  processes  (Chapter  1,  
§2),  which  shows  that  the  candle  flame  seems  to  have  none  of  the  identifying  features  of  a  
98  See  Becher  (1669,  and  later  1708)  (True  Theory  of  Medicine)  and  Stahl  (1700).   Stahl  was  the  one  to  coin  the  term  
“phlogiston,”  replacing  Becher’s  term  “Terra  pinguis”  from  1669.   Both  are  held  responsible  for  the  actual  physical  
claim  about  the  substantial  (material)  character  of  fire.   
99  See  Laudan  (1981),  Poincaré  (1952),  Putnam  (1978).   
100  Particularity  can  also  be  couched  in  terms  of  persistence,  being  a  locus  of  change,  countability  (being  one  
“particular  instance”  of  its  kind),  non-instantiable,  independent,  discrete,  unified,  or  simple.   These  different  
categories  are  drawn  from  Aristotle’s  accounts  of  “Ousia”  (Commonly  translated  as  substance  or  subject).   See  
Aristotle  Metaphysics  1017b16,  1038b35,  1041a4,  1042a34,  Physics  200b33,  Categories  2a13,  3b33.   
101  C.f.,  Johnson  (1921).   
102  Note  again  that  this  list  does  not  include  transportability,  nor  does  it  include  solidity,  which  are  some  of  the  
features  that  differentiate  substantial  things  from  substantial  stuff  like  phlogiston.   
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process.   Purely  spatial  shape  and  structure,  for  example,  are  typifying  of  things,  not  processes  
(processes  do  not  in  general  have  a  characteristic  shape,  “square”  for  instance).   Therefore,  to  
most,  it  would  seem  natural  to  call  the  candle  flame  a  thing.   
However,  this  presents  us  with  a  difficulty.   The  candle  flame  still  bears  these  thing-like  
features.   Candle  flames  still  have  shape,  we  can  still  see  them,  we  can  still  touch  them,  they  still  
have  internal  structure  and  bear  external  relations.   They  are  still  (apparently)  particular,  
continuant,  and  singlet  (countable)  systems.   It  is  not  as  if  the  candle  flame  stopped  being  hot  or  
teardrop-shaped  with  the  advent  of  the  chemical  revolution.   So,  why  is  it  that  we  no  longer  think  
of  the  candle  flame  as  a  thing?   This  question  generalizes.   Namely,  if  the  features  that  once  led  
philosophers  and  scientists  to  consider  the  candle  flame  to  be  a  thing  cannot  prove  that  the  flame  
is  in  fact  a  thing,  then  do  we  have  any  reason  to  suppose  that  there  are  things  at  all?   
It  would  be  easy  to  dismiss  this  as  but  another  example  supporting  the  pessimistic  
meta-induction  in  the  history  of  science,  as  indeed  is  done  in  Laudan  (1981). 103    Historically,  the  
thing-ness  of  the  candle  flame  (e.g.,  phlogiston,  or  the  element  “fire”)  was  a  theoretical  posit  that  
was  later  proven  to  be  untenable  and  superseded  by  a  more  accurate  theory.   Thus,  this  example  
fits  the  pattern  of  this  meta-induction  perfectly.   One  might  therefore  take  this  as  evidence  that  
antirealism  is  the  only  acceptable  and  epistemically  modest  interpretation  of  this  particular  
science.   
This  is  too  quick.   Scientists  of  the  time  did  not  resort  to  antirealism.   Never  did  they  
claim  that  the  features  of  the  candle  flame—the  “thing  features”—were  not  actual  or  real.   Nor  
did  they  reject  that  their  models  of  the  candle  flame  were  describing  one  or  more  real  entities.  
Rather,  they  merely  redefined  and  explained  the  thing-features.   For  example,  Antoine  
Lavoisier’s  work  between  1770  and  1790  on  oxidation  and  reduction  of  iron,  tin,  and  sulfur  was  
taken  as  direct  evidence  that  combustion  reactions  (i.e.,  oxidation  reactions)  did  not  involve  the  
release  or  stimulation  of  some  “combustible  substance,”  as  had  been  claimed  by  Becher  and  
103  See  also  P.  Lewis  (2001),  Psillos  (1996),  and  Saatsi  (2005)  for  reconstructions  of  the  pessimistic  meta-induction.  
Saatsi’s  work  is  especially  interesting,  since  it  is  a  defense  of  the  meta-induction.   See  also  Saatsi  (2015,  2016).  
Saatsi  (2016)  seems  to  be  an  explicit  opponent  of  process  accounts  (e.g.,  “dynamical  systems  theory”)  in  philosophy  
of  science,  criticizing  Lyon  and  Colyvan  (2007)  for  their  “explanatory  indispensability  argument”  for  dynamical  
systems  theory.   I  should  note  here  that  the  dynamical  systems  theory,  while  process  realist  adjacent,  has  some  key  
differences  to  my  own  pure  process  realism,  most  notably  the  lack  of  explicit  consideration  of  the  history  of  process  
ontology  and  its  literature.   Dynamical  systems  theory,  construed  as  a  mere  mathematical  tool  lacking  ontological  
import,  does  provide  some  useful  theoretical  machinery  for  understanding  dynamic  shape,  however,  and  so  may  be  
useful  for  the  process  realist  in  some  way.   
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Stahl. 104    Instead,  combustion  was  described  as  an  interaction  between  an  organic  substance  (or  
metal)  and  what  Lavoisier  termed  “oxygene.” 105    Lavoisier  himself  described  his  work  in  1783  as  
evidence  that  “Stahl’s  phlogiston  is  imaginary.” 106    Other  properties  of  the  fire  and  flame  
received  a  similar  analysis  with  the  development  of  both  the  new  chemistry  of  the  late  18th  
century  and  the  development  of  optics  and  electromagnetism.   Both  the  radiation  of  light  and  
heat  from  the  candle  flame  came  to  be  described  not  as  some  intrinsic  aspect  of  a  substantial  
element  of  the  world,  as  had  previously  been  claimed  by  the  scholastics.   Rather,  these  radiative  
properties  were  explained  as  the  result  of  emission  of  light  and  energy,  two  deeper  underlying  
substances  the  action  of  which  we  could  directly  measure  with  our  eyes  and  implements  like  a  
thermometer  respectively.   Crucially,  the  substances  were  left  unexplained  until  much  later,  but  
scientists  were  comfortable  using  the  action  of  these  substances—the  processes—both  as  
explanans  and  explananda  of  the  phenomena.   
This  collective  work  to  analyze  the  underlying  mechanistic  cause  and  properties  of  fire  
and  flame  led,  eventually,  to  the  development  of  a  complete  redescription  of  the  substantial  being  
of  the  candle  flame.   In  1848,  Michael  Faraday  collected  these  analyses  into  a  lecture  series  
dedicated  to  this  very  redescription  called  “the  Chemical  History  of  the  Candle  Flame.”   A  series  
of  six  lectures,  Faraday  explicitly  states  that  the  goal  of  his  analysis  is  a  full  causal  description  of  
the  candle  flame:   
  
“We  come  here  to  be  Philosophers…    whenever  a  result  happens,  especially  if  it  
be  new,  you  should  say,  “What  is  the  cause?   Why  does  it  occur?”  and  you  will  in  
the  course  of  time  find  out  the  reason,”   (Faraday,  Lecture  1).   
  
Moreover,  this  causal  description  is  reductive:   Faraday  describes  each  manifest  material  feature  
of  the  candle  flame—every  property  that  could  serve  as  evidence  of  the  substantial  being  of  the  
candle  flame—in  terms  of  underlying  interactions,  motions,  and  other  processes.     In  other  
104  It  is  perhaps  more  accurate  to  take  Lavoisier’s  work  as  a  refutation  of  the  Aristotelian  argument  for  substantial  
fire,  rather  than  as  a  refutation  of  Becher  and  Stahl.   
105  The  discovery  of  oxygen,  however,  was  not  Lavoisier’s  alone,  as  it  was  built  on  isolation  experiments  done  by  
Henry  Cavendish  (1766)  and  Joseph  Priestley  (1774).   
106  An  interesting  historical  quirk  is  that,  when  more  detailed  scientific  study  reveals  a  previously  accepted  substance  
to  be  physically  no  more  than  a  collection  of  processes,  terms  like  “imaginary”  and  “illusionary”  are  employed.   We  
will  see  this  same  language  appearing  in  descriptions  of  the  atom,  the  nucleus,  and  the  particle  as  we  progress.  
Perhaps  this  terminology  is  meant  to  evoke  the  Platonic  distinction  between  the  true  and  the  imaginary  world,  or  
perhaps  the  terminology  is  meant  as  a  rebuke  against  believers  in  the  substance.   I  will  not  be  analyzing  the  
historical  significance  of  this  language  in  great  enough  detail  to  judge.   
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words,  the  goal  of  such  a  model  is  to  fully  understand  what  it  is  to  be  the  candle  flame,  its  shape,  
its  generative  cause,  and  its  matter,  and  all  of  these  are  described  processually,  as  I  show  in  the  
next  section.   
In  short,  it  would  be  incorrect  to  claim  that  phlogiston  is  an  example  of  bad  science.  
Rather,  it  was  bad  metaphysics.   Phlogiston  and  elemental  fire  theories  sought  a  static  
explanation  for  what  were  essentially  dynamics  of  the  candle  flame  system.   Thus,  when  
dynamic  explanations  and  definitions  of  these  features  were  offered,  the  phlogiston  and  
elemental  fire  theories  were  superseded.   The  mistake  was  not  to  posit  that  there  were  such  
properties  in  the  world,  nor  to  posit  that  such  properties  were  indicative  of  some  real  underlying  
entity.   The  mistake  was  to  posit  that  this  underlying  entity  was  thing-like  and  not  processual.  
Exactly  how  we  are  meant  to  understand  these  supposed  material  features  of  the  candle  flame  is  




[4.3]:   Explaining  Things  Away  
  
  
[4.3.1]:   What  Do  We  See  in  the  Flames?   
  
  
We  begin  our  analysis  with  a  short  primer  on  everything  going  on  in  the  candle. 107   
Roughly,  there  are  three  explananda  of  interest  in  the  candle:   
(1) The  production  of  the  bright  yellow,  teardrop-shaped  flame  (its  causal  origin),  
(2) The  maintenance  of  this  flame  (how  it  persists  and  by  what  means),  and  
(3) The  features  of  the  environment  that  constrain  and  allow  the  production  and  maintenance  
of  the  flame.   
By  explaining  these  explananda,  we  will  also  explain  the  other  properties  of  the  flame—its  color  
regions,  its  various  internal  energetic  structures,  etc.—simply  in  virtue  of  achieving  fine-grained  
analysis.   Presumably,  the  production  of  the  flame,  along  with  how  and  by  what  means  it  persists,  
107  It  should  be  noted  that  this  is  an  abridged  and  paraphrased  description  of  Faraday’s  explanation  in  his  lecture  
series.   The  analysis  I  offer  is  anachronistic  for  the  sake  of  clarity  to  the  modern  reader,  but  I  will  show  throughout  
that  my  explanation  is  a  reasonable  paraphrase  and  deviates  only  slightly  from  Faraday’s.   
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will  together  explain  any  feature  of  the  candle  flame  we  see.   Of  these,  (1)  is  the  simple  process  
of  combustion:   where  and  under  what  conditions  combustion  occurs.   (2)  is  the  cycle  of  
activities  that  produces  the  stability  of  the  flame:   the  combination  of  convection  currents  to  
bring  new  air  to  the  combustion  region,  the  melting  of  wax  and  capillary  action  to  bring  new  fuel  
to  the  combustion  region,  and  steady  heat  radiation  to  initiate  combustion.   (3)  is  the  combination  
of  goings  on  outside  of  (1)  and  (2)  that  must  occur  so  as  not  to  disturb  (and  in  extreme  cases,  
destroy)  the  production  or  maintenance  of  the  candle  flame.   (3)  includes  factors  like  the  
specifics  of  the  shape  of  the  candle  (including  its  production  and  maintenance),  the  kinds  of  
convection  that  must  occur,  the  composition  of  the  wax  and  the  air  surrounding  it,  etc.   Together,  
these  three  features  form  a  complete  explanation  of  the  candle  flame  hypothetically  sitting  before  
us.   
A  candle  flame  is  produced  initially  by  bringing  oxygen,  paraffin  (in  the  typical  wax  
candle),  and  energy  together  at  the  top  of  the  wick  of  a  candle.    More  accurately,  one  first  brings  
a  match  near  the  candle  wick.   The  match  releases  highly  energized  particles  (primarily  light)  
which  impart  their  motion  to  the  paraffin  molecules  of  the  wax.   These  paraffin  molecules,  now  
moving  faster,  break  free  of  the  binding  forces  which  hold  them  in  the  solid  candle,  forming  
liquid  paraffin.   This  liquid  is  then  transported  up  the  candle  wick  by  capillary  action,  at  which  
place  the  paraffin  is  further  energized  into  vaporous  form.   There,  the  now-vaporous  paraffin  and  
oxygen  energized  by  the  radiation  from  the  match  collide.   These  collisions  result  in  the  breaking  
of  the  chemical  bonds  of  the  paraffin  and  oxygen,  and  the  resultant  scattering  and  loss  of  energy  
of  the  scattering  products  allows  the  recombination  of  these  products  into  carbon  dioxide  and  
water  vapor.   These  products  then  emit  light  as  they  release  energy  in  their  bonding  and  through  
their  incandescence.   The  energy  from  this  collision,  and  the  consumption  of  oxygen  from  the  air  
causes  air  to  flow  upward  and  around  the  combustion  at  the  wick.   Thus,  the  products  of  
combustion  incandere  as  they  flow  upward,  forming  the  bright  yellow  teardrop  shape  we  call  the  
candle  flame.   This  is  how  the  candle  flame  is  produced,  feature  (1)  above.   
This  flame  is  then  maintained  by  the  radiation  of  heat  from  combustion.   As  combustion  
occurs  at  the  base  of  the  candle  flame,  the  resultant  emission  of  energized  particles  (heat  
radiation)  performs  the  same  activity  as  the  match  did  in  the  genesis  of  the  candle  flame.  
Paraffin  melts,  then  is  transported  up  the  wick  by  capillary  action,  then  vaporizes,  then  combusts  
when  in  contact  with  air.   More  interestingly,  the  radiation  from  the  combustion  process  
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facilitates  the  continued  flow  of  oxygen  up  and  around  the  candle  base  to  the  combustion  zone.  
As  energized  particles  are  emitted  from  the  combustion  zone,  they  energize  the  surrounding  air,  
causing  it  to  flow  upward.   This  flow  of  air  upward  creates  a  pressure  differential  in  air  below  the  
candle,  causing  it,  too,  to  rise.  The  convection  currents  that  result  from  this  sequence  bring  a  
steady  supply  of  oxygen  to  the  combustion  zone  and  maintain  the  shape  of  the  candle  flame.  
This  completes  our  discussion  of  how  the  candle  flame  is  maintained,  feature  (2)  above.   
Lastly,  we  are  concerned  with  what  environmental  factors  must  obtain  for  the  production 
and  maintenance  of  the  candle  flame.   These  are  many;  depending  on  how  specific  one  wishes  to  
make  these  environmental  factors,  one  may  obtain  a  list  of  factors  of  arbitrary  length. 108   
However,  there  are  two  environmental  factors  that  are  of  particular  historical  interest.   First  is  the  
shape  of  the  candle’s  wax  base.   In  order  for  a  stable  candle  flame  to  persist,  the  convection  
currents  must  be  symmetric  so  as  not  to  produce  any  oscillation  or  fluctuation  in  the  flow  of  the  
air  and  incandescent  combustion  products.   This  means  that  the  wax  must  be  symmetric.   In  
addition,  the  wax  base  must  be  such  that  melted  wax  does  not  simply  run  down  the  sides;  the  
wax  base  must  form  some  sort  of  vessel  for  the  liquid  paraffin,  and  the  vessel  must  be  
undisturbed  by  continued  heat  emission  from  the  combustion  zone.   This  is  achieved  by  having  a  
wax  base  that  is  both  symmetric—so  that  no  segment  of  the  edge  of  the  wax  is  more  exposed  to  
heat  than  another—and  wide  enough  that  the  heat  differential  from  the  combustion  zone  provides  
more  heat  to  the  solid  paraffin  close  to  the  wick.   Convection  currents  then  cool  the  edge  of  the  
wax  base,  while  the  wax  at  the  center  of  the  base  is  melted  into  liquid  paraffin.   It  is  in  this  way  
that  (in  Faraday’s  words)  a  “beautiful  cup”  is  formed  that  contains  the  liquid  paraffin,  preventing  
the  symmetry  of  the  wax  base  from  being  disturbed  by  run-off  liquid  paraffin  or  uneven  heating.   
The  second  environmental  factor  of  interest  is  the  consistent  supply  of  oxygen.   In  order  
for  combustion  to  occur  continuously,  thereby  maintaining  a  persistent  and  stable  candle  flame,  
all  of  the  interactions  that  produce  combustion  must  be  capable  of  continuous  occurrence.   I.e.,  
oxygen  must  collide  with  vaporized  paraffin  in  the  combustion  zone  continuously.   In  order  for  
this  to  occur,  both  paraffin  and  oxygen  must  be  continuously  transported  to  the  combustion  zone,  
108  We  might,  for  example,  say  that  “the  environment  should  not  have  a  limited  amount  of  oxygen”  is  a  feature  that  
must  obtain  for  a  persistent  candle  flame.   We  may  then  specify  every  way  that  an  environment  may  have  a  limited  
amount  of  oxygen:   being  contained  in  a  bell  jar,  being  in  a  bubble  in  the  ocean,  being  fed  oxygen  from  a  tank  in  
space,  etc.   Or,  we  could  group  these  cases  into  types:   being  in  a  closed  system,  being  in  an  oxygen-free  
environment  that  is  temporarily  supplied  oxygen,  etc.   In  this  way,  we  obtain  lists  of  different  cardinality,  even  
though  they  are  not  interestingly  different.   
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at  which  place  they  can  interact  to  combust.   The  paraffin  is  supplied  by  the  candle  by  way  of  the  
melting  and  capillary  action  processes  already  discussed.   The  oxygen  is  supplied  by  the  
environment  by  way  of  the  convection  currents  surrounding  the  candle  flame.   
Notice  that  the  environmental  features  appear  as  specific  constraints  on  the  processes  that  
occur  in  the  production  and  maintenance  of  the  candle  flame.   We  may  very  well  remove  these  
features  entirely  from  our  explanations  with  no  loss  by  simply  incorporating  these  constraints  
into  the  descriptions  of  the  descriptions  used  to  explain  production  and  maintenance.   For  
example,  we  know  that  the  base  of  the  wax  candle  must  be  symmetric  in  order  for  the  flame  
maintain  a  stable  shape.   However,  it  is  only  because  the  radiation  from  the  combustion  region  
and  the  convection  currents  that  surround  the  combustion  region  are  circularly  symmetric  that  
the  wax  cup  is  formed  symmetrically  in  the  first  place.   Rather  than  playing  an  active  role  in  the  
maintenance  of  the  candle  flame’s  shape,  the  constraint  of  the  wax  cup’s  symmetry  acts  only  as  a  
constraint  on  the  continued  symmetric  flow  of  air  around  the  candle  flame.   This  additional  
environmental  factor—the  symmetry  of  the  wax  cup—is  irrelevant;  it  is  only  the  symmetric  flow  
of  the  convection  currents  (and  symmetric  melting  of  the  wax)  that  makes  any  difference.   In  
other  words,  the  reference  to  a  symmetric  wax  cup  acts  as  a  placeholder  for  reference  to  the  
symmetry  of  the  processes  of  convective  air  flow  and  radiative  melting.   
   
  
[4.3.2]:   What  Do  We  Explain  About  the  Flames?   
  
  
The  brief  explanation  of  the  candle  flame  in  §3.1  is  already  suggestive.   Both  the  genesis  
of  the  candle  and  its  persistence  are  explained  in  terms  of  triggering  processes,  cycles  of  
processes,  and  balances  thereof.   The  environmental  factors—what  initially  appear  to  be  
structures  and  static  properties  of  things—play  a  role  in  the  explanations  only  insofar  as  they  
evoke  the  balance  of  dynamic  activities.   We  seem  to  have  explained  the  candle’s  broad  nature  in  
terms  of  processes  and  a  few  underlying  things  like  oxygen  and  paraffin.   
However,  the  analysis  goes  even  deeper  than  this.   In  fact,  we  can  show  how  the  broad  
processual  explanation  of  section  3.1  translates  directly  into  specific  explanations  of  every  
feature  of  the  candle  flame  system.   In  short,  anything  that  could  act  as  an  indicator  of  a  static  
thing  is  generated,  maintained,  and  learned  about  via  processes,  and  so  is  explained  dynamically.  
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This  includes,  most  notably,  material  features  of  the  supposed  thing-underliers:   oxygen,  paraffin,  
and  the  like.   
To  see  this,  we  must  first  separate  out  the  relevant  explananda  of  the  candle  flame.   It  is  
here  that  we  will  draw  on  Faraday’s  analysis  explicitly.   The  first  step  in  Faraday’s  analysis  is  to  
isolate  a  collection  of  features  of  the  candle  flame.   These  features  serve  as  the  basis  for  further,  
causal  analysis  in  the  course  of  the  explanations  Faraday  presents.   These  properties  are  many,  
but  roughly  fall  into  three  categories:   (1)  the  form  of  the  candle  flame,  its  shape,  size  and  other  
monadic  properties  of,  and  relations  between,  its  parts;  (2)  the  matter  of  the  candle  flame,  the  
“actual  composition”  of  the  candle  system;  and  (3)  the  productive  origin  of  the  candle  flame,  
how  it  is  created  and  how  it  persists.   Specific  members  of  these  three  categories  are  listed  in  
table  1  below.   We  shall  proceed  through  each  category  independently  in  the  next  three  
subsections.   More  attention  is  given  to  the  two  types  of  property  that  one  might  reasonably  
suppose  are  not  dynamic:  formal  and  material.   However,  it  is  worth  working  through  an  
example  of  a  productive  property  to  set  the  stage  for  later  discussion.   Moreover,  we  will  focus  
on  single  examples  of  properties  from  table  1  so  as  to  limit  the  amount  of  exegesis  in  favor  of  




Table  1:   A  list  of  features  of  the  candle  flame  that  Faraday  seeks  to  explain,  grouped  into  three  
categories   
111  
Type  of  Property:  Formal  Material  Productive/Motive  
Token  Properties  to  
be  Explained:  
-The  shape  of  the  
candle  flame  
  
-The  shape  of  the  
wax  
  
-The  shapes  of  the  
three  regions  of  the  
flame  (blue,  grey,  
yellow)  
  
-The  relative  
positions  of  the  three  
regions  of  the  flame  
  
-The  color  of  the  
flame  in  its  three  
regions  
  
-The  heat  variance  of  
the  three  regions  of  
the  flame  
-The  chemical  
phase/state  of  the  wax  
as  it  is  burned  
  
-The  chemical  
phase/state  of  the  wax  
that  is  transported  up  
the  wick  as  fuel  
  
-The  chemical  
phase/state  of  each  of  
the  three  regions  of  
the  flame  
  
-The  chemical  




-The  chemical  
phase/state  of  the  
post-combustion  
materials   
-The  nature  of  the  
transport  of  fuel  from  
the  base  of  the  wick  
to  the  candle  
  
-The  nature  of  the  
production  of  more  
fuel  by  the  flame  (i.e.,  
the  persistence  of  the  
flame) 
  
-The  nature  of  the  
production  of  emitted  
light  
  
-The  nature  of  the  
production  of  emitted  
heat  
  
-The  nature  of  the  
production  of  
post-combustion  




[4.3.3]:   Explaining  What  Needs  Explaining  
  
  
[4.3.3.1]:   Explaining  Productive  Features  
  
  
Let  us  consider  as  an  example  the  movement  of  fuel  from  the  base  of  the  candle  to  the  
combustion  region.   Faraday  remarks  to  his  listeners:  
  
“Notice  that  when  the  flame  runs  down  the  wick  to  the  wax,  it  gets  extinguished,  
but  it  goes  on  burning  in  the  part  above.   Now,  I  have  no  doubt  you  will  ask,  how  
is  it  that  the  wax,  which  will  not  burn  of  itself,  gets  up  to  the  top  of  the  wick,  
where  it  will  burn?  How  is  it  that  this  solid  gets  there,  it  not  being  a  fluid?   …  
Capillary  action  conveys  the  fuel  to  the  part  where  combustion  goes  on,  and  it  is  
deposited  there,  not  in  a  careless  way,  but  very  beautifully  in  the  very  midst  of  the  
center  of  action  which  takes  place  around  it.”   (Lecture  1). 109    
  
Faraday  points  out  to  his  readers  that  there  is  a  processual  gap  that  must  be  explained.   Namely,  
we  see,  in  the  first  place  through  the  emission  of  light  from  the  candle  flame, 110   that  combustion  
is  occurring  in  a  location  spatially  removed  from  the  fuel  of  the  combustion.   Put  another  way,  
the  activity  that  we  directly  perceive  in  the  candle—the  propagation  of  light  from  the  flame  to  
our  eyes—is  not  obviously  spatially  or  temporally  continuous  with  the  activity  that  creates  the  
fuel  for  combustion—the  melting  of  the  wax.   We  must  therefore  explain  how  fuel  is  moved  
from  the  wax  base  of  the  candle  to  the  location  at  which  combustion  occurs.   We  must  also  
explain  how  oxygen,  a  necessary  component  of  combustion,  is  consistently  delivered  to  the  area  
of  the  flame  in  which  combustion  occurs:   the  blue  portion  of  the  candle  flame  in  a  ring  around  
the  wick  and  the  grey  region.   Finally,  we  must  explain  how  combustion  results  in  the  perceived  
109  As  a  point  of  interest,  notice  how  Faraday  describes  this  process  of  capillary  action  as  “beautiful.”   Interestingly,  
Faraday  refers  to  many  aspects  of  the  candle  and  the  candle  flame  as  beautiful,  but  the  aspects  which  are  beautiful  
are  always  processes  of  formation,  of  balanced  interactions  which  preserve  the  stability  of  the  candle,  of  production,  
etc.   Beauty  is  most  clearly  associated  with  process  when  Faraday  states  at  the  beginning  of  his  lectures:   “I  hope  
you  will  now  see  that  the  perfection  of  a  processes—that  is,  its  utility—is  the  better  point  of  beautify  about  [the  
candle].   It  is  not  the  best  looking  thing,  but  the  best  acting  thing,  which  is  the  most  advantageous  to  us,”  (Lecture  
1).   This  trend  of  describing  beauty  in  terms  of  processes,  not  static  qualities,  is  an  interesting  historical  throughline  
in  the  work  of  scientists  after  the  scientific  and  chemical  revolutions.   
110  We  later  discover  the  exact  relative  location  of  combustion  through  more  precise  interventions,  as  we  shall  
discuss  later  in  this  section.   
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effects  of  both  blue  and  yellow  light  radiation.   In  short,  we  must  describe  how  the  initial  process  
of  melting  wax  is  carried  through  to  the  final  process  that  we  see  directly.   
Faraday  describes  this  processual  sequence  in  his  lectures  in  roughly  the  order  in  which  
they  occur  in  an  actual  candle.   First,  the  heat  from  the  ignition  mechanism  (e.g.,  a  match)  melts  
the  wax  by  heat  radiation.   Next,  capillary  action  delivers  the  melted  wax  to  the  top  of  the  wick.  
At  the  top  of  the  wick,  the  heat  of  the  ignition  mechanism  vaporizes  the  wax,  allowing  it  to  flow  
out  from  the  wick  to  the  edges  of  the  candle  flame.   At  the  edges,  the  vaporized  wax  comes  into  
contact  with  oxygen  that  is  consistently  delivered  to  the  contact  area  by  convection  currents,  
which  are  in  turn  caused  by  the  heating  of  surrounding  air  by  the  candle  flame. 111    The  contact 
between  oxygen  and  highly  energetic  vaporized  wax  initiates  the  combustion  process,  wherein  
the  paraffin  vapor  (C 25 H 52 )  and  the  oxygen  (O 2 )  are  converted  into  water  (H 2 O),  Carbon  (C),  
carbon  dioxide  (CO 2 ),  and  a  great  deal  of  heat.   The  C  and  CO 2   is  energized  enough  to  be  
incandescent,  releasing  blue  light.   The  heat  radiating  from  this  combustion  provides  the  
initiating  process  for  the  melting  of  more  wax  and  the  flow  of  additional  convection  currents.  
The  convection  currents  then  move  the  water  vapor  and  still-incandescent  carbon  dioxide  up  into  
the  yellow  part  of  the  candle  flame.   Having  been  moved  out  of  the  hottest  part  of  the  candle  
flame,  the  carbon  dioxide  emits  yellow  instead  of  blue  light.   
Thus,  the  explanation  of  the  processual  gap  between  lighting  the  candle  and  seeing  light  
rests  on  the  following  sequence  of  processes  (make  this  visual  in  a  figure):   
(1) emission  of  heat  from  the  ignition  source,   
(2) melting  of  the  wax,   
(3) capillary  action,   
(4) vaporization  of  the  melted  wax,   
(5) combustion  with  oxygen*  (emission  of  blue  light  and  heat),   
(6) convection  current  initiation*,   
(7) flow  of  incandescent  combustion  products  up  with  the  convection  currents  (emission  of  
yellow  light).   
111  Note  also  that  incomplete  combustion  takes  place  nearer  to  the  wick,  in  the  grey  region  of  the  flame.   This  is  
because   
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Starred  processes  (combustion  and  initiation  of  convection  currents)  then  act  as  a  new  set  of  
ignition  processes, 112   beginning  anew  the  sequence  depicted  above  by  melting  the  wax  and  
bringing  new  oxygen  into  the  combustion  region.   Our  processual  sequence  therefore  fills  the  
gap  between  ignition  and  observation  of  the  candle,  explaining  how  one  event  leads  to  the  other,  
and  explains  why  the  candle  persists  in  its  activity.   
This  style  of  explanation  will  occur  throughout  our  later  discussion  of  formal  and  
material  properties.   First,  we  notice  a  processual  gap  between  some  activity  in  the  candle  system  
and  a  dynamic  interaction  between  the  candle  system  and  our  own  senses  (i.e.,  a  process  we  
engage  in  or  respond  to  directly).   Second,  we  fill  this  gap  with  additional  dynamic  transitions,  
interactions,  and  motions.   In  so  doing,  we  construct  an  explanation  of  the  processes  we  see  
involving  a  single,  continuous  sequence  of  dynamics:   one  process  after  another  from  start  to  
finish.  
(Note  that  the  dynamic  shape  involved  in  our  explanations  will  not  always  be  a  pure  
sequence.   I.e.,  we  do  not  need  to  show  that  there  is  exactly  one  process  following  and  preceding  
each  other  process  in  order  to  successfully  explain  any  part  of  the  candle  system.   Rather,  we  will  
see  loops,  cycles,  forks,  intersections,  and  all  sorts  of  dynamic  shapes  appear  in  our  explanations,  
especially  for  more  complicated  systems  and  features.   Indeed,  the  existence  of  loop-  or  
cycle-shaped  dynamics  is  a  key  identifying  feature  of  the  processes  underlying  structural  features  
of  our  systems,  as  I  show  in  the  next  section.)  
Each  of  the  processes  that  fills  the  gap  is  indeed  a  general  subjectless  process,  i.e.,  an  
occurrence  in  its  own  right  that  exhibits  the  features  of  processes  described  in  chapter  1.   We  can  
show  this  simply  by  listing  the  features  of  processes  with  which  we  identify  them,  and  showing  
that  the  processes  in  the  candle  flame  have  those  features.   Taking  capillary  action  for  an  
example: 113   
(1) Generality :   Capillary  action  is  not  a  particular.   It  cannot  be  located  in  a  definite  
spatiotemporal  point  or  region,  although  it  can  be  localized  in  a  region  of  spacetime  by  
various  means.   
112  Here  we  should  note  that  there  are  no  new  processes  here  except  as  arbitrarily  differentiated.   In  order  to  
understand  the  dynamic  balance  of  the  system,  we  speak  about  these  processes  as  if  they  are  in  a  particular  
sequence.   However,  they  roughly  begin  and  end  simultaneously,  and  so  the  construction  of  sequences  does  not  
constitute  an  identification  of  different  (countable)  processes.   
113  Features  (7),  that  processes  are  not  changes,  but  can  be  measured  or  partitioned  into  changes,  is  omitted.   This  
feature  is  corollary  to  (1),  (2)  and  (4)  in  the  scientific  context.   
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(2) Subjectlessness :   Capillary  action  is  an  occurrence  in  its  own  right,  not  a  modification  of  
some  other  entity.   We  can  describe  it  as  the  process  by  which  paraffin  is  transported  to  
the  combustion  region,  but  it  is  not  thereby  a  modification  of  this  or  that  paraffin  (or  
similarly  of  this  or  that  wax).   To  test  this,  we  simply  note  that  capillary  action  is  not  
identified  by  its  occurrence  in  a  particular  wick  or  involving  a  particular  liquid  to  
transport,  even  if  certain  measurable  specifics  of  the  action  are  dynamically  
contextualized  to  specific  interactions  with  particular  wicks  and  fuels  (see  below).   
(3) Occurrent  Nature :   Capillary  action  is  a  temporally  extended  occurrence.   No  moment  of  
time  can  define/identify  capillary  action,  its  effects,  its  causes,  or  its  features.   
(4) Measurability,  not  Countability :   Capillary  action  is  not  unitary  (we  do  not  count  
capillary  actions  in  the  world,  nor  would  we  say  that  one  system  has  fewer  capillary  
actions  than  another).   Capillary  action  is  measurable  by  various  means,  e.g.,  the  flux  of  
gravitational  potential  energy  or  the  flux  of  pressure  differentials  (we  would  say  that  there  
is  less  capillary  action  in  one  system  than  in  another).   
(5) Determinability :   Capillary  action  is  not  determinate,  but  can  be  determined  through  
appropriate  measurement  practices.   E.g.,  we  can  isolate  capillary  action  from  other  
processes,  and  determine  its  energetic  features,  by  means  of  various  experiments  (see  
below).   
(6) Contextual  Individuation :   We  identify  capillary  action  processes  in  part  by  their  dynamic  
context.   I.e.,  this  capillary  action  in  a  symmetric  candle  is  not  that  one  in  an  asymmetric  
candle  because  of  the  difference  between  the  dynamic  heating  of  the  wax,  and  the  
differences  in  the  resultant  dynamics  of  combustion  and  convection  that  alter  the  pressure  
differentials  in  the  wick  and  so  change  the  rate  and  effect  of  capillary  action.   
Each  of  these  features  is  relatively  simple  to  exhibit.   However,  of  particular  interest  are  features  
(2)  and  (6),  subjectlessness  and  contextuality.   Of  the  features  of  processes,  these  are  the  two  that  
least  obviously  identify  capillary  action  and  the  other  processes  in  the  candle  flame.   The  key  to  
doing  so  is  to  note  that  our  means  of  identifying  these  processes  in  the  candle  flame  follows  the  
same  prescription  as  we  saw  in  chapter  1.   Namely,  we  do  not  identify  these  processes  by  the  
presence  (or  absence)  of  some  subject,  but  rather  through  a  collection  of  interventions,  
perturbations,  and  successive  observations  of  the  isolated  system.   I.e.,  we  identify  these  
processes  by  their  dynamic  context.   
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   Our  knowledge  of  these  processes—both  those  which  define  the  processual  gap  and  the  
processes  we  use  to  fill  the  gap—comes  from  our  ability  to  interact  with  the  system  to  isolate  
them.   For  example,  we  know  that  capillary  action  brings  the  melted  wax  to  the  top  of  the  wick  
because  we  can  take  melted  wax,  put  it  in  a  beaker,  introduce  a  long  wick  leading  far  away  from  
the  beaker  (and  the  source  of  heat),  and,  after  waiting  a  suitable  period  of  time,  light  the  now  
transported  wax  at  the  other  end  of  the  wick.   Faraday  also  describes  other  situations  that  act  
similarly  to  the  wick  and  the  melted  wax.   In  particular,  he  describes  an  experiment  wherein  he  
puts  a  colored  fluid  in  one  beaker,  places  a  wick  in  the  beaker  leading  to  an  empty  beaker,  and  
then  waits  as  the  empty  beaker  is  slowly  filled  with  the  colored  fluid.   One  can  even  see  the  
moment  to  moment  action  of  this  process  because  the  fluid  is  colored.   Finally,  Faraday  notes  
that  replacing  the  wax  or  the  wick  with  some  material  that  will  not  undergo  capillary  action  (e.g.,  
anachronistically,  a  metallic  wick  or  a  heavily  polarized  liquid)  prevents  the  formation  of  the  
candle  flame.   
The  combination  of  these  three  experiments  allows  us  to  know  that  the  process  of  
capillary  action  is  occurring.   We  isolate  where  the  process  is  occurring  by  recognizing  that  the  
system  is  analogous  to  the  beaker  filled  with  liquid  and  the  string  to  the  empty  beaker.   We  then  
note  that  the  analogous  situation  of  the  beaker  reveals  that  the  fluid  is  transported.   We  can  then  
perform  interventions  on  this  beaker  system  to  stop  or  inhibit  the  transport  process  such  as  
changing  the  wick  or  altering  the  fluid. 114    This,  in  turn,  reveals  how  we  might  intervene  on  the  
melted  wax  and  wick  system  to  test  its  capillary  action.   Upon  performing  these  interventions,  
we  discover  that  inhibiting  the  process  of  capillary  action  prevents  the  initiation  or  continuation  
of  combustion  in  the  candle  flame.   
Crucially,  we  inhibit  the  process  of  capillary  action  by  altering  the  dynamics  in  the  candle  
flame  that  enable  it.   Namely,  the  melting  of  the  wax,  the  interaction  between  the  wick  and  the  
fuel,  and  the  combustion  processes  going  on  at  the  top  of  the  wick.   We  notice  that  merely  
altering  the  wick  or  altering  the  fuel  is  not  sufficient  to  change  the  capillary  action  process.   It  is  
only  when  the  alteration  of  one  or  both  would  result  in  a  different  interaction  between  wick  and  
114  Faraday’s  demonstrations  involve  replacing  the  wick  with  salt  and  the  melted  wax  with  alcohol.   This  alteration  
allows  for  a  better  demonstration  of  the  capillary  action.   Then,  he  changes  the  salt  to  a  different  material,  and  notes  
that  the  capillary  action  no  longer  occurs.   As  we  will  later  discover,  the  explanation  for  capillary  action  is  in  terms  
of  the  adhesion  forces  between  the  fluid  and  the  capillary.   In  short,  it  is  processes  of  electromagnetic  attraction,  and  
the  imbalance  between  the  fluid-fluid  attraction  and  fluid-capillary  attraction,  that  explains  the  process  of  capillary  
action  itself.   
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fuel  that  the  capillary  action  is  inhibited.   In  particular,  if  the  wick  and  fuel  have  insufficient  
adhesion  interactions,  or  if  the  fluid  fails  to  have  sufficient  cohesion  self-interaction,  the  capillary  
action  will  fail  to  occur.   This  reveals  to  us  how  the  fluid  is  transported.   Thus,  we  know  where,  
when,  how,  and  that  capillary  action  occurs  to  bring  fuel  from  the  candle  to  the  top  of  the  wick,  
providing  us  with  an  understanding  of  the  next  step  in  the  dynamic  sequence  from  melting  to  
illumination.   
Thus,  the  process  of  capillary  action  is  identified  by  its  dynamic  context,  not  by  some  
subject  or  object.   This  generalizes.   We  are  led,  in  the  case  of  productive  features  of  the  candle  
system,  to  identify  these  productive  features  with  specific  processes  or  sequences  of  processes.  
In  our  example,  we  identify  the  production  of  light  in  the  candle  with  the  sequence  that  begins  
with  the  melting  of  wax  and  proceeds  through  capillary  action,  combustion,  and  incandescent  
radiation.   
This  is,  perhaps,  not  very  surprising.   Production  is  processual,  after  all.   We  therefore  
might  expect  explanations  of  production  to  be  processual.   However,  we  will  see  that  the  style  of  
explanations  given  for  productive  features  of  the  candle  apply  generally  to  formal  and  material  
features  of  the  candle  as  well.   
  
  
[4.3.3.2]:   Explaining  Formal/Structural  Features  
  
  
Once  we  have  admitted  that  the  various  productive  features  of  the  candle  flame  are  
processes  and  are  explained  by  processes,  we  are  forced  to  admit  that  the  candle  flame  system  
with  all  its  features  is  inherently  processual.   That  is,  since  the  candle  flame  is  defined  in  part  by  
its  occurrence  (its  processual,  temporally  extended  existence),  continuant  features  of  the  candle  
flame  like  its  structure  will  not  exist  independent  of  context.   In  fact,  they  will  depend  on  the  
occurrent  features  of  the  candle  flame  system.   When  the  processes  of  the  candle  flame  are  
occurring,  the  candle  flame  will  have  a  structure  and  material  character.   When  those  processes  
are  absent,  there  will  be  no  candle  flame,  let  alone  a  structure  or  a  material  character  of  the  
candle  flame.   We  therefore  expect  that  the  explanations  of  structural  and  material  features  of  the  
candle  flame  will  be  made  in  terms  of  processes,  and  the  same  processes  that  we  saw  in  §3.3.1.   
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Moreover,  since  the  structures  and  material  features  of  the  candle  flame  will  be  identified  
and  explained  by  the  same  processes  as  those  we  saw  in  §3.3.1,  we  should  expect  that  these  
structures  and  material  features  will  exhibit  all  of  the  identifying  features  of  processes.   They  will  
inherit  these  processual  features  from  the  processes  on  which  they  depend.   I.e.,  the  structure  of  
the  candle  flame  is  explained  by  and  dependent  on  a  dynamic  context,  specific  underlying  
dynamics  that  make  it  countable,  determinable,  general,  and  subjectless,  and  is  itself  necessarily  
temporally  extended,  unidentifiable  at  a  moment  in  time.   Put  simply,  structures  are  stabilities,  
not  staticities.   They  are  therefore  necessarily  dependent  on  and  defined  by  processes.   As  I  will  
show,  the  structures  in  the  candle  flame  do  indeed  have  this  processual  character. 115    
Let  us  consider  the  shape  of  the  candle.   That  is,  we  will  discuss  two  properties:   the  
shape  of  the  wax  base  and  the  shape  of  the  flame.   Both  of  these  are  investigated  by  Faraday  in  
the  opening  lecture,  and  share  many  of  the  same  features.   Faraday  begins  his  analysis  with  the  
shape  of  the  flame  and  the  shape  of  the  wax—what  Faraday  calls  the  “beautiful  cup.” 116    As  we  
have  already  briefly  discussed,  this  cup  and  the  shape  of  the  flame  itself  are  formed  and  
maintained  by  the  air  currents  which  flow  around  the  candle  flame  as  it  burns.   As  the  candle  
flame  emits  heat,  it  excites  the  air  surrounding  the  flame,  causing  it  to  rise.   Concurrently,  the 
emitted  heat  melts  the  wax  at  the  base  of  the  wick.   The  excited  air,  in  rising,  causes  cooler  air  to  
rush  up  and  around  the  candle  flame  to  fill  the  void  left  by  the  heated  air.   This  rising  cooler  
air—the  convection  currents—keeps  a  continuous  heat  sink  next  to  the  edges  of  the  wax.   This  
means  that  the  heat  which  melts  the  wax  at  the  base  of  the  wick  is  quickly  dispersed  into  the  
convection  currents  near  the  edges  of  the  candle.   Therefore,  not  enough  heat  is  delivered  to  the  
wax  at  the  edge  of  the  candle  to  melt  it,  with  progressively  more  of  the  wax  receiving  enough  
heat  to  melt  the  closer  to  the  wick  one  measures.   Hence,  a  cup  of  wax  is  formed,  with  melted  
wax  held  within.   
The  rising  convection  currents  also  supply  a  steady  stream  of  cool  air  to  be  heated  by  the  
candle  flame.   These  convection  currents  flow  up  and  around  the  flame,  directing  the  products  of  
combustion  up  and  out  of  the  flame’s  incandescent  region.   The  source  of  heat  being  the  total  
combustion  taking  place  at  the  candle’s  wick,  air  is  heated  by  a  greater  degree  closer  to  the  tip  of  
the  wick.   This  ensures  that  as  the  air  flows  around  the  candle  flame,  it  will  flow  around  the  
115  Note  that  my  analysis  will  mirror  work  done  on  molecular  structures  by  Earley  (2008a,  b,  c,  2012,  2016).   
116  See  Lecture  1.   Faraday’s  full  explanation  for  the  shape  of  the  candle  flame  and  wax  cup  are  also  found  in  lecture  
1.   I  reproduce  simplified  versions  of  these  explanations  here.   
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central  axis  of  the  candle  flame,  and  will  converge  to  this  axis  as  it  rises.   This  means  that  the  
products  of  combustion,  including  those  that  incandesce  to  form  the  characteristic  yellow  region  
of  the  flame,  will  similarly  flow  symmetrically  around,  and  converge  to  the  central  axis  of  the  
candle.   This  symmetric  flow  of  air  and  incandescent  combustion  products  produces  exactly  the  
characteristic  teardrop  shape  of  the  candle  flame.  
Importantly,  the  causal  relationships  between  these  convection  currents  and  the  shapes  of  
the  candle  and  the  wax  cup  are  established  by  Faraday  through  a  series  of  interventions.   These  
interventions  allow  him  to  isolate  the  specific  interactions  and  processes  which  give  rise  to  
certain  observable  features  of  the  candle  system.   We  know  that  it  is  the  convection  currents  
which  cause  the  candle  flame  to  take  on  its  teardrop  shape  because  disturbing  these  convection  
currents  disturbs  the  flame’s  shape.   This  disturbance  can  be  introduced  by  either  inhibiting  the  
flow  of  the  convection  currents,  e.g.,  by  blowing  on  the  candle  flame  or  altering  the  aerodynamic  
interaction  between  the  wax  and  the  air  currents.   Faraday  remarks  that  this  is  why  “novelty”  
candles  that  lack  the  standard  symmetry  of  a  cylindrical  candle  fail  to  form  a  consistent  shape:  
such  candles  inhibit  the  flow  of  convection  currents  around  the  flame  through  their  irregular  
aerodynamics.   Similarly,  Faraday  remarks  that  tipping  the  candle  reveals  the  importance  of  the  
convection  currents  as  well.   The  more  one  tips  the  candle,  the  more  the  convection  currents  are  
inhibited.   A  small  degree  of  tipping  leaves  the  candle  flame  roughly  undisturbed  since  the  
convection  currents  are  uninhibited.   In  contrast,  the  wax  cup  forms  asymmetrically  even  with  a  
small  degree  of  tipping  as  the  convection  currents  cool  the  edge  of  the  wax  in  the  direction  
tipping  more  efficiently,  causing  the  edge  of  that  side  of  the  wax  to  be  much  higher  and  fully  
formed  than  the  opposite  side.   With  a  large  degree  of  tipping,  the  candle  flame  begins  to  sputter,  
no  longer  holding  a  consistent  shape  as  the  convection  currents  are  no  longer  able  to  flow  
consistently  around  the  flame.   Similarly,  a  large  degree  of  tipping  destroys  the  wax  cup  entirely.   
These  interventions  reveal  the  causal  relationship  between  the  convection  currents  and  
the  shapes  of  the  wax  and  the  candle  flame.   I.e.,  disturbing  the  convection  currents  in  specific  
ways  predictably  disturbs  these  formal  properties  of  the  candle.   However,  we  must  notice  two  
points  in  this  analysis.   First,  that  the  interventions  are  actions  taken  by  the  observer:   tipping  the  
candle,  blowing  on  the  flame,  introducing  additional  inhibiting  material  to  the  side  of  the  wax  
cup.   Moreover,  the  interventions  are  revealing  of  some  causal  relationship  between  what  is  
intervened  on  and  the  system  of  interest  because  they  produce  some  novel,  noticeable  change  in  
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behavior  of  the  system.   We  notice  that  the  candle  flame  no  longer  maintains  a  stable  shape  when  
we  disturb  the  convection  currents,  instead  sputtering  and  flickering. 117   
Second,  we  notice  that  the  interventions  are  on  specific  activities  of  and  surrounding  the  
candle.   In  this  case,  the  convection  currents  are  being  disturbed  so  that  they  can  no  longer  flow  
in  the  appropriate  way.   We  intervene  not  on  the  composition  of  the  air,  but  only  on  the  motion  of  
the  air  and  the  interactions  that  guide  this  motion.   Thus,  not  only  is  the  intervention  itself  a  
process  carried  out  by  the  observer,  but  that  which  is  intervened  upon  is  a  process  as  well.   
What  we  learn  from  these  two  points  is  that,  contrary  to  the  thing-realist  intuition  of  a  
static  shape-property  inhering  in  the  candle  flame,  the  shape  of  a  candle  flame  just  is  the  
processes  that  produce  and  maintain  the  stability  of  the  candle  flame.   I.e.,  it  is  through  a  balance  
of  processes—in  this  case,  heat  radiation  and  air  convection—that  the  property  of  “teardrop  
shapedness”  comes  into  being  and  persists.   We  learn  about  and  explain  this  property  of  shape  
through  dynamic  interventions.   Our  interventions,  activities  that  we  perform,  trigger  some  new  
dynamic  event  in  the  system,  and  we  infer  from  this  to  the  existence  of  dynamic  interactions  in  
the  system  that  we  have  disturbed.   After  performing  several  interventions,  on  the  system  in  this  
way,  we  are  able  to  further  infer  that  these  dynamic  interactions  in  the  system  balance  in  some  
appropriate  way  so  as  to  produce  some  form  of  stability  in  the  system:   shape  in  this  example.   
This  inferential   process  is  exactly  what  generalizes  to  all  formal  properties  of  the  candle  
flame,  and  to  other  systems  besides.   We  have  the  following  general  scheme:  
(1) We  intervene  (Process  1,  intervention )  on  a  system,  and  observe  the  change  in  activity  of  
the  system  (Process  2,  observation ).   E.g.,  we  blow  on  a  candle  and  observe  that  the  
emission  of  light  to  our  eye  alters.   
117  A  few  interlocutors  have  remarked  to  me  that  one  might  think  of  this  intervention  not  as  a  process  at  all,  but  as  a  
simple  alteration  of  the  state  of  the  system.   I.e.,  there  is  no  active  change  that  is  playing  any  role,  but  rather  only  a  
passive  difference.   I  take  it  that  this  remark  trades  on  the  idea  that  we  do  not  care  how  we  intervene  on  the  system,  
only  that  we  have  successfully  altered  it.   It  is  then,  according  to  my  interlocutors,  this  alteration,  and  not  some  
process,  that  acts  as  the  salient  feature  in  our  explanations  and  acquisition  of  knowledge  about  the  system.   While  I  
understand  the  desire  for  such  an  account—it  is  motivated  by  the  reasonable  equivocation  of  mathematical  variables  
and  aspects  of  a  system—I  find  this  account  to  be  mistaken.   It  would  be  feasible  if  we  could  observe  a  system  in  
two  perfectly  defined  states  without  any  dynamic  interaction  between  us  and  the  system,  but  we  cannot.   Moreover,  
it  is  precisely  because  we  observe  the  system  changing  that  we  are  inclined  to  infer  anything  in  the  first  place.  
Consider:   it  would  not  be  sufficient  for  any  inference  about  the  system  to  merely  observe  that  it  is  in  some  state  X.  
Rather,  we  need  to  see  that  the  system  comes  to  be  in  state  X  from  some  other  state.   In  short,  it  matters  how  a  
system  comes  to  be  in  X.   This  is  just  another  way  of  saying  that  what  guides  our  explanations  are  active  
interventions  in  which  we  bring  about  a  change  in  a  system,  not  some  mere  fact  of  difference.   (Think  of  an  example  
of  a  system  in  two  states  successively  that  is  brought  there  by  two  different  means—this  shows  that  the  process  
matters:  it  is  the  difference  maker).    Thanks  to  Gal  Ben-Porath  and  Jim  Woodward  for  this  comment.   
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(2) We  infer  from  Process  2  that  Process  1  caused  Process  2  by  some  series  of  dynamic  
interactions.   E.g.,  our  blowing  caused  the  change  in  the  pattern  of  light  emissions.   
(3) If  we  have  performed  the  appropriate  intervention  or  series  of  interventions,  we  are  then  
able  to  infer  the  dynamics  that  lead  from  our  intervention  to  the  observation  (Process  3).  
E.g.,  the  flow  of  air  around  the  candle  is  what  defines  the  region  of  motion  of  the  
incandescent  combustion  products.   Thus,  by  disturbing  the  first  process  (the  air  flow),  
we  dynamically  produce  the  second,  that  constitutes  the  change  we  observe.   
(4) We  repeat  this  process  until  we  can  chart  some  collection  of  mutually  interacting  
processes  within  a  system  that,  when  balanced,  produce  a  steady  cycle  of  activity  in  the  
system  (Process  4).   This  steady  cycle  then  defines  one  or  more  stable  aspects  of  the  
system,  and  so  we  infer  that  the  system  possesses  a  stable  formal  property  in  virtue  of  this  
cycle.   E.g.,  the  cycle  of  heating  and  cooling  that  continually  guides  incandescent  
combustion  products  up  in  a  teardrop  shape.   
Formal  properties  and  structures  are  identified  with  these  balanced,  cyclic  processes  in  a  system.  
This  means  that  structures  are  defined  by  a  dynamic  shape  (cyclic)  with  a  dynamic  context  (the  
processes  which  feed  into  and  flow  out  of  the  cycle).   Moreover,  the  processes  within  the  cycle  
are  defined  in  the  same  manner  as  we  have  seen  in  previous  sections.   Namely,  they  have  all  of  
the  identifying  features  of  processes  (generality,  subjectlessness,  measurability,  determinability,  
contextuality,  and  occurrent  nature),  and  we  determine  these  features  by  means  of  our  dynamic  
interventions  on  the  system.   
We  should  not  be  surprised  that  we  arrived  at  this  result.   Formal  properties  are  meant  to  
be  stabilities.   However,  we  only  understand  stabilities  when  we  know  how  they  can  be  
perturbed,  to  what  degree,  and  in  what  manner.   In  other  words,  the  stability  must  be  
continuously  maintained,  and  contextually  defined,  as  per  our  discussion  in  chapter  2.   The  
stability  only  has  meaning  insofar  as  it  can  respond  to  its  dynamic  context.   We  will  see  








[4.3.3.3]:   Explaining  Material  Features  
  
  
Material  features  are  perhaps  the  most  difficult  to  assess,  primarily  because  there  is  a  
hidden  distinction  between  two  different  types  of  explanation  associated  with  two  senses  of  
“material  feature.”   On  the  one  hand,  we  might  say  that  the  material  features  of  the  candle  flame  
are  those  that  indicate  that  the  system  is  material.   I.e.,  we  look  for  the  identifying  properties  of  
matter  in  the  system,  and  then  seek  to  explain  these.   On  the  other  hand,  we  might  say  that  the  
material  features  of  the  candle  flame  are  the  compositional  features  of  the  system  at  a  moment  in  
time.   I.e.,  we  look  for  a  reduction  of  states  of  the  system  to  some  collection  of  entities  or  
properties  in  the  right  configuration  or  with  the  right  character.    Let  us  label  these  two  sorts  of  
explanation:  
  
( Identifying  Material  Features ):   Those  features  of  the  system  that  identify  the  system  as  
material.   
( Compositional  Material  Features ):   The  features  of  the  system’s  composition,  whenever  this  
composition  is  a  configuration  of  material  subsystems.   
  
We  can  separate  each  of  the  features  listed  in  table  1  (§3.2)  into  two  separate,  related  features.  
For  example,  we  could  seek  to  explain  the  chemical  phase/state  of  the  wax  in  the  combustion  
region  insofar  as  it  identifies  a  structural  feature  of  the  system.   In  this  case,  we  might  say  that  at  
each  moment  of  time,  there  is  a  property  called  “material  phase”  of  the  system  defined  and  
identified  entirely  at  that  moment  for  each  region  of  the  system.   Explaining  this  would  involve  
explaining  how  and  that  we  identify  that  the  system  attains  this  property  of  material  phase.   
Alternatively,  we  could  seek  to  explain  the  chemical  phase/state  of  the  wax  in  the  
combustion  region  insofar  as  this  composition  is  indeed  a  composition.   At  this  point,  we  are  no  
longer  explaining  material  properties  of  the  candle  flame,  but  rather  explaining  the  mereological  
nature  of  the  candle  flame.   In  order  to  establish  that  this  mereological  nature  entails  that  it  is  
material,  we  would  need  to  defend  the  further  claim  that  the  components  of  the  chemical  phase  
of  the  wax  in  the  combustion  region  are  material  in  character.   
In  both  cases,  what  counts  as  material  will  play  a  major  role  in  what  and  how  we  explain.  
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  clear  definition  of  material  we  can  make  use  of  here.   However,  we  
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need  not  answer  this  question  here.   Instead,  we  can  simply  note  that,  if  we  wish  for  “material”  to  
mean  “substantial  or  thing-like,”  the  properties  and  entities  that  we  identify  as  material  properties  
and  entities  had  better  be  thing-like.   I.e.,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  we  can  replace  the  above  
explananda  with:   
  
( Identifying  Material-Thing  Features ):   Those  features  of  the  system  that  identify  it  as  a  thing.  
I.e.,  the  features  that  are  definite,  are  discrete,  render  the  system  countable,  grant  the  
system  a  definite  location  in  space  and  time  (make  it  particular),  and   
( Compositional  Material-Thing  Features ):   Those  features  of  the  system’s  composition,  
whenever  this  composition  is  a  configuration  of  things  (i.e.,  identified  as  above).   
  
The  upshot  is  this:   if  the  features  we  identify  in  manifestly  material  systems  are  processual  and  
not  thing-like,  we  need  only  reject  that  being  material  has  anything  to  do  with  being  thing-like.  
We  will  not  be  required  to  revise  our  claims  about  material  and  non-material  systems  (the  same  
distinctions  will  hold  as  normal  between,  e.g.,  bodies  and  souls).   
Unfortunately  for  the  thing  realist,  our  analysis  of  the  candle  flame  results  in  exactly  this  
conclusion.   We  begin  with  the  identifying  material  features.   Here,  we  notice  that  Faraday  
implicitly  rejects  that  the  candle  flame  can  be  identified  as  a  thing  at  all,  simply  in  virtue  of  
redescribing  the  candle  flame  as  a  system  of  dynamics.   The  contrast  with  Becher  and  Stahl  is  
here  made  apparent,  since  “fire”  is  no  longer  associated  with  a  particular  substance  in  which  
inhere  the  standard  determinate,  discrete,  definitely  located  properties  of  things.   In  other  words,  
Faraday  assumed  that  the  flame  is  not  itself  a  thing,  possessing  its  own  material  features,  but  is  at  
best  composed  of  things:   molecules  and  (anachronistically)  photons  and  the  like.   
Take,  for  example,  the  kinesthetic  material  features  of  the  candle  flame:   that  when  we  
touch  the  flame,  it  burns  us  (it  is  causally  potent  to  other  material  systems).   Implicit  in  Faraday’s  
explanations  of  this  phenomenon  is  that  the  flame  burns  us  because  of  some  underlying  cause.  
I.e.,  the  flame  contains  interacting  paraffin  and  oxygen  that,  in  interacting,  produce  a  great  deal  
of  thermal  energy.   This  thermal  energy  is  translated  up  through  the  incandescent  region  of  the  
flame  by  convection  currents  that  carry  the  energized  combustion  products.   Thus,  when  an  
unsuspecting  observer  places  their  finger  within  this  region,  the  energized  combustion  particles  
interact  with  that  finger,  translating  their  energy  into  the  finger,  resulting  in  a  sensation  expressed  
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vociferously  as  “ouch,  that’s  hot.”   Put  simply,  the  candle  flame  does  not  possess  any  material  
features  itself.   What  might  be  taken  to  be  material  features  of  the  flame  itself  are  no  more  than  
processes  of  (supposed)  material  constituents.   
We  can  therefore  quickly  reject  the  project  of  explaining  any  identifying  material-thing  
features  in  the  system;  we  will  not  find  any  if  the  system  is  not  a  thing.   We  must  now,  instead  
ask,  what  are  the  compositional  material-thing  features  of  the  system.   I.e.,  can  we  claim  that  at  
any  moment  in  time,  in  some  definite  location,  with  determinate  identifiable  features,  the  candle  
flame  as  a  system  is  composed  of  thing-like  entities?   
Answering  this  question  is  the  subject  of  the  next  section.   Briefly,  our  answer  will  rely  
on  first  answering  the  question  of  what  explanatory  role  mereological  claims  can  have  in  
explanations  of  features  of  the  candle  flame  system.   I  argue  that,  insofar  as  a  mereological  claim  




[4.4]:   What  Explanatory  Role,  Things?   
  
  
[4.4.1]:   New  Thing-Terms  Appear  In  Our  Explanations…   
  
  
So  far,  we  have  seen  that  most  of  the  explanations  of  the  candle  flame  and  its  features  are  
processual.   They  involve,  depend  on,  and  are  about  processes.   Nevertheless,  the  thing  realist  
will  argue  that,  because  the  features  of  the  flame  itself  are  explained  by  the  motions  and  
interactions  of  further  things  (its  material  composition),  these  material  features  still  serve  as  
positive  evidence  for  thing  realism.   I.e.,  if  things  appear  in  the  explanations  of  the  features  of  the  
candle  flame,  then  this  suggests  that  the  candle  flame  is  composed  of  things.   If  it  is  composed  of  
things,  then  even  if  it  is  not  itself  a  thing,  things  are  still  present  in  the  world  and  play  an  
explanatory  role.   So  goes  the  thing-realist  argument.  
For  now,  we  must  assume  that  the  thing  realist  is  still  interested  in  reifying  things  within  
the  candle  flame  system  in  virtue  of  the  study  of  that  system.   That  is  to  say,  the  thing  realist  is  
not  (in  this  argument)  reifying  things  within  the  candle  flame  system  in  virtue  of  an  analysis  of  
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those  things  in  particular.   We  have  no  evidence  (yet)  that  these  material  constituents  are  things  
themselves.   Rather,  for  now,  we  only  assume  that  they  exist  as  vehicles  for  the  relevant  
processes  within  the  candle  flame.   In  other  words,  the  thing  realist’s  argument  is  that,  even  if  all  
of  the  explanations  of  the  candle  flame  system  are  processual,  and  all  of  the  features  of  the  flame  
itself  are  defined  by  said  processes,  analysis  of  the  candle  flame  system  nevertheless  results  in  
the  reification  of  at  least  one  thing  as  an  underlier  or  subject  for  those  processes. 118    
We  are  therefore  led  to  ask  two  questions.   First,  do  new  things  actually  appear  in  our  
explanations  of  the  candle  flame  system?   Second,  if  they  appear,  what  role  do  they  play  in  our  
explanations?   In  answering  this  second  question  in  particular,  we  are  looking  for  some  reason  to  
suppose  that  things  exist  on  the  basis  of  our  examination  of  the  candle  flame  system  alone.   In  
other  words,  at  this  point  in  the  regression,  it  would  be  illicit  to  appeal  to  an  independent  
investigation  of  the  supposed  material  constituents  of  the  candle  flame  system  in  order  to  reify  
them.   We  can  only  ask:   in  examining  and  intervening  upon  the  candle  flame,  is  there  some  
feature  or  resultant  observation  that  necessitates  (or  even  suggests)  the  existence  of  things  for  the  
relevant  explanations.   
  
  
[4.4.2]:   …But  Things  Play  No  Role  In  Our  Explanations  
  
  
The  simple  answer  to  these  questions  is:   things  play  no  role  in  our  explanations.   While 
new  thing  terms  do  appear  in  our  explanations  and  descriptions  of  the  candle  flame  system,  they  
do  not  appear  qua  things.   They  are  mere  placeholders:   words  that  indicate  to  us  what  sorts  of  
interventions  we  have  performed  or  would  need  to  perform  in  order  to  identify  the  relevant,  
explanatory  dynamics.   
Let  us  consider  more  closely  the  chemical  state  and  phase  of  the  pre-  and  
post-combustion  materials.   As  we  have  discussed  briefly  above,  combustion  occurs  in  the  blue  
region  of  the  flame  in  a  concentric  ring  around  the  wick.   For  paraffin-based  candles,  this  ring  is  
the  region  where  vaporous  (energized)  paraffin  (C 25 H 52 )  and  vaporous  oxygen  (O 2 )  collide  and  
produce  incandescent  vaporous  carbon  dioxide  (CO 2 )  and  water  vapor  (H 2 O).   Thus,  we  know  
118  In  the  next  chapter,  we  will  analyze  the  arguments  for  the  particular  thing-ness  of  the  compositional  entities  in  the  
candle  flame,  i.e.,  molecules  and  atoms.   
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both  what  materials  are  present  before  and  after  combustion,  and  how  these  materials  manifest  
(their  chemical  phase).   
We  now  wish  to  explain  three  things:   (1)  how  these  material  features  come  to  be  (and  be  
present)  in  the  combustion  region,  (2)  what  role  these  material  features  play  in  the  processes  that  
we  have  already  used  to  define  the  formal  properties  of  the  candle,  and  (3)  how  we  come  to  learn  
of  these  material  features  of  the  candle  system.   In  our  analysis,  we  find  the  following:   
(1) The  material  features  come  to  be  (and  be  present)  in  the  combustion  region  because  of  
temporally  prior  processes.   
(2) The  material  features  are  important  only  as  (a)  placeholders  for  further  processes,  and  (b)  
identifiers  of  process  types;   e.g.,  “vaporous”  is  an  important  feature  of  the  paraffin  
because  it  tells  us  that  the  paraffin  interacts  more  energetically  and  with  more  dispersion,  
and  “water”  is  important  in  the  post  combustion  convection  processes  because  it  
identifies  that  this  is  indeed  a  hydrocarbon  combustion  process  (as  opposed  to  a  more  
general  oxidation  process).   
(3) We  learn  about  these  features  by,  again,  intervening  on  the  system  and  observing  the  
dynamic  event  that  is  triggered.   Unlike  the  formal  properties,  we  do  not  look  for  cycles  
of  processes  in  this  case,  but  rather  for  same-kind  interactions  across  many  interventions  
(I.e.,  we  do  multiple  different  things  and  observe  similar  effects).   
For  the  sake  of  brevity,  I  will  consider  only  one  of  the  material  features:   the  phase  and  existence  
of  water  vapor  after  combustion.   
Faraday  considers  this  feature  of  the  candle  system  in  lecture  in  lectures  2  and  3,  lecture  2  
being  where  he  shows  that  water  is  produced  in  the  combustion  reaction  and  lecture  3  bring  
where  he  shows  how  water  comes  to  be  produced  through  combustion  and  where  the  necessary  
materials  come  to  be  in  the  combustion  region  of  the  candle  flame.   First,  Faraday  holds  a  cooled  
and  dried  spoon  above  the  candle  flame  and  notices  that  it  becomes  dim  with  condensation.  
Since  this  test  can  be  performed  in  a  dry-air  environment,  this  condensation  indicates  that  there  is  
some  process  in  the  candle  flame  which  brings  about  the  dimming  on  the  spoon.   Before  we  can  
investigate  this  process  further,  we  first  need  to  know  the  character  of  the  dimming,  i.e.,  we  need  
to  know  how  it  is  that  light  comes  to  be  less  intensely  reflected  off  of  the  spoon.   We  suspect,  
having  seen  similar  dimming  effects  in  the  condensation  of  water  on  cool  surfaces  that  the  spoon  
is  reflecting  light  because  water  vapor  is  rising  from  the  candle  flame  and  condensing  on  the  
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spoon.   Hence,  Faraday  first  turns  the  spoon  over  and  places  potassium  in  it,  knowing  that  water  
reacts  strongly  with  potassium.   Observing  that  this  condensation  does,  in  fact,  react  strongly  
with  the  potassium,  we  conclude  that  the  condensation  is  probably  water  because  it  reacts  like  
water.   As  a  further  test,  we  run  an  electrical  current  through  the  condensation  and  then  burn  the  
products.   Since  the  products  burn  with  the  pale  blue  flame  of  hydrogen  combustion,  and  since  
we  can  perform  this  combustion  in  an  evacuated,  closed  system,  we  have  further  evidence  that  
the  original  material  which  we  electrolosized  had  the  chemical  composition  of  water,  hydrogen  
and  oxygen.   We  therefore  conclude  that  the  condensation  is,  in  fact,  water.   
Since  water  is  neither  contained  in  the  wax  of  the  candle  nor  in  the  surrounding  air, 119   the  
water  must  be  produced  in  the  combustion  process.   This  then  entails  that  the  combustion  process  
is  a  special  kind  of  oxidation  reaction,  namely  hydrocarbon  oxidation.   In  other  words,  the  
presence  of  water  allows  us  to  infer  that  the  process  at  the  heart  of  the  candle  flame  is  a  specific  
interaction  between  hydrogen,  carbon,  and  oxygen.   We  now  have  a  complete  dynamical  
explanation  for  the  presence  of  water  at  the  locus  of  our  intervention  (the  spoon).   Water  vapor  is  
produced  through  the  interaction  of  hydrogen,  carbon,  and  oxygen  in  the  blue  region  of  the  
candle  flame,  where  hydrogen  and  carbon  come  to  covalently  bond.   The  water  vapor  remains  
energized,  inheriting  the  excess  energy  of  the  energized  paraffin  and  oxygen,  and  rises  as  vapor  
following  the  convection  currents  surrounding  the  flame.   The  water  vapor  then  interacts  with  the  
cool  spoon,  distributing  the  energy  of  its  motion  (its  heat)  into  the  heat  sink  of  the  spoon.   The  
water  vapor  begins  to  move  more  slowly,  and  thus  condenses  into  liquid.   
There  are  three  points  to  note  in  this  explanation.   First,  while  it  may  seem  obvious,  the  
water  vapor  comes  to  be  present  in  the  candle  system  dynamically  through  the  combustion  
reaction.   I.e.,  the  candle  system  acquires  the  material  feature  of  “containing  water  vapor”  
dynamically.   In  general,  this  is  true  of  all  material  features  of  the  candle  system.   The  material  
makeup  of  the  candle  system  is  dynamically  acquired  at  all  stages,  and  this  is  reflected  in  our  
explanations.   This  means  that  we  explain  the  material  state  of  the  post-combustion  flame  in  
terms  of  processes ;   we  do  not  explain  the  processes  of  the  flame  in  terms  of  material  states.   
Second,  just  as  with  the  formal  properties  of  the  candle  system,  we  learn  of  this  material  
feature  (and  others)  via  a  series  of  dynamical  inferences  from  specific,  targeted,  interventions.  
119  Implicitly,  we  assume  that  we  have  set  up  the  experiment  in  dry  air,  which  means  that  we  have  already  tested  that  
the  surrounding  air  does  not  contain,  or  contains  a  minimal  amount  of  water  vapor.   
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We  interact  with  the  system  to  disturb  the  process  of  water  vapor  rising  by  introducing  the  cool  
spoon.   We  disturb  the  process  of  water  moving  as  vapor  (i.e.,  moving  with  characteristic  
dispersion  and  freedom),  by  cooling  it  with  the  spoon,  which  slows  the  water’s  motion  and  
causes  it  to  condense.   This  intervention—moving  a  heat  sink  above  to  the  candle  
flame—impacts  the  activities  of  the  system—vaporous  motion—such  that  we  can  isolate  a  
specific  activity  that  was  present  before  our  intervention—the  vaporous  motion  of  water.   This  
isolation  allows  us  to  infer  that  the  vaporous  motion  of  the  water  must  have  been  triggered  by  the  
production  of  water  in  the  candle  flame,  allowing  us  to  identify  the  causal  connection  between  
the  combustion  process  and  the  process  of  vaporous  motion.   
This  leads  us  to  an  interesting  related  point.   That  is,  while  we  cannot  explain  the  
processes  in  the  candle  system  in  terms  of  states,  we  can  make  use  of  states  in  order  to  both  
identify  processes  and  identify  their  connections  to  each  other.   In  other  words,  we  know  that  the  
combustion  in  the  candle  is  a  hydrocarbon  combustion  process  because  water  is  produced  and  
rises  from  the  candle  flame  as  vapor.   This  is  not  the  same  as  saying  that  the  combustion  process  
is  a  hydrocarbon  combustion  process  because  water  is  produced.   We  can  say  we  know  what  the  
process  is  because  of  our  detection  of  a  specific  state  or  material  feature,  but  this  does  not  entail  
an  ontic  claim  about  the  nature  of  the  process.   Notice:   we  still  learn  of  the  production  of  water  
through  a  series  of  interventions  and  inferences  about  dynamics.   We  therefore  infer  the  state  
from  the  processes.   
The  third  point  to  notice  is  that  the  material  nature  of  “the  water”  serves  three  purposes  in  
our  experimentation  on  and  subsequent  explanation  of  the  candle  system:   
(1) “Water”  acts  as  a  unifying  feature  of  the  two  interventions  we  perform  and  the  processes  
we  are  interested  in,  namely,  the  volatile  reaction  with  potassium,  the  condensation  
process,  the  vaporous  motion  process,  the  electrolysis  process,  and  the  combustion  
process.   
(2) “Water”  acts  as  a  means  of  labeling  an  isolated  (or  isolatable)  sub  process  within  the  
candle  flame.   
(3) “Water”  acts  as  a  means  of  defining  the  causal  connection  of  various  sub  processes.   
We  will  consider  each  of  these  in  turn.   
The  first  role  that  “water”  plays  in  our  experimentation  and  explanation  is  to  act  as  a  
unifying  identifier  of  the  processes  in  the  candle  flame.   I.e.,  it  is  because  we  already  assume  that  
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water  both  reacts  strongly  with  potassium  and  condenses  on  cool  surfaces  that  we  are  able  to  
make  descriptive  claims  about  the  causal  connection  between  the  combustion  in  the  candle  flame  
and  the  dimming  of  the  spoon.   I.e.,  this  is  what  lets  us  say  that  this  is  a  hydrocarbon  combustion  
process:   all  such  processes  produce  water.   
However,  we  are  only  interested  in  this  production  of  water  for  the  effects  that  it  has  on  
various  interventions  we  perform,  e.g.,  the  effect  of  condensation,  or  the  effect  of  a  reaction  with  
potassium.   Insofar  as  we  are  interested  in  the  material  features  of  the  candle  system,  we  have  no  
interest  in  whether  water  is  itself  a  thing.   We  care  only  that  our  interventions  reveal  the  specific  
character  of  the  combustion  process  in  the  candle  flame  and  the  convective  motions  of  the  air,  
and  that  these  processes  can  be  perturbed  and  detected  through  well-defined  acts  of  intervention.   
Moreover,  the  unificatory  role  of  “water”  requires  no  assumption  that  water  (whether  the  
conglomerate  or  the  individual  chemical  molecule)  is  a  thing  at  all.   In  order  for  water  to  be  an  
identifier  of  combustion,  we  require  only  that  there  is  some  feature  of  water-containing  systems  
that  is  uniquely  and  consistently  identifiable,  and  that  this  feature  is  stable  under  the  
interventions  we  are  performing.   Allow  me  to  elaborate.   In  order  for  “water”  to  act  as  a  
unifying  feature  of  the  dynamics  in  the  candle  flame,  we  need  to  be  able  to  identify  its  presence.  
If  we  could  not,  we  would  never  posit  it  in  the  first  place.   In  order  to  identify  it,  we  must  be  able  
to  intervene  on  various  systems  in  such  a  way  that  at  least  one  feature  of  all  of  these  systems  is  
revealed  and  comparable  to  the  features  revealed  in  the  other  systems.   To  use  a  toy  example,  if  
we  take  liquid  from  a  still  pond  and  liquid  from  a  river,  put  both  in  the  same  clear  container,  and  
drop  a  stick  in  the  container,  we  observe  the  same  refraction  of  light  from  the  stick  in  each  case.  
The  refraction  of  light  through  the  liquid,  or  (in  more  thing  realist  terms)  the  refractive  index  of  
the  liquid,  is  similar  in  both  systems  under  the  same  interventions.   Thus,  we  say  that  both  
systems  similarly  contain  water,  the  thing  that  obtains  this  refractive  index  or  performs  this  
refraction.   
However,  we  need  more  than  similarity  in  order  for  “water”  to  act  as  a  true  unifier  of  the  
disparate  systems.   In  particular,  we  need  at  least  that  the  feature  we  observe  as  
stable—refraction  in  our  toy  example—is  stable  under  the  interventions  we  perform .   If  we  
intervened  on  the  two  containers  of  water  by,  e.g.,  heating  them  until  they  completely  
evaporated,  the  refractive  index  would  not  be  a  viable  unifier  of  the  two  systems.   In  this  case,  
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we  would  refer  to  some  other  property  of  the  water  (e.g.,  its  boiling  point)  to  unify  the  two  
systems.   
Returning  to  our  candle  flame  example,  the  unification  of  vaporous  motion,  combustion,  
condensation,  potassium-reaction,  and  electrolysis  provided  by  “water”  is  dependent  on  our  
ability  to  identify  in  each  process  (each  subsystem  of  the  candle)  a  feature  that  is  relatively  stable  
under  the  interventions  performed  on  the  candle  system.   Such  a  feature  could  indeed  be  the  
thing-ness  of  water,  or  its  essential  properties.   However,  it  need  not  be.   In  this  case,  the  
two-process  sequence  of  electrolysis  and  closed-container  combustion  serves  adequately  as  the  
unifying  feature.   I.e.,  at  every  stage  of  the  processes  of  the  candle  flame,  and  in  every  
intervention  process  involving  “water,”  we  can  consistently  identify  “the  presence  of  water”  by  
isolating  the  local  process  of  interest  and  performing  electrolysis  followed  by  combustion.   Our  
interventions  on  the  candle  flame—disturbing  the  flow  of  convection  currents  by  blowing  on  the  
flame,  introducing  a  spoon  above  the  flame,  putting  a  piece  of  paper  in  the  center  of  the  flame,  
etc.—do  nothing  to  disturb  the  process  of  electrolysis.   Thus,  electrolysis  is  stable  under  the  
interventions  we  perform  to  learn  about  the  candle  flame. 120    Instead  of  “water.”  we  might  unify  
the  dynamics  of  the  candle  flame  using  the  process  of  electrolysis  (or  the  ability  to  perform  
electrolysis)  instead.   Similar  remarks  might  be  made  about  the  process  of  interacting  with  
potassium,  another  of  the  interventions  used  to  test  for  the  presence  of  water.   In  short,  the  
unificatory  role  of  “water”  in  our  explanations  can  equally  be  performed  by  a  dynamic  feature  of  
the  system  as  it  can  by  a  thing-like  feature.   
The  second  role  that  “water”  plays  is  as  a  labeling  tool.   I.e.,  when  considering  vaporous  
motion,  we  might  separate  this  motion  into  several  distinct  vaporous  motions  according  to  how  
these  component  motions  differ  with  respect  to  our  interventions.   Notably,  one  vaporous  motion  
can  be  affected  by  a  cool  spoon  or  react  strongly  with  potassium  while  the  other  remains  
unaffected  by  both  interventions.   We  therefore  label  the  affected  vaporous  motion  as  the  
120  We  notice,  also,  that  electrolysis  is  the  process  used  by  Faraday  to  argue  that  water  is  composed  of  hydrogen  and  
oxygen.   For  the  thing-realist,  the  composition  of  water  would  be  the  feature  of  choice  for  unifying  the  various  
dynamics  of  the  candle  flame.   Thus,  by  selecting  electrolysis  as  the  processual  equivalent  of  the  thing-realist’s  
unifying  feature,  we  have  effectively  translated  thing  realism  directly  into  process  realism  with  little  trouble.   I  will  
note  here  that  the  process  realist  underlier—electrolysis—holds  an  advantage  over  the  thing  realist’s  underlier—the  
composition  of  water.   Namely,  as  we  have  already  discussed,  electrolysis  is  used  to  learn  about  the  composition  of  
water,  not  the  other  way  around.   The  thing  realist  therefore  infers  their  unifying  underlier  from  dynamic  
interventions,  whereas  the  process  realist  simply  performs  the  interventions.   In  other  words,  the  thing  realist  
requires  an  additional  inferential  step  from  their  empirical  tests  to  their  ontology  (c.f.,  chapter  2).   
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vaporous  motion  of  water  to  linguistically  differentiate  it  from  the  unaffected  vaporous  motion  
(the  motion  of  CO 2   and  Carbon).   
We  do  this  primarily  for  convenience  of  reference,  not  to  indicate  any  ontic  feature  of  the  
world.   Notice,  again,  that  the  thing-ness  of  water  does  not  play  an  ontic  role  in  isolating  this  sub  
process  that  we  label  “the  vaporous  motion  of  water.”   Rather,  it  plays  only  a  dialectical  or  
linguistic  role.   It  is  the  intervention  of  the  spoon,  and  the  revealed  difference  in  reaction  to  this  
intervention,  that  separates  the  vaporous  motion  of  water  from  the  vaporous  motion  of  carbon  
and  CO 2 .   I.e.,  we  know  that  vaporous  motion  of  water  is  an  individual  dynamic  event  because  
this  motion  can  be  disturbed  by  a  cool  spoon  or  the  interaction  with  potassium.   This  motion  is  
an  individual  dynamic  event  because  it  leads  to  different  dynamic  events  in  response  to  
interventions  than  does  the  motion  of  the  carbon  or  the  CO 2 .   In  short,  insofar  as  “water”  plays  a  
differentiating  (labeling)  role  in  our  explanations,  the  noun  “water”  is  a  placeholder  term  for  the  
processual  differentiators.   
The  third  role  that  the  material  presence  of  water  plays  is  in  the  connection  of  
non-obviously  connected  processes.   Prima  facie,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  a  combustion  
process  would  directly  cause  a  vaporous  motion  process.   After  we  learn  of  this,  e.g.,  in  a  
secondary  chemistry  class,  this  causal  connection  seems  obvious.   However,  we  learn  of  this  
connection  by  linking  the  dynamic  event  of  combustion  with  the  dynamic  event(s)  of  the  
vaporous  motion.   One  of  the  most  powerful  ways  we  can  do  this  is  to  show  that  the  “end”  of  one  
process  is  identical  to  the  beginning  of  the  other.   I.e.,  we  show  that  the  two  processes  are  
relatively  continuous  (c.f.,  chapter  1),  in  that  they  are  co-defining  such  that  the  ontic  and  physical  
features  of  one  are  inherited  by  the  other.   This  leads  us  to  (semi-arbitrarily)  separate  the  single  
dynamical  flow  of  the  system  into  sub-parts  by  defining  states  of  the  system.   We  then  declare  
that  the  state  of  the  system  at  the  end  of  the  first  process  is  identical  to  the  state  of  the  system  at  
the  beginning  of  the  next.   In  our  example  of  the  production  of  water  vapor,  the  stipulated  state  at  
the  end  of  the  combustion  process  is  defined,  in  part,  by  the  water  that  has  been  produced.   
Notice,  however,  that  we  are  not  warranted  in  claiming  that  these  sub  processes  are  
separate  and  in  need  of  connection  until  after  we  have  performed  our  interventions.   The  candle  
as  a  whole  is  a  single,  dynamic  event  that  we  observe.   This  means  that  their  connection  is  
given—it  is  not  something  that  needs  to  be  explained.   Instead,  we  describe  the  connection  of  
various  sub  processes  in  terms  of  water  and  other  features  of  their  connecting  state(s).   
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This  is  a  point  to  which  we  return  in  more  detail  in  chapter  3.   For  now,  suffice  it  to  say  
that  states  are  defined  arbitrarily,  by  convention,  and  on  top  of  the  actual  dynamic  events  in  order  
to  facilitate  our  understanding  of  the  system.   They  represent  our  conceptual  apparatus  for  
making  sense  of  an  infinitely  complex  world,  not  some  actual  thing  or  structure  of  things.  
Different  ways  of  assigning  states  take  advantage  of  dynamic,  not  static,  features  of  the  system.  
Moreover,  one  state  assignment  is  superior  to  another  in  virtue  of  its  usefulness  in  describing  the  
dynamics  of  the  system  and  facilitating  dynamic  explanations  of  phenomena,  not  in  virtue  of  any  
reference  to  a  real  thing.   This  should  be,  if  not  obvious,  at  least  plausible  given  the  discussion  of  
this  section.   
One  of  the  primary  objections  to  a  pure  process  realism  is  that  all  systems  have  material  
features,  and  these  material  features  cannot  be  processes.   We  now  have  the  tools  to  understand  
how  this  objection  fails.   Material  features  arise  dynamically,  they  are  explained  dynamically,  
they  are  learned  about  dynamically,  and,  most  importantly,  they  only  play  an  explanatory  role  in  
a  system  insofar  as  they  represent  (actual  or  potential)  dynamics  themselves.   The  thing-ness  of  
water  is  uninteresting.   The  fact  that  water  can  react  with  potassium  is,  in  contrast,  very  
interesting.   Just  as  with  formal  features  of  the  candle  system,  we  see  that,  as  far  as  scientific  




[4.5]:   Conclusion   
  
  
We  have  seen,  now,  how  the  features  of  the  candle  flame  system  are  all  identified  with  
and  explained  by  processes.   We  also  have  seen  something  of  a  natural  pattern  emerge  amongst  
those  explanations.   Productive  features  are  explained  by  sequential,  forked,  or  jointed  dynamic  
shapes.   Structural  features  are  explained  by  cyclic  dynamic  shapes.   Lastly,  material  features  are  
explained  by  no  particular  dynamic  shape,  but  rather  by  a  comparatively  longer  time  scale  or 
larger  characteristic  energy  than  the  dynamics  of  interest  in  the  system.   We  might  therefore  say  




( Productive  or  Causal  Features  of  a  System ):   Those  features  identified  by  a  generalized  
continuous  sequence  of  processes,  possibly  including  joints  and  forks  into  and  out  
of  the  sequence.   
( Structural  or  Formal  Features  of  a  System ):   Those  features  identified  by  a  generalized  cycle  of  
processes,  typically  with  measurable  quantity  exchanges  that  are  proportional.   
( Material  or  Underlier  Features  of  a  System ):   Those  features  identified  by  any  generalized  
intervention  process  with  any  dynamic  shape,  with  quantifiable  and  determinable  
energetic  features  (flux,  work),  that  are  characteristically  larger  than  or  less  
responsive  to  the  perturbations  involved  in  the  system.   
  
Thus,  we  identify  the  features  of  the  system  as  the  relevant  types  of  processes  we  observe  and  
refer  to  in  our  explanations.   The  candle  flame  is  not  material  in  that  it  has  material  features,  but 
rather  because  it  contains  stable  underlying  dynamics.   The  candle  flame  does  not  have  a  
structure  in  virtue  of  bearing  intrinsic  relational  properties,  but  rather  because  it  contains  cyclic,  
self-stabilizing  systems  of  dynamics.   
It  should  be  noted  that  this  is  essentially  the  task  of  the  process  realist:   to  show  that  all  
apparently  non-processual  aspects  of  a  system  or  model  can  be  reinterpreted  consistently  in  
process-realist  terms.   The  process  ontologist  must  perform  this  task  as  well,  with  a  different  set  
of  data  (linguistic  rather  than  scientific-theoretic).   E.g.,  the  GPT  seeks  to  redescribe  the  
truth-makers  of  thing-,  property-,  and  relational-terms  as  process  truth-makers. 121    If  the  process  
realist/ontologist  can  reproduce  all  of  the  relevant  scientific  explanations  and  linguistic  data  that  
is  thought  to  be  captured  by  thing/substance  realism/ontology,  then  they  are  no  longer  subject  to  
the  accusation  of  unmotivated  revisionism.   
In  sum,   all  features  of  the  candle  flame  itself  are  successfully  explained  by,  described  by,  
identified  with,  and  defined  as  processes.   At  this  point,  it  is  possible  to  resolve  the  historical  
tension  that  motivated  this  discussion.   Namely,  there  was  a  tension  between:  
(1) our  current  belief  that  the  candle  flame  is  not  itself  a  thing,   
(2) that  the  candle  flame  (still)  possesses  certain  features,  
(3) that  these  features  of  the  candle  flame  were  taken  as  past  evidence  for  reifying  the  candle  
flame,  resulting  in  theories  of  the  thingness  of  the  candle  flame.   
121  See  Seibt  1990,  1996a,  b,  c,  2004,  2007,  2008,  2010.  
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The  resolution  of  this  tension  is  simple:   the  features  are  still  present  in  the  candle  system,  but  
they  have  been  redefined  by  past  scientists  as  a  collection  of  processes  (dynamics).   I.e.,  the  
candle  flame  is  not  a  thing,  but  is  rather  a  collection  of  processes  that  define  its  relevant  
empirical/material  features.   
We  should  note  an  important  linguistic  point.   That  is,  we  still  say  that  the  candle  flame  
has  these  material  and  formal  features.   The  candle  flame  is  yellow.   The  candle  flame  is  hot.  
The  candle  flame  is  teardrop-shaped.   However,  our  understanding  of  these  features—the  
meaning  of  these  propositions—is  couched  in  the  underlying  dynamics  of  the  system.   For  
example,  the  candle  flame  itself  does  not  possess  some  static  property  “color.”   Rather,  the  
system  contains  dynamics  that,  in  interacting  with  us  and  our  senses,  produce  the  sensation  of  
color.   The  color  of  the  candle  flame  is  the  interaction  itself,  not  a  property  in  either  the  candle  
system  or  the  observer  of  it  (Chirimuuta  2015). 122   
In  this  discussion,  many  references  were  made  to  the  activities  of  other  entities,  like  
molecules,  fuel,  water  vapor,  etc.   On  the  surface,  at  least,  these  terms  apparently  refer  to  further  
things,  to  “underliers,”  of  the  explaining  processes.   While  I  have  argued  that  these  terms  are  not  
explanatory  for  the  features  of  the  candle  flame  system,  it  would  nevertheless  seem  that  the  thing  
realist  has  some  recourse.   They  might  argue  that  the  candle  flame’s  features  are  all  explained  by  
processes,  but  that  these  processes  (ontologically)  require  the  existence  of  further  things  in  order  
to  exist.   In  other  words,  while  things  are  explanatorily  empty,  they  are  not  ontologically  
empty. 123    
In  the  next  chapter  we  will  consider  this  argument  in  more  detail.   Within  the  history  of  
physics,  the  argument  itself  appears  in  apparent  robustness  arguments  offered  for  these  new  thing  
terms.   In  particular,  Perrin’s  argument  that  molecules  must  be  real  within  thermal  processes  is  
taken  in  the  literature  as  a  robustness  argument  for  things  (W.  Salmon  1979,  1981(2005),  2003).  
For  now,  we  may  note  that  such  robustness  arguments  are  expected  to  fail.   Chapter  2  of  this  
work  was  precisely  designed  to  articulate  how  and  why  no  such  argument  can  ever  successfully  
establish  that  things,  and  not  processes,  are  the  ontological  underliers  of  processual  explanations  
in  science.   It  should  come  as  no  surprise,  then,  that  in  the  next  chapter,  I  will  show  just  this  
122  This  is  also  a  part  of  W.  Seller’s  work.   See  Tye  (1975)  and  Vinci  (1981)  for  analyses  and  defenses  of  Sellers’s  
adverbialism  about  sensation.   See  also  deVries  (2005)  for  a  cogent  account  of  W.  Seller’s  work  as  a  whole,  
including  his  adverbialism.   
123  One  might  argue  in  contrast  that  things  are  not  explanatorily  empty  because  they  are  ontologically  empty.  
However,  this  argument  relies  on  a  very  strict  notion  of  explanation  that  only  countenances  ontological  explanations.  
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within  the  history  of  physics.   I.e.,  in  this  chapter,  I  argued  for  the  explanatory  defeat  of  things,  
and  in  the  next  I  will  argue  their  ontological  defeat  as  well.   
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[5.1]:   Introduction  
  
  
In  the  previous  chapter  I  argued  that  things  do  not  appear  as  explanatory  features  of  our  
models,  specifically  in  the  case  of  the  candle  flame.   This  was  because  all  core  explanations  of  
the  system  involve  reference  to  experimental  dynamics  such  as  interventions,  observations,  and  
in  general  dynamically  contextualized  and  occurrent  features  of  the  system.   Our  explanations  
are  therefore  always  made  in  terms  of  dynamics,  and  things  need  play  no  role  in  defining  or  
identifying  those  dynamics.   
Nevertheless,  the  thing  realist  persists.   Perhaps,  they  might  argue,  things  cannot  be  
immediately  inferred  from  one  particular  observation  of  the  candle  flame.   However,  things  
appear  consistently  within  our  explanations  and  descriptions  of  particular  aspects  of  the  candle  
flame  system  and  similar  systems.   Moreover,  the  same  thing  terms  appear  across  multifarious  
descriptions  and  explanations.   Thus,  these  thing  terms  (and  implicitly,  their  supposed  static  
referents)  are  robust  features  of  multiple  models.   In  short,  in  response  to  the  argument  for  the  
explanatory  defeat  of  things  in  the  context  of  the  candle  flame,  the  thing  realist  offers  an  
underlier  argument  for  the  ontological  necessity  of  things.   In  this  chapter,  I  will  show  by  
example  how  things  are  defeated  ontologically  as  well.   
One  of  the  triumphs  of  thing-realism  is  the  argument  for  atoms,  offered  by  Perrin  in  1909.  
This  argument  has  been  described  in  W.  Salmon  (1979c,  1984) 124   as  an  explicit  robustness  
argument  for  things.   Similarly,  Coko  (2018,  2019)  provides  historical  support  for  various  
portions  of  Perrin’s  argument,  showing  how  historical  context  lends  additional  strength  to  the  
so-called  robustness  argument  for  atoms.   Many  other  accounts  treat  the  case  similarly  (Brush  
1968;  Chalmers  2009,  2011;  Nye  1972,  1984). 125    While  each  of  these  accounts  is  subtly  different  
124  See  also  W.  Salmon’s  other  work  for  context  and  for  further  references  to  this  robustness  analysis.   E.g.,  W.  
Salmon  (1990,  1994,  2005).   The  connection  with  Reichenbach  is  informative,  and  can  be  found  in  Salmon  (1979a,  
b,  1994).   
125  For  similar  discussions  of  Perrin’s  arguments  that  are  less  obviously  thing-realist,  see  Cartwright  (1991),  
Glymour  (1975),  Mayo  (1986,  1996),  Psillos  (2011a,  b).   
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in  the  details,  the  basics  of  the  argument  are  the  same.   Namely,  the  thing  realist  argues  that  in  
Perrin’s  work  (and  also  Einstein’s  preceding  work  on  Brownian  motion),  atoms  appear  as  robust  
posits  in  many  different  models  and  calculations  of  thermodynamic  systems.   They  are  therefore  
real  entities.   
It  does  not  take  much  to  see  that  the  thing  realist  has  a  good  argument  here.   Not  only  are  
atoms  apparently  robust  across  models,  they  apparently  have  the  properties  of  thing-like  entities.  
Namely,  they  have  definite,  atemporal  properties,  are  particular  in  the  sense  that  they  are  
spatiotemporally  definitely  located,  are  countable,  and  are  independent  of  dynamic  or  
experimental  context.   This  last  point,  especially,  follows  from  their  being  robust.   At  least,  so  
goes  the  argument.   
However,  as  I  argue  in  this  chapter,  this  supposed  triumph  of  thing  realism  is  mistaken.  
Perrin’s  arguments  can  and  should  be  understood  as  arguments  for  specific  dynamic  entities,  not  
for  things  at  all.   The  argument  for  this  processual  conclusion  requires  a  close  reading  of  Perrin’s  
1909  and  1916  arguments  in  particular.   In  these,  we  will  see  that  Perrin  is  offering  a  means  of  
consistently  identifying  the  measurable  aspects  of  thermal  dispersion  processes.   Importantly,  
these  dispersion  processes  come  in  specific  countable  amounts  with  a  characteristic  (but  only  
determinable!)  size,  but  are  not  themselves  particulars.   Therefore,  we  see  in  Perrin’s  work  an  
argument  that  thermal  dispersion  processes  have  a  characteristic  measurable  size,  not  an  
argument  for  atoms  qua  things.   
We  proceed  as  follows.   We  begin  with  Perrin’s  intuition  pumping  example  from  his  1916  
work  (§2).   This  sets  the  stage  for  the  explicit  qualitative  arguments  and  calculational  arguments  
to  come.   After  considering  these  more  detailed  arguments  in  (§3)  and  (§4)  respectively,  we  
conclude  by  considering  some  general  points  from  later  atomic  physics,  specifically  quantum  
mechanics,  that  show  how  physicists  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Perrin  were  explicit  in  their  
moves  toward  interpreting  physical  systems  in  terms  of  non-particular,  dynamically  contextual,  
determinables  rather  than  determinate  particular  independent  things  (§5).  This  will  close  our  







[5.2]:   Perrin’s  Intuition  Pump:   The  Bath  and  Cascading  Fluid  Motion  
  
  
Perrin  is  often  cited  as  the,  or  one  of  the  scientists  who  proved  the  existence  of  molecules  
through  the  analysis  of  Brownian  motion. 126    His  arguments  in  1909,  and  later  1916,  are  taken  to  
be  paradigm  examples  of  so-called  robustness  reasoning.   The  intuition  is  that,  by  showing  how  
to  calculate  avogadro’s  number  through  multiple  experimental  and  mathematical  methods,  Perrin  
established  that  this  number  was  a  fundamental  parameter  in  the  world,  and  thus  was  an  actual  
count  of  something.   The  close  agreement  of  the  values  calculated,  and  the  independence  of  the  
calculation/discovery  methods,  acts  as  evidence  that  this  number  is  no  coincidence  or  artifact  of  
our  experience.   Rather,  it  is  a  statistically  relevant  aspect  of  the  world,  to  use  Salmon’s  1970  
phrase  (c.f.  Reichenbach  1956).   This  is  taken  to  mean  that  the  things  being  counted  are  
statistically  relevant,  and  therefore  explanatory,  elements  of  reality.   Implicitly,  the  standard  
interpretation  of  this  argument  requires  that  only  things  may  be  counted. 127    
While  some  have  questioned  the  exact  nature  of  Perrin’s  argument  (c.f.  Hudson  2014,  
2020)  who  argues  that  Perrin  is  a  “calibration”  reasoner,  not  a  robustness  reasoner),  Perrin’s  
argument  is  always  taken  as  an  argument  for  things,  molecules/atoms  in  particular.   However,  
analysis  of  Perrin’s  work  shows  this  to  be  mistaken.   Perrin  begins  his  1916  work  with  an  
intuition  pump  for  the  importance  of  Brownian  motion:   
  
“When  we  consider  a  fluid  mass  in  equilibrium,  for  example  some  water  in  a  
glass,  all  the  parts  of  the  mass  appear  completely  motionless  to  us.   If  we  put  into  
it  an  object  of  greater  density  it  falls….   When  at  the  bottom,  as  is  well  known,  it  
does  not  tend  again  to  rise,  and  this  is  one  way  of  enunciating  Carnot’s  
principle….   These  familiar  ideas,  however,  only  hold  good  for  the  scale  of  size  to  
which  our  organism  is  accustomed,  and  the  simple  use  of  the  microscope  suffices  
to  impress  on  us  new  ones  which  substitute  a  kinetic  for  the  old  static  conception  
of  the  fluid  state .”   (1916,  1,  italics  mine).   
  
Perrin’s  intuition  pump  goes  as  follows:   we  see  in  a  fluid  a  particular  stability,  a  lack  of  motion.  
However,  investigating  this  reveals  not  that  there  is  no  motion,  but  rather  that  the  motion  is  
126  Another  oft-cited  scientist  in  this  regard  is  Einstein.   See  Einstein  (1905a,  b,  c,  d,  e)  
127  As  we  have  seen  in  chapter  1,  processes  are  indeed  not  countable,  but  can  come  in  amounts  that  are  quantifiable.  
These  quantified  amounts  (1000  lumens  in  a  radiative  process,  200  Joules  in  this  motion,  etc.)  can  then  be  counted.   
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merely  balanced,  evenly  distributed  throughout  the  fluid,  such  that  it  escapes  our  ability  to  
immediately  observe  it.   
In  other  words,  Perrin’s  opening  framing  device  sets  the  stage  for  his  investigation  into  
the  underlying  kinetics  (read:  dynamics)  of  the  fluid,  not  into  its  thing-like  composition.  
Already,  this  indicates  that  Perrin’s  argument  for  the  existence  of  molecules  is  not  quite  the  
paradigm  of  thing-realism  that  Salmon’s  gloss  suggests,  since  the  goal  of  Perrin’s  analysis  is  to  
arrive  at  a  processual  understanding  of  the  fluid.   The  question,  then,  is  whether  this  processual  
understanding  of  the  fluid  requires  the  existence  of  things.   
Perrin’s  argument  for  molecules/atoms  then  takes  three  forms,  one  qualitative  followed  
by  two  calculational  arguments.   The  latter  arguments  are  the  true  arguments  for  the  existence  of  
molecules,  and  occupies  the  remainder  of  his  paper.   The  former  argument  within  pages  2-7  is  an  
eliminative  argument  that  the  cause  of  Brownian  motion  is  the  motions  of  the  parts  of  the  liquid  
transferring  their  motion  to  the  suspended  particle.   It  is  notable  that  this  argument  appears  first,  
before  the  argument  for  the  existence  of  molecules.   The  eliminative  argument  must  succeed  in  
order  to  provide  (a  portion  of)  the  necessary  evidentiary  base  for  the  second  argument,  as  we  will  




[5.3]:   Perrin’s  Historical/Eliminative  Argument  
  
  
Perrin’s  opening  eliminative  argument  begins  on  page  2.    In  the  eliminative  argument,  
Perrin  cites  the  major  experiments  and  arguments  of  his  predecessors  that  rule  out  other  possible  
causes  of  the  motion  of  the  suspended  Particle.   First  among  these  is  Weiner,  whom  Perrin  cites  
(1916,  2)  as  arguing  first  that  the  motion  of  the  suspended  particle  cannot  be  due  to  currents  in  
the  air  or  to  currents  in  the  fluid  arising  from  thermal  disequilibrium  (the  standard  explanations  
of  the  time).   Father’s  Delsaulx  and  Carbonelle,  Perrin  quotes  as  arguing  first  that  Brownian  
motion  is  indicative  of  some  general  property  of  the  matter  composing  the  fluid  in  which  is  
suspended  the  Brownian  particle,  namely  that  the  fluid  is  composed  of  corpuscles.   However,  
Perrin  suggests  that  these  were  all  ignored  because  their  work  was  “superficial”  (3),  lacking  
proper  experimental  test.   
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It  wasn’t  until  Louis  Georges  Gouy  in  1888  that  the  standard  explanation  of  Brownian  
motion  was  truly  questioned,  according  to  Perrin  (4-5). 128    In  his  work,  Gouy  provided  a  series  of  
experiments  to  test  and  rule  out  all  but  one  explanation  of  Brownian  motion  in  a  paradigm  
example  of  eliminative  reasoning.   First,  Gouy  rules  out  that  the  motion  of  the  suspended  particle  
is  caused  by  convection  currents  in  the  fluid  by  testing  to  see  if  the  motion  changes  after  enough  
time  has  passed  for  the  fluid  to  reach  thermal  equilibrium.   Finding  that  there  is  no  difference  in  
the  motion  of  the  particle  before  and  after  this  equilibration  period,  Gouy  rules  out  that  the  
thermal  state  of  the  fluid  accounts  for  the  motion. 129    Next,  Gouy  rules  out  that  Brownian  motion  
is  caused  by  the  external  transmission  of  motion  through,  e.g.,  vibration  impacting  the  fluid  
container.   He  took  two  equally  prepared  systems  and  observed  one  at  night  in  the  countryside  
and  the  other  during  the  day  in  a  busy  London  street.   Finding,  again,  that  there  was  no  
difference  in  the  motion  of  the  suspended  particle,  Gouy  ruled  out  that  external  vibrations  could  
be  causing  the  motion.   Next,  Gouy  rules  out  that  the  cause  of  Brownian  motion  is  light  from  any  
source  impinging  on  the  particle,  what  Perrin  calls  “unavoidable  illumination”  (5).   To  test  this,  
Gouy  performed  a  series  of  rapid  and  radical  changes  to  the  color  and  intensity  of  the  light  
impinging  on  the  suspended  particle.   Again,  this  produced  no  difference  in  the  Brownian  
motion.   Lastly,  Gouy  makes  use  of  Brown’s  own  arguments  to  show  that  the  nature  of  the  
suspended  particle  has  no  bearing  on  the  motion. 130   
Perrin  takes  this  eliminative  argument  of  Gouy’s  as  definitive  evidence  that  the  cause  of  
Brownian  motion  lies  in  some  fundamental  feature  of  the  fluid:  
  
“Thus  comes  into  evidence,  in  what  is  termed  a  fluid  in  equilibrium ,  a  property  
eternal  and  profound.   This  equilibrium  exists  as  an  average  and  for  large  masses;  
it  is  a  statistical  equilibrium.   In  reality  the  whole  fluid  is  agitated  indefinitely  and  
spontaneously  by  motions  the  more  violent  and  rapid  the  smaller  the  portion  taken 
into  account;  the  statical  notion  of  equilibrium  is  completely  illusory.   (1916,  5-6,  
Perrin’s  emphasis).   
  
128  It  is  probably  significant  for  the  dissemination  of  Gouy’s  arguments  that  Maede  Bache  provided  confirmation  for  
Gouy  in  1894.   
129  We  also  know,  according  to  Gouy,  that  this  is  a  different  kind  of  motion  than,  e.g.,  the  motion  of  dust  particles  in  
air  because  the  movements  of  two  Brownian  bodies  are  completely  independent  of  each  other,  whereas  the  dust  
particles  exhibit  a  common  coherence  in  their  motion.   
130  See  Brown  (1828)  for  details.   Brown’s  experimental  procedure  is  quite  clearly  a  further  example  of  eliminative  
reasoning.   
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According  to  Perrin,  even  when  in  thermal  equilibrium,  with  no  external  sources  of  motion,  the  
fluid  exhibits  a  kinetic  nature  that  is  fundamental  to  all  matter.   It  is  this  kinetic  nature  that  is  the  
cause  of  Brownian  motion.  Equivalently,  the  suspension  of  a  particle  within  a  fluid  acts  as  a  
probe  of  this  fundamental  kinetic  nature  of  the  fluid.   
This,  then,  is  the  eliminative  argument  that  Perrin  provides.   We  begin  by  considering  an  
observed  phenomenon:   the  motion  of  the  suspended  particle.   We  notice  that  this  motion  
involves  many  small  and  sudden  changes  in  direction  and  speed  in  the  suspended  particle.   We  
then  ask:   what  is  the  cause  of  these  changes?   We  then  construct  a  list  of  possible  causes  of  the  
changes  in  motion.   We  know  from  previous  investigations  that  changes  in  momentum  require  a  
transfer  of  momentum  from  some  other  source. 131    Thus,  there  must  be  motion  external  to  the  
suspended  particle  that  can  transfer  motion  to  the  particle  (the  motion  of  the  particle  is  not  
spontaneous).   Upon  looking  at  the  viable  sources  of  motion—external  vibration,  illumination,  
thermal  disequilibrium,  air  currents,  the  internal  character  of  the  suspended  particle—we  
discover  that  none  of  these  makes  any  sort  of  difference  to  the  motion  of  the  suspended  particle.  
Only  the  nature  of  the  fluid  in  which  the  particle  is  suspended  makes  any  difference.   We  
therefore  conclude  that  the  motion  of  the  particle  must  come  from  some  intrinsic  motion  of  the  
fluid  that  is  not  an  aggregate  motion  like,  e.g.,  the  motion  arising  from  thermal  disequilibrium.   
We  investigate   each  of  these  sources  of  motion  in  much  the  same  way  we  investigated  
the  features  of  the  candle  flame,  i.e.,  through  a  series  of  interventions  meant  to  isolate  the  motion  
(and  source  of  motion)  of  interest.   E.g.,  we  intervene  on  the  fluid  +  particle  system  to  isolate  
external  vibrations  as  a  potential  source  of  motion  by  placing  identical  systems  in  different  
locations,  one  with  a  much  external  vibration  and  the  other  with  little.   The  only  difference  
between  these  being  the  impact  of  external  vibrations,  any  difference  we  observe  (any  change  in  
the  character  of  the  Brownian  motion)  must  be  due  to  the  external  vibrations.   Observing  no  such  
change,  we  conclude  that  external  vibrations  are  not  a  cause  of  Brownian  motion.   Similarly,  we  
intervene  on  the  fluid+particle  system  to  isolate  the  nature  of  the  fluid  as  a  potential  cause  by  
altering  the  fluid  in  which  is  suspended  the  Brownian  particle,  e.g.,  by  placing  the  same  particle  
in  water  and  then  in  a  more  viscous  fluid.   In  contrast  to  the  case  of  external  vibrations,  we  
observe  a  difference  in  the  Brownian  motion  of  the  particle  in  this  case.   Since  the  only  
131  Note  that  this  is  an  assumption  about  macroscopic  and  minimally  microscopic  systems  and  phenomena.   It  is  well  
established,  but  it  is  an  assumption  all  the  same.   Phenomena  on  the  quantum  scale  require  a  slight  amendment  of  
this  assumption,  as  we  will  see  in  later  sections.   
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difference  between  these  two  systems  was  the  characteristic  dispersion,  or  non-aggregate  motion,  
of  the  fluid,  we  infer  that  this  characteristic  dispersion  of  the  fluid  is  a  cause  of  the  Brownian  
motion  we  observe. 132    By  eliminating  all  but  one  such  source  of  motion  through  these  
interventions,  we  infer  that  the  internal  motion  of  the  fluid  is  the  sole  cause  of  Brownian  motion.   
This  eliminative  argument,  however,  is  not  truly  an  argument  for  the  reality  of  atoms.   We  
have  not  discovered,  through  this  analysis,  any  feature  of  the  fluid  that  could  only  exist  given  the  
existence  of  a  thing-like  entity  to  compose  the  fluid.   Rather,  we  have  established  only  that  the  
cause  of  the  motion  we  perceive  in  the  suspended  particle  is  the  aggregate  transfer  of  motion  
from  the  components  of  water,  and  that  these  motive  components  are  many  times  smaller  than  
the  suspended  particle  that  is  caused  to  move. 133    Equivalently,  we  have  shown  that  the  fluid  
exhibits  a  characteristic  dispersion  of  motion,  and  this  dispersion  is  the  cause  of  the  motion  of  
the  suspended  particle. 134    It  is  only  when  we  further  infer  that  this  characteristic  dispersion  is  
indicative  of  the  sum  of  motions  of  constituent  things—molecules—that  we  are  able  to  infer  the  
existence  of  those  things.   This  is  the  purpose  of  Perrin’s  second  argument:   to  show  that  the  
characteristic  dispersion  is  indeed  the  type  of  dispersion  one  gets  in  a  substance  that  is  composed  
of  an  aggregate  of  molecules.   
We  will  turn  to  this  second  argument  in  a  moment.   Before  we  do,  notice  that  we  cannot  
provide  an  elimination  argument  to  the  effect  that  the  characteristic  dispersion  of  the  fluid  is  a  
dispersion  of  the  motions  of  things.   I.e.,  we  cannot  list  every  dispersion  rate  equation,  label  each  
as  a  dispersion  rate  of  things  or  a  dispersion  rate  of  processes,  and  then  show  that  the  dispersion  
rate  in  the  fluid  is  a  dispersion  rate  of  things  not  processes.   This  is  because  the  difference  
between  the  process  and  the  thing  ontology  lies  not  in  the  particular  terms  of  the  dispersion  rate  
equation  but  in  the  emphasis  placed  on  the  equation  as  a  whole.   This  suggests  that  the  priority  of  
things  over  process  must  be  put  into  our  arguments  by  hand,  rather  than  arising  from  the  
132  Note,  anachronistically,  we  can  perform  additional  interventions  on  the  fluid  to  test  which  internal  aspect  of  the  
fluid  is  a  cause.   E.g.,  we  can  compare  viscous  to  non-viscous  fluid,  polar  to  non-polar,  and  Newtonian  vs.  
non-Newtonian.   
133  Note,  here,  that  there  is  a  difference  between  saying  “the  aggregate  transfer  of  motion”  and  “the  transfer  of  
aggregate  motion.”   The  latter  would  refer  to  the  transfer  of  motion  from,  e.g.,  a  current  in  the  fluid,  which  is  an  
aggregate  motion.   The  former  refers  to  many  individual  transfers  of  motion.   
134  It  may  not  be  obvious  why  the  claim  that  there  is  non-aggregate  motion  internal  to  the  fluid  is  equivalent  to  the  
claim  that  the  fluid  has  a  characteristic  dispersion.   The  connection  lies  in  the  fact  that  non-aggregate  motion  is  the  
cause  of  equilibration  in  a  fluid.   This  means  that,  whenever  the  fluid  is  in  disequilibrium  with  itself,  in  which  case  it  
will  exhibit  aggregate  motion  of  some  kind,  it  will  equilibrate  through  the  loss  of  aggregate  motion  by  way  of  
non-aggregate  motion.   The  loss  of  aggregate  motion  is  identical  (in  this  case)  to  diffusion.   
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mathematics  alone.   In  contrast,  the  eliminative  argument  we  have  just  discussed  establishes  that  
Brownian  motion—a  process  itself—is  caused  (brought  about,  produced)  by  a  characteristic  
process  of  the  fluid  in  which  is  suspended  the  Brownian  particle:   the  dispersion  of  motion.   In  
short,  just  like  we  found  in  the  candle  flame,  our  inferences  to  the  existence  of  processes  arises  
as  a  direct  result  of  our  interventions  and  observations,  whereas  our  inferences  to  things  require  
additional  assumptions.   We  now  discuss  Perrin’s  second  argument,  where  this  will  become  even  




[5.4]:   Perrin’s  Precise  Arguments 
  
  
[5.4.1]:   Argument  1:   Qualitative  Robustness  
  
  
Having  shown  that  there  is  some  characteristic  dispersion  of  the  fluid,  Perrin  moves  to  
provide  an  argument  that  Brownian  motion  proves  (or  requires)  the  existence  of  molecules.   That  
is,  Perrin  provides  various  derivations  of  Avogadro’s  number,  N.   The  sum  of  these  derivations,  
their  diversity  and  independence,  is  then  meant  to  provide  reason  to  believe  that  N  is  a  
fundamental  feature  of  the  fluid  in  which  the  Brownian  particle  is  suspended.   Since  in  all  of  
these  derivations  N  arises  as  a  consequence  of  observing  the  interaction  of  the  fluid  and  the  
Brownian  particle,  N  must  represent  some  feature  of  the  cause  of  Brownian  motion.   Since  N  is  a  
whole  number  related  to  weight  and  density,  N  is  taken  to  count  things—molecules—whose  
collisions  with  the  Brownian  particle  cause  it  to  move  in  the  characteristic  erratic  way.   Thus,  
Brownian  motion  must  be  caused  by  the  existence  of  molecules  that  move  independently  of  each  
other.   Perrin  then  adds  the  further  argument  that,  since  the  value  of  N  can  be  calculated  in  a  
multitude  of  ways,  our  apparent  ability  to  count  things  within  the  fluid  is  no  fluke.   I.e.,  N  is  a  
fundamental  feature  of  reality  because  it  is  robust  to  differences  in  experimental  and  
calculational  methods,  including  different  idealizations  and  approximations.   This  is  what  later  
interlocutors  term  Perrin’s  “robustness”  argument.   
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Interestingly,  this  robustness  argument  opens  first  with  a  qualitative  argument  that  the  
fluid  is  composed  of  some  entity.   The  eliminative  argument  establishes  that  the  cause  of  
Brownian  motion  is  some  feature  of  the  fluid  itself.   However,  this  alone  is  not  reason  enough  to  
suspect  that  this  feature  of  the  fluid  is  a  feature  of  some  fundamental  constituent  of  the  fluid.  
Perrin  does,  eventually,  infer  that  the  cause  of  Brownian  motion  is  the  fundamental  motions  of  
the  constituents  of  the  fluid  (and  their  dispersion  through  collisions).   But  notice  that  this  
inference  requires  an  additional  premise:   that  the  fluid  may  be  decomposed  into  more  
fundamental  constituents.   Whether  these  constituents  are  constituent  motions  (processes)  or  
constituent  molecules  (things)  remains  undecided,  but  Perrin  must  suggest  to  the  reader  that  the  
fluid  has  constituents.   Otherwise,  Brownian  motion,  which  our  elimination  argument  established  
is  caused  by  some  feature  of  the  fluid,  could  be  caused  by  some  intrinsic  feature  in  the  fluid,  thus  
indicating  no  further  decomposition  of  the  fluid  into  individual  constituents.   
For  example,  Brownian  motion  could  be  caused  by  spontaneous  motion  in  the  fluid.  
Such  motion  would  not  be  aggregate  motion  of  the  fluid,  which  Gouy  ruled  out  when  he  showed  
that  thermal  currents  in  the  fluid  are  not  the  cause  of  Brownian  motion.   However,  spontaneous  
motion  in  the  fluid  could  still  be  a  feature  of  the  fluid  as  a  whole  and  also  the  cause  of  motion  in  
the  Brownian  particle.   In  such  a  case,  we  would  say  that  the  cause  of  Brownian  motion  is  the  
tendency  of  the  fluid  to  spontaneously  acquire  localized  momentum  (with  some  decrease  in  
momentum  elsewhere  to  compensate).   Importantly,  the  location  of  this  acquired  moment,  the  
region  in  which  it  arises,  would  have  to  have  no  definite  length  scale.   
Perrin  therefore  needs  to  establish  that  there  is  some  characteristic  constituent  of  the  fluid  
before  he  can  calculate  N  in  the  first  place .  In  other  words,  Perrin  must  show  that  there  is  a  
regularity  in  the  fluid  suggestive  of  the  existence  of  some  entity  out  of  which  the  fluid  as  a  whole  
is  composed.   He  does  this  by  establishing  that  the  dispersion  of  the  fluid  which  is  the  cause  of  
Brownian  motion  has  a  characteristic,  observable  size.   Put  simply,  dispersion  of  motion  in  the  
fluid  does  not  occur  indefinitely,  but  only  until  motions  within  the  fluid  occur  on  a  particular  
length  scale.   Once  the  motions  are  all  on  that  length  scale,  dispersion  no  longer  produces  
de-coordination  in  the  motion  of  the  fluid.   
This  notion  of  de-coordination  is  key.   To  illustrate  it,  Perrin  considers  a  large  amount  of  
water  poured  into  a  bathtub  (8).   The  water,  Perrin  remarks,  will  exhibit  coordinated  motion:   any  
two  regions  of  the  fluid  will  be  moving  in  approximately  the  same  direction  with  the  same  speed.  
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This  coordinated  motion  corresponds  to  what  we  might  anachronistically  call  aggregate  motion  
in  the  water,  and  can  be  observed  by  introducing  colored  powder  into  the  water  and  tracking  the  
trajectories  of  the  colored  regions.   After  the  initial  flow  of  water  into  the  tub,  the  water  will  
collide  with  the  walls  of  the  tub.   The  water  will  then  exhibit  motions  that  are  still  coordinated,  
but  on  a  smaller  length  scale.   Roughly,  a  portion  of  the  water  will  splash  left,  another  will  splash  
right.   All  regions  of  the  left-splashing  water  will  remain  coordinated  in  their  motion,  but  the  left-  
and  right-splashing  water  will  no  longer  be  coordinated.   This  is  the  de-coordination  that  Perrin  
is  interested  in:   the  coordination  between  motions  in  the  water  exists  within  smaller  regions  of  
the  water .   
Perrin  then  asks:   is  this  de-coordination  of  the  water  never  ending?   I.e.,  do  the  
coordination  regions  continue  to  shrink  in  size  indefinitely?   What  we  find  is  that  they  do  not  
shrink  indefinitely.   Rather,  de-coordination  occurs  only  until  the  motions  within  the  water  occur  
at  a  particular  length  scale.   At  this  point,  every  further  de-coordination  of  the  motion  within  two  
regions  of  the  water  will  incur  an  equal  and  opposite  coordination  of  each  of  these  regions  with  
another  region.   I.e.,  if  X  and  Y  de-coordinate,  X  and  re-coordinates  with  Z 1   and  Y  with  Z 2 .   This  
is  equivalent  in  modern  parlance  with  saying  that  dispersion  of  the  water’s  non-thermal  energy  
brings  the  water  into  equilibrium.   Again,  we  can  observe  this  (according  to  Perrin)  by  
introducing  colored  powder  into  the  water  and  observing  the  motion  of  the  colored  region.   
Since  the  coordination  in  the  water’s  motion  will  always  exist  at  a  certain  length  scale,  
Perrin  infers  that  the  water  is  composed  of  some  entity  of  that  size. 135    The  natural  entity  to  posit  
is  a  thing—molecules—since  N  is  a  counting  number.   However,  it  should  be  noted  at  this  point  
that  Perrin  makes  no  pronouncement  that  would  indicate  that  N  is  any  more  special  than  other  
fundamental  parameters  that  one  can  calculate  for  fluid  (and  gas)  systems.   Importantly,  this  
includes  k,  Boltzmann’s  constant.  
Having  established  that  the  dispersion  of  the  water  exhibits  a  characteristic  length  scale,  
and  that  this  length  scale  suggests  that  the  constituents  of  the  water  are  of  that  length  scale,  
Perrin  is  ready  to  argue  that  N  is  a  fundamental  parameter  counting  molecules  in  the  world.   We  
will  discuss  his  first  calculation  in  the  next  section.  Before  we  do,  we  must  note  that  Perrin’s  
argument  manifestly  rests  on  the  observation  of  dispersion  (de-coordination,  in  his  language).  
135  Note  that  this  is  a  move  from  dispersion  to  scattering  in  Perrin’s  thinking,  since  he  immediately  invokes  
thing-like  constituents  of  the  fluid  and  their  collisions  to  explain  these  de-coordinations.   
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As  far  as  his  experiments  are  concerned,  dispersion  is  the  phenomenon  he  can  actually  
manipulate,  intervene  upon,  and  observe.   Dispersion  is  a  process,  as  are  the  microscopic  
motions  that  Perrin  appeals  to  in  his  account  of  the  de-coordination  of  aggregate  motion  in  the  
water.   Therefore,  Perrin’s  argument  follows  the  same  pattern  of  inference  we  have  been  noting  
all  throughout  this  chapter:   we  begin  with  observed  dynamics,  infer  further  dynamics  through  
the  use  of  careful  intervention  and  observation,  and  only  then  infer  that  there  exists  some  
underlying  thing  for  these  dynamics.   Thus,  while  Perrin  argues  that  molecules  can  be  inferred  
from  these  observations,  we  must  always  remember  that  this  is  an  inference  several  steps  
removed  from  the  bare  observation  of  the  system.   
This  is  something  of  which  Perrin  seems  aware.   While  he  argues  definitively  that  N  is  a  
fundamental  parameter  in  the  world,  and  thus  believes  that  there  is  something  being  counted,  he  
is  reticent  to  draw  any  further  conclusions  from  this  fact.   In  particular,  even  though  the  existence  
of  molecules  would  naturally  suggest  that  collisions  between  them  are  the  cause  of  diffusion  of  
their  motion,  Perrin  remarks  that  redistribution  of  motion  within  the  fluid  occurs  “by  impact  or  in  
any  other  manner,”  (9).   This  sort  of  reticence  indicates  that  Perrin  is  aware  that,  while  N  can  be  
said  to  refer,  the  metaphysical  nature  of  its  referent  is  not  thereby  established.   This  proves  an  
invaluable  point  to  exploit  for  the  process  realist.   
  
  
[5.4.2]:   Argument  2:   Quantitative  Robustness  
  
  
Here,  we  consider  Perrin’s  calculations  of  N.   In  these  calculations,  we  note  the  
assumptions  that  Perrin  makes  in  order  to  perform  the  calculations.   Namely,  Perrin  assumes  
something  about  the  size  of  the  molecules  in  the  fluid  and  something  about  their  density.  
Finding  that  these  assumptions  are  warranted  on  the  basis  of  dynamic  analysis  of  the  system,  or  
else  are  assumptions  about  these  dynamics,  I  argue  that  Perrin’s  calculations  can  be  restructured  
into  an  argument  for  processual  underliers  of  diffusion  rather  than  thing  underliers.   This  
restructuring  is  quite  simple,  and  makes  obvious  the  ways  in  which  the  calculations  represent  
inferences  from  experimental  tests.   We  conclude  that  Perrin’s  argument  is  not  an  argument  for  
things  at  all.   Indeed,  it  seems  more  natural  to  interpret  it  as  an  argument  for  a  processual  
decomposition  of  an  observed  macroscopic,  dynamic  phenomenon.   In  short,  Perrin’s  argument  
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becomes  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  things  only  if  we  accept  Perrin’s  interpreters’  
thing-ontological  framing  of  the  calculations  in  the  first  place.   If  we  simply  reframe  the  
calculations,  they  become  arguments  for  processes.   
  
  
[5.4.2.1]:   The  First  Calculation:   An  Estimation  
  
  
Perrin’s  first  calculation  of  N  (1916,  13-18)  is  an  attempt  to  estimate  N  by  establishing  an  
upper  and  lower  bound  on  N’s  value.   To  begin,  Perrin  notes  that  previous  work  by  Maxwell  and  
Clausius  establishes  a  relationship  between  the  density  of  molecules  in  a  given  volume  and  their  
average  size. 136    Namely,  assuming  that  molecules  in  a  gas  are  approximately  spherical,  we  have  
  






where  L  is  the  mean  free  path  that  a  molecule  traverses  between  any  two  collisions  within  a  gas,  
n  is  the  molecular  density  equal  to  N  divided  by  the  volume  V,  and  D  is  the  diameter  of  a  
molecule  approximately  the  shape  of  a  sphere.   Colloquially,  this  means  that  spherically  shaped  
molecules  will  collide  with  each  other  every  L  units  of  distance  they  travel,  and  that  this  distance  
decreases  as  the  molecules  increase  in  size  and  packing  within  a  given  volume.   
L  is  calculated  independently.   We  assume  that  the  molecules  in  a  gas  have  speeds  in  the  
x-coordinate  direction  distributed  according  to  the  Gaussian: 137   
  




Here,  U  is  the  root  mean  square  (rms)  velocity  of  the  molecules  which  is  determined  solely  by  
the  temperature  of  the  gas.   (Note  that  the  variable  x  is  referring  to  speeds,  not  coordinate  
positions).   If  this  is  the  case,  it  follows  that  the  average  speed  of  a  molecule,  Ω,  in  the  gas  is:  
  
  Ω = U√ 83π  
136  Perrin  is  referring  to  Maxwell  (1860)  and  Clausius  (1851).   
137  This  Gaussian  distribution  will  hold  if  the  molecules  in  the  gas  are  assumed  to  be  roughly  non-interacting,  




Combining  this  with  a  measurement  of  the  viscosity  ξ  (i.e.,  the  internal  friction  of  the  gas)  and  
the  absolute  density  of  the  gas,  δ,  we  can  determine  that:  
  
 .31δΩLξ = 0  
δ  is  measured  using  a  finely  tuned  balance.   ξ  is  calculated  as  a  solution  to  a  differential  equation  
for  the  angular  velocities  in  a  specially  prepared  system  of  coaxial  cylinders  containing  the  gas.  
Put  simply,  we  determine  viscosity  by  noting  the  relationship  between  the  changes  in  angular  
speed  of  the  inner  cylinder  when  the  outer  is  driven  to  rotate  by  a  motor. 138    Since  the  gas  is  the  
medium  through  which  the  angular  speed  of  the  outer  cylinder  is  translated,  the  inner  cylinder  
will  acquire  angular  speed  at  a  rate  proportional  to  the  ability  of  the  gas  to  translate  motion,  and  
inversely  proportional  to  the  gas’s  resistance  to  motion.   
What  remains  is  to  establish  an  additional  relationship  between  n  and  D  so  that  n,  and  
thereby  N,  can  be  calculated.   Perrin  provides  two  such  relations,  namely  two  inequalities,  and  
thereby  provides  an  upper  and  lower  bound  to  N.   The  first  relation  assumes  that  the  gas  
molecules  can  be  no  more  closely  packed  than  billiard  balls  in  a  closed  container  (15),  thereby  
providing  an  upper  bound  on  the  density  of  the  molecules.   The  second  relation  assumes  that  the  
molecules  can  be  no  less  closely  packed  than  a  number  of  perfectly  conducting  spheres  would  be  
in  a  volume  with  the  same  dielectric  constant  as  the  gas  (16),  thereby  providing  a  lower  bound  on  
the  density  on  the  molecules.   Roughly,  this  allows  Perrin  to  calculate  that  N  must  be  between  
4.5  and  20  times  10 23   (the  true  value  is  6.022  times  10 23 ).   
Notice  that  this  estimation  of  N  cannot  be  taken  as  any  evidence  for  the  existence  of  
molecules  as  it  has  been  written  by  Perrin.   The  language  used  so  far,  e.g.,  that  the  gas  contains  
molecules  of  diameter  D,  has  assumed  that  molecules  exist  a  priori.   If  we  were  to  argue  that  
there  are  N  things  (molecules)  contained  in  a  gas  because  a  gas  consisting  of  molecules  with  
diameter  D  will  contain  N  molecules  in  a  volume  V,  we  would  clearly  be  begging  the  question.  
138  One  possible  system  works  as  follows:   we  contain  a  gas  within  the  space  between  two  coaxial  cylinders.   The  
inner  is  allowed  to  rotate  freely  on  a  torsion  fibre  with  a  fixed  support.   The  outer  is  rotated  at  a  constant  speed  w  by  
a  motor.   This  introduces  a  velocity  gradient  within  the  gas,  w  at  the  outer  boundary  and  0  at  the  inner.   The  
calculation  then  proceeds  by  measuring  how  quickly  the  inner  cylinder  acquires  angular  speed.   
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Instead,  if  we  wish  this  to  act  as  an  argument  that  the  gas  really  does  consist  of  things,  and  that  
there  are  N  of  them  in  a  mole,  we  must  reinterpret  the  language  used  in  Perrin’s  estimation. 139    
This  reinterpretation  is  rather  simple.   All  we  must  do  is  replace  phrases  such  as  “D,  the  
diameter  of  the  molecule,”  “L,  the  mean  free  path  between  collisions  of  two  molecules,”  and  “Ω,  
the  average  velocity  of  a  molecule  in  the  gas,”  with  their  empirical  grounds.   For  example,  we  
calculate  Ω  by  noting  that,  at  a  given  temperature  T ,  an  enclosed  gas  imparts  a  certain  amount  of  
energy  to  the  surface  of  its  container.   This  allows  us  to  calculate  U ,  and  thereby  calculate  the  
distribution  of  velocities.   From  this  distribution,  we  calculate  Ω,  the  average  speed.   In  this  way,  
we  link  Ω  with  the  measurable  values  of  the  temperature  of  the  gas  and  the  average  energy  
imparted  to  the  container  of  the  gas  per  unit  time.  
Importantly,  within  these  calculations,  a  certain  granularity  appears.   This  is  the  same  
granularity  to  which  Perrin  appeals  in  the  qualitative  argument  discussed  above.   Namely,  the  
redistribution  of  motion/energy  within  the  gas  system  exhibits  a  characteristic  length  scale  when  
it  reaches  equilibrium.   In  Perrin’s  analysis,  this  granularity  is  expressed  in  the  number  of  
molecules,  the  amount  of  substance,  in  the  gas.   However,  notice  that  we  could  equally  remark  
that  there  is  a  granularity  in  the  energy  transferred  to  the  container  of  the  gas  per  unit  time,  and  
therefore  granularity  in  the  energy  of  the  motions  observed  in  the  gas.   Namely,  the  mean  energy  
of  each  motion  turns  out  to  be:  
  
 KTE = 2
3  
This  is  typically  interpreted  as  meaning  that  each  molecule  in  a  (monatomic)  gas  possesses  
approximately  3/2KT  units  of  energy,  plus  or  minus  some  degree  of  variance  from  the  mean.  
This  variance  is  then  taken  to  be  the  cause  of  the  random  distribution  of  motion  in  the  gas,  and  so  
the  cause  of  the  random  motions  of  a  Brownian  particle.   However,  if  we  are  arguing  that  N  
represents  a  number  of  things  in  the  world,  we  are  not  permitted  to  perform  this  interpretation.  
Instead,  we  must  simply  say  that  there  is  a  granularity  in  the  energy  of  motions  in  the  gas.   
This  reinterpretation  must  be  performed  for  every  calculation  that  follows  in  Perrin’s  
analysis.   Crucially,  in  performing  this  reinterpretation  in  Perrin’s  later  calculations,  we  will  
discover  that  for  everything  Perrin  says  about  N,  we  can  find  an  equivalent  statement  about  K,  
139  Consider  also:   the  natural  way  to  determine  n  is  to  count  the  number  of  molecules  in  a  given  volume.   However,  
we  cannot  do  this  practically.   Instead,  we  must  use  dispersion  and  scattering  analysis  in  order  to  calculate  n .   
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the  granularity  in  the  energy  of  diffusion.   K  is,  prima  facie,  a  property  of  processes  (it  is  a  
measure  of  the  size  of  a  “collision”  interaction).   Thus,  we  have  parity  between  a  process  
interpretation  of  Perrin’s  calculations  and  a  thing  interpretation.   This  parity,  resulting  from  the  
calculational  parity  between  K  and  N,  is  something  Perrin  is  aware  of  (1916,  11,  18).   We  turn  
now  to  Perrin’s  second,  more  precise  calculation  of  N,  in  which  these  points  become  even  more  
obvious.   
  
  
[5.4.2.2]:   The  Second  Calculation:   More  Precisely  
  
  
To  achieve  a  more  exact  calculation  of  N,  Perrin  needs  only  to  make  the  method  of  
calculation  more  precise.   His  goal  is  to  provide  a  sequence  of  calculations  meant  to  establish  the  
connection  between  the  relevant  constants  N  and  k,  and  experimental  parameters  that  can  be  
accurately  determined.   By  doing  this,  he  can  specify  multiple  experimental  means  of  
determining  these  experimental  parameters,  thereby  determining  “in  the  same  step  the  three  
universal  constants  N,  e,  and  α…”  (1916,  12)  in  virtue  of  their  relationship  with  these  
experimental  parameters.   (Note  that  α  is  a  stand-in  for  k  in  this  instance).   His  remaining  
calculations  of  N,  therefore,  rest  on  merely  describing  different  experimental  means  of  filling  in  
the  details  of  this  relationship.   Crucially,  the  majority  of  Perrin’s  effort  is  therefore  placed  not  in  
the  mathematical  calculations,  but  in  the  experimental  justification  for  the  application  of  these  
mathematical  relations.   In  parallel  with  this,  calculations  in  this  section  will  be  omitted  in  favor  
of  discussion  of  the  more  relevant  experimental  justifications.   
Perrin  begins  by  calculating  the  mean  square  speed  of  the  molecules  in  the  gas.   This  is  
done  by  simply  noting  that,  for  ideal  gases,  the  mean  square  speed  is  equal  to  the  square  root  of  
R  (a  known  constant)  multiplied  by  the  temperature  of  the  gas  (which  is  determinable  by  direct  
intervention  on  the  gas).   We  then  calculate,  following  Maxwell,  the  distribution  of  speeds  
around  this  mean.   Assuming  that  the  component  speeds  are  independent,  we  find  that  the  
molecular  speeds  vary  in  a  gaussian:   





From  this,  we  obtain  the  mean  speed  of  the  molecule,  which  differs  from  U  by  a  multiplicative  
constant. 140   
Perrin  then  needs  to  calculate  the  mean  free  path  of  the  molecule,  or  the  mean  distance  
traveled  between  collisions.   This  will  depend  on  the  shapes  of  the  colliding  molecules,  but  can  
be  approximated  experimentally  by  measuring  the  average  distance  between  two  colliding  
molecules  upon  collision,  the  impact  parameter  I,  and  treating  I  as  the  radius  of  the  molecule.  
This  distance  is  measured  by  observing  the  angular  change  in  the  trajectory  of  a  molecule  in  a  
collision  event,  which  is  done  within  a  bubble  chamber.   Having  obtained  I,  we  then  calculate  the  
mean  free  path  of  the  molecules  (following  the  work  of  Clausius  1851)  as  being  inversely  
proportional  to  I  and  n ,  the  density  of  molecules.   Perrin  notes  that  a  second  relation  between  I  
and  n  must  be  given  to  facilitate  this  calculation  of  L,  since  neither  I  nor  n  is  independently  
known.   By  obtaining  a  second  relation  between  I  and  n ,  we  can  calculate  n ,  and  then  multiply  by  
the  known  molecular  weight  to  obtain  N  (thereby  obtaining  the  three  constants  N,  e ,  α).   Perrin  
proceeds  (pages  15  and  on)  to  provide  various  ways  of  obtaining  this  second  relationship.   
Once  again,  we  must  stress  that  Perrin’s  argument  cannot  yet  be  taken  as  an  argument  for  
things.   First,  we  must  substitute  experimental  values  for  terms  such  as  “the  radius  of  the  
molecule”  and  “the  density  of  molecules.”   Without  this  substitution,  Perrin’s  argument  would  be  
viciously  circular,  seeking  to  prove  that  there  are  such  molecules  while  assuming  brute  facts  
about  their  existence.    Thus,  we  must  once  more  read  his  remarks  about  the  size  of  the  molecule  
and  the  molecular  density  as  statements  about  the  experimental  method  of  determining  these  and  
related  parameters.   
This  means  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  the  true  workings  of  Perrin’s  analysis.  
Perrin  is  explicit  in  remarking  that  the  impact  parameter  is  obtained  through  the  analysis  of  
experimental  processes,  i.e.,  through  the  angular  deflection  of  observed  motions  in  a  bubble  
chamber.   The  question,  then,  is  how  we  are  meant  to  interpret  the  molecular  density  n  in  terms  
of  experimental  observations.   Luckily,  this,  too,  is  not  terribly  difficult,  but  requires  us  to  depart  
from  Perrin’s  explicit  analysis  slightly.   In  particular,  we  must  replace  n  with  a  statement  about  
the  characteristic  time  between  collisions  in  the  fluid,  i.e.,  the  dispersion  rate.   It  is  for  this  reason  
that  Perrin’s  opening,  qualitative  description  of  the  fluid  system  is  so  crucial  to  his  analysis:   it  
140  Maxwell  uses  this  to  determine  the  viscosity  of  a  gas  by  showing  that  the  friction  between  two  planes  of  the  gas  
is  the  result  of  constant  exchange  of  speed/kinetic  energy.   The  result  that  this  viscosity  is  unrelated  to  the  density  of  
the  gas  is,  according  to  Maxwell,  quite  surprising.   
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provides  the  necessary  intuitions  relating  the  dispersion  of  the  fluid’s  aggregate  motion  and  the  
density  of  the  component  motions.  
To  calculate  this  characteristic  time  is  similarly  simple,  following  the  experimental  set  up  
of  the  qualitative  argument  with  which  Perrin  begins  the  paper.   As  an  intuition  pump,  if  we  
introduce  into  the  liquid  a  particle  with  a  known  mesoscopic  diameter—a  Brownian  particle—we  
can  measure  the  average  impulse  provided  to  it  by  measuring  its  changes  in  momentum  across  
some  set  period  of  time.   I.e.,  each  change  in  momentum  will  be  supplied  by  some  number  of  
collisions,  or  rather,  some  accumulation  of  kinetic  energy  per  unit  time.   This  corresponds  to  
some  loss  in  kinetic  energy  per  unit  time—dispersion—within  the  fluid,  as  the  fluid  transmits  its  
kinetic  energy  to  the  Brownian  particle.   This  would  allow  us  to  determine  through  
measurements  of  times/durations  alone  a  simple  relation  between  the  size  of  the  Brownian  
particle  and  the  dispersion,  from  which  we  could  estimate  the  number  of  collisions  per  unit  time.  
With  our  previous  assumptions  about  I,  the  impact  parameter  of  the  molecules  striking  the  
Brownian  particle,  and  a  few  additional  reasonable  assumptions  about  the  distribution  of  
momenta  for  those  molecules,  we  could  then  calculate  n,  the  molecular  density  of  the  fluid.   Note  
this  is  essentially  what  Perrin  does  in  section  14  (page  23  on).   He  then  describes  how  one  
actually  sets  up  this  experiment  in  later  sections  (e.g.,  section  16  on  page  27).   
In  other  words,  the  molecular  density,  n ,  is  calculated  in  terms  of  measurable  times  for 
dispersion  processes,  assuming  a  particular  distribution  of  motion  (i.e.,  the  Maxwell  distribution)  
in  the  fluid  and  a  relation  between  the  relative  impact  parameters  of  the  relevant  interacting  
bodies.   From  this,  we  calculate  the  constants,  N,  e ,  and  α,  with  α  being  the  first  and  easiest  to  
calculate.   The  importance  of  this  cannot  be  overstated.   In  providing  a  calculation  of  n ,  and  
thereby  of  N,  Perrin  is  forced  to  first  determine  experimentally  more  fundamental  parameters  of  
the  system,  namely,  average  dispersion  of  the  fluid  and  the  average  interaction  strength  and  
angular  deflection  in  each  dispersive  collision  (i.e.,  the  impact  parameter).   In  other  words,  we  
have  replaced  thing-like  terms  with  parameters  and  terms  that  refer  to  dynamics,  properties  of  
dynamics,  and  interactions  thereof.   Put  another  way,  Perrin’s  calculation  of  N  can  be  co-opted  
and  transformed  into  a  calculation  of  k,  the  average  dispersion  of  motion  in  a  thermal  system.   
As  Perrin  remarks  (page  18)  there  is  equivalence  between  the  claim  that  the  partial  
pressure  of  each  gas  in  a  mixture  remains  fixed  and  the  claim  that  the  mean  kinetic  energy  of  
each  gas  in  a  mixture  remains  fixed.   The  former  is  treated  as  a  feature  of  the  density  of  the  gas,  
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but  the  latter  is  clearly  a  processual  property.   I.e.,  the  measure  of  the  fundamental  unit  of  motion  
within  each  gas  or  fluid  remains  constant.   Similarly,  Perrin  notes  that  N  (the  count  of  component  
particulars)  and  k  (the  measure  of  component  motions)  are  equivalent  from  a  calculational  point  
of  view  (page  11).   The  question  is  not  which  is  fundamental.   Rather  we  are  driven  to  choose  
one  over  the  other  in  virtue  of  either  our  pre-existing  ontological  commitments  or  else  in  virtue  
of  the  priority  of  one  over  the  other  in  experimental  measurement  practices.   
Perrin  tips  the  scales  in  favor  of  the  thing  realist  by  beginning  his  analysis  with  a  
discussion  of  N  as  a  fundamental  constant.   However,  the  fact  remains  that  the  mean  kinetic  
energy  of  translation  of  different  molecules  can  be  used  to  calculate  N.   In  fact,  the  result  of  our  
calculations  is  that,  rather  than  revealing  some  fundamental  thing-like  property  of  fluids  through  
analysis  of  Brownian  motion,  we  have  revealed  only  that  there  is  some  countable  feature  of  the  
fluid.   In  process  realist  terms,  we  would  say  that  every  fluid  has  a  fixed  parameter  defining  the  
rate  at  which  dispersion  occurs,  and  that  this  dispersion  translates  into  a  countable  accumulation  
of  kinetic  energy  of  a  Brownian  particle  suspended  in  the  fluid.   Moreover,  this  dispersion  
relation  is  the  key  qualitative  indication  of  this  countable  feature  of  the  fluid,  as  evidenced  by  
Perrin’s  opening  qualitative  description.   It  is  this  priority  in  experiment  that  breaks  the  
calculational  parity  between  N  and  k.    
  
  
[5.4.2.3]:   Breaking  Parity  Between  N  and  K  
  
  
Manifestly,  the  process  is  prior  to  the  thing  in  experiment.   We  do  not  measure  avogadro’s  
number.   We  calculate  it  from  measurements  of  dispersion,  i.e.,  from  measurements  of  observed  
processes  and  their  interactions.   In  other  words,  the  thing  is  inferred,  but  on  what  grounds?  
Clearly,  it  cannot  be  on  experimental  grounds  alone,  otherwise  we  would  not  have  an  equivalent  
process  realist  interpretation  of  Perrin’s  counting  argument  in  the  first  place.   Rather,  we  require  
additional  assumptions  to  make  Perrin’s  argument  into  an  argument  for  real  things.   The  
character  of  these  assumptions  is  the  subject  of  this  subsection.   What  we  will  find  is  that  these  
assumptions  come  from  little  more  than  a  desire  for  the  world  to  be  composed  of  things  and  
substances  in  the  first  place.   This  presupposition  can  only  ever  beg  the  question  against  the  
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process  realist,  and  so  the  thing  realist  is  forced  to  turn  to  other  arguments  to  solidify  their  
ontology.   
The  first  means  of  transforming  Perrin’s  argument  into  an  argument  for  the  reality  of  
things  is  to  assume  that  only  things  can  be  counted.   If  this  were  true,  then  the  existence  of  a  term  
in  the  equations  of  our  models  that  takes  only  whole  number  values  indicates  the  existence  of  
things  to  be  counted.   An  argument  similar  to  this  is  used  in  the  context  of  quantum  mechanics.  
Namely,  some  interlocutors  argue  that  the  existence  of  a  number  operator  in  certain  quantum  
systems  is  an  indicator  of  haeccity  in  the  components  of  the  quantum  system.   Moreover,  it  is  
argued  that,  since  the  number  operator  is  not  preserved  in  certain  systems  (e.g.,  in  a  system  
consisting  of  electromagnetic  radiation  in  a  mirrored  container),  a  clear  distinction  can  be  made  
on  this  basis  between  quantum  systems  containing  things  and  quantum  systems  that  do  not  
contain  things.   
However,  the  unstated  premise  of  these  arguments—that  only  things  may  be  counted  or  
come  in  whole  numbered  amounts—is  not  sufficient.   Process  types  can  be  counted ,  and  process  
tokens  can  be  measured  and  thereby  quantified.   If  I  see  two  candles  before  me,  I  say  that  there  
are  two  (type)  processes  of  combustion  before  me.   If  I  see  two  balls  rolling  on  a  table,  I  say  
there  are  two  (type)  motions  across  the  table.   If  I  consider  this  dispersion  processes,  I  can  
measure  it  in  units  of  3/2kT,  and  thereby  quantifiably  scale  it  against  other  dispersion  processes,  
or  divide  it  into  intervals  of  dispersion  characterized  by  a  particular  multiple  of  3/2kT.   
Moreover,  in  Perrin’s  argument,  the  process  realist  redescription  of  a  thermal  system  
exhibits  granularity  just  like  the  thing  interpretation.   The  difference  resides  in  where  and  how  
this  granularity  appears  in  each  respective  interpretation.   In  the  thing  interpretation,  the  
granularity  appears  as  a  result  of  the  nature  of  the  material  constituents  of  the  fluid,  namely  the  
molecules.   In  the  process  interpretation,  the  granularity  appears  as  a  result  of  the  characteristic  
size  of  the  typical  interactions  within  the  fluid.   Namely,  all  motions  within  the  fluid  interact  with  
an  energy  approximately  equal  to  a  whole  number  multiple  of  the  mean  energy  3/2kT.   
Admittedly,  processes  are  uncountable.   We  therefore  only  ever  count  numbers  of  certain  
semi-arbitrarily  determined  amounts  of  quantities  carried  by  processes.   Processes  exhibit  a  
continuous  character  that  does  not  lend  itself  to  non-arbitrary  counting  of  them.   In  part,  this  is  
because  processes  are  by  nature  not  fully  separable  from  their  environment.   One  may  therefore  
attempt  to  justify  the  premise  that  only  things  may  be  counted  by  claiming  that  only  things  can  
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be  discrete  individuals.   I.e.,  only  things  have  a  character  that  permits  them  being  identified  in  
the  world  as  wholly  separate  from  their  environment.   If  this  were  the  case,  then  only  things  
could  be  counted  by  whole  numbers  non-arbitrarily .    This  then  is  our  second  means  of  
transforming  Perrin’s  argument  into  an  explicit  argument  for  things.   
Prima  facie,  this  revised  transformation  of  Perrin’s  argument  stands  on  firmer  ground.  
However,  even  modified,  the  premise  of  this  argument  is  problematic.   Firstly,  things  are  not  
wholly  separate  from  their  environment,  as  all  things  must  be  defined  partly  by  their  relation  to  
their  environment.   In  particular,  the  identification  of  a  discrete  individual  thing  no  doubt  relies  
on  the  location  of  that  individual.   Absolute  spatiotemporal  coordinates  being  impermissible,  the  
location  of  a  thing  must  be  defined  relationally.   
More  importantly,  insofar  as  things  are  separable  from  their  environment,  so  too  are  
processes.   Without  desiring  to  be  too  technical,  things  are  individuated  and  separated  from  their  
environment  by  the  recognition  of  differences  between  the  thing  and  the  environment.   The  water  
glass  is  different,  and  thus  a  separate  individual,  from  the  table  it  sits  on  because  it  is  a  different  
color,  has  different  reflective  properties,  etc.   The  same  can  be  said  of  processes.   Combustion  is  
different  from  radiation  in  the  candle  system  because  radiation  interacts  with  the  wax  of  the  
candle  to  melt  it  whereas  combustion  does  not,  radiation  triggers  color  receptors  in  our  eye  and  
combustion  does  not,  etc.   
In  fairness,   I  am  not  attempting  to  argue  that  processes  are  discrete  individuals  in  the  
same  sense  as  are  things.   It  seems  to  me  that  one  of  the  primary  differences  between  a  process  
and  a  thing  ontology  is  exactly  this  point:   that  processes  are  not  discrete  individuals  fully  
separable  from  their  environment  as  are  things.   However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  
difference  is  a  metaphysical  difference  between  the  two  ontic  units.   The  discreteness  of  a  thing  
comes  not  from  our  means  of  identifying  it  empirically,  nor  our  means  of  defining  it,  but  from  
some  a  priori  stipulation  that  the  essence  of  a  thing  is  non-relational.   This  means  that,  to  appeal  
to  this  discreteness  in  Perrin’s  argument  for  the  sake  of  establishing  the  existence  of  things  is  to  
appeal  to  a  metaphysical  principle  without  empirical  ground.   Once  again,  we  find  that  the  
argument  Perrin  provides  for  molecules  exhibits  parity  between  a  process  and  thing  
interpretation. 141    This  parity  is  broken  by  metaphysical,  not  empirical,  premises.   
141  I  note,  again,  that  this  argument  that  only  things  can  be  counted  again  begs  the  question  against  the  process  
realist.   If  Perrin’s  argument  is  meant  to  establish  the  existence  of  things  through  the  recognition  of  some  granularity  
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The  third  and  final  means  of  transforming  Perrin’s  argument  is  to  declare  that  the  
dynamics  of  diffusion  requires  that  there  are  at  least  two  things  to  deflect  each  other’s  motion.  
I.e.,  the  processes  involved  in  Brownian  motion  require  thing  underliers.   This  assumption,  more  
so  even  than  the  other  two,  begs  the  question.   The  purpose  of  Perrin’s  argument,  according  to  
the  thing  realist,  was  to  establish  that  there  are  indeed  things  to  underlie  the  random  motions  of  
the  suspended  particle  in  Brownian  motion.   To  assume  that  there  must  indeed  be  such  underliers  
is  viciously  circular.   
  
  
[5.4.3]:   Summary  
  
  
It  is  easy  to  mistake  Perrin’s  argument  for  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  things.  
However,  we  must  remember  that  Perrin’s  argument  is  primarily  an  argument  against  the  plenum  
view  of  matter.   I.e.,  he  was  arguing  that  thermal  systems  are  not  composed  of  continuous  
substance.   While  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  the  diametric  opposite  of  continuous  substance  is  
discrete  substance—static  things  like  atoms  and  molecules—it  would  be  a  mistake  to  conclude  
that  Perrin’s  argument  is  naturally  an  argument  for  such  things.   In  fact,  Perrin  draws  attention  to  
the  true  novelty  of  his  arguments:   that  we  substitute  a  “kinetic  for  the  old  static  conception  of  
the  fluid  state,”  (1916,  1).   I.e.,  we  are  not  meant  to  conclude  that  there  are  new  things  at  all,  but  
rather  that  what  we  thought  was  static  is  actually  dynamic.   
While  the  explanations  of  these  dynamics  offered  by  Perrin  and  others  contain  terms  we  
typically  associate  with  thing-like  entities,  the  nature  of  these  things  is  left  entirely  opaque.   Or  
rather,  the  nature  of  these  things  is  irrelevant.   All  that  matters  is  that  they  move  and  interact  
appropriately.   Indeed,  it  is  these  motions  and  interactions  that  remain  constant  in  multifarious  
models  of  thermal  systems.   
We  should  therefore  expect  the  thing  realist  to  provide  an  account  of  what  makes  these  
so-called  underliers  things  at  all.   Such  a  task  might  be  done  by  specifying  those  underliers  as  a  
physical  system  to  be  investigated,  with  the  goal  of  producing  thing-like  features  of  the  system.  
However,  this  was  exactly  how  we  began  chapter  3.   The  thing  realist  posited  a  thing-like  entity.  
in  our  models,  then  surely  the  premise  that  only  things  exhibit  granularity  is  not  permissible.   If  things  entail  
granularity,  and  granularity  entails  things,  we  are  left  in  a  dialectical  circle.   
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We  then  declared  it  a  physical  system  to  be  investigated,  and  sought  to  explain  its  features.  
However,  upon  analysis,  we  discovered  that  we  needed  to  posit  that  this  system  is  a  collection  of  
dynamics  because  of  the  need  to  specify  the  system’s  features  in  terms  of  the  experiments  we  
perform  on  the  system.   If  we  but  repeat  this  series  of  investigative  steps,  we  should  find  that  the  
new  thing-system—atoms  and  molecules—are  no  more  than  collections  of  dynamics.   This  is  




[5.5]:   Conclusion  
  
  
The  thing  realist  faces  a  tension  with  historical  analysis  in  interpreting  Perrin.   On  the  one  
hand,  Perrin  consistently  refers  to  his  program  and  arguments  as  a  rejection  of  the  “old  statical”  
and  “static”  conceptions  of  fluids  and  other  thermal  systems.   He  thereby  explicitly  rejects  the  
substance  or  thing-ontological  paradigm.   However,  the  thing  realist  wishes  to  interpret  Perrin  as  
arguing  for  the  existence  of  a  substantial  and  thing-like  entity  to  act  as  the  core  compositional  
element  of  thermal  systems.   They  must  therefore  attribute  to  Perrin  arguments  involving  the  
thing-like  nature  of  the  mereological  components  of  matter  that  would  directly  contradict  
Perrin’s  rejection  of  determinate,  non-dynamic  states  of  the  fluid.   If  there  are  true  things  
composing  the  thermal  system,  then  the  thermal  system  can  be  fully  and  independently  described  
at  a  moment  in  time  in  terms  of  those  things  and  their  momentary,  definite  properties.   However,  
this  would  mean  that  the  thermal  system  has  definite,  independent,  non-contextual,  non-dynamic  
properties  in  virtue  of  its  mereological  nature,  a  claim  that  Perrin  rejects.   
This  same  tension  is  felt  throughout  the  physics  of  the  20th  century.   Most  notably  the  
quantum  physics  that  would  succeed  Perrin’s  matter  physics  in  providing  accounts  of  the  
fundamental  material  nature  of  physical  systems.   Once  again,  we  see  historical  figures  in  
quantum  physics  articulating  explicit  rejections  of  the  substance  or  thing-ontological  paradigm,  
while  philosophers  of  science  in  the  current  day  present  us  with  interpretations  of  these  thinkers  
that  are  explicitly  thing-realist.   





“When  you  ask  what  are  electrons  and  protons,  I  ought  to  answer  that  this  
question  is  not  a  profitable  one  to  ask  and  does  not  really  have  a  meaning.   The  
important  thing  about  electrons  and  protons  is  not  what  they  are  but  how  they  
behave,  how  they  move.   I  can  describe  the  situation  by  comparing  it  to  the  game  
of  chess.   In  chess,  we  have  various  chessmen,  kings,  knights,  pawns,  and  so  on.  
If  you  ask  what  a  chessman  is,  the  answer  would  be  that  it  is  a  piece  of  wood,  or  a  
piece  of  ivory,  or  perhaps  just  a  sign  written  on  paper,  anything  whatever.   It  does  
not  matter.   Each  chessman  has  a  characteristic  way  of  moving,  and  this  is  all  that  
matters  about  it.   The  whole  game  of  chess  follows  from  this  way  of  moving  the  
various  chessmen,”  (Dirac  1955).   
  
Once  more,  we  see  a  physicists  presenting  us  with  explicit  reason  to  suppose  that  thing-ontology  
is  simply  uninteresting.   The  things  we  posit  are  mere  placeholders  for  particular  motions,  not  
definite,  particular,  non-contextual  entities  like  the  thing  realist  would  wish  to  find.   We  do  not  
make  use  of  things  in  our  explanations,  nor  is  their  ontological  character  important  to  the  
experiments  or  models  of  physics.   How,  then,  can  the  thing  realist  reasonably  seek  to  recover  a  
thing-ontology  in  the  context  of  this  physics?   
This  is  not  merely  a  philosophical  tension,  however.   It  has  direct  consequences  in  the  
interpretation  of  theory.   One  instance  of  this  is  the  focus  of  the  next  chapter.   Namely,  I  will  
show  that  the  thing-realist’s  deathgrip  on  their  ontological  intuitions  of  substance  produces  
explicit  contradiction  in  the  interpretation  of  nuclear  models.   This  means  that  the  thing  realist  
must  commit  to  something  absurd  if  they  wish  to  continue  holding  to  these  ontological  beliefs.  
The  process  realist  faces  no  such  challenge,  as  I  argue,  and  can  in  fact  unify  the  supposedly  
incompatible  nuclear  models.   
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Chapter  6:   Models  of  the  Nucleus:   Incompatible  Things,  Compatible  Processes 
[6.1]:   Introduction 
If  nuclear  models  are  taken  to  represent  things—determinate,  particular,  independent,  
atemporal,  entities  like  objects,  structures,  and  substances—then  they  are  incompatible  (Boniolo  
et.  al.  2002,  Teller  2004,  Morrison  2011,  Portides  2011).   Specifically,  the  two  most  prevalent  
models—the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models—treat  the  nucleus,  its  internal  structure,  and  the  
component  nucleons  as  entities  with  contradictory  properties.   These  differences  allow  these  two 
models  to  describe  and  explain  different  nuclear  phenomena:  fission  and  neutron-scattering  in  
the  liquid  drop  model,  and  single-nucleon  excitation  and  nuclear  decay  in  the  shell  model.  
However,  prima  facie,  these  differences  also  suggest  that  these  models  are  incompatible  in  their  
ontology.   Indeed,  by  maintaining  an  adherence  to  standard  static  ontologies  of  objects,  
structures,  and  substances,  henceforth  “thing  realism,” 142   this  incompatibility  is  irresolvable.  
Any  success  of  their  explanations  comes  not  from  the  entities,  properties,  and  structures  they  
posit  but  from  somewhere  else.   
This  presents  two  problems.   First,  there  is  an  ontological  problem  with  this  
incompatibility:   to  what  are  we  referring  when  we  use  the  term  “the  nucleus”?   Second,  there  is  
an  explanatory  problem:   how  can  we  reasonably  use  one  set  of  features  of  the  nucleus  to  explain 
successfully  if  those  features  are  incompatible  with  equally  explanatory  features  of  a  different  
model?   The  explanatory  problem  is  built  on  top  of  the  ontological  problem.   The  ontological  
problem  suggests  that  the  explanations  offered  by,  e.g.,  the  liquid  drop  model  are  reliant  on  
entities  that  cannot  exist,  meaning  that  the  explanations  are  akin  to  explaining  the  functioning  of  
a  computer  with  square  circles.   In  other  words,  the  incompatibility  of  these  models  is  more  than  
the  result  of  attributing  different  features  to  a  single  system:   each  model  denies  the  possibility  of 
the  (thing)  ontology  offered  by  the  other.   
142  Examples  of  thing  realism  abound.   See  Wiggns  (2016a,  b,  c)  for  an  example  of  a  mixed  ontology  that  treats 
substance  as  the  continuant  of  an  active  principle.   
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However,  this  is  only  a  problem  with  a  thing-interpretation  of  these  models.   By  taking  
seriously  the  experimental  methods  by  which  these  models  are  constructed  and  the  calculational  
tools  these  models  provide  for  interpreting  experimental  outcomes,  I  construct  a  new  form  of  
realism  about  these  models  that  renders  them  ontologically  compatible.   Namely,  I  argue  that  
nuclear  models  are  consistent  in  the  dynamic  entities  to  which  they  refer:   the  interactions  of  
nucleons,  the  excitations  of  the  aggregate  whole  and  its  parts,  the  decay  processes  the  system  
undergoes,  and,  in  general,  the  processes  of  the  nuclear  system.   Here  “process”  is  a  primitive  
term  used  to  refer  to  the  sort  of  entity  exemplified  by  motions,  interactions,  excitations,  growths,  
decays,  etc. 143    Similar  to  recent  work  by  other  authors  in  the  philosophy  of  science  (Dupre  2010,  
2018;  Earley  2003,  2008;  Kaiser  2018;  Guay  and  Pradeu  (forthcoming);  Guay  and  Sartenear  
2018),  I  therefore  advocate  a  pure  process  realism  with  respect  to  nuclear  models.   That  is,  we  
should  reify  the  models’  processes—  the  non-particular,  dynamically  contextual,  uncountable,  
determinable  entities—without  reifying  the  objects,  structures,  and  static  properties  that  are  
demonstrably  incompatible.   By  doing  so,  I  argue  that  both  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  are  
fully  compatible  and  successfully  explanatory.   The  nucleus,  therefore,  is  no  more  than  a  
collection  of  processes. 144    
Critical  to  this  process  realism  is  the  recognition  that  the  processes  referred  to  within  
nuclear  models  are  essential  parts  of  the  observational  acts  that  form  nuclear  experiments.   In  
particular,  because  the  dynamics  within  the  nucleus  must  always  be  a  continuous  intermediary  of  
our  experimental  interventions  and  the  reception  of  signals  from  the  system,  these  dynamics  are  
essential  dynamic  parts  of  nuclear  experiments.   We  are  therefore  licensed  in  inferring  these  
dynamic  parts  on  the  basis  of  experimental  practice  alone  because  it  is  only  experimental  
practice  that  makes  true  the  descriptions  of  processes  in  nuclear  models.   
143  I  use  the  word  “process”  in  much  the  same  way  as  Seibt  (1990,  2004,  2005,  2018)  uses  the  word  “dynamics.”  
Importantly,  it  is  a  primitive  term  and  cannot  be  defined  independently.   However,  as  I  have  suggested  here,  it  is  
possible  to  build  a  working  definition  of  process  from  various  paradigmatic  examples.   Motions,  interactions,  
decays,  excitations,  growths,  etc.  are  all  paradigmatic  processes.    See  chapter  1.   See  also  Pemberton  (2018),  
Griesemer  (2018),  Love  (2018),  and  Chen  (2018)   for  more  on  constructing  a  working  definition  of  process  within  
scientific  theory  (specifically  biology).  
144  Similar  claims  have  been  made  about  other  systems.   Parr  et.  al.  (2005)  and  Bader  (1999,  2008)  problematize  the  
molecular  system  in  a  similar  way.   Hattema  (2007)  describes  some  of  the  problems  in  the  history  of  molecular  
modeling,  e.g.,  the  Heitler  and  London  (1927)  and  the  Hund  (1927)  models  of  the  molecule.   Earley  (2003,  2008)  
argues  explicitly  for  a  “process  structural  realism”  about  the  molecule  that  is  quite  similar  to  what  I  articulate  here.  
The  largest  difference  is  that  Earley  is  willing  to  reify  structures  within  the  molecule,  while  I  take  this  as  impossible  
given  that  structures  in  the  nucleus  are  a  part  of  the  incompatibility  of  nuclear  models.   
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In  contrast,  the  thing  terms  reified  by  the  thing  realist  in  these  models  require  additional  
inferences,  the  premises  of  which  cannot  be  supported  on  the  basis  of  experiment  alone.   The  
essential  premise  of  these  additional  inferences  is  one  of  two  options  (a)  that  all  dynamics  
(metaphysically)  require  static  things  to  underlie  them, 145   or  (b)  that  the  existence  of  stability  in  
an  experimental  system  necessitates  something  static  and  unchanging  within  the  system.   These  
premises  are  dubious  if  deductively  supported,  and  insufficient  if  inductively  supported.   Thus,  
inferences  to  processes  are  experimentally  supportable,  whereas  inferences  to  things  are  dubious  
at  best.   Process  realism  is  therefore  superior  to  thing  realism  in  the  context  of  nuclear  models  
because  it:   
(1) establishes  cross-model  consistency,   
(2) accords  with  experimental  practice  and  explanations,  and   
(3) is  ontologically  and  epistemically  modest.   
We  begin  with  a  brief  introduction  to  the  liquid  drop  and  the  shell  models  of  the  nucleus  
(§2).   In  addition  to  the  normal  exegesis,  I  will  also  show  how  these  models  are  ontologically  
incompatible  on  any  form  of  thing  realism  (object,  structural,  substantial,  bundle-theoretic,  etc.).  
We  then  turn  to  reinterpreting  the  material  and  formal  features  of  the  nucleus  in  terms  of  
dynamic  entities  (motions,  excitations,  etc.)  (§3).   In  discussing  the  formal  and  material  features  
meant  to  support  the  haeccity  of  the  nucleus,  I  offer  the  standard  process  realist  arguments  that  
these  features  are  no  more  than  real  dynamics  with  the  added  knowledge  that  they  cannot  be  
reinterpreted  as  things  in  any  sense.   I  then  show  that  the  explanations  of  the  nuclear  models  rest  
on  these  dynamics,  and  that  these  dynamics  are  compatible.   Their  compatibility  is  the  result  of  
both  models  acknowledging  the  existence  of  all  processes,  but  only  using  a  subset  of  these  







145  This  is  a  claim  that  dates  back  to  Aristotle.   See  Physics  190a31-b9.   Seibt  (1990)  also  criticizes  this  premise  
extensively.   
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[6.2]:   Many  Models,  Divergent  Things  
  
  
There  are  many  models  of  nuclear  systems  corresponding  to  many  phenomena. 146    Liquid 
drop  models,  developed  in  the  1930’s,  are  still  used  to  model  the  fission  of  a  nucleus.   Shell  
models,  similar  to  molecular  and  atomic  orbital  models,  are  used  to  model  nuclear  line  spectra,  
and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  stability  of  the  nucleus.   Lattice  models  are  used  to  understand  nucleus  
formation  and  structural  binding  stabilities.   For  our  purposes  here,  we  will  consider  only  liquid  
drop  and  shell  models.   Considering  these  two  will  be  quite  sufficient  to  establish  that  no  
robustness  argument—an  argument  that  terms  in  these  models  refer  to  real  things  in  virtue  of  
their  appearance  and  similarity  in  both  (and  more)  models 147 —can  be  made  for  the  reality  of  
things  in  the  nucleus,  or  for  the  nucleus  qua  thing  itself.   Insofar  as  “the  nucleus,”  “nucleons,”  
“Energy  structure,”  etc.  appear  as  identical  terms  in  models  of  nuclear  systems  meant  to  refer  to  
a  static  thing,  the  terms  are  wildly  divergent  in  meaning.   The  models  therefore  contain  no  robust  
thing-terms.   
  
  
[6.2.1]:   The  Liquid  Drop  Model  
  
  
The  liquid-drop  model  treats  the  nucleus  as  a  drop  of  incompressible  fluid  of  similar  
shape  and  structure  to  a  drop  of  water.   This  analogy  facilitates  a  highly  accurate  account  of  the  
nuclear  binding  energy  and  of  how  nucleons  act  together  to  produce  collective,  nucleus-wide  
motions  such  as  fission.   The  model  achieved  its  success  primarily  through  this  description  of  
fission  given  by  Meitner  and  Frisch  (1939). 148   
146  See  Cook  (2006)  for  an  overview  of  the  various  types.   One  type  not  discussed  by  Cook,  more  recently  
developed,  is  the  so-called  unified  lattice  model.   See  Caurier  et.  al.  (2005).   It  is  worth  noting  that  this  model  is  not  
a  unification  of  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models.   The  hope  is  that  the  model  will  be  able  to  unify  explanations  of  
nuclear  decay  and  of  scattering  experiments,  but  the  model  cannot  explain  fission.   It  is  still  unclear  that  the  model  
can  explain  spectral  emission.   
147  Penn  (“Processes  Underlie  Processes”  manuscript)  and  Penn  (“Reimagining  Perrin’s  Argument”  manuscript)  
offer  in  depth  discussions  of  robustness  arguments  in  general  and  in  a  particular  historical  case  study  respectively.  
Both  are  written  in  the  context  of  a  discussion  of  process  realism  and  thing  realism.  
148  For  a  fully  detailed  explanation  of  the  history  of  this  model,  see  Stuewer  (1994).   See  Gamow  (1929)  for  the  first  
liquid-drop  model.   See  Cook  (2006,  ch.  4)  for  a  detailed  introduction  to  the  liquid-drop  model.  
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In  a  drop  of  liquid,  molecules  will  meaningfully  interact  only  with  their  
nearest-neighbors.   For  example,  water  molecules  in  a  drop  of  water  will  electrostatically  repel  
and  attract  each  other  and  undergo  collisions  brought  about  by  the  momenta  and  thermodynamic  
vibrations  of  the  molecules.  Each  of  these  interactions  is  between  exactly  two  molecules,  and  the  
interactions  are  only  significant  when  these  molecules  are  sufficiently  close  to  each  other.   The  
liquid-drop  model  of  the  nucleus  imports  near-exactly  this  reasoning  to  nucleon-nucleon  
interactions.   The  model  assumes  that  there  is  a  strong  attractive  potential,  built  from  pairwise  
interactions  between  nearest-neighbor  nucleons,  binding  the  nucleus  together,  as  well  as  
electrostatic  repulsion  between  nearest-neighbor  nucleons  that  prevents  collapse.   
This  assumption  entails  a  difference  in  binding  energy  between  particles  at  the  surface  
and  particles  within  the  volume  of  the  liquid-drop.   Particles  at  the  surface  will  always  have  
fewer  neighbors  than  particles  within  the  volume.   Thus,  particles  at  the  surface  of  the  drop  will  
be  much  more  weakly  bound  than  particles  in  the  interior  of  the  drop.   This  means  that  the  
binding  energy  of  the  liquid-drop  is  expressed  by  the  following  proportionality  (k 1   and  k 2   are  real  
constants,  mere  proportions):  
  
 Eq. 1) E (number of  particles) (number of  particles)  ( binding k1 k2
2 3/  
  
As  the  number  of  particles  increases,  the  first  term—the  volume  term—begins  to  dominate  the  
second  term—the  surface  term.   Thus  larger  drops  are  less  stable,  since  they  have  lower  binding  
energy. 149    Following  this  analogy,  the  nucleus  therefore  exhibits  similar  behavior  to  that  given  
by  equation  1.   
149  Note  that  by  convention,  binding  energy  is  considered  large  when  it  is  a  large  negative  number.   
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Additional  pairwise  interactions  are  added  to  this  nuclear  model  to  provide  further  
accuracy  to  the  theoretically  predicted  binding  energy  (figure  1).   First,  one  recognizes  that  
protons  will  repel  each  other.   Therefore  an  additional  repulsive  term  is  added  to  the  
proportionality  of  equation  1.   Second,  empirically  motivated  terms  are  added  recognizing  that  
nuclei  with  an  even  number  of  nucleons  have  higher  binding  energy  (pairing),  and  recognizing  
that  nuclei  with  an  equal  number  of  neutrons  and  protons  tend  to  have  higher  binding  energy  
(asymmetry).   These  are  collected  in  the  Weizsäcker  mass-energy  equation:  
  
 Eq. 2) BE(Z, A) A A Z(Z ) hell terms(   = k1 + k2
2 3/ + k3 1 + k4 A
(A 2Z)2 + k5
1
A1 2/
+ s  
  
Figure  2  shows  the  relative  effects  of  each  term  in  moving  the  theoretical  binding  energy  curve  
closer  to  the  observed  binding  energy  curve. 150    




With  all  of  these  terms  accounted  for,  the  liquid-drop  model  is  able  to  explain  vibrational  
and  oscillatory  resonances  of  the  whole  nucleus.   Any  disturbance  in  the  nucleus  as  a  whole  will  
be  the  result  of  many  interactions  between  neighboring  nucleons.   For  example,  if  a  nucleus  is  
struck  by  a  low-energy  bombarding  neutron,  this  neutron’s  energy  will  distribute  throughout  the  
nucleus  through  the  nearest-neighbor  interactions  depicted  in  figure  1.   Impacted  nucleons  will  
similarly  interact,  causing  the  nucleus  as  a  whole  to  enter  a  higher  energy  state.   The  nucleus  will  
redistribute  the  energy  of  the  bombarding  neutron  among  its  nucleons  until  this  energy  is  







[6.2.2]:   The  Shell  Model  
  
  
While  the  liquid-drop  model  is  concerned  with  analyzing  the  behavior  of  collections  of  
particles,  the  shell  model  considers  the  behavior  of  an  individual  nucleon.   The  model  seeks  to  
explain  only  the  behavior  of  this  individual  nucleon  and  treats  all  other  nucleons  as  equivalent  to  
an  external  Fermi  field  to  which  this  nucleon  couples.   The  nucleon  is  therefore  treated  as  if  it  
were  part  of  a  diffuse  Fermi  gas,  much  like  the  electrons  bound  in  an  atom.   This  facilitates  a  
description  of  how  an  individual  nucleon  can  occupy  and  transition  between  energy  states  within  
the  nucleus.   This  in  turn  allows  the  model  to  explain  the  special  stability  of  nuclei  with  certain  
numbers  of  nucleons:   the  so-called  magic  numbers. 151    
Two  facts  are  suggestive  of  nuclear  energy  shell-structure.   First,  an  individual  nucleon  
will  not  collide  with  other  nucleons  very  frequently.   Were  such  collisions  to  occur,  nuclei  would  
be  far  less  stable  in  various  decay  processes  than  observational  data  suggests.   Second,  for  an  
individual  nucleon,  the  forces  acting  on  it  from  the  other  nucleons  can  be  amalgamated  into  a  
single  quantum  potential  well  to  which  the  nucleon  couples—a  Fermi  field.   Thus,  the  nucleon  
will  enter  quantized  energy  levels,  the  structure  of  which  will  depend  on  the  shape  of  the  
potential  well  imposed  on  the  individual  nucleon.   These  facts  entail  that  nucleons  occupy  
non-coinciding  trajectories  within  the  nucleus.   Given  that  nucleons  experience  strong  attractive  
forces  which  would  otherwise  bring  them  into  collisions,  this  in  turn  suggests  that  nucleon  
trajectories  are  kept  apart  by  something  like  the  Pauli-exclusion  principle.   In  analogy  with  the  
case  of  electron  orbits  in  an  atom,  nucleons  are  unable  to  occupy  the  same  trajectories,  instead  
occupying  discrete  trajectories  quantized  by  the  total  angular  momentum  and  energy  of  the  
nucleon  occupying  that  trajectory.   
151  The  first  shell  model  is  presented  by  Mayer  and  jensen  (1955).   For  a  modern  introduction  to  the  model,  see  Cook  




The  applicability  of  the  Pauli  exclusion  principle  for  nucleons  facilitates  a  direct  comparison  of  
nuclear  structure  to  atomic  structure:   the  nucleus  can  be  treated  like  an  electron  cloud  in  an  
atom.   Electrons  moving  in  an  atom  move  in  orbits—orbits  that  are  separated  from  each  other  by  
Pauli  exclusion—defined  by  a  central,  attractive  potential  well.   Each  electron  occupies  the  
lowest-energy  orbital  that  is  not  already  filled  by  another  electron,  and  orbits  are  quantized  in  
terms  of  the  net  energy,  angular  momentum,  and  spin  of  the  occupying  electron.   Similarly,  
nucleons  in  the  shell  model  occupy  energy  levels—”orbits”  or  “energy  shells”—which  are  
defined  by  something  like  the  harmonic  oscillator  potential  well.   The  energy  levels  associated  
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with  coupling  the  nucleon  to  such  a  harmonic  potential  well  are  depicted  in  figure  3  (left  hand  
lines).   Two  nucleons,  like  electrons  in  the  atom,  are  incapable  of  occupying  the  same  energy  
level  in  virtue  of  Pauli  exclusion.   Finally,  having  defined  nucleon  “orbits,”  one  introduces  a  
spin-orbit  coupling  for  the  orbiting  nucleon.   This  splits  the  energy  level  into  sublevels  defined  
by  the  total  angular  momentum  of  the  nucleon,  as  depicted  in  figure  3  (right  hand  lines).   Just  
like  electrons  in  an  atom,  nucleons  will  occupy  the  lowest  available  energy  level  that  is  not  
already  occupied  by  another  nucleon,  and  nucleons  will  transition  between  two  levels  only  when  
individually  excited  with  the  discrete  energy  corresponding  to  the  difference  in  energy  between  
the  two  levels.   
This  provides  the  basis  for  explaining  the  magic  numbers.   Atoms  with  filled  energy  
shells  exhibit  much  greater  stability  than  atoms  with  open  energy  shells,  called  shell  closure. 
This  is  why  noble  gas  elements  like  Helium  and  Neon  are  far  less  reactive  than  elements  like  
those  in  the  alkali  group,  e.g.,  Lithium  and  Sodium.   Helium  and  Neon  have  “magic  numbers”  of  
electrons—2  and  10—which  correspond  to  the  number  of  electrons  needed  to  fill  the  lowest  
energy  levels.   Similarly,  nuclei  which  fill  all  the  subshells  in  a  given  energy  shell  will  
experience  shell  closure,  and  be  much  more  stable.   Shell  closure  occurs  when  a  nucleus  has  2,  8,  
20,  etc.  nucleons  of  either  type.   
  
  
[6.2.3]:   Incompatibility  
  
  
We  now  ask:   are  these  two  models  describing  the  same  thing?   The  answer  is  that  they  
are  not.   The  nucleus  of  the  liquid  drop  model  is  quite  different  from  that  of  the  shell  model.   The  
two  models  of  “the  nucleus”  describe  the  nucleus  as  having  a  different  shape,  different  internal  
structure  (e.g.,  definable  spatial  relations  between  nucleons),  different  spatial  extent  and  density,  






Table  2:   A  comparison  of  properties  and  thing-claims  made  by  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models. 
First,  the  liquid-drop  and  shell  models  directly  contradict  each  other  on  the  presence  of  
internal  nuclear  structure.   The  liquid-drop  model  admits  only  a  nuclear  surface  and  interior.   In 
contrast,  the  shell  model  predicts  energy  shells  and  subshells,  and  therefore  admits  rich  internal 
substructure.   Thus  the  liquid-drop  model  depicts  a  nucleus  with  no  internal  structure,  and  the  
shell  model  depicts  a  nucleus  with  much  internal  structure.   
The  two  models  also  conflict  over  the  size  and  shape  of  the  nucleus.   The  liquid-drop  
predicts  an  approximately  spherical  shape  for  the  nucleus  resulting  from  nearest-neighbor  
attractive  interactions  between  the  nucleons.   This  in  turn  means  that  the  liquid-drop  predicts  a 
sharp  drop  in  nucleon  density  as  one  approaches  the  boundary  of  the  nucleus.   There  are  
few-to-no  nucleons  that  exist  outside  of  the  nuclear  radius.   The  nucleus,  according  to  the  
liquid-drop  model,  has  a  definite  shape  and  size  related  to  the  number  of  nucleons  A;   the  
nucleus  is  a  spheroid  of  radius  proportional  to  A 1/3 .   
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Feature  of  the 
nucleus:   
Liquid-drop  Model 
Claims:   
Shell  Model  Claims: Experimental  Results 
Support:   
Entity  Claim: The  nucleus  is  a 
liquid-drop  
The  nucleus  is  a 
Fermi  gas  
neither 
Presence  of  internal 
structure:  
There  is  no  internal 
structure  
There  is  internal 
structure  
both 
Shape  of  the  nucleus: Roughly  spherical,  
varying  directly  with 
nucleon  number  
Roughly  spherical,  
not  varying  directly  
with  nucleon  number 
Liquid-drop 
Density  of  the 
nucleus:  
Constant,  with  a  
sharp  drop  at  the 
nuclear  radius  
Varying,  with  a  
gradual  drop  at  the 
nuclear  radius  
Shell 
Radius  of  the 
nucleus:  
Proportional  to  A 1/3   
(the  cube  root  of  the  
number  of  nucleons) 
Proportional  to 
occupation  numbers 
of  energy  shells,  not 




In  contrast,  the  shell  model  predicts  that  the  size  and  shape  of  the  nucleus  depends  on  the  
shape  and  closure  of  energy  shells.   This  is  because  nuclear  structure  in  the  shell  model  is  almost  
entirely  dependent  on  the  texture  of  these  shells.   The  nuclear  radius  will  therefore  depend  on  
occupation  number,  not  A 1/3 .   In  addition,  the  density  of  nucleons  will  vary  radically  between  
nuclei  with  magic  numbers  of  nucleons  and  nuclei  without  magic  numbers  of  nuclei,  again  
because  energy  shell  structure  determines  nuclear  structure.   These  features  are  depicted  
schematically  in  figure  4.   
Finally,  the  energy  shell  structure  of  the  nucleus  also  entails  that  nuclear  density  varies  
continuously  with  increasing  radius.   Rather  than  a  constant  density  as  in  the  liquid-drop  model,  
the  shell  model  predicts  that  the  tendency  of  energy  shells  to  spatially  separate  will  cause  
nucleon  density  to  be  inconstant,  especially  in  nuclei  with  open  energy  shells.   
Empirical  data  do  not  strictly  rule  in  favor  of  either  model.   Rather,  both  models  
experience  some  success  in  their  explanations,  and  failure  in  others.   The  liquid-drop  model  
successfully  explains  the  nuclear  radius  but  not  the  nuclear  density.   Fission  experiments  and  
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neutron  bombardment  indicate  that  there  is  little  internal  shell  structure  in  the  nucleus,  
supporting  the  liquid-drop,  while  scattering  experiments  and  observations  of  radioactive  decay  
suggest  the  rich  internal  structure  of  the  shell  model.   The  models  are  therefore  directly  
contradictory  in  a  thing  ontology,  with  no  apparent  way  of  adjudicating  between  them.   It  is  no  
wonder,  then,  that  many  authors  advocate  not  only  that  these  models  are  incompatible,  but  that  
we  should  remain  silent  on,  or  else  eliminate,  thing  realist  intuitions  about  the  nucleus  on  the  




[6.3]:   The  Features  of  the  Nucleus  are  Processes  
  
  
The  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  represent  contradictory  things.   Therefore,  these  things  
cannot  be  robust.   However,  we  saw  in  chapter  2  that  this  is  not  special.   Indeed,  we  expect  that  
processes  are  robust  where  things  are  not.   To  see  this  in  the  nuclear  case,  we  return  to  our  list  of  
features  of  the  nucleus.   These  are:  
  
Table  3:   A  list  of  formal,  material,  and  productive  features  of  the  nucleus  to  be  explained.   
  
152  Cook  (2006)  also  remarks  that  the  models  make  inconsistent  claims.   See  also  Bohr  and  Mottelson  (1969)  for  an  
in-depth,  historical  account  of  the  tension  between  these  models.   
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  Formal  Features  Material  Features  Productive  Features  
Example  Features:  -The  shape  of  the  
nucleus  
  
-The  internal  energy  
spectrum  structure  
  
-The  radius  of  the  
nucleus  
  
-The  density  of  the  
nucleus  
-The  composition  of  
the  nucleus  in  terms  
of  protons  and  
neutrons.   
  
-The  composition  of  
decay  products  
produced  by  nuclear  
radioactive  decay.   
-The  production  of  
line  spectra  
  








Importantly,  the  features  of  the  nucleus  that  are  of  most  interest  are  the  formal  and  productive  
features.   These  are,  at  minimum,  the  features  of  the  nuclear  system  that  models  of  the  nucleus  
are  supposed  to  explain.   We  saw  this  in  section  2:   the  liquid  drop  model  can  successfully  
explain  the  shape  and  size  of  the  nucleus,  and  the  shell  model  can  successfully  explain  its  
internal  energy  structure.   
However,  there  is  an  important  distinction  we  must  draw:   the  formal  features  are  not,  
strictly  speaking,  the  explananda  of  nuclear  models.   The  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  are  not  
used  in  experimental  settings,  both  historical  and  contemporary,  to  explain  these  formal  features.  
Rather,  they  are  used  to  explain  the  processual  features  of  the  nuclear  system:   fission,  
radioactive  decay,  spectral  emission,  neutron  capture  and  scattering,  etc.   These  are  the  
phenomena  that  are  actually  modeled  and  occur  in  experimental  settings.   The  formal  features  of  
the  nuclear  system  are  therefore  explananda  only  insofar  as  we  might  already  have  thing-realist  
intuitions.   
Moreover,  I  have  already  shown  how  the  formal  features  of  the  nucleus  according  to  the  
two  models  are  incompatible.   Therefore,  these  formal  features  cannot  be  explanans  either.  
Rather,  I  show  below  that  the  formal  features  of  the  nucleus  are  placeholder  terms  for  collections  
of  processes,  useful  only  for  their  pragmatic  role  in  describing  the  evolution  and  dynamics  of  
interest  in  the  nuclear  system.   Importantly,  this  is  not  an  a  priori  argument,  but  rather  follows  
simply  from  the  facts  of  the  models  and  their  history.   The  models  were  designed  to  explain  
dynamics,  and  use  dynamics  to  do  this  explaining.   This  is  the  explanatory  defeat  of  things:  
processes  do  all  of  the  explaining  in  these  models,  and  are  the  entities  being  explained.   
In  turn,  the  material  features  are  offered  as  the  thing-realist’s  hope  of  an  explanans  
independent  of  these  formal  features.   Surely,  the  argument  goes,  the  material  composition  of  the  
nucleus  plays  a  role  in  explaining  nuclear  phenomena  simply  because  nucleons  are  the  bearers  of  
properties  and  vehicles  of  processes  in  the  nucleus.   As  I  will  articulate,  this  argument,  just  like  
the  underlier  arguments  rejected  in  chapter  2,  fails  because  it  does  not  rule  out  that  the  nucleons  
are  themselves  processes  or  collections  thereof. 153    
153  Note  that,  just  as  I  argued  in  chapter  2,  this  means  both  that  processes  can  act  as  truthmakers  for  sentences  
involving  change  and  persistence  (c.f.,  Stout  2012),  and  that  where  necessary,  systems  of  processes  act  as  a  
“persistent  entity”  to  ground  claims  about,  e.g.,  the  nucleons  in  nucleon-nucleon  interactions  and  the  like.   This  latter  
claim,  that  systems  of  processes  can  ground  structural  properties  of  a  physical  system,  entails  the  former  claim.   
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However,  just  like  with  the  formal  features,  the  incompatibility  of  nuclear  models  on  
thing-realist  interpretations  makes  it  difficult  to  see  how  appeal  to  thing-nucleons  is  meant  to  
resolve  anything.   Given  that  these  nucleons  have  to  be  fit  into  incompatible  models  as  
explanatory  elements,  they  will  inevitably  inherit  that  incompatibility.   For  example,  if  nucleons  
are  meant  to  both  occupy  discrete  energy  shells  and  not  occupy  these  shells,  the  nucleons  
themselves  will  need  to  have  a  property 154   “energy  within  the  nuclear  system”  that  is  one  value  in  
the  liquid  drop  model  and  another  in  the  shell  model.   
This  means  that  things  are  defeated  ontologically  as  well.   No  thing  term  may  be  reified  
in  both  of  these  models  on  pain  of  contradiction,  and  no  thing  term  may  be  thought  to  explain  in  
either  of  these  models.   Instead,  as  I  show  below,  all  we  need  are  processes.   Processes  are  
explanans,  explananda,  and  ontological  ground  in  both  models.   Moreover,  the  processes  of  each  
model  are  compatible  with  each  other.   I  turn  now  to  a  re-analysis  of  the  features  of  the  nuclear  
system,  in  order  to  show  this.   
  
  
[6.3.1]:   Formal  Features  of  the  Nucleus:   Balanced  Dynamics  
  
  
For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  let  us  consider  only  two  formal  features  of  the  nucleus:   the  
shape  of  the  nucleus  and  the  internal  structure  of  its  energy  spectrum.   We  use  the  liquid  drop  
model  to  explain  the  former,  whereas  we  use  the  shell  model  to  explain  the  latter.   Moreover,  the  
two  models  provide  correct  explanations  for  their  respective  features  of  the  nuclear  system,  but  
fail  to  explain  the  other  feature.   Naïvely,  this  suggests  that,  even  independently  of  the  
incompatibility  of  the  thing  interpretation  of  the  two  models,  these  two  models  cannot  find  
common  ground.   As  we  will  see,  the  processes  used  to  explain  these  two  features  are  indeed  
common  ground  between  the  models:   the  models  do  not  contradict  in  their  process  realist  
interpretation.   
  
  
154  Note  that  the  property  need  not  be  basic  or  fundamental,  but  will  need  to  be  constructible  in  order  for  the  thing  
realist  to  reify  the  nucleon.   
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[6.3.1.1]:   The  Shape  of  the  Nucleus  
  
  
The  shape  of  the  nucleus  is  explained  by  the  liquid  drop  model.   This  explanation  is  
simple:   the  shape  of  the  nucleus  is  the  result  of  all  of  the  inter-nucleon  interactions  (as  
catalogued  by  the  Weizsäcker  mass-energy  equation)  being  balanced  against  each  other  to  
minimize  the  total  energy  of  the  nuclear  system.   In  other  words,  the  electromagnetic  and  
chromodynamic  interactions,  both  represented  as  simple  modifiers  on  the  strength  of  each  term  
in  the  Weizsäcker  mass-energy  equation,  counteract  each  other  to  bring  about  a  stable  
configuration  of  the  system.   In  other  words,  the  shape  of  the  nucleus  is  not  some  static  feature  of  
the  nucleus,  but  is  rather  the  result  of  a  balance  of  multiple  dynamics  within  the  system.   This  
matches  other  discussions  of  structures  in  chemistry  (Earley  2003,  2008)  and  physics  
(Finkelstein  1996,  2003;  Chapter  3)  
However,  it  is  far  more  interesting  to  note  how  the  shape  of  the  nucleus  plays  a  role  in  the  
explanation  of  fission.   Data  on  neutron  bombardment  of  nuclei  puzzled  physicists  in  the  1930’s  
(Stuewer  1994).   The  best  theories  of  the  nucleus  predicted  that  for  low-energy  neutrons,  neutron  
capture  should  be  as  likely  as  scattering  from  the  nucleus.   However,  experimental  results  
showed  that  neutron  capture  was  much  more  likely.   In  addition,  data  showed  that  for  each  
element,  neutrons  with  certain  energies  were  absorbed  at  higher  rates.   This  too  disagreed  with  
the  current  theories  of  the  nucleus. 155   
Bohr’s  compound  nucleus  provided  the  solution  to  these  problems.   Bohr  analyzed  the  
process  of  neutron  bombardment  into  several  distinct  stages.   First,  an  incident  neutron  impacts  
the  nucleus.   Second,  the  nucleus  absorbs  the  neutron,  and  the  neutron’s  energy  is  distributed  
among  the  nucleons  in  nearest-neighbor  interactions.   Then,  if  enough  energy  is  collected  into  a  
single  nucleon,  that  nucleon  is  ejected  from  the  nucleus. 156    However,  if  there  is  not  enough  
energy  to  eject  a  single  nucleon,  the  nucleus  captures  the  incident  neutron.   The  energy  required  
to  eject  neutrons  from  a  nucleus  of  a  given  element  depends  upon  the  particular  binding  energy  
of  that  nucleus.   Thus,  only  neutrons  with  particular  energies  will  be  able  to  “scatter”  by  being  
ejected  from  the  nucleus:   a  compound  nucleus  with  captured  neutron  is  more  likely  to  form  if  
the  energy  of  the  incident  neutron  is  enough  to  excite  the  nucleus  into  the  next  highest  energy  
155  See  Pais  (1981,  336-337)  for  more  on  this  historical  difficulty.   
156  See  Bohr  (1937,  163)  for  this  exact  account,  with  explicit  reference  to  both  processes  and  stages  (intermediate  
states)  of  a  process.   See  also  Bohr  (1936).  
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level  of  the  nucleus  as  a  whole.   This  effect,  which  Bohr  (1936,  344)  called  “resonance  
excitation”  explains  why  neutron  capture  is  more  likely  than  scattering,  and  why  certain  neutron  
energies  produce  peak  capture  or  peak  scattering.   Here,  resonance  is  taken  literally,  unlike  in  
discussions  of  molecular  resonance.   Bohr  is  literally  describing  the  nucleus  as  resonating,  i.e.,  
vibrating  with  harmonics  in  tune  with  the  incident  energy  of  the  bombarding  neutron.   When  
resonant,  the  nucleus  enters  a  standing  wave  oscillation  pattern.   It  is  these  standing  wave  
oscillation  patterns  that  constitute  the  energy  levels  of  the  nuclear  system,  just  like  the  standing  
waves  of  a  string  on  a  cello.   
This  explanation  was  later  extended  to  include  the  emission  of  larger  clusters  of  nucleons  
by  Meitner  and  Frisch  (1939). 157    Instead  of  emitting  only  a  single  nucleon  when  in  an  excited  
state,  Meitner  and  Frisch  proposed  that  oscillations  of  a  compound  nucleus  split  that  nucleus  into  
two  smaller  nuclei  through  the  same  process  as  Bohr  describes.   This  is  depicted  schematically  
below,  in  figure  5.  
157  See  Stuewer  (1994,  107-116)  for  a  full  account  of  the  historical  development  of  the  liquid-drop  account  of  fission  
offered  by  Meitner  and  Frisch.   See  also  Frisch  (1939)  and  Meitner  (1936).   
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These  oscillations  of  the  nuclear  system  are  oscillations  in  the  shape  of  the  nucleus.  
However,  these  oscillations  are  the  result  of  a  disturbance  of  the  balance  of  strong  and  
electromagnetic  interactions.   When  we  bombard  the  nucleus  with  a  neutron  (our  intervention),  
this  bombardment  produces  a  change  in  the  system:   the  emission  of  two  or  more  fission  
products.   We  observe  that  the  fission  products  have  a  characteristic  kinetic  energy.   We  therefore  
infer  that  this  kinetic  energy—the  motion  of  the  fission  products—must  have  been  acquired  
through  some  redistribution  process  within  the  original  nuclear  system.   We  therefore  infer,  
following  Bohr,  that  this  redistribution  of  motion  within  the  nuclear  system  is  the  result  of  a  
series  of  interactions,  first  between  the  nuclear  system  and  the  bombarding  neutron,  then  
between  nearest-neighbor  nucleons.   We  then  represent  this  redistribution  as  a  collective  motion  
of  the  nuclear  system,  effectively  averaging  over  the  many  individual  interactions  to  produce  the  
oscillations  of  the  nuclear  system.   It  is  at  this  point  that  we  represent  this  collective  motion  as  an  
oscillation  in  the  shape  of  the  nucleus.   Such  a  representation  is  good  because  the  shape  of  the  
nucleus  acts  as  an  effective  placeholder  for  the  balance  of  processes  within  the  nuclear  system.  
E.g.,  when  the  nucleus  has  a  “spherical”  shape,  the  processes  are  perfectly  balanced  and  
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therefore  the  system  is  stable.   However,  when  the  nucleus  has  an  “oblong”  shape,  the  processes  
are  imbalanced ,  and  the  system  is  unstable.   By  describing  fission  as  the  result  of  oscillations  in  
this  shape  from  spherical  to  oblong,  we  thereby  show  how  the  nuclear  system  dynamically  
reaches  the  point  of  instability  at  which  fission  occurs.   
Crucially,  the  shape  of  the  nucleus  is  acting  as  a  placeholder  term  in  this  explanation.  
Namely,  it  is  a  placeholder  for  the  balance  of  many  sub-nuclear  interactions  and  motions.   When  
we  want  to  describe  these  interactions  and  motions  in  aggregate,  shape  becomes  a  relevant  
feature  of  the  system.   However,  “shape”  is  only  relevant  when  it  itself  is  dynamic.   I.e.,  even  
when  we  are  making  use  of  “shape”  in  our  explanations,  we  are  implicitly  referring  to  the  
underlying  interactions  and  motions  of  the  nuclear  system.   
Moreover,  the  shape  is  only  ever  inferred,  never  observed.   Rather,  what  we  observe  is  
the  dynamic  change  of  the  nuclear  system  from  stable  to  unstable  that  results  from  our  dynamic  
intervention.   Since  we  already  associated  the  shape  of  the  system  with  the  stability  produced  by  
balanced  internal  interactions,  we  describe  this  dynamic  change  from  a  stable  to  unstable  nuclear  
system  in  terms  of  the  shape  of  the  system.   
  
  
[6.3.1.2]:   Internal  Energy  Structure  
  
  
We  turn  next  to  the  explanation  of  the  internal  energy  structure  of  the  nucleus  provided  
by  the  shell  model.   Again,  this  explanation  is  rather  simple,  and  quite  obviously  processual:   the  
energy  structure  of  the  nucleus  is  the  result  of  the  interaction  of  single  nucleons  with  the  
aggregate  potential  created  by  the  remainder  of  the  nuclear  system.   This  interaction  can  be  
further  divided  into  an  electromagnetic,  chromodynamic,  and  spin  interaction.   Thus,  the  
available  energies  of  a  nucleon  in  the  nucleus  are  defined  by  these  three  interactions  that  nucleon  
can  have  with  the  nuclear  potential.   It  should  come  as  no  surprise,  at  this  point,  that  the  bound  
state  energies  that  these  interactions  produce  are  the  result  of  balancing  these  three  interactions.  
I.e.,  the  relative  strengths  of  the  three  interactions  define  a  series  of  stable  states  in  which  the 
three  interactions  are  balanced.   There  being  multiple  ways  to  balance  these  interactions,  there  
are  correspondingly  many  ways  in  which  the  nucleon  can  occupy  a  stable  energy  level.   
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Again,  it  is  far  more  interesting  to  see  how  and  why  this  energy  structure  appears  as  a  
feature  of  the  nucleus  in  the  first  place.   As  already  noted,  the  shell  model  of  the  nucleus  is  
motivated  by  a  qualitative  analysis  of  patterns  of  naturally  occurring  stable  isotopes,  their  
spectral  line  signatures,  and  the  decay  of  non-magic  number  isotopes  into  magic  number  
isotopes.   Quantitatively,  the  stability  of  magic-number  nuclei  is  the  result  of  a  difference  
between  the  binding  energies  of  isotopes  with  a  magic  number  of  nucleons  and  nuclei  with  one  
additional  proton  or  neutron.   
This  energy  difference  manifests  in  various  observed  decay  and  spectral  emission  
processes.   Lighter  nuclei  with  one  more  nucleon  than  a  magic  number  tend  to  decay  through  
nucleon  emission  and  alpha  decay  (Mayer  and  Jensen  1955,  21).   For  example,  Helium-5  and  
Lithium-5  will  both  α-decay  into  an  α-particle  and  the  additional  neutron  or  proton  respectively.  
Heavier  nuclei  will  instead  tend  to  β-decay  into  more  stable  isotopes.   
Mathematically,  we  represent  these  decay  and  spectral  emission  processes  as  the  result  of  
changes  in  the  energy  of  individual  nucleons.   These  changes  are  in  turn  represented  by  jumps  
between  energy  levels  defined  by  the  interaction  of  the  nucleon  with  the  chromo-electrodynamic  
potential  created  by  the  rest  of  the  nuclear  system.   I.e.,  nucleons  jump  between  energy  levels  
quantized  according  to  figure  3  above.   
This  means  that  the  energy  structure  is  apparently  playing  an  explanatory  role  in  our  
explanations  of  decay  and  spectral  emission  processes.   However,  just  as  with  the  shape  of  the  
nucleus,  the  energy  structure  of  the  nuclear  system  is  only  acting  as  a  means  of  identifying  the  
relevant  processes  in  the  system.   Recall  that  the  goal  of  the  shell  model  is  to  explain  decay  and  
spectral  emission  processes.   It  was  for  this  reason  that  we  constructed  energy  states.   We  first  
intervene  on  the  nuclear  system  by,  e.g.,  bombarding  it  with  light.   This  produces  a  change  in  the  
system,  namely  the  emission  of  line  spectra.   We  then  infer  that  our  intervention  must  have  
produced,  through  a  series  of  dynamics  within  the  system,  this  emission  of  line  spectra.   We  infer  
that  it  is  single  nucleons  that  are  excited  by  this  light,  and  which,  in  losing  this  excitation  energy,  
emit  the  line  spectra  we  observe.   We  know  from  the  frequencies  of  the  line  spectra  the  energy  of  
each  emission,  and  therefore  the  energy  of  each  energy  excitation  in  a  single  nucleon.   We  
therefore  construct  a  collection  of  energy  states  that  can  exhibit  these  energy  excitations,  i.e.,  by  
ensuring  that  the  energy  of  each  possible  excitation  is  equal  to  the  difference  in  energy  between  
two  energy  states.   Importantly,  we  choose  the  mathematical  potential  in  which  we  define  these  
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energy  states.   While  we  know  the  interactions  that  define  this  potential  (chromodynamic,  
electromagnetic,  and  spin  interactions),  we  do  not  know  their  relative  strengths  or  balance  within  
the  nuclear  system.   This  is  something  we  must  do  entirely  based  on  fitting  our  model  to  the  
observed  energies  of  spectral  emission  (and  decay).   
In  short,  the  energy  structure  is  superfluous  to  our  explanations  of  decay  and  spectral  
emission.   Our  interest  is  only  in  the  balance  of  interactions  between  nucleons,  and  the  
interaction  of,  e.g.,  radiation  with  this  balance  that  produces  the  absorption,  excitation,  and  
spectral  emission  processes  we  observe.   I.e.,  not  only  do  we  define  the  energy  structure  of  the  
nuclear  system  in  terms  of  three  interactions  and  their  balance,  we  only  ever  make  use  of  this  
energy  structure  in  our  explanations  as  a  pragmatic  means  of  identifying  the  relevant  and  
explanatory  processes.   
  
  
[6.3.1.3]:   Robust  Processes  in  Formal  Feature  Explanations  
  
  
Manifestly,  both  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  of  the  nucleus  contain  reference  to  
exactly  the  same  processes:   chromodynamic  interaction,  an  attractive  force,  and  electromagnetic  
interaction,  a  repulsive  force.   Thus,  manifestly,  these  two  interactions  are  robust  features  of  the  
models.   If  we  only  reify  these  two  interactions,  i.e.,  the  processes  in  each  model,  the  models  will  
not  be  contradictory.   
Each  model  constructs  its  token,  explanatory  processes  out  of  these  basic  interactions.  
For  example,  in  the  liquid  drop  model,  the  difference  between  surface  and  volume  
chromodynamic  interactions  is  the  result  of  the  difference  in  number  of  nearest-neighbor  
chromodynamic  interactions  that  take  place  at  the  surface  and  within  the  volume  of  the  system.  
This  difference  gives  rise  to  two  sorts  of  aggregate  interaction,  the  surface-attractive  interaction  
and  the  volume-attractive  interaction.   Similarly,  the  field  interactions  for  individual  nucleons  
within  the  shell  model  are  the  result  of  aggregating  all  of  the  chromodynamic  and  
electromagnetic  interactions  of  the  other  nucleons  with  the  one  in  which  we  are  interested.   
Nevertheless,  one  might  still  be  troubled  that  the  two  models  disagree  on  empirical  
results.   Even  if  they  both  refer  to  the  same  processes,  they  cannot  both  be  correct  in  every  
empirical  context.   My  contention,  and  what  I  show  below,  is  that  the  difference  between  the  
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models  rests  on  their  emphasis  on  how  many  and  which  processes  to  consider  relevant,  and  
which  ones  can  be  neglected  in  specific  empirical  instances.   Neither  model  denies  or  contradicts  
the  existence  of  the  neglected  processes.   Quite  the  opposite:  both  models  include  explicit  
reference  to  the  processes  they  are  neglecting.   However,  both  neglect  certain  processes  precisely  
because  they  are  not  always  relevant  to  the  behavior  being  explained  by  the  model.   This  being  
the  case,  I  show  here  that  the  models  do  indeed  become  fully  compatible  precisely  because  
neither  is  interested  in  being  universally  applicable.   
The  key  to  understanding  this  is  that  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  do  not  posit  
processes  in  a  vacuum,  without  context. 158    Rather,  the  processes  of  both  models  only  exist  
insofar  as  they  are  connected  to  specific  interventions  and  dynamic  alterations  of  the  system.  
Thus,  the  processes  posited  by  each  model,  themselves  not  directly  observable  as  is,  e.g.,  the  
emission  of  spectral  lines,  are  contextualized  to  these  interventions  and  dynamic  alterations.   
Let  us  consider  again  the  shape  of  the  nucleus.   My  contention  here  is  that  the  nucleus  
only  has  a  shape  insofar  as  we  interact  with  the  nucleus  in  a  particular  way.   In  performing  
scattering  experiments,  we  discover  that  there  is  a  typical  deflection  pattern  of  our  scattering  
probes.   In  collecting  this  information  through  many  scattering  trials,  we  can  summarize  it  by  
claiming  that  the  nucleus  has  a  contained  charge  density  that  is  responsible  for  the  scattering.  
I.e.,  the  nucleus  has  a  shape.   However,  this  shape  is  no  more  than  a  representation  of  the  many  
individual  deflections  of  scattering  probes,  the  many  interactions  of  the  probe  with  the  nuclear  
system.   These  deflections,  then,  do  not  involve  the  processes  of,  e.g.,  spin  interaction  described  
by  the  shell  model.   Instead,  the  interactions  of  the  nucleons  described  by  the  liquid  drop  model  
are  the  processes  that  are  relevant  to  the  scattering  and  subsequent  deflection  processes.   
The  processes  of  the  liquid  drop  model  therefore  do  not  deny  those  of  the  shell  model.  
Rather,  the  liquid  drop  model  recognizes  that  those  processes  are  not  relevant  to  the  processes  
that  define,  and  in  which  we  determine,  the  shape  of  the  nucleus.   In  the  process  of  fission,  and  
the  processes  of  energy  redistribution  that  make  up  the  intermediate  dynamics  of  fission,  only  
nearest-neighbor  interactions  are  relevant.   Interactions  between  distant  nucleons  still  occur.  
However,  they  are  of  a  size  that  is  negligible  in  the  redistribution  of  energy  within  the  nucleus.  
This  is  because  the  redistribution  of  energy  in  the  nucleus  fundamentally  relies  on  single  
158  See  Jungerman  (2003)  for  a  brief  discussion  of  the  importance  of  interconnectedness  both  in  physical  models  and  
process  ontology.   Process  philosophy,  especially  as  advocated  within  Eastern  philosophical  circles   
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nucleons  translating  their  energy  to  others  directly  (hence  the  term  “collision”  in  Bohr’s  
explanations).   In  contrast,  distant-nucleon  interactions  become  highly  relevant  when  considering  
the  excitation  processes  of  a  single  nucleon.   For  this  reason,  the  shell  model  includes  these  
distant-nucleon  interactions  as  important  features.   Importantly,  the  shell  model  does  not  treat  
these  distant-nucleon  interactions  as  any  different  in  strength  or  variety  from  the  ones  that  the  
liquid  drop  model  neglects.   They  are  the  same  processes  in  both  models.   The  difference  is  that  
the  shell  model  considers  them  relevant  parts  of  the  dynamics  of  decay  and  spectral  emission,  
whereas  the  liquid  drop  model  recognizes  them  as  small  enough  to  neglect  for  the  purposes  of  
mathematical  simplicity. 159    
This,  then,  is  how  we  explain  the  difference  in  empirical  predictions  between  the  two  
models.   The  two  models  have  different  explanatory  aims.   Namely,  they  are  attempting  to  
describe  and  explain  (in  terms  of  specific  processes!)  different  dynamic  phenomena.   This  
difference  in  aim  translates  into  the  incorporation  of  different  processes  as  relevant  aspects  of  the  
intermediate  dynamics  of  the  nuclear  system.   Spectral  emission,  nuclear  decay,  and  fission  
simply  involve  different  sequences  of  dynamics,  just  as  we  learn  about  each  through  different  
interventions  and  different  acts  of  observation.   Nevertheless,  both  models  consider  the  nuclear  
system  to  be  composed  of  electromagnetic  and  chromodynamic  interactions,  and  of  all  the  
multifarious  combinations  of  these  basic  interactions  that  one  could  reasonably  construct.   Thus,  
process  realism  about  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  produces  a  consistent,  monist,  realist  
interpretation  of  the  models.   
This  is  the  explanatory  defeat  of  things.   Notice  that  the  formal  features  of  table  2  are  
exactly  those  features  of  the  nuclear  system  that  the  thing  realist  would  expect  us  to  explain  
using  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models.   These  explanations,  as  I  have  argued,  are  performed  
entirely  in  terms  of  processes:   it  is  the  processes  of  chromodynamic  and  electromagnetic  
interaction  that  explain  the  shape  of  the  nucleus  and  the  internal  energy  structure  of  the  nucleus.  
In  contrast,  the  supposed  material  features  of  the  nucleus  are  those  entities  the  thing  realist  would  
have  us  reify  in  order  to  explain  the  formal  features.   In  short,  the  thing  realist  must  argue  that  
159  Notice  that  as  the  number  of  nucleons  increases,  the  importance  of  the  asymmetry  and  pairing  terms  in  the  
Weizsäcker  equation  becomes  more  important  (see  figure  2,  the  asymmetry  energy).   Something  similar  happens  
with  the  shell-correction  terms  in  this  equation.   Thus,  for  larger  nuclei,  it  becomes  relevant  to  reincorporate  the  
non-nearest-neighbor  interactions  into  the  model  in  order  to  explain  nuclear  shape.   This  is  a  further  indication  that  
the  liquid  drop  model  is  not  contradicting  the  shell  model  in  its  process  terms.   Far  from  it;  the  liquid  drop  model  is  
affirming  the  dynamic  ontology  of  the  shell  model.   
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the  explanations  of  formal  features  of  the  nucleus  (and  more  importantly,  the  dynamics  of  fission  
and  spectral  emission  and  the  like)  require  these  material  features  in  order  to  underlie  the  
processes  that  are  actually  doing  the  explanatory  work.   I.e.,  the  thing  realist  must  offer  an  
underlier  argument  that  processes  require  things  ontologically . 160    
  
  
[6.3.2]:   Material  Features  of  the  Nucleus  
  
  
We  turn  now  to  material  features  of  the  nucleus:   the  composition  of  the  nucleus  in  terms  
of  nucleons.   Prima  facie,  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  of  the  nucleus  agree  on  these  features.  
Both  models,  after  all,  refer  to  nucleons  in  their  explanations  of  nuclear  behaviors.   So,  prima  
facie,  the  thing  realist  seems  to  have  an  available  interpretational  move:   the  nucleus  is  a  system  
composed  of  smaller  things.   While  the  formal  features  of  the  nucleus  are  (collections  of)  
processes,  are  explained  by  processes,  and  are  used  in  the  models  to  explain  processes,  the  
nucleons  may  yet  act  as  some  sort  of  thing-underlier  for  nuclear  processes.   The  contention  is  
both  an  ontological  and  explanatory  claim:  
(Ontic  Underlier  Claim):   Processes  cannot  exist  without  vehicles  to  undergo  them.   For  
example,  a  nuclear  interaction  presupposes  that  there  are  two  things  interacting.   
(Explanatory  Underlier  Claim):   Processes  cannot  explain  without  things.   For  example,  
any  explanation  involving  a  change  in  the  nuclear  system,  like  nuclear  resonance  
oscillations,  requires  that  there  is  a  thing  that  changes  in  order  to  explain  the  
change  itself.   
There  are  three  problems  with  this  move,  discussed  in  turn.   
  
  
[6.3.2.1]:   Nucleons  Qua  Things  Do  No  Explanatory  Work  
  
  
First  we  have  already  seen  that  it  is  the  nuclear  processes  that  are  doing  explanatory  
work.   Therefore,  nucleons  are  only  explanatory  insofar  as  they  participate  in  these  processes:   it  
160  See  Penn  (“Processes  Underlie  Processes”  manuscript)  for  a  categorization  of  such  arguments.   The  first  explicit  
underlier  argument  was  probably  offered  by  Aristotle  in  Physics  1.2,  184b15–16.  
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is  only  the  dynamics  of  nucleons  that  are  explanatory. 161    To  suppose  further  that  these  dynamics  
deserve  their  own  explanations  is  legitimate.   However,  it  is  illegitimate  to  suppose  that  these  
further  explanations  must  involve  things.   The  nucleon,  just  like  the  nucleus,  is  an  experimental  
system  with  features  to  be  explained,  in  particular  a  set  of  dynamics  to  be  explained.   Just  like  
the  explanations  of  nuclear  features  and  behaviors  above,  we  should  suppose  that  the  dynamics  
of  nucleons,  the  behaviors  of  these  nucleon  systems,  will  be  (and  are  in  fact)  explained  by  further 
processes,  not  things. 162    
[6.3.2.2]:   The  Underliers  of  Nucleon  Dynamics  Are  Processes,  Not  Things 
The  thing  realist  must  therefore  rely  on  the  ontological  underlier  claim.   This  leads  us  to  
our  second  problem.   Specifically,  any  argument  that  is  meant  to  support  the  existence  of  a  
thing-nucleon  is  equally  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  a  process-nucleon.   I.e.,  any  argument  
that  there  is  a  thing,  “the  nucleon,”  to  underlie  nuclear  processes  fails,  or  fails  to  rule  out  that  this 
underlier  is  itself  a  process.   This  failure  is  the  result  of  a  general  failure  of  such  arguments:   they 
rest  on  first  recognizing  that  there  is  some  stability  in  a  system,  and  then  claiming  that  this  
stability  entails  the  existence  of  something  static.   For  more,  see  Penn  (“Processes  Underlie  
Processes”  manuscript).   
In  the  particular  case  of  the  nucleon,  we  do  not  need  any  general  failure  of  underlier  
arguments  to  see  that  the  nucleon  is  itself  a  collection  of  further  processes.   Nucleons  are  at  best  
atypical  things.   Our  nuclear  models,  as  well  as  models  of  these  particles  in  field  theory,  already  
suggest  that  these  supposed  things  do  not  possess  characteristics  like  any  thing  we  have  
discussed  so  far.   Nucleons  are  non-local,  non-localizable  entities  in  quantum  field  theory.   They 
appear  as  fluctuations  within  an  infinite  field.   Mathematically,  they  appear  as  creation  and  
161  This  point  is  made  more  thoroughly  in  Penn  (“The  Processes  of  the  Candle  Flame”  manuscript).   
162  I  will  not  discuss  this  further,  since  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work.   However,  notice  that  nucleon  dynamics  
and  formal  properties  were  explained  from  the  beginning  in  terms  of  exchange  interactions.   This  is  the  heart  of  
Heisenberg’s  1932(a,  b,  c)  work  on  the  nucleus  (see  especially  1932a).   While  Heisenberg’s  theoretical  framework  
was  rejected,  the  idea  of  nucleons  being  fluctuations  of  oscillations  in  the  energy  of  an  exchange  force  was  taken  up 
by  Yukawa  (1935)   in  order  to  describe  cosmic  rays,  and  later  reintegrated  into  the  shell  model  of  the  nucleus.  
Moreover,  the  nucleons  are  now  described  field  theoretically  as  the  balanced  and  stable  interaction  of  triplets  of  
quarks,  which  are  in  turn  described  as  fluctuations  in  the  energy  of  a  quark  field.   
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annihilation  operators,  mathematical  entities  that  are  typically  associated  with  actions  performed 
on  and  activities  of  a  system,  not  objects  within  the  system.  
To  see  this,  let  us  take  the  most  basic  feature  of  nucleons  and  see  if  they  bear  thing-realist  
interpretation.   That  is,  consider  the  simple  and  basic  property  that  nucleons  come  in  two  forms:  
protons  and  neutrons.   These  two  things  play  quite  similar  roles  in  both  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  
models  of  the  nucleus.   Both  engage  in  the  same  excitation  processes,  both  engage  in  “collisions” 
that  redistribute  kinetic  energy  throughout  the  nucleus,  both  engage  in  collective  motions  as  in 
fission,  etc.   In  light  of  this,  one  may  argue  that  protons  and  neutrons  are  not  differentiated  by  
their  behaviors  (their  dynamics,  the  processes  they  undergo).   Rather,  one  might  suggest  that  the  
haeccity  of  protons  and  neutrons,  or  at  least  their  “essential”  properties  of  charge,  mass,  and  spin, 
are  the  means  by  which  we  differentiate  them.   I.e.,  the  thing  realist  might  argue  that  neutrons  
and  protons  undergo  the  same  processes  (spin,  excitation,  collision,  etc.),  and  yet  are  different  
entities.   What  differentiates  them,  then,  must  be  non-processual.   Hence,  protons  and  neutrons,  
in  virtue  of  being  identifiably  different,  are  things,  not  processes.   
The  point  is  well  made,  and  is  tempting.   However,  we  cannot  accept  this  line.  Protons  
and  Neutrons  do  not  undergo  the  same  processes.   Undoubtedly,  many  of  the  processes  we  
associate  with  neutrons  in  the  nucleus  are  similar  to  those  processes  of  protons.   However,  we  
also  always  associate  with  protons  an  electromagnetic  interaction  of  a  strength  on  the  order  of  
the  electron  charge  that  we  do  not  associate  with  neutrons.   The  proton  and  the  neutron  undergo  
different  internal  chromodynamics—different  quark  interactions.   In  turn,  these  quarks  undergo  
different  Higgs  interactions  with  different  relative  strengths.   These  different  interaction  strengths 
are  used  as  the  definition  of  the  different  quark  masses,  and  by  extension,  the  different  masses  of  
the  proton  and  neutron.   Protons  and  Neutrons  undergo  different  decay  processes,  even  within  
larger-scale  models  of  the  nucleus  like  the  shell  model.   Neutrons  can  beta  decay  into  a  proton,  
an  electron  antineutrino,  and  an  electron.   Protons,  however,  beta  decay  into  a  neutron,  a  
positron,  and  an  electron  neutrino.   Protons  and  Neutrons  are  therefore  identified  (and  
differentiated)  both  by  different  processes  and  similar  processes  of  different  strengths.   They  are  
therefore  differentiated,  by  definition,  in  mathematical  description,  and  by  experiment,  through  
differences  of  dynamics,  not  by  determinate  properties. 163   
163  Notice  that  the  various  determinate  properties  of  the  nucleons  are  only  defined  in  physical  models  in  a  dynamic 
context.   I.e.,  it  is  an  essential  feature  of  the  quantum  mechanical  paradigm  that  the  “properties  of  a  nucleon”  are  
determinables,  not  determinants,  that  are  determined  through  a  specific  action  on  a  system.   
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This  leads  us  to  our  first  counterclaim  against  the  ontic  underlier  claim:   processes,  not  
things,  underlie  processes.   For  any  nuclear  processes  for  which  the  thing  realist  supposes  that  
we  should  include  a  thing  underlier,  “the  nucleon,”  we  need  only  replace  the  thing  term  with  the  
relevant  process  underlier.   For  example,  the  underliers  of  nucleon-nucleon  interaction  in  the  
liquid  drop  model  are  the  more-stable  quark-quark  interactions  that  define  neutrons  and  protons.  
The  underliers  of  beta  decay  processes  of  the  nucleus  in  the  shell  model  are  the  two  different  beta 
decay  processes  associated  with  independent  neutrons  and  protons.   And  so  on.   Provided  the  
processual  underlier  is  more  stable  than  the  process  it  is  meant  to  underlie,  the  processual  
underlier  is  perfectly  capable  of  acting  as  an  underlier.   Things  are  unnecessary.   
[5.3.2.3]:   Things  Inherit  Incompatibility 
However,  the  situation  for  thing-nucleons  is  far  worse  than  simple  impotence.   In  fact,  if 
nucleons  are  treated  as  things  with  thing-like  properties,  they  will  inevitably  inherit  all  of  the  
incompatibility  of  the  models  in  which  they  appear.   This  means  that,  even  were  we  to  suppose  
that  the  nucleus  is  composed  of  things  (nucleons),  we  would  still  be  left  in  the  position  in  which 
we  began  our  discussion:   with  two  sets  of  incompatible  thing-components  suited  for  successful  
explanations  of  physical  phenomena  in  different  contexts.   
To  see  how  nucleons  inherit  incompatibility  from  nuclear  models,  we  need  look  no  
further  than  the  claims  of  energy  structure  within  the  nucleus.   The  liquid  drop  model  consists  of 
no  internal  energy  structure.   The  shell  model  consists  of  rich  internal  energy  structure.   Now,  
supposing  that  nucleons  are  things  with  static  properties  and  relations  to  other  things,  we  notice  
that  nucleons  in  the  shell  model  must  bear  relations  to  other  nucleons  that  are  not  born  by  the  
nucleons  of  the  liquid  drop  model.   In  particular,  shell-model-nucleons  must  bear  the  relations  
that  compose  the  differences  in  energy  of  the  various  shells.   This  means  that  the  nucleons  of  the 
liquid  drop  model,  which  do  not  bear  these  relations,  are  incompatible  with  the  nucleons  of  the  
shell  model.   This  same  pattern  can  be  demonstrated  for  properties  like  “being  a  surface  
nucleon,”  “having  a  nuclear  energy  state,”  and  other  monadic  properties,  in  addition  to  relations. 
We  might  suppose  that  nucleons  are  not  defined  essentially  in  terms  of  these  incompatible 
relations  or  monadic  properties.   This  at  least  removes  the  incompatibility.   However,  if  nucleons  
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6. . .
are  not  meant  to  be  the  bearers  of  properties  and  the  relata  for  nuclear  relations,  then  surely  they 
are  utterly  impotent  even  within  thing  realism.   Their  only  purpose  is  to  satisfy  some  a  priori  
assumption  that  the  nucleus  is  composed  of  things.   Such  an  assumption  could  hardly  prove  
particularly  informative,  useful,  or  persuasive.   
[6.3.3]:   Reestablishing  Compatibility 
We  can  now  collect  what  we  have  discussed  into  table  4,  similar  to  table  2  showing  the 
incompatibility  of  thing-interpretations  of  the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models,  to  show  that  the  
models  are  compatible  on  a  pure  process  ontology:   
Table  4 :   A  collection  of  the  processes  that  appear  in  both  models.   These  collections  are 
identical,  but  are  used  in  different  ways  to  explain  different  ends.   
Moreover,  we  can  demonstrate  this  compatibility  by  locating  in  both  models  the  
processes  contained  in  the  other.   As  I  have  already  discussed,  the  liquid  drop  model  contains 
explicit  reference  to  shell-interactions  in  the  Weizsäcker  mass-energy  equation  in  the  form  of  
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Model  —> Liquid  Drop Shell 
Explanandum  of  the  model: Fission,  Capturing,  and 
Scattering  Processes  
Excitation/Decay  Processes 
Explanans  offered  by  the 
model:  
Aggregate  motions  of  the  
nucleons,  brought  about  by  
the  nearest-neighbor  
interactions  of  the  nucleons. 
Interaction  of  a  single  
nucleon  with  the  field  of  
aggregated  interactions  
provided  by  all  other  
nucleons  (Shell  Interactions) 
What  processes  compose  the 










shell  correction  terms.   In  the  majority  of  cases,  these  correction  terms  are  unnecessary  to  
include.   Their  effect  on  the  binding  energy  of  the  nucleus,  and  therefore  on  the  aggregate  
motions  of  the  nucleus,  is  miniscule  compared  to  the  effect  of  nearest-neighbor  interactions.  
However,  for  particularly  large  or  small  nuclei  the  shell  correction  terms  become  relevant.   For  
small  nuclei,  this  is  because  the  shell  interactions  are  on  the  same  length  scale  as  the  
nearest-neighbor  interactions.   Nearest-neighbor  interactions  are  therefore  significantly  impacted  
by  the  small  size  and  occupancy  constraints  on  nucleons  in  their  lower  energy  shells.   For  larger  
nuclei,  this  is  because  the  source  of  shell  interactions—the  aggregation  of  all  nucleons  save  one  
into  a  single  Fermi  field—is  strong  enough  to  noticeably  perturb  the  nearest  neighbor  
interactions  that  guide  fission  and  other  aggregate  motions.   Thus,  while  the  liquid  drop  model  
has  little  to  say  about  the  form  that  these  shell  interactions  take,  the  model  still  assumes  that  
these  interactions  are  occurring,  and  includes  them  as  essential  explanatory  features  when  they  
become  relevant  to  the  modeler.   
The  same  can  be  said  of  the  shell  model  and  nearest-neighbor  interactions.   The  shell  
model  is  predicated  on  the  fact  that  all  nucleons  in  the  nucleus  are  affecting  the  nucleon  of  
interest.   The  potential  well  formed  by  the  sum  of  all  of  these  interactions  is  what  defines  the  
decay  and  excitation  processes  for  a  given  nucleon  by  defining  the  available  energy  levels  for  
that  nucleon,  its  shells.   As  these  interactions  change,  the  experimenter  making  use  of  the  shell  
model  will  need  to  alter  the  potential  well  in  order  to  reflect  these  changes.   In  other  words,  the  
potential  well  is  fine-tuned  to  reflect  the  specific  nucleon-nucleon  interactions,  both  
nearest-neighbor  and  other,   so  that  the  experimenter  may  treat  these  individual  interactions  in  
aggregate.   
In  essence,  both  models  refer  directly  to  the  same  processes—chromodynamic  and  
electrodynamic  interactions—in  their  construction.   Their  difference  lies  in  that  they  differently  
aggregate  and  select  the  processes  that  are  relevant  to  their  respective  explanatory  goals.   While  
the  shell  model  does  not  explain  fission,  it  was  never  designed  to  do  so.   Since  the  shell  model  
nowhere  denies  or  contradicts  the  existence  of  those  processes  that  do  explain  fission,  we  avoid  
the  explanatory  problem  of  the  thing  interpretation  of  nuclear  models.   Similarly,  these  models  
are  each  fine-tuned  in  different  ways  by  the  experimenter  in  order  to  reflect  the  specific  
experimental  situation  for  which  they  are  being  used.   The  liquid  drop  model  will  never  be  
fine-tuned  to  better  reflect  the  spectral  emissions  of  excited  nucleons  because  it  was  never  
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intended  to  explain  these  processes.   Again,  nowhere  does  the  liquid  drop  model  deny  or  
contradict  the  processes  that  are  used  in  the  shell  model  to  model  spectral  emission  and  beta  
decay.   In  short,  nowhere  do  the  ontologies  of  these  two  models  differ.   Rather,  it  is  because  this  
single,  processual  ontology  is  used  for  two  different  scientific  explanations  that  we  have  two  




[6.4]:   Conclusion  and  Prospectus  
  
  
We  have  now  seen,  once  more,  that  an  apparent  thing  can  be  redescribed  and  explained  in  
terms  of  processes.   In  the  case  of  the  nucleus,  as  opposed  to  the  cases  of  the  molecule  and  the  
candle  flame,  we  have  also  discovered  that  the  supposed  thing  underliers  of  these  defining  and  
explaining  processes  are  only  things  if  one  stretches  the  definition.   Protons,  neutrons,  and  
electrons  are  all  dubiously  things  at  all.   They  are  non-local  and  non-localizable,  and  they  are  all  
defined  as  fluctuations  in  an  infinite  field.   We  therefore  conclude  that  the  nucleus  is  not  a  thing,  
but  a  collection  of  processes.   We  also  suspect  that  this  collection  of  processes  will  have  no 
thing-underliers.   
We  saw  a  further  benefit  in  the  process  realist  account  of  the  nucleus.   That  is,  the  
explanatory  processes  of  the  nuclear  system  are  robust  and  non-contradictory  across  nuclear  
models.   This  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the  thing  interpretation  of  the  nuclear  models,  which  
produced  irredeemable  contradictions  between  the  models.   The  thing  interpretation  of  the  liquid  
drop  and  shell  models  produced  two  different  nuclei  with  different  and  incompatible  structures,  
properties,  and  even  haeccity.   In  providing  a  non-contradictory  interpretation  of  these  models,  
the  process  realist  once  again  goes  beyond  mere  parity  with  thing  realism.   I.e.,  process  realism  is  
once  again  shown  to  be  superior  in  its  account  of  scientific  models.   
Finally,  we  must  note  that  the  key  difference  between  process  and  thing  ontologies,  in  the  
context  of  models  of  the  nucleus  at  least,  is  that  they  characterize  models  as  explaining  
fundamentally  different  sorts  of  features  of  the  nuclear  system.   The  thing  interpretation  of  the  
liquid  drop  and  shell  models  characterized  these  models  as  offering  explanations  of  static  
properties,  structures,  and  thing-components:   the  shape  of  the  nucleus,  the  magic  numbers,  etc.  
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This  is  evidently  not  the  purpose  of  these  models,  both  historically  and  in  contemporary  uses.  
The  models  are  used  to  explain  behaviors  (i.e.,  processes)  first.   Insofar  as  the  nuclear  system  has  
certain  behaviors  that  we  describe  in  terms  of  these  static  properties—e.g.,  the  way  we  use  the  
shape  of  the  nucleus  to  characterize  the  stages  of  oscillation  within  the  processes  of  
fission—these  static  properties  are  still  useful  tools.   However,  they  are  not  explanatory  and  must  
not  be  reified.   Only  the  behaviors  of  the  system  are  of  interest  to  those  that  use  the  model.   
The  process  interpretation  reorients  our  analysis  to  describe  these  behaviors.   We  interpret  
the  liquid  drop  and  shell  models  as  tools  to  explain  fission  and  excitation/decay  processes,  just  as  
they  were  originally  intended  historically.   In  so  doing,  the  process  interpretation  also  reorients  
our  interpretation  of  these  models  to  match  the  experimental  use  to  which  they  are  put.   These  
models  are  not  meant  to  be  descriptions  of  the  static  being  of  the  world,  but  rather  are  
constructed  to  describe,  at  their  most  basic  level,  specific  experiments.   The  liquid  drop  model  is  
meant  to  describe  fission,  neutron  scattering,  and  neutron  capture  in  neutron  bombardment  
experiments.   The  shell  model  is  meant  to  describe  nucleon  excitation  and  decay  resulting  in  
spectral  emission  and  nuclear  decay  processes  in  decay  and  spectral  line  experiments.  
Experiments  are  dynamic  first  and  foremost.   The  experimenter  acts  on  the  system,  and  observes  
some  change  in  the  system  that  results  from  the  dynamic  sequence  their  intervention  triggers.   It  
is  only  natural,  then,  to  expect  that  models  meant  to  describe  these  experiments  are  about  those  
system  dynamics,  those  processes.   Inference  to  anything  else  is  unwarranted.   
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Summary  and  Prospectus 
While  process  realism  as  I  have  called  it  is  strongly  supported  by  the  necessary  existence  
of  processes  to  ontologically  ground  our  experiences  (observations,  experiments,  etc.),  its  true  
strength  comes  from  the  means  by  which  it  balances  interpretive  strength,  historical  and  practical 
accuracy,  and  epistemic  modesty.   In  making  use  of  process  realism,  we  can  resolve  many  of  the  
problems  in  the  interpretation  of  scientific  theories.   We  also  match  more  closely  the  language  
used  by  working  physicists  throughout  history,  and  make  evident  the  core  practical  challenges  of  
physical-theory  construction.   Finally,  we  gain  all  of  this  with  far  less  epistemic  risk  than  
thing-interpretations  incur,  being  conventionally  known  as  resting  on  a  miracle.   The  process  
realist  needs  only  to  notice  that  we  cannot  physically  observe  or  experiment  at  all  if  there  are  no  
physical  processes  for  us  to  engage  in.   
However,  while  I  have  suggested  throughout  that  process  realism  is  superior  as  an 
interpretive  metaphysics  for  the  practice  and  theory  of  science  in  general,  there  is  still  much  
work  to  be  done.   In  particular,  we  notice  three  key  areas  for  improvement  on  improving  our 
understanding  of  science  in  tandem  with  improvements  to  process  realism.   
First,  while  I  have  suggested  here  that  process  realism  can  co-opt  the  thing-realist’s  
robustness  arguments,  a  full  analysis  of  robustness  within  process  ontological  interpretations  of 
science  should  be  attempted.   This  will  trade  on  the  addition  of  nuance  to  the  idea  of  relative  
levels  of  stability  I  offered  in  chapter  2.   
Second,  process  realism  remains  one  of  the  least  studied  ontologies  historically.   This  is  
especially  evident  when  we  consider  that  many  of  the  historical  proponents  of  process  ontology,  
or  proponents  of  process-adjacent  philosophy,  appear  in  cultures  outside  of  historical  Europe.   I  
have  collected  some  isolated  clusters  here  to  mark  points  where  these  works  could  be  integrated, 
but  a  thorough  analysis  is  needed  to  fully  grasp  the  connections  between  the  development  of  
science  in  Europe,  the  rejection  of  orthodox  Christian  (substance)  ontologies,  and  the  influence  
of  Chinese  and  Japanese  philosophies  in  this  developmental  process.   The  evidence  of  some  
connection  is  overwhelming,  given  the  key  importance  of,  e.g.,  Yukawa  and  Tomanaga  on  the  
190 
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development  of  quantum  field  theory  and  Needham’s  remarks  on  the  social  impacts  of  Chinese  
engineering  and  medicine  on  European  thought  in  the  early  modern  period.   
Finally,  process  realism  faces  a  serious  challenge  in  the  construction  of  spatial  notions.  
Ideas  of  locality  and  non-locality  in  particular  are  somewhat  troubling  for  the  process  realist,  but  
remain  integral  to  much  scientific  work.   Thus,  just  like  the  problem  of  time  and  change  for  
substance/thing  realism,  process  realism  faces  a  problem  of  space.   I  have  suggested  here  that 
stability  can  and  should  be  understood  purely  as  a  relation  between  processes.   This  suggests  a  
way  forward  for  the  process  realist  in  constructing  spatial  notions.   However,  the  full  account  
must  be  left  for  another  work.   
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